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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to empirically investigate the factors which drive the 
demand for and supply of mortgage finance in the United Kingdom. In particular, 
borrowers of long term mortgage funds are especially susceptible to the effects of 
inflation in `tilting' the stream of real repayments towards the initial years of the loan. 
As such, under certain circumstances inflation can be an important cause of mortgage 
default and thus plays a crucial role in the determination of mortgage demand. 
The mechanism through which mortgage default leads to households being possessed 
by their creditors is examined empirically. The results suggest that the ability to 
withdraw equity from the property either by remortgaging or `trading down' is 
important for borrowers who face financial difficulties. In addition, a relaxation of the 
non-interest terms of the mortgage contract is shown to lead to a rise in mortgage 
default, although this does not appear to have dampened the willingness of either 
mortgage borrowers or lenders to transact at high loan to value ratios. 
Understanding the underlying forces which cause repayment problems gives an 
important insight into the specification of both the mortgage demand and supply 
functions. In formulating such models, it is imperative that the dramatic structural 
changes in the market for mortgage finance are accounted for. This is particularly true 
for the supply side, and a formal theoretical model of building society interest rate 
setting is derived in which societies choose the degree to which they are either 
`member-' or `profit-oriented'. Interestingly, the model suggests that up to a point a 
building society may not alter either its mortgage or savings rate if its `preference for 
mutuality' were to change. 
Finally, reduced form cointegrating relationships for the quantity of mortgages traded, 
the mortgage interest rate and the loan to value ratio are estimated. The results are 
used to evaluate the extent of mortgage rationing during the 1970s; this research 
reaffirms the findings of other papers and anecdotal evidence to suggest that 
disequilibrium quantity rationing was substantial prior to 1980. In fact, a regime shift 
in the early 1980s is confirmed by the change in the way mortgage lenders have used 
combinations of the mortgage rate and the loan to value ratio to restrict lending. 
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1.1 OUTLINE OF THE THESIS 
The housing and mortgage markets play a crucial role in the wider economy. Given 
the importance of the housing asset in households' wealth portfolios, cycles in the 
housing market can have a significant influence on the economy as a whole, and 
indeed vice versa. Clearly, then, the mortgage market acting as the facilitator to the 
purchase of property is crucial to the operation of the housing market and other inter- 
related markets. Likewise, given that the majority of UK owner occupiers hold 
mortgage debt, the operation of monetary policy has important implications for the 
affordability of housing through the mortgage market. Structural developments in the 
UK mortgage market which have resulted from legislative changes during the 1980s 
have acted to enhance competitiveness and efficiency among mortgage suppliers, 
which in turn has had implications for the ability of the housing market to support 
more rapid growth, particularly during the second half of the 1980s. However, this 
position became unsustainable during the economic recession of the early 1990s as 
arrears and possessions rose, house prices collapsed and housing turnover (and thus 
also mortgage approvals) slowed; the changes in the mortgage market during the 
1980s played no small role in the housing boom followed by this dramatic decline. 
In recognising the importance of the mortgage market, the objective of this thesis is to 
investigate not only the factors which drive the demand for and supply of mortgage 
funds in the UK, but also to analyse some of the problems faced by the borrowers of 
long term funds; understanding the underlying forces which cause repayment 
problems can give an insight into the specification of both the mortgage demand and 
supply functions. Thus, following an examination of the institutional structure of the 
mortgage market, the first half of the thesis considers the mechanism through which 
mortgage default leads to households being possessed by their creditors; this in turn is 
shown to have implications for house prices. The interaction of general price inflation 
with the type of mortgage design used to fund the house purchase has in the past 
been 
cited as an important factor in causing mortgage default; as such, special attention 
is 
devoted to analysing this problem. 
Armed with this knowledge, the second half of the thesis estimates a model of the 
demand for and supply of mortgage finance across all UK lending institutions. A 
theoretical model of building society mortgage supply is included as a stand-alone 
analysis; however, given the recent trend in building society de-mutualisations, the 
incorporation of its findings into a contemporary econometric model proved too 
problematic (with regard data issues). 
Specifically, the thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 provides a discussion of the 
institutional characteristics of the UK mortgage market, and a number of hypotheses 
are briefly investigated as to the nature of the relationship between the housing and 
mortgage markets and the economy as a whole. It will be seen throughout the thesis 
that it is particularly important to have a good understanding of the evolution of the 
market when it comes to specifying appropriate models of mortgage finance. 
Although the historical context is briefly outlined, attention is focused on the more 
recent developments in the market that have occurred since 1970, and particularly the 
important legislative and ensuing structural changes of the 1980s and 1990s. Most 
notably, the chapter investigates the decline in the dominance of building societies 
over banks in mortgage lending activity, the ending of mortgage rationing following 
increased competitive supply side pressures and the trends in mergers, amalgamations 
and conversions within the mutual sector. 
As a precursor to the estimation of equations determining arrears and possessions and 
mortgage demand and supply later in the thesis, Chapter 3 analyses the `front-loading' 
or `tilt' problem that is generated by the coexistence of general price inflation with 
certain types of mortgage contract (such as the standard level payment mortgage and 
variable rate mortgage, currently the most popular contracts in the UK). It will be 
seen that in such situations, even with a constant real mortgage rate, the intertemporal 
distribution of real mortgage repayments will be skewed towards the initial years of 
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the mortgage term, the size of the skewness depending upon the rate of inflation. The 
principal implication of this repayment tilt is that for a given mortgage size, 
households will face more demanding real repayment schedules during the early years 
of the loan which will raise the probability of default for those households deciding to 
acquire or already holding mortgage debt. A number of alternative mortgage designs 
are then reviewed; the extent to which the repayment tilt remains a problem (and thus 
will be important in the econometric models specified in later chapters) will then be 
dependent on the popularity of the more effective designs. 
In Chapter 4 the mechanics of mortgage default are investigated further, with 
cointegrating and dynamic models of real house prices, arrears and possessions 
proposed by Breedon and Joyce (1993) in a Bank of England working paper being 
examined and re-estimated. The theoretical model of real house prices is derived 
from a household utility maximisation model, whereas arrears are assumed to arise 
when a household's mortgage repayments exceed the sum of disposable income plus 
available unwithdrawn housing equity. Finally, the lender's decision to possess a 
property is shown to depend upon the current house price and the lender's expectation 
of both future house prices and the borrowers ability to repay the loan. The models 
are estimated using an extended data set from that of Breedon and Joyce (capturing 
the upturn, peak and subsequent fall in arrears and possessions, and also the full cycle 
in house prices in the early to mid-1990s) using Park's (1992) canonical cointegrating 
estimator (Breedon and Joyce use Johansen's (1988) procedure). The coefficients of 
the cointegrating and dynamic equations are shown to be reasonably robust to the 
precise functional specification, although some of the long run parameters are found 
to be sensitive to the sample period extension. It will be seen that the short run 
dynamic equations perform particularly well with respect to parameter stability and 
forecast accuracy. 
Attention is directed in Chapter 5 to the development of a theoretical model of 
building society mortgage interest rate setting, in order that the determinants of 
mortgage supply may be more rigorously identified. An important issue in modelling 
building society behaviour is the specification of the objective function; clearly, the 
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assumption of profit maximisation would be inappropriate given building societies' 
mutual status. The first half of the chapter therefore investigates the possible use of 
various objective functions and, following a review of the US credit union literature 
(from which two testable microeconometric models are constructed), it is assumed 
that UK building societies choose their mortgage and savings rates in order to 
maximise a weighted function of member financial benefits and additions to reserves. 
The resultant optimal interest rate functions are shown to depend on the parameters of 
the behavioural equations for mortgage demand and savings supply and also the 
exogenous competing interest rates. A particularly interesting feature of the model is 
that under certain circumstances the interest rate choice will be independent of the 
extent to which the society is oriented towards the maximisation of either profits or 
member benefits (i. e. the degree of `mutuality'). Nevertheless, the model is also 
shown to be consistent with evidence suggesting that conversion from mutual to Plc 
status is associated with higher mortgage rates and lower deposit rates. 
The final two chapters of the thesis are concerned with the specification, estimation 
and testing of a non-stationary macroeconomic model of the demand for and supply of 
mortgage finance. Given the inconsistency of building society lending data following 
the recent trend in de-mutualisation (break adjusted data is not available from 1990 
onwards), the model is estimated across all mortgage lending institutions. However, 
this means that the full specification of building societies' mortgage supply suggested 
by the theoretical model of Chapter 5 cannot be adopted empirically. 
Chapter 6 details the precise specification and construction of the relevant variables 
used in the empirical analysis of Chapter 7. This includes the use of the Box-Jenkins 
(1976) framework to estimate an ARMA model in order that forecasts of expected 
future house prices can be constructed, a component of the real user cost variable in 
the mortgage demand equation. Following the discussion of a number of data issues, 
the series are tested to ensure that each is non-stationary of order 1(1), a necessary 
requirement for cointegration. 
Following a discussion of the difficulties in estimating a cointegrating structural 
demand and supply model of the mortgage market, Chapter 7 presents the results from 
the estimation of the long run cointegrating reduced form relationships for the quantity 
of mortgages traded, the mortgage rate and the loan to value ratio over the period 1984 
to 1995 (during which period the mortgage market was assumed to be in a state of 
competitive equilibrium). The cointegrating reduced form mortgage equation is then 
used to backcast the expected level of mortgages traded from the late 1960s to early 
1980s, a period during which the market was characterised by a regime of 
disequilibrium rationing (i. e. where changes in the terms of the mortgage loan were 
insufficient to clear the market). The model suggests that disequilibrium mortgage 
rationing was substantial throughout the 1970s and estimates of mortgage rationing 
are presented and discussed. The relationship between the estimated coefficients in 
the loan to value and mortgage rate equations are shown to be of particular importance 
in determining how equilibrium rationing has been achieved since then. The short run 
dynamic estimation of the reduced form mortgage equation suggests that the 
adjustment to long run equilibrium is speedy for the period post-1984. 
Finally, Chapter 8 presents the overall summary and conclusions of the thesis 
The remainder of this introductory chapter is devoted to reviewing the recent literature 
on the mortgage market. The preference is to keep the review both specific and 
reasonably short since throughout the thesis a considerable number of other papers are 
discussed in the process of constructing each model and analysing the results. 
1.2 A REVIEW OF THE MORTGAGE MARKET LITERATURE 
Many of the first efforts at modelling the mortgage market came in the form of 
complete housing sector models, of which Smith's (1979) model of the Canadian 
market is particularly characteristic (and is indeed one of the later formulations of the 
complete sectoral approach). Smith estimates a stock-flow model using OLS on 
quarterly data from 1954 to 1965. Three equations are specified to characterise the 
operation of the housing market. First, housing starts are assumed to depend upon 
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house prices, total construction costs and the cost and availability of mortgage 
finance'. Second, the specification of house prices is the result of equilibrium 
between the demand for and supply of housing. Housing demand is assumed to 
depend upon the usual variables (including real permanent income, demography, 
house prices and the cost and availability of finance; see Chapter 7 later in the thesis 
for a discussion) whereas the stock supply of dwellings is a function of its lag and 
lagged terms in housing starts. Finally, the annual change in construction costs2 is 
assumed to be a function of changes in construction sector earnings, the cost of 
financing, land costs and supply bottlenecks (estimated as being generated by above- 
trend capacity utilisation). 
Moving to the mortgage market, Smith continues the analysis by estimating a 
disaggregated model of mortgage approvals across different types of mortgage 
supplier, with the approval process being assumed to be driven by the supply side of 
the market. The interaction of mortgage supply with demand (the latter being 
dependent on the determinants of housing demand plus the cost of mortgage finance 
relative to equity finance) then generates an estimating equation for the mortgage rate. 
The major drawback with this type of model has tended to be that it has been 
characterised by empirically-led functional specifications based on stock and flow 
considerations rather than on any theoretical model. As such, the preferences of 
neither mortgage suppliers nor borrowers are modelled from a formal analysis of their 
optimising behaviour. 
In contrast to Smith, O'Herlihy and Spencer (1972) limit the scope of their analysis to 
the UK building society sector alone and as such are able to undertake a more in-depth 
analysis. The model attempts to estimate the major flow equations for the building 
society sector, being specified as gross receipts and withdrawals of shares and 
' Kearl and Mishkin (1977) also present a model of housing starts dependent upon the availability of 
credit. 
2 It is argued that the equation is specified in terms of the annual change in order to alleviate the 
problem of the variability of the quarterly series. 
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deposits3, new mortgage advances and mortgage repayments, in addition to the rates 
of interest on shares and deposits and mortgages. The system of equations is 
estimated over the period 1955 to 1970 using two-stage least squares. Of particular 
interest is the equation for new mortgage advances, which accounts for the presence of 
non-price rationing in the mortgage market by including two dummy variables which 
indicate the presence of either mild or strict rationing (constructed on the basis of 
anecdotal evidence). The coefficients on the dummy variables are found to be highly 
significant, with the coefficient on the strict rationing dummy being greater than that 
on the mild dummy, as expected. The inclusion of proxies for mortgage rationing in 
the function for new advances allowed its interpretation as a what O'Herlihy and 
Spencer term a `modified demand equation'. However, the treatment of rationing in 
this way, despite being innovative at the time, has been the subject of intense 
criticism. As noted by Hendry and Anderson (1977), the dummies are really 
endogenous and are not an explanation of rationing (although O'Herlihy and Spencer 
do accept this problem in their paper). A further criticism of the construction of the 
dummy variables is that they imply constant magnitude effects of rationing (i. e. they 
do not reflect a continuous degree of rationing, but only `mild' or 'strict' )4. 
These early stock and flow models of the mortgage market eventually were replaced 
by more elaborate optimisation models of mortgage supply. Of this type of model, 
perhaps the most widely used as a theoretical basis for empirical investigation in the 
history of mortgage market literature has been that of Hendry and Anderson (1977), 
more recently revised by Anderson and Hendry (1984). The broad appeal of this 
theoretical model comes from its ability to support a variety of empirical 
specifications; as such, the model deserves special attention here. 
Anderson and Hendry assume that the building society's objective is to choose 
planned mortgage supply and rates of mortgage and deposit interest in order to 
minimise a logarithmic quadratic cost function. Disutility in the cost function is 
3 These are specified individually rather than as a net series, since it is argued that the decision to 
withdraw funds is likely to be made by a different group of individuals than those deciding to invest 
additional funds. 
4 Sharpe (1973) specifies a similar model to that of O'Herlihy and Spencer (in terms of general 
structure) although no account of rationing is made. 
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assumed to be generated by unsatisfied mortgage demand, adjustment costs from 
altering the mortgage and deposit rates and the quantity of mortgages traded, 
deviations of the actual reserve ratio from its desired level, and deviations of the 
mortgage rate from its (unobservable) target rate. These conflicting objectives are 
included to account for the fact that building societies are not driven solely by the 
objective of maximising profits. As we will see later in Chapter 5, the literature on 
credit unions in the US provides some insight into the selection of an objective 
function for UK mutual institutions. 
The cost function is minimised with respect to current and capital account identities 
(the link between the two being that the after-tax surplus generated on the current 
account is added to reserves on the capital account each period) and behavioural 
equations for societies' real demand for shares and deposits and for real personal 
sector mortgage demands. The minimisation provides Anderson and Hendry with a 
basis for the parameterisation of dynamic and static equations for mortgage and 
deposit interest rates and supply-driven mortgage and deposit quantities; the former 
two are the most interesting and are thus considered briefly below. The theory 
suggests that the mortgage interest rate should be a mark-up over the deposit interest 
rate and should also depend on the determinants of mortgage demand; estimation 
using UK building society data over the period 1958 to 1980 confirm that this is 
indeed the case, with the coefficient on the deposit rate in the mortgage rate equation 
being positive at 0.70 and highly significant (with a t-statistic of 14.0). 
The importance of the deposit rate equation cannot be understated since it essentially 
drives the entire model. This, however, is the weak link in Anderson and Hendry's 
empirical analysis. Difficulties in modelling empirically the deposit rate arise mainly 
from the complexity of the theoretical formulation, the existence of the unobservable 
target mortgage rate in the equation and industry-specific characteristics which cannot 
be modelled theoretically or empirically. Nevertheless, the deposit rate was found to 
Static equilibrium solutions are derived by assuming that the reserve ratio, liquid asset ratio and 
mortgage to deposit ratio are constant and that the change in reserves is zero. However, it is the 
minimisation of the cost function discussed in the text which is of interest, since this represents the full 
dynamic model specification in which long run outcomes are not necessarily achieved. As such, one 
may consider the model to be one of disequilibrium. 
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depend positively on competing interest rates and excess mortgage demand, and 
negatively on the liquidity ratio. The deposit rate equation was the only function for 
which parameter constancy was rejected. 
As previously mentioned, a number of studies have made use of Anderson and 
Hendry's framework. Hewitt and Thom (1978), for example, apply the methodology 
of Hendry and Anderson (1977) to model empirically the gross flow of building 
societies' new mortgage advances in Northern Ireland6. The province is assumed 
small enough to allow societies' interest rates and mortgage rationing behaviour to be 
considered as exogenously imposed by their UK counterparts; as such, mortgage 
demand is identified by the inclusion of exogenous terms in the mortgage equation to 
account for the extent of mortgage rationing. Although no dynamic model is 
estimated, results from the static equilibrium model indicate that the elasticities of 
mortgage advances with respect to income and the mortgage rate are lower than those 
reported in Hendry and Anderson. Hewitt and Thom also use the model to calculate 
estimates of excess mortgage demand, finding that in 27 of the 31 quarters up to 1973 
Q4 excess demand was non-negative. 
However, a more rigorous and general approach to the direct estimation of mortgage 
demand is provided by Meen (1990b). A similar cost function to that proposed in 
Anderson and Hendry (1984) is minimised yielding an equivalent dynamic flow 
equation for mortgages; mortgage flow demand forms a component part of this 
equation, and for estimation purposes is assumed to depend upon house prices, the 
after-tax mortgage rate, household income and the previous period's stock of 
outstanding mortgages. The coefficient on the mortgage rate in the mortgage equation 
is around the same level of that reported in Anderson and Hendry (although two 
further lags of the variable are included in Meen's specification). 
Additionally, Meen reports estimates of excess mortgage demand, showing that the 
gap between demand and supply declined from its peak of around 5 per cent in 1967 
to under zero in the early to mid-1980s, following which it rose in the late 1980s as 
6A standard partial adjustment model is used to model shares and deposits. 
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the demand for housing boomed. Meen shows that the quantity of mortgages traded 
during the period 1980-1988 was primarily demand determined, unlike that of the 
period prior to 1980. 
Using a sectoral model of the building society industry, Wilcox (1985) also examines 
the extent to which rationing persisted in the UK mortgage market during the period 
up to the early 1980s. In this Bank of England discussion paper, building societies are 
modelled as choosing their rates of interest on shares and deposits and mortgages and 
the loan to value ratio according to three equations. Each function is, in the long run, 
assumed to be dependent upon the stock of liquid assets, whereas in the short run 
liquid assets are considered a residual term resulting from the selection of interest 
rates and loan to value ratio. Two structural equations of the demand for shares and 
deposits and for mortgages are also specified; the former is assumed to depend on 
competing and own rates of interest following a standard portfolio approach to asset 
allocation, whereas the arguments of the latter result from the household's utility 
maximisation process subject to budget and rationing constraints7. The five equations 
are estimated both in their short run dynamic and long run equilibrium forms. The 
deposit and mortgage equations were both found to be characterised by slow 
adjustment to equilibrium following a change in the exogenous variables. Wilcox 
estimates unrationed mortgage demand by assuming that the highest loan to value 
ratio over the estimation period represented a situation of no rationing. However, this 
methodology is somewhat flawed since any estimates of excess demand over the 
period will always be non-negative. His conclusion that, "although the building 
societies moved towards market clearing in the 1980s there was still some rationing in 
1983" must therefore be interpreted with particular care. A more objective 
methodology for estimating excess mortgage demand is presented in Chapter 7 of this 
thesis. 
More recently, Paisley (1994) develops a one period theoretical model of building 
society mortgage and deposit rate setting, with demand functions for mortgages and 
deposits specified as semi-log linear functions of their respective own interest rates 
7 No theoretical model is presented in the paper. 
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among other variables (equilibrium in each market being demand driven). The 
interesting feature of Paisley's model is that the assumption is made that societies set 
their rates in order to maximise profit, which contrasts with much of the US credit 
union literature (see Chapter 5 for a review) and with other models of the UK building 
society industry, such as Anderson and Hendry (1984)8. Optimisation is subject to 
balance sheet and income restrictions in addition to a constraint specifying liquid 
assets as a function of deposits. The optimal deposit rate is found to depend upon a 
weighted average of the (exogenous) rates on liquid assets and wholesale deposits, in 
addition to the elasticity of deposit demand to the deposit rate; as in Anderson and 
Hendry (1984), the mortgage rate then turns out to be a mark-up over the deposit rate. 
Cointegrating and error correction estimations of the model on post-1984 monthly 
data were found to perform well, passing both predictive failure and stability tests9. 
However, as Paisley notes, the model lacks any consideration of risk and could 
certainly benefit from an extension to more than one period. 
Not all mortgage market models have been developed as the result of the building 
society optimisation process. Smyth and Arora (1989) formulate a straightforward 
(yet appealing) dynamic model of the mortgage market which relies on simple demand 
and supply equilibrium rather than any form of maximisation. Demand and supply 
functions are specified as partial adjustment equations dependent upon the mortgage 
rate of interest and vectors of exogenous variables. The results of interest are obtained 
from the derivation of equilibrium equations for mortgages traded and the mortgage 
rate of interest. In the equilibrium mortgage equation, the vectors of exogenous 
demand and supply variables appear only in current terms; as such, the quantity of 
mortgages traded is found to converge monotonically to equilibrium following a 
demand or supply shock. However, in the equilibrium interest rate solution, the 
vectors appear in their lagged form, which can lead to the interest rate overshooting in 
response to an exogenous shock1°. The model is estimated by Smyth and Arora on 
a However, Paisley shows that the maximisation of societies' profits in her model is equivalent to the 
maximisation of the size of their balance sheet when subject to a minimum capital constraint. 
Lagged changes of the exogenous rates were included in the ECMs in order to account for the delayed 
response of building societies to changes in official rates (see Suddards (1983) for a discussion of the 
insensitivity of building society mortgage rates to market conditions). '° Whether or not the mortgage rate overshoots is shown to depend upon the relative size of the 
adjustment parameters in the demand and supply functions. 
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US data from 1973 to 1983 using a full-information maximum likelihood technique. 
They find the mortgage demand curve to be more inelastic than the supply curve, 
which is shown to lead to a speedy adjustment in the quantity of mortgages traded 
following an exogenous shock to demand or supply. Simulations using the estimated 
equations also confirm the overshooting effect of the mortgage rate of interest. 
Drake and Holmes (1997) estimate a relatively straightforward model of mortgage 
demand and supply incorporating the assumption that building societies face an 
adverse selection problem. High mortgage rates are supposed to `screen out' low-risk 
borrowers leaving mortgage lenders with a larger proportion of higher risk borrowers 
in their asset portfolio. Raising the mortgage rate may then have the effect of 
reducing profits as the probability of (costly) arrears and possessions rises, and a 
backward bending mortgage supply curve results. This is accounted for in the 
mortgage supply function by including not only the mortgage rate (r, ) but also its 
square (r. 2); adverse selection is then confirmed if the coefficient on r,  is positive and 
that on r,  is negative. This is indeed found to be the case when the model is 
estimated on quarterly building society data over the period 1980 to 199211, with the 
turning point being calculated at 11.86 per cent12. The long run demand and supply 
functions for net advances are estimated using Johansen's (1988) methodology on the 
assumption that a combination of the loan to value ratio (as a proxy for non-interest 
rate mortgage terms) and the mortgage interest rate clear the market in each period. It 
is found that the loan to value ratio exerts a greater influence on mortgage demand 
than does the mortgage rate, a result confirmed in other studies including Nellis and 
Thom (1983) and Wilcox (1985). The mortgage rate, however, is by far the most 
important influence in the supply equation. Error correction models are estimated 
using three-stage least squares where it is found that the adjustment to long run 
equilibrium is reasonably slow: only 18 per cent of the adjustment in supply and 16 
per cent in demand occurs during each period. 
One assumes that the mortgage lending data has been break-adjusted to take account of the effect of 
the conversion of the Abbey National building society to bank status in July 1989. 12 Drake and Holmes provide supportive anecdotal evidence for this theory, stating that the large 
increase in arrears and possessions during the early, 1990s followed a sustained rise in the mortgage rate 
above the `optimal' rate of 11.86 per cent. 
12 
There are, however, a number of criticisms of the model. Firstly, the empirical 
specification of the structural equations is based on casual empiricism rather than any 
theoretical model. Secondly, no account is taken of the structural changes 
in the 
mortgage market occurring during the period of estimation. Further criticism of the 
paper appears later in the thesis in Chapter 6. 
Explicit disequilibrium models of the mortgage market have been sparse in the 
literature, although three from the late 1980s are discussed here 
13. Askari (1986) 
specifies a partial adjustment model in which the demand for and supply of mortgage 
approvals are a function of the difference between the current period's 
desired 
mortgage stock and the previous period's actual stock 
14. The disequilibrium nature of 
the model implies that the mortgage rate adjusts too slowly to bring about market 
equilibrium, and as such Askari specifies two alternative processes for mortgage rate 
adjustment. The first allows for the mortgage rate to adjust at different speeds 
depending on whether the market is characterised by excess demand or supply, 
whereas the second assumes the adjustment is symmetricalis. In both cases, the 
quantity of mortgages traded is assumed to be the minimum of demand and supply. 
The model is estimated on Canadian data over the 20 year period to 1976 using 
maximum likelihood and it is found that, according to a likelihood ratio test, both 
disequilibrium specifications perform considerably better than the equilibrium 
version. In the first disequilibrium model, the mortgage rate is found to adjust upward 
more speedily in response to excess demand than downward to excess supply, which 
is understandable if the objective of mortgage lenders is to maximise profits. In all 
models, income elasticity of demand of greater than unity indicates the importance of 
16 income in the mortgage approval process. In addition, higher interest elasticities for 
" Other disequilibrium models of the mortgage market include Smith and Brainard (1982) and Browne 
(1988). 
14 Desired mortgage demand is assumed to depend on the mortgage rate, real personal disposable 
income, the real house price and expected inflation; desired supply is a function of the mortgage rate, 
the return on alternative investments and the total available funds of societies. 
15 The first model is seen as more restrictive since the sample must be separated into excess demand and 
supply regimes prior to estimation. Askari performs this according to directional changes in the 
mortgage rate, finding that the majority of the period was characterised by excess mortgage demand. 
16 Studies that have specifically investigated the significance of income in determining housing demand 
(and thus also mortgage demand) include Goodman and Kawai (1982), Cameron (1986), Goodman 
(1988), Haurin and Gill (1987) and Haurin (1991), the latter two concentrating particularly on the 
effects of income variability. 
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supply than demand possibly underline the availability of more investment 
opportunities for mortgage lenders than borrowing opportunities for house purchasers. 
Based on the second disequilibrium model, it was found that for the majority of the 
sample period the Canadian market was characterised by excess mortgage supply (in 
contrast to the findings of both the simplistic separation undertaken in the first model 
and other models of the Canadian market). 
Hall and Urwin (1989) undertake a similar disequilibrium model of the mortgage 
market to that of Askari (1986) albeit with a number of important changes. As in 
Wilcox (1985), mortgage demand is derived from housing demand which in turn 
results from a standard (but unspecified) household utility optimisation problem. On 
the other hand, the supply of funds to finance mortgage supply is divided into the 
supply of personal sector shares and deposits (which depends on own and competing 
asset returns) and that resulting from "societies' behaviour" (i. e. taking into 
consideration wholesale funding, legal liquid asset ratios and assuming that the loan to 
value ratio is indicative of societies' willingness to lend mortgage funds). Both 
equations include a lagged dependent variable to account for the slow dynamic 
adjustment to equilibrium. The interest rate adjustment equation is specified as the 
change in the ratio of the societies' deposit rate relative to a competing rate and is 
assumed to depend on the extent of excess mortgage demand and a lagged dependent 
variable. The model is estimated over the period 1969 to 1986 explicitly allowing for 
structural breaks caused by changes to the institutional structure of the market. The 
estimated interest rate equation suggests incredibly slow adjustment towards 
equilibrium (confirming the use of a disequilibrium rather than market clearing 
model), although estimates of excess mortgage demand (reaching a maximum of 4 per 
cent of mortgage lending) are less than those reported in Wilcox's paper. All of the 
signs of the coefficients in the long run mortgage demand and supply equations are as 
expected, and parameter stability is tested for and confirmed. However, an 
unreasonably high coefficient on the number of owner occupied houses in the demand 
model is attributed to either insufficient data or the variable picking up a trend in 
mortgage demand. A particularly interesting finding of Hall and Urwin's model is 
that during periods in which banks' mortgage market share rose, rationing fell as 
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societies were forced to become more competitive to retain their position. This 
confirms the anecdotal evidence observed in the mortgage market during these 
periods. 
Finally, Goodwin's (1986) disequilibrium model of the US housing and mortgage 
markets has followed a different approach by allowing for disequilibrium quantity 
rationing17 in either market to spill over into the other. Notional demand and supply 
functions are specified for housing and mortgages which are assumed to be dependent 
upon vectors of exogenous variables and a single lag of the dependent variable. 
Asymmetric spillover effects are then generated through the effective demand and 
supply schedules which are functions not only of their notional counterparts but also 
of terms representing excess demand and supply in the other market18. In order that 
minimum distance estimators (a variant of three-stage least squares) may be used, the 
sample is separated into regimes of excess demand and supply using various pieces of 
information, including the direction of movement of the price terms. The model is 
estimated on US data over the period 1964 to 1980, the results providing strong 
evidence to suggest that excess demand in the mortgage market spills over into the 
housing market. Disequilibrium spillover effects from the housing market to the 
mortgage market, however, were found to be markedly weaker. The model is limited 
in that the choice of the set of exogenous variables is largely ad hoc and it suffers 
from the restrictive requirement of the a priori sample separation. 
It is important to note that whilst a disequilibrium model of the UK mortgage market 
may have been appropriate prior to the early 1980s, this is clearly unlikely to be the 
case in the less restrictive mortgage market which has prevailed since then. 
One may observe that in comparison to mortgage supply, relatively little has been 
written on the demand for mortgage finance since it is usually assumed that it is 
driven by the demand for housing (Jones (1993,1995) calls this the `linkage 
17 By disequilibrium rationing we refer to rationing which is not alleviated by changes in the price 
vector. Chapter 7 considers this phenomenon in greater depth. 
18 Again, it is assumed that the short side of the market dominates (there is voluntary exchange). 
15 
hypothesis')19. As we have seen in the papers reviewed above, few present any formal 
analysis on the demand for mortgage debt. However, given that a surprising 
percentage of homeowners hold no mortgage debt, it cannot be the case that housing 
demand is the sole explanation of mortgage demand. Jan Brueckner has devoted 
considerable time in modelling the demand for mortgage finance; here we briefly 
review his 1994 paper which presents a basic model of mortgage demand. This paper 
is similar to that of Jones (1993,1995), which is considered in more depth in Chapters 
6 and 7 later in the thesis. Essentially, the representative household chooses 
(simultaneously) the value of the house and mortgage loan and the desired level of 
savings in order to maximise lifetime utility (assumed to be a function of current 
consumption of housing and other goods and future wealth) subject to a standard 
intertemporal budget constraint, a restriction on the loan to value ratio and other 
technical constraints. The results of the theoretical optimisation show that when the 
after-tax savings rate (r) exceeds the after-tax mortgage rate (r, ) (as in the US due to 
the tax deductibility of mortgage interest), the household will take on the largest 
allowable mortgage (in other words, the loan to value constraint will bind); otherwise, 
the household could borrow additional mortgage funds to invest at the higher rate, r, 
which would add to both future wealth and utility. On the other hand, when r,  > r, 
optimal mortgage demand varies only according to the household's degree of time 
preference20. The results for the latter case are unchanged when r is allowed to be 
stochastic, but for the former case any level of mortgage becomes possible, consistent 
with anecdotal evidence from the US which suggests that households desire lower 
loan to value ratios than originally predicted in the certainty case21. 
Although Brueckner derives the comparative statics of the certainty model22 and 
suggests a possible methodology for estimation, it has been left for future studies to 
undertake the relevant empirical analysis. It will be seen later in the thesis (Chapters 6 
19 As part of his utility maximising model of mortgage demand, Jones (1993,1994,1995) discusses 
extensively how the demand for mortgage finance may be dependent upon households' demand for 
certain non-housing assets, and presents evidence supportive of this conjecture. 
20 Nevertheless, it is shown that in this case, when savings are greater than zero mortgage demand must 
be zero. 
21 The results for neither case are altered by allowing randomness in either prices or incomes. 22 It is found that mortgage demand depends non-negatively on the value of the house and future income 
and non-positively on the household's initial wealth and the discount rate of interest. 
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and 7) that in a macroeconomic setting there are identification problems in estimating 
mortgage demand (due in part to the problem of rationing). However, a number of 
studies have estimated mortgage demand in a microeconometric framework. Follain 
and Dunsky (1996), for example, base their microeconometric study of mortgage 
demand on the theoretical results derived by both Brueckner (1994) and Jones (1993, 
1995)23. In their paper, two models are estimated using the 1983 and 1989 (US) 
Surveys of Consumer Finances (SCF). Firstly, a reduced form model of mortgage 
demand is estimated using a tobit estimator to account for the censored nature of the 
dependent variable24 (mortgage demand for some households will be zero), the 
specification including both the difference between the mortgage rate and (a) the after- 
tax return on savings (reflecting the cost of mortgage funds relative to owner equity) 
and (b) the after-tax rate on consumer credit25. Estimates of the parameter on the first 
relative cost term were, as expected, negative and highly significant for both SCF 
samples, and the coefficient on income was significantly positive. 
Secondly, a structural model was also estimated in which mortgage demand was 
assumed to depend (in part) upon housing demand, which in turn was specified 
separately. Using a simultaneous tobit estimator26, the coefficients on the cost 
difference terms were again correctly signed and significant (yet smaller than their 
reduced form counterparts)27, as were those on after-tax income. The marginal effects 
for the reduced form model were computed for a variety of subsamples (based on 
income levels and credit constraints), with the elasticity of demand for mortgage debt 
with respect to the rate of mortgage interest relief being high at -1.5 for 1983 and -3.5 
for 1989, and larger for higher income groups. The results led Follain and Dunsky to 
conclude that any reduction in mortgage interest relief would have a considerable 
impact on the demand for mortgage finance (and possibly housing). 
23 Although Follain and Dunsky allow for further uncertainty in the future utility function, their final 
specification of lifetime utility is kept relatively simple given the complexities involved in the 
optimisation procedure. 
2 Ham and Melnik (1987) undertake a microeconometric study of the demand for US commercial loans 
using a similar modelling strategy. 
25 In addition, a considerable number of household specific variables were included in the estimations. 
26 The use of this estimator was confirmed by the rejection of tests for the exogeneity of housing 
demand. 
27 The authors suggest that this implies the reduced form coefficient captures a substitution away from 
debt towards equity and a reduction in housing demand following a rise in the cost of debt. 
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As a brief summary to this section, the literature on the mortgage market has evolved 
from relatively simple stock-flow type models, typically estimated by OLS or two 
stage least squares, into elaborate supply and demand specifications based not on 
casual empiricism but rather on formal optimisation models of the decisions made by 
participants in the market. In addition, with the advent of cointegrated time series 
modelling techniques during the 1980s, the estimation and testing of such long run 
specifications has become more rigorous. Models of this type will be investigated, 




The Changing Nature of the Mortgage Market in the United 
Kingdom 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Any study of building societies and the mortgage market as a whole would be 
incomplete without addressing the way in which the market operates and how the 
market has changed, particularly over the past two decades. It will be seen later in 
Chapter 5 that the changing role played by building societies in the provision of 
mortgage finance must be taken into consideration when constructing a theoretical 
model of societies' interest rate setting. In addition, increased competition in the 
mortgage market, particularly over the last 20 years, has important implications for the 
empirical modelling of mortgage demand and supply as we will see in Chapter 7. 
This chapter provides a qualitative discussion and analysis of the nature of the UK 
mortgage market, focusing particularly on the changes that have taken place over the 
past 20 years. Section 2.2 begins by outlining the way in which the housing and 
mortgage markets interact with the economy as a whole and considers a variety of 
alternative viewpoints on the issue. The first subsection of Section 2.3 examines 
briefly the historical evolution of UK mortgage lending institutions in order to provide 
the background to the second subsection which investigates in detail the developments 
within the market since 1970. Section 2.4 then considers in more depth the current 
regulatory environment in which mortgage lenders (and in particular building 
societies) operate, following which Section 2.5 outlines the recent trend in mergers, 
acquisitions and conversions from mutual to Plc (bank) status in the building society 
industry. Finally, Section 2.6 concludes by summarising the salient points of the 
chapter. 
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2.2 THE IMPORTANCE OF MORTGAGE FINANCE IN THE WIDER 
ECONOMY 
It is argued that the housing and mortgage markets play a crucial role 
in the wider 
economy. House building accounts for a significant portion of GDP and thus a 
boom 
in the housing market is often associated with a boom in the economy as a whole. An 
alternative viewpoint expressed has been that construction is a counter-cyclical 
demand management tool of the government, used to flatten cyclical swings. 
However, it is the former pro-cyclical view on the interaction of the housing market 
with the wider economy that has been most prominent over the past two decades 
(see 
Harnnett (1994), for example). If this is true, then the recent spate of deregulation in 
the mortgage finance industry will have had dramatic economy-wide effects. The 
housing market growth in the late 1980s, for example, played a crucial role in the 
overall economic boom between 1985 and 1989. Nevertheless, it is important to note 
that although the provision of mortgage finance to fund such housing market 
transactions was instrumental to the housing boom of the late 1980s, the ease of 
attaining such finance should not be seen as a direct cause of house price inflation. 
Rather, it was the combination of declining interest rates and regulatory reform in the 
latter half of the 1980s that served to promote competition within the housing finance 
industry, fuelling the boom in housing and asset prices. 
In its simplest form, a strong housing market will stimulate demand for consumer 
durables and induce other housing related expenditure, having multiplier effects 
throughout the whole economy. The general mechanism by which housing is pro- 
cyclical is that as house prices rise, so does consumer spending (an important 
component of aggregate spending) since consumption depends upon personal wealth 
of which housing is a large component. In the two and a half years from the first 
quarter of 1987, nominal house prices grew by almost 70 per cent to reach a peak in 
the third quarter of 1989' (source : Housing and Construction Statistics Part 2). In 
stimulating consumption, increases in the value of housing through house price rises 
encouraged savings to fall, with the seasonally adjusted savings ratio falling to an 
Nominal house prices then proceeded to fall in the subsequent recession by 12 per cent bottoming out 
in the second quarter of 1993. 
E 
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almost 30 year low at 4.9 per cent of disposable income during the peak of the boom 
in the third quarter of 1988, and rising to almost 13.5 per cent during the depth of 
recession in the third quarter of 1992 (see Figure 2.10 later in the chapter). In 
addition, the upswing in property prices led to the withdrawal of equity from the 
housing market as some households moved to a property of lower value or borrowed 
against unwithdrawn equity (Holmans (1990) notes that the latter has gained in 
importance at the expense of the former during the 1980s as consumers have re- 
mortgaged their houses to benefit from cheaper loans). Carruth and Henley (1990) 
have estimated the effect of housing market activity on aggregate consumption and 
saving, finding that the boom in spending and the fall in the savings ratio were 
stimulated by the potential to withdraw significant amounts of equity from housing. 
Their study estimates that equity withdrawal may have added up to 4 per cent to 
consumer spending in 1988. 
The argument of the previous paragraph can help explain how the slump in the 
housing market helped to cause the recession of the early 1990s. As households 
strived to repay their debt with the onset of recession and new mortgage lending came 
to a standstill, the ratio of mortgage debt to personal disposable income (which had 
been increasing steadily over the whole of the 1980s) stabilised at around 3 at the end 
of 1990 (see Figure 2.1 below). This in part was a result of the fact that base rates had 
reached 15 per cent in 1990, although mortgage rates were held at a lower level to 
limit the effect of the high interest rates on mortgagors and also to maintain market 
share. Given that this strategy required that interest rates paid on deposits also had to 
be kept low (to maintain interest margins), both retail deposit inflows and mortgage 
supply were subdued. 
The above pro-cyclical argument that the slump in the housing market helped cause 
the wider economic recession is rejected by the Council of Mortgage Lenders (CML), 
who argue that mortgage borrowing for consumption reasons has been encouraged 
through channels other than simply through housing equity withdrawal. These include 
2 The savings ratio is also determined by the level of government welfare provision; a lower level of 
government welfare will encourage households to save more. For example, Japan has a very low level 
of welfare provision and also a very high savings ratio. 
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the relatively lax monetary policy of the latter half of the 1980s (base rates fell to 8.17 
per cent in the second quarter of 1988, their lowest level since the first quarter of 
1978) rapid real income growth, the income tax reductions of the 1988 budget and 
financial deregulation (which served to make all types of borrowing easier). It is 
argued by the CML that there exists no causal evidence for the increase in housing 
wealth being responsible for the consumer boom of the late 1980s. However, 
Hamnett (1994) perhaps more accurately writes that, "while there is undoubtedly a 
causal link between the housing market and consumer spending, it is not the only one, 
nor necessarily the most important". Nevertheless, the slump in the home ownership 
market during the early 1990s undoubtedly compounded the economic recession. 








Source : Financial Statistics 
According to the deregulation view, financial market deregulation encouraged greater 
competition in the mortgage market as new entrants and existing suppliers competed 
vigorously to accumulate or maintain their market share. In doing so, lenders offered 
higher loan to value and loan to income ratios, placing less emphasis on the 
borrower's ability to repay the mortgage loan. As house prices began to fall in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, the number of mortgages with negative equity rose 
dramatically, being followed by considerable increases in the number of possessions 
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(see Chapter 4 for a theoretical and empirical analysis of arrears and possessions in the 
housing market). 
The boom in housing and consumption came to an end in 1989 and the economy 
moved towards recession as a result of the combination of rising inflation in retail 
prices and a tightening of monetary policy (the government's commitment to 
regulatory reform in the financial services industry left a rise in interest rates as the 
only option to control personal sector spending and borrowing3), the policy being 
designed to cut back consumer spending and regulate wage and price inflation. In the 
recession which followed the rise in real housing wealth and mortgage debt during the 
heady 1980s, individuals were encouraged to build up their savings and reduce their 
levels of debt and consumption. This cycle was similar to the `Barber Boom' between 
1971 and 1973, during which time average house prices more than doubled; in late 
1973, monetary policy was tightened followed by a contraction in the overheated 
housing market with prices and turnover remaining depressed for some considerable 
time afterwards. 
Government policies have appeared to have been of considerable importance in 
influencing turnover in the housing market. In fact, as Meltzer (1974) notes, "much 
`housing policy' in the US and in Western Europe is `mortgage policy"', the purpose 
of which being, "to encourage the production of housing by increasing the 
`availability' of mortgage credit". However, it is argued by Meltzer that there is no 
evidence to suggest that the form of credit provision affects the composition of 
spending, as it is suggested that the borrower will substitute one type of credit for 
another rather than one type of asset for another. 
3 The London clearing banks base rates rose from 8.17 per cent in the second quarter of 1988 to 15 per cent by the first quarter of 1990 (albeit temporarily), an increase of more than 650 basis points within only 7 quarters. 
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2.3 THE UK MORTGAGE MARKET 
2.3.1 A Brief Historical Overview of the Building Society Movement 
Building societies and other friendly societies were originally established in the latter 
half of the eighteenth century as mutual funds, whose specific purpose it was to 
finance the housing of fund members. Boleat (1986) points out that such societies 
grew as a result of the prevailing economic trends and social behaviour, most notably 
the industrial revolution (as urban immigrants left their rural communities), greater 
financial sophistication and an increasing appreciation of the Victorian values of thrift 
self help. 
The first building society was established in the Golden Cross Inn in Birmingham in 
1775 by Richard Ketley, and by the end of the eighteenth century, the number of 
societies in the movement had reached between 20 and 50, located mainly in the 
Midlands, Lancashire and Yorkshire4 (and, since the Napoleonic Wars, throughout the 
rest of the country). All of these original institutions were `true' building societies, 
known as terminating societies. They existed to provide each member (and no one 
else) with a house financed from the mutual fund. Their membership at this time was 
composed in the main of skilled workers, and for any building society typically 
numbered less than 20. Each member would contribute a regular subscription (usually 
fortnightly or monthly) to the fund of the society, and construction would begin once 
sufficient funds had been raised5. The order of allocation of housing to members 
would either be drawn by lots (in which case the right was sometimes sold on) or 
auctioned to the highest bidder. Whichever way, all members continued to pay 
subscriptions until each member had been housed, at which point the society 
`terminated'. Around 250 terminating building societies had been established by 
1825. 
Despite recent changes in the building society movement over the past two decades, it is interesting to 
note that for the majority of societies their headquarters have remained in these regions. 3 Each individual held what was known as a `share' in the society. These funds were then either distributed directly to the members or used to buy houses which where then allocated to the members. 
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A dramatic increase in building society size and membership during the nineteenth 
century encouraged terminating societies to evolve into what became 
known as 
permanent societies, the first being established in 1845. To speed up the provision of 
housing finance, permanent building societies accepted deposits (as opposed to 
shares) from investors who wished to save but not to purchase a house; similarly, the 
society then had to charge interest to its borrowing members6. By the mid-1800s, 
deposits had become extremely popular. As such, societies were transformed into 
more flexible financial intermediaries, allowing their activities to continue beyond the 
time at which their original members had all been housed. Nevertheless, societies 
retained their objectives of providing housing finance and remained mutual, being run 
for the benefit of their members and not to maximise profit (any operating surpluses 
were added to the society's reserves from which occasional bonus distributions were 
made). An important characteristic of these financial mutuals was that their members 
could not sell their claims to any operating surplus in a secondary market?. 
The rapid growth of the building society movement during the early part of the 
nineteenth century led to the adoption of legislation which specifically targeted 
societies. The first legal recognition of societies came in the form of the Regulation 
of Benefit Building Societies Act in 1836, which exempted societies from certain 
stamp duties and established a `certifying barrister' (later known as the `Chief 
Registrar of Friendly Societies') to formulate the rules of operation and to give advice. 
During the 1850s and 1860s, however, the government began to question building 
societies' exemption from stamp duty. The failure of societies to act as a single 
movement in lobbying the government over this matter prompted the establishment in 
1869 of the Building Societies Gazette, a body set up primarily to promote the 
interests of the building society industry in the hope of influencing government policy. 
6 Unlike in terminating societies, borrowing and saving members of permanent institutions were no 
longer one and the same. Investors were permitted to join at any time without having to make back 
payments and could withdraw their money on demand, whereas borrowers received a loan to be repaid 
with interest over a pre-specified duration. 
This remains true today. It is also useful to note that the major difference between building societies 
in the UK and savings and loans (S&Ls) institutions in the US is that where the former can only take the 
form of mutuality, S&Ls can either be mutual or of stock ownership. In addition, where building 
societies operate on a `one-member one-vote' principle, S&L members receive one vote per $100 
6' invested (up to a maximum of 50 votes). 
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Additionally, in the same year, the Building Societies Protection Association was 
founded (the predecessor of the Building Societies Association), another group whose 
purpose it was to represent the views of mortgage financiers. 
Following two years of deliberation, in 1872 the findings of a Royal Commission on 
Friendly Societies were reported, which included a new role for the Chief Registrar 
and the recommendation that additional powers be made available to societies. The 
Report resulted in the passing of the first comprehensive Building Societies Act in 
1874, the main provisions of which were to authorise permanent societies to accept 
deposits up to a total of two thirds of the sum secured by mortgages (or up to 12 
months' share subscriptions for terminating societies, whichever was the most 
beneficial to the society), to grant them corporate status (limited liability) and to 
restrict the investment of surplus funds only to mortgages or government guaranteed 
securities (preventing societies from owning other companies, land or buildings other 
than their own premises to conduct society business). The proposals of the Royal 
Commission regarding the strengthened powers of the Chief Registrar were also 
adopted by the Act. 
However, the effectiveness of this early building regulatory legislation was restricted 
by the frailty of the economic environment at the time. The last 25 years of the 
nineteenth century was a tumultuous period for all financial institutions, with building 
societies being no exception. Given the economic depression and falling house prices, 
mortgage financing of property became more risky (the situation was remarkably 
similar to that of the late 1980s/early 1990s). A number of societies failed as a result 
of distressed lending and fraudulent activities; in early 1892, the Portsea Island 
Building Society collapsed (due to the embezzlement of funds which resulted from 
inadequate supervision) followed later in the year by the failure of the Liberator 
Building Society (then the country's largest building society) as a result of its 
speculative investment of funds (with insufficient mortgage demand to absorb higher 
deposit inflows at the time, societies' investments had become increasingly risky). A 
new Act in 1894, designed to regain public confidence in the industry, further 
strengthened the powers of the Chief Registrar by allowing more active intervention 
S 
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and required societies to disclose their full accounts and conduct more 
in-depth audits. 
What were considered to be risky transactions, such as the provision of mortgage 
finance for a property already mortgaged by another party and the random balloting 
for mortgages, were also outlawed for new societies8. The events of the 
last decade of 
the nineteenth century not only encouraged further legislation to be enacted 
but also 
fostered a new culture of prudence amongst societies and a subsequent 
increase in 
their liquidity ratios9. 
Despite the collapse of the Birkbeck Building Society in 1911 (again the country's 
largest society at the time) due to managerial failures and a slump in the price of its 
stock of gilt holdings, confidence in the building society movement was slowly 
nurtured back to health during the early years of the twentieth century. The inter-war 
period was a period of strong growth in the industry, interrupted only by the great 
depression of the 1930s. Growth was boosted by rising real income, low house prices 
(ironically as a result of the depression), low interest rates and strict rent controls, all 
of which discouraged the building of housing for rent and stimulated the demand for 
owner occupation. The resulting increased demand for mortgages was easily 
accommodated, as a combination of rising real income and a higher savings ratio 
encouraged significant retail inflows. Permanent and large localised societies enjoyed 
the most significant growth as they looked to gain market share outside of their 
traditional locations10. With permanent societies gaining at the expense of terminating 
societies, the industry naturally became more concentrated and the number of societies 
fell from its peak of 3642 in 1895 to only 960 at the end of 1939 (source : Boleat 
(1986)). Whereas terminating societies represented over 50 per cent of all societies at 
the turn of the twentieth century, by 1932 there were only 16 per cent remaining. In 
Prior to the 1894 Act, there existed what were termed Starr-Bowkett Societies, which were 
terminating societies providing interest free advances to members. When the society had accumulated a 
specific sum, this was allotted by ballot to one of the members who was required to repay it by 
instalments over an agreed term while maintaining his share subscriptions. The new owner of the 
property could in fact then sell it at a profit which, according to Bellman (1927) was, "a prolific source 
of discontent amongst other members who were unsuccessful in the ballot". This was eventually 
abandoned by many societies through the requirement that all profits made on the sale of the property 
be paid into the common fund of the society (a scheme known as `alternate ballot and sale'). 
9 By 1918, societies' liquid assets represented around 20 per cent of their total assets. 
10 The fact that the majority of societies at this point in time were based in the North meant that there 
was excess mortgage supply in the North and excess demand in the South. This led to the wider 
geographic spread of societies throughout the country during the inter-war period. 
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1° The fact that the majority of societies at this point in time were based in the North meant that there 
was excess mortgage supply in the North and excess demand in the South. This led to the wider 
geographic spread of societies throughout the country during the inter-war period. 
fact no terminating society has been established since 1953, and the last one was 
wound up in 1980. Nevertheless, the take-over of small societies by larger mutual 
institutions did play an important part in the consolidation of the industryl1. 
The interwar years, despite being a period of considerable growth in the building 
society industry, did pose a number of challenges. Competition for mortgage business 
was intense given the low risk and high profitability; attempts to introduce a code of 
operating ethics to govern the increasingly aggressive business of mortgage lending 
divided the Building Societies Association into two separate bodies. Another problem 
was that of `builders' pools', which came to a head with the 1938 `Borders case', 
generating unfavourable publicity for societies and culminating in the Building 
Societies Act of 1939. Builders keen to sell houses deposited an amount of money 
with a society equivalent to the excess of the loan above the society's desired loan to 
value ratio (usually around 15 per cent of their value) on which the society could draw 
under circumstances of borrower default. This allowed societies to lend more than the 
average 75 per cent loan to value ratio by accepting this form of security from the 
builders. However, as poorer quality housing was constructed for sale to lower 
income households during the 1930s, societies found themselves lending mortgage 
funds on the basis of unsatisfactory security; with the borrower's equity in the 
property being small, problems arose when mortgage repayments could not be met 
and the value of the house no longer covered the amount of the mortgage outstanding. 
This led to the case of Mrs Elsie Borders who won her case against the Bradford 3rd 
Equitable building society, alleging it had lent money for the purchase of a property of 
unacceptably low quality. As a result of the case, the 1939 Act legislated to define in 
detail the characteristics of a property deemed acceptable as security on the loan, 
ending the operation of the builders' pool and leading to the re-unification of the 
Building Societies Association in 1940. 
Mortgage demand subsided in the immediate post-war years as the new Labour 
government focused its housing policy on building rentable accommodation. This led 
societies to allow their liquid asset ratios to soar, peaking at 29 per cent (source 
Mergers are discussed more fully later in the chapter with regard to the provisions of the 1986 and 1997 Building Society Acts. 
Ae 
Phillips (1983)). However, the housing market regained buoyancy as the policies of 
the new 1951 Conservative government (which had the effect of lowering the relative 
cost of owner occupation and encouraged the expansion of building societies) and 
loose monetary policy led to a rapid increase in owner-occupier property construction. 
As such, the volume of mortgage lending recovered during the 1950s and liquidity 
ratios were restored. 
The importance of building societies in the provision of housing finance was 
recognised by the House Purchase and Housing Act of 1959, under which the 
government lent the societies £100 million (£1.2bn at 1996 prices) for mortgage 
lending to purchasers of pre-1919 houses. The only event to mar the expansion in the 
market was the collapse of the State Building Society in 1959, following substantial 
unsecuritised lending to a property company which used the monies to leverage a 
series of take-over bids. The extent of prudential supervision in the mortgage market 
was closely scrutinised, not only as a result of this collapse but also due to the 
liquidity crisis experienced by Scottish Amicable, then one of the country's largest 
mortgage lenders. 
These events led to the passing of a new Building Societies Act in 1960, which 
authorised the Chief Registrar to require societies to hold certain liquid assets in order 
that cash flow considerations should not be compromised. In addition, societies were 
limited in their ability to undertake corporate loans, being required to make at least 90 
per cent of advances on owner occupied housing. This Act, which was essentially 
designed to curb the activities of suspect societies, and all previous legislation was 
consolidated in the Building Societies Act of 1962. In addition, the 1962 Act set out 
the rules under which societies were authorised to take part in intra-sector mergers and 
acquisitions. Two types of merger were defined: transfers of engagements (akin to 
acquisitions in the publicly owned sector, usually where a smaller society is acquired 
by larger society) and unions (or mergers in the publicly owned sector, where the 
parties are of equivalent size12). 
1Z Unions have since been renamed 'mergers and amalgamations' by the 1986 Building Societies Act. The collective terms as defined here are used interchangeably throughout the thesis. 
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Consolidation in the building society industry continued throughout the 1960s and 
1970s; as the number of building societies dwindled, the importance of the industry 
rose considerably (society assets rose by more than threefold during the 1960s alone) 
as owner occupation became increasingly popular (again aided by government policy). 
Deposit accounts lost out to share accounts due to the higher rates of interest offered 
on the latter. However, it was the rate of interest charged on mortgages that became 
the primary political focus of the 1960s, and in 1966 building societies' interest rate 
setting procedure was referred to the Prices and Incomes Board. The main 
recommendation of the Board, however, did not address the level of mortgage interest 
rates; rather, the Board suggested that the Building Societies Association establish a 
committee to advise on reserve and liquidity requirements. The result of this was the 
establishment of a minimum reserve ratio which declined as total assets of the society 
increased (i. e. smaller societies were required to keep relatively higher levels of 
reserves than larger societies), despite the existence of a constant minimum liquidity 
ratio across all societies. 
The political pressure on building societies was heightened further during the 1970s as 
the government laid the blame on the industry for the rapid rise in house prices during 
the early part of the decade 13. During the 1970s building society business boomed, as 
reflected in the increase in the total number of branches from 2000 to 5700 over the 
decade, and share accounts from 10 million to 30 million over the same period 
(source : Phillips (1983)). A possible reason for the boom in mortgage business could 
have been the substantial fall in the real mortgage rate during the latter half of the 
decade as nominal rates failed to keep up with spiralling inflation. 
From this brief history of the building society movement, it is clear that the evolution 
and development of mortgage lending institutions since the eighteenth century has 
been shaped not only by the requirements of their owner occupier customers but also 
by the nature of the regulatory legislation which in turn has often been enacted in 
response to financial crises in the industry. We will see in the following subsection 
and in Section 2.4 how the regulation of the mortgage market has affected the 
13 Building society relations with the government were improved substantially, however, after the 
establishment of the Joint Advisory Committee in 1973. 
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continued expansion of building societies' business and indeed mortgage provision in 
general during the 1980s and 1990s, encouraging the demise of mutual institutions 
and the emergence of new and larger publicly owned financial conglomerates. 
2.3.2 A General Synopsis of the Mortgage Market Since 1970 
Over the last twenty five years there has been a dramatic change in the behaviour of 
UK building societies. The range and scope of services offered by societies has 
increased to the point that they are now very close substitutes for the clearing banks in 
many areas. In fact it has been during the 1980s and 1990s in which the most 
profound changes have occurred with intensification of competition in both the 
mortgage and deposit markets. The increase in importance of building society 
activities was recognised by the Bank of England through the creation in May 1987 of 
a new monetary aggregate (M4) which included private sector holdings of building 
society shares and deposits. In June 1988 the stock of £M3 was £202bn and the stock 
of M4 £329bn (source : Hall and Urwin (1989)), almost all of the difference of 
£127bn being accounted for by building societies. However, since 1989 the change 
within the mortgage finance industry has manifested itself in the de-mutualisation of a 
significant proportion (in terms of the value of mortgage lending) of building 
societies. This development is discussed later in the chapter in Section 2.4 and more 
specifically in Section 2.5. 
The growth in real mortgage lending strengthened substantially in the 1980s compared 
with both of the previous two decades (see Figure 2.2 below), this period of growth 
coinciding with major changes in the institutional structure of the UK mortgage 
market. Such changes were quite unprecedented and amounted to a relaxation of the 
constraints under which all participants in the mortgage market operated. 
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During the 1970s, the mortgage market was essentially dominated by building 
societies which were virtually the only source of mortgage supply. They accounted 
for an average of 78 per cent of the stock of mortgage lending during the 1970s, and in 
the second quarter of 1979 (when the proportion of mortgage lending undertaken by 
building societies was at its height) the share of mortgages was 82.3 per cent for 
building societies, 7.6 per cent for local authorities, 4.7 per cent for banks, 3.9 per cent 
for insurance companies and pension funds, 1.3 per cent for central government and 
0.2 per cent for public corporations (source : Financial Statistics). At this time (and 
prior to the 1986 Building Societies Act) regulation of building societies was based on 
the 1962 Building Societies Act (see Section 2.3.1 above for a discussion). Because 
this represented a consolidation of all previous regulation, the Act was essentially 
based on-obsolete nineteenth century legislation and practices. As we have seen, the 
main provision of the Act was to restrict building societies to use retail funds to 
finance personal property loans, with their remaining investments being either specific 
fixed or liquid assets. This proved to be of little consequence to societies during the 
1970s and before as a result of their monopolisation of mortgage lending and the lack 
14 The exaggerated peaks in both Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3 in 1989 were caused by the conversion of 
Abbey National from being a building society to a bank. 
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of competition in the market for long maturity retail deposits". In fact, despite the 
current intensity of competition between building societies and banks, the market for 
savings remains fragmented to a certain degree, as societies still concentrate on larger 
and longer term deposits. The way in which this segmentation is achieved is 
discussed by Smith (1996c) who writes that, "any financial organisation in retail 
savings can feature in `best buy' tables by launching a particularly competitive 
product while continuing to offer less attractive rates across a range of other 
accounts". However, one cannot deny that the concentration of building societies on 
the longer term end of the market has generally increased their average cost of funds. 
Prior to the 1980s, competition for funds in the retail deposit market was most intense 
amongst building societies themselves as banks chose to fund primarily in the 
wholesale markets; as such, banks were relatively uncompetitive in the retail deposit 
market. However, despite the absence of any strong external competition in their 
deposit market, building societies were themselves uncompetitive during times of 
rising interest rates (causing vast outflows of retail funds) as a result of the procedure 
of infrequent rate changes adopted by the Building Societies Association (BSA). 
After such an experience in 1973-74, building societies were prompted to introduce 
new types of retail deposit, such as higher-rate term deposits. Such accounts became 
very popular and, at the expense of increasing their average cost of funds, societies 
began to take an increasing share of personal sector wealth during the latter half of the 
1970s16. 
There were two main reasons for the lack of any serious competition from banks and 
the domination of building societies in the retail deposit market during the 1970s. 
Firstly, bank lending was restricted by a regulatory device known as the 'Corset' 17 and 
is Building societies concentrated on attracting long term savers by offering high interest rates on term 
accounts while banks focused on the shorter end of the market, offering low (or zero) interest current 
accounts. 
16 However, in 1979/80 the spread of building society deposit rates over bank rates narrowed briefly 
and the declining market share of bank deposits was temporarily arrested. " The Corset was the colloquial name for the Supplementary Special Deposits (SSD) scheme which began operation in 1973. It was a direct method of monetary control whereby the Bank of England 
could require an interest free reserve to be deposited by commercial banks if their interest bearing 
liabilities rose above specified levels. As such, banks were constrained from lending significant 
amounts in the mortgage market for the majority of the 1970s. 
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as such, banks were faced with a paucity of profitable lending outlets. Figure 2.3 
below illustrates how building societies have traditionally dominated the market for 
mortgage finance (although more recently the conversion of building societies to Plc 
status and the entrance of banks into the market has caused societies to lose a 
significant proportion of their market share). With banks already commanding a 
significant portion of personal sector liquid assets and having unlimited access to the 
wholesale deposit market, chasing additional and more expensive retail deposits 
would have been futile. Secondly, it was alleged that by competing more vigorously 
with building societies for retail deposits, banks could have faced an internal 
migration of funds away from their interest-free current account base (rather than new 
inflows), serving only to increase the average cost of funds. 



















During the period prior to 1980, building societies could be viewed unambiguously as 
non-profit making institutions. Being mutual institutions with Friendly Society status 
they attempted to reconcile the conflicting demands between borrowers for low rates 
and savers for high rates by maintaining a relatively stable intertemporal interest rate 
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path18 (the issue of the so-called `borrower-saver conflict' is addressed 
in Section 
5.2.2 of Chapter 5). This stability was made possible by a cartel arrangement under 
which the BSA recommended to its members appropriate saving and 
borrowing rates 
of interest on a monthly basis. With the primary remit of the BSA cartel 
being to 
maintain low borrowing rates in order to protect existing mortgage borrowers, 
during 
periods of rising general market interest rates societies' savings and mortgage rates 
tended to be relatively sticky19. The result was that the competitiveness of societies' 
shares and deposits waned (leading to weaker retail inflows) whilst mortgage 
demand 
rose considerably (the former trend is clearly visible in Figure 2.4 below). 
The initial response by building societies to this relative lack of available loanable 
funds tended to be to allow the liquid assets ratio to take up the slack; however, a 
policy of falling liquidity could not be sustained indefinitely and as such, periods of 
sustained fund shortfalls ultimately led to a reduction in mortgage lending20. Thus 
interest rate stickiness led to mortgage rationing in the form of mortgage queues and 
changes in the non-interest terms of the mortgage contract (such as loan to income and 
loan to value ratios)2' as retail inflows were subdued and mortgage demand was 
encouraged. In contrast, when general interest rates were falling the competitive 
position in terms of retail deposits tended to strengthen and that with respect to 
mortgage demand to weaken, with the increased level of inflows and reduced 
mortgage demand allowing rationing to be lessened (leading to a restoration of 
liquidity levels and a subsequent expansion of mortgage lending). However, with 
building societies being permitted access to the market for wholesale funds since the 
mid-1980s, it has become the stock of wholesale liabilities rather than the liquidity 
ratio that has tended to adjust in the light of retail funding disequilibria; the ease with 
18 Cost considerations were of particular importance in the desire to change mortgage and saving rates 
only infrequently. 
19 It is noted by Suddards (1983) that a similar situation existed in South African building societies. A 
number of hypotheses are reviewed briefly in his paper as to the inflexibility of the mortgage rate. 
20 For a theoretical and empirical discussion of the determination and importance of liquidity ratios in a 
model of the demand for and supply of mortgage advances see Hadjimatheou (1976) Chapters 5-7. 
2' As we will see later in Chapter 7 of this thesis, when for any given rate of interest the adjustment of 
the non-interest terms of the mortgage loan is sufficient to clear the market (such as the loan to value 
ratio) we refer to this as `equilibrium rationing'. When there exists excess demand for mortgages even 
after accounting for these terms, then we denote this as `disequilibrium rationing', an example of which 
is the formation of mortgage queues or the requirement of a 'savings history' with a particular 
institution before being considered for a mortgage loan. 
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which societies (and indeed all mortgage lenders) are able to access the wholesale 
deposit market has meant that mortgage rationing has since become obsolete (except 
of course for prudential purposes). 
Figure 2.4 : The Spread Between Base Rates and Building Societies' Gross Share 
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Sources : Financial Statistics and Housing Finance 
However, in the early 1980s building societies' retail deposit inflows weakened as a 
result of the highly competitive National Savings rates (and indeed the easing of these 
instruments' eligibility conditions) offered by the government in an attempt to fund a 
rising public sector borrowing requirement, or PSBR (now known as the public sector 
net cash requirement) as part of its Medium Term Financial Strategy (MTFS)22. 
The situation was not to last long, as lower rates on National Savings (driven by a 
declining PSBR) and a rise in the rate of inflation meant that these instruments looked 
less attractive. Additionally, the introduction of high balance short notice accounts in 
ZZ It is estimated that the first issue of index-linked retirement National Savings Certificates in 1979 




1981 quickly became an important source of funding for societies; in fact, according 
to Callen and Lomax (1990), the share of short notice and instant access accounts of 
building societies rose from zero in 1974 to 16.9 per cent in 1982 and 83.3 per cent in 
1989. Similarly, building societies' market share of personal sector liquid assets rose 
from 46.1 per cent in 1981 to 52.4 per cent in 1985 (source : Housing Finance). 
However, this growth not only came at the expense of other financial institutions but 
also other types of building society account, again having the effect of increasing 
societies' average funding costs. 
Prior to discussing the change in market structure which led to the ending of mortgage 
rationing during the early 1980s, it is useful to note at this point the importance of 
government policy in exacerbating rationing in the market for mortgage finance. 
There can be no doubt that government policy has in the past been successful in 
influencing the level of mortgage lending and reducing the effective rate of interest on 
mortgage loans. An example of government intervention in the mortgage market that 
contributed to influencing the demand for mortgage finance has been the tax 
deductibility of mortgage interest payments. The real cost of the Mortgage Interest 
Relief At Source (MIRAS) scheme to the government rose consistently each year from 
1963 to 1977, but fell towards the end of the decade. After rising to a peak in 1991, 
1996 saw the real cost fall to its lowest level since 1973 (see Figure 2.11 later in the 
chapter)23. 
The market structure endured during the 1970s was ended with the abolition of 
exchange controls in 197924, the removal of the Corset on banks in mid-1980 and the 
removal of the reserve asset requirement in 1981 (which specified that 12.5 per cent of 
banks deposits must be kept in liquid form). The removal of these lending constraints 
on the banks gave them the opportunity to expand into areas (such as the mortgage 
market) in which their previous influence had been minimal or even non-existent. 
23 It is worthwhile pointing out that the introduction of capital gains tax on owner occupied housing in 
1982 served to make the housing transaction less profitable, having an offsetting effect to that of the 
increase in mortgage tax relief during the early 1980s. 
24 The lifting of exchange controls encouraged the private sector to invest more readily in overseas 
securities and other investments. Banks then found it easy to `disintermediate' around the corset 
restrictions by channelling lending to domestic customers through overseas subsidiaries, which 
encouraged its abolishment in June 1980. 
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Banks rapidly pursued the opportunities to expand their domestic balance sheets 
(beginning to gain market share in mortgage lending in 1981) in an attempt to make 
up some of the ground they had lost in the personal sector market during the 1970s25. 
The extent of mortgage rationing in the market meant that their goal was easily 
achievable. The particular appeal of the mortgage market to banks was its 
profitability (mortgage rates were high in the early 1980s reaching 15 per cent in the 
first quarter of 1982 as greater competition in the investment market pushed up the 
rate on savings) and the opportunity for portfolio diversification into what was seen as 
lower risk lending. Indeed, foreign and corporate lending had both become more risky 
with a significant number of LDC loans turning sour26 and the recession of the early 
1980s taking its toll on corporate activity. In addition, large corporations were 
increasingly turning to the capital markets to raise debt, forcing banks to search for 
new business. By 1982, the banking sector had attained a market share of net new 
lending exceeding 35 per cent (source : Annual Abstract of Banking Statistics, 1995). 
However, as lending restrictions on banks were lifted towards the end of the 1970s 
and the early 1980s, the regulations on building societies' activities, as set out in the 
1962 Act, began to bite. The Act prevented societies from undertaking corporate 
lending and raising wholesale funds to finance their business, giving other financial 
intermediaries a significant competitive advantage (as they had a greater choice over 
both their funding and investment strategies). As Callen and Lomax (1990) state, 
"banks were better able to compete in the traditional business of the building societies 
than were the building societies in the business of the banks". 
23 The extent to which the banking sector has become involved in the provision of mortgages to the 
personal sector is described in Figure 2.3 above. 
6 As is noted by Leigh Pemberton (1986), "the difficulties encountered with international lending, in 
particular, lending to less developed countries and for oil-related projects, have encouraged major international banks to concentrate more heavily on personal banking -a key element which is seen to be 
the provision of loans secured on a first mortgage". See Leyshon and Thrift (1993) for a discussion of 
the emergence of new types of risk within the global financial system. 
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Figure 2.5 : Net Lending by Banks and Building Societies and Banks' Share of 
Annual Net Lending 
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Bank mortgage lending grew more slowly from the end of 1982 to the end of 1984 (a 
local peak in bank lending in 1982 is clearly visible in Figure 2.5 above) as banks had 
by then already achieved their initial targets and the rise in long term lending had 
caused a deterioration in their capital ratios. In addition, bank deposit rates were 
particularly uncompetitive during 1982 and 1983 (despite the fact that the BSA 
recommended a lower than equilibrium interest rate structure for building societies) 
and the resulting inadequate level of retail funds affected their ability to extend their 
mortgage lending. Following the breakdown of the BSA cartel in 1983 (see below for 
a more in depth discussion) competition for retail deposits became intense. In 
particular, the inclusion of banks in the composite rate system of tax deduction27 from 
27 The composite tax arrangement enabled a financial institution to discharge the income tax liability on 
savings interest to the Inland Revenue on behalf of its depositors. The financial institution is charged a 
composite rate of tax on gross interest payments equivalent to the same amount of tax revenue as that 
which would be generated if all savers liable to basic rate tax had received their interest gross and had 
then paid their tax liabilities individually. Given that some investors were not subject to basic rate tax, 
the composite rate was usually lower than the basic rate. For investors subject to basic rate tax, the 
financial institution would automatically deduct the composite tax rate from their savings interest, 
whereas higher rate taxpayers would incur a further charge equal to the difference between their 
marginal tax rate and the basic rate. 
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6 April 1985 (which building societies had been subject to since 1894) proved to be 
immensely important in attracting deposits and thereby stimulated the increase in the 
growth rate of banks' mortgage lending from the middle of 1985. 
The intensity of competition in the mortgage market during the first half of the 1980s 
had a profound effect on the market and induced a fundamental shift in building 
societies behaviour. As Boddy (1991) describes, "structural changes in financial 
markets broke open the previously protected position of the societies, forcing them to 
be less introspective". One particularly important behavioural change was that fewer 
societies adopted the rates recommended by the BSA, the system being abolished 
from October 198328. The collapse of the cartel was inevitable, with its operations 
drawing widespread criticism from a variety of sources including both the Wilson 
Committee (reporting in 1980) on the functioning of financial institutions and also the 
Bow Group (1980)29. The main criticisms of the system were that it encouraged 
inefficiency in mortgage allocation and caused undesirable fluctuations in the 
availability of mortgage credit. 
Nevertheless, the BSA continued to advise interest rates until November 1984 at 
which point it began only to co-ordinate the timing of interest rate changes and 
indicate their approximate size; this role was abandoned in 1986. The market moved 
from a situation of centrally managed building society rates to one in which the largest 
societies set their own rates of interest which the rest of industry would follow30. This 
led to further competitive pressures and diversification of business as mortgage- 
Deposit rates offered by banks were already lower than those of building societies, so the fact that 
banks had to start quoting net rather than gross rates to depositors from 1985 made their uncompetitive 
rates even more transparent to investors. Banks thus took a more competitive stance in the retail 
deposit market. However, an increase in banks' base rates in January 1985 (base rates rose from 10.5 
per cent on 11 January to 14 per cent on 28 January 1985) which was not followed immediately by 
building societies meant that as banks started to quote their deposit rates net of tax (prior to April 6) 
they were unusually competitive. Composite tax on building society deposits was abandoned in 1991 
and instead charged at the basic rate of tax. 
28 The Abbey National was the catalyst for the break-up of the cartel, giving three months notice of its 
withdrawal in September 1983. 
29 Both reports suggested that the industry could benefit by giving the Chief Registrar powers to 
encourage building society amalgamation (the Bow Group went further by advocating the conversion of societies to Plc status). See Mabey and Tillet (1980) for further details. 
30 One suggestion for future work on the industrial structure of mortgage lending financial intermediaries is to model the industry as a price leadership oligopoly. 
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deposit interest rate spreads tightened further3'. Figure 2.6 below illustrates this trend 
between 1982 and 1984, although spreads widened again from 1984 to 1987 as banks' 
mortgage lending growth slowed after they had satisfied their short term mortgage 
asset holding requirements (see previous discussion). 











Sources : Financial Statistics and Housing Finance 
In Figure 2.6 above, the spread is calculated as the difference between the average 
annual lending and funding rates. It is assumed that all lending is made at the 
prevailing mortgage rate and that the cost of funding is a weighted average of the rate 
of interest on retail and wholesale funds32 (the average gross share rate and LIBOR33 
respectively). It is apparent that the spread has widened, although this may not 
necessarily suggest an increase in building societies' profitability over time as some 
new accounts contain higher processing costs (due mainly to expensive money 
transmission services) making intertemporal comparison difficult. In addition, it is 
31 Competition has not only taken the form of interest rate strategies but also non-price forms, such as 
new technology, new products, increased advertising and the use of automated teller machines (ATMs). 
32 The weights reflect the relative proportions of outstanding retail and wholesale funds. 
33 LIBOR is the commonly used abbreviation for the London Interbank Offered Rate, the rate of interest 
at which banks offer to lend unsecured wholesale funds in the sterling interbank market (often for the 
purpose of liquidity management). The importance of LIBOR is that it is considered a good indicator 
of the marginal cost of funds for financial institutions with access to wholesale money markets. 
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problematic to calculate an equivalent bank spread due to the particularly fragmented 
nature of their savings accounts. 
It has been alleged that the break-up of the BSA cartel in 1983 was encouraged not 
only by intense competition in the mortgage market but also competitive pressures in 
the market for deposits (with the inevitable consequence of increased deposit rates). 
As the average cost of retail funds soared, building societies found themselves 
particularly disadvantaged as a result of their inability to access the relatively cheaper 
wholesale funding market. 
A number of important consequences for the demand for and supply of mortgage 
finance and deposits emerged as a result of the changing nature of the market in the 
early 1980s. With greater access to the wholesale deposit markets societies were 
generally able to satisfy all mortgage demand, albeit at the expense of higher mortgage 
and savings interest rates than recommended under the BSA carte134. Of course this 
made mortgage lending particularly attractive to those institutions funded through the 
wholesale markets (such as banks, pension funds and insurance companies) and the 
need to maintain market share encouraged building societies to become more `profit 
oriented' than was previously the case. Indeed, this issue is addressed in more detail 
later in Chapter 5 of the thesis, where a model is developed allowing a parameter to be 
chosen to indicate the degree to which a building society is oriented towards either the 
maximisation of member benefits or profit. 
One of the most important consequences of the increased competition in the market 
for mortgages and deposits/shares was the diversification of building societies' asset 
and liability portfolios. This process provided the major impetus for change and 
culminated in legislation in the form of the Building Societies Act (1986), which 
aimed to recognise the changing operations of building societies. However, prior to 
1986 the adoption by building societies of more positive attitudes to the 
diversification of their balance sheets through the provision of wider housing services 
34 Meen (1990b) notes that such a fundamental change, "not only has wide implications for building 
societies themselves,, but also potentially has important effects for personal sector housing, asset accumulation, and consumption decisions, as well as for the conduct of monetary policy". 
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was hampered by the legislative framework which, for example, prevented them 
from 
holding land except for their own purposes of conducting business. This is confirmed 
by Boddy (1991) who states that, "as the limits to expansion of owner occupied 
housing are approached, societies see their opportunities for expanding into new 
forms of housing provision". In addition, this change in attitude on the part of the 
building society movement has been identified by Marshall et al (1997) who comment 
that during the 1970s building societies exhibited, "a paternalistic management style, 
slow to change and characterised by co-operation". But it was the entry of other 
mortgage market players that provoked, "an aggressive response from management 
in 
some of the building societies, which adopted a more forceful and less paternalistic 
approach". 
The diversification of building societies' balance sheets around this time was most 
apparent and dramatic with respect to societies' funding arrangements. As is noted by 
Callen and Lomax (1990), "building society expansion into the banks' liability 
markets paralleled the banks' penetration of building societies' traditional asset 
market". Although their liabilities were made up primarily of retail shares and 
deposits, between 1983 and 1986 a significant proportion of funds began to come 
from a variety of alternative sources as rising competition in the domestic retail 
deposit market drove up funding costs. These alternative funding instruments 
included certificates of deposit", interbank borrowing, bond issuance (being rated by 
a major credit rating agency allowed societies easier access to the wholesale funds 
market), eurosterling issues (sterling time deposits held in banks outside the UK)36 
and eurobonds and non-sterling issues, especially after the advent of swaps allowing 
the conversion of non-sterling funds into sterling at a predetermined rate. Indeed, by 
1986 net receipts of non-retail funds were almost equal to net receipts of retail shares 
 Certificates of deposit, or CDs, are very liquid and almost risk free negotiable (without endorsement, 
i. e. can be bought or sold without reference to the issuer) fixed maturity assets paying fixed (and usually 
low) rates of interest. They are issued by financial institutions and are analogous to interest-bearing 
time deposits except for the fact they may be traded (i. e. they are essentially securitised bank accounts). 
Changes in tax arrangements (legalised by the Finance Act of 1983) which enabled societies to pay 
interest gross rather than net on qualifying CDs facilitated societies' ability to access the wholesale 
money markets. 
36 The eurosterling floating rate note (FRN) market proved particularly popular as it was able to provide 
societies with relatively cheap long term funds (FRNs are medium term debt securities that pay floating 
rate coupons). 
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and deposits (see Figure 2.8 later in the section). As Hamnett (1994) writes, "even the 
flow of funds into housing is being internationalised, with mortgage backed securities 
and bonds increasingly traded on and between the major financial centres and large 
scale loans raised on the euromarkets"37. As a result, however, the UK housing 
market became less insulated from the performance of the global economy, and in 
particular the forces that drive global interest rates; this again served to stimulate 
competition. 
The Building Societies Act of 1986, which came into force on 1 January 1987 (see 
Section 2.4 for a more thorough discussion of the Act and its implications), 
recognised the desire of building societies to diversify both their asset and liability 
base. A particularly important measure of the Act was to allow wholesale funding up 
to 20 per cent of a society's total liabilities (40 per cent from January 1 1988 and 50 
per cent following the Building Societies Act of 1997) which helped to lower the cost 
of building society funding and reduced their reliance on retail deposits. Adherence to 
the new regulations was overseen by the Building Societies Commission (BSC), 
replacing the Chief Registrar of Friendly Societies. Leyshon and Thrift (1993) state 
that prior to the legislation of the 1980s, "financial institutions were subjected to a 
system of `structural regulation', whereby different types of firms were limited to 
prescribed areas of the financial system, although the degree to which their activities 
were supervised was often minimal. Now, financial institutions have greater freedom 
to compete across a wider range of markets, but they are subject to a higher level of 
surveillance". 
The introduction of the Building Societies Act (1986) coupled with rapid 
concentration in the mortgage finance industry38 has helped rectify building societies' 
loss of market share to banks by allowing new lines of business to be pursued. The 
Act gave societies the authority to conduct foreign exchange, estate agency and 
37 Leyshon and Thrift (1993) analyse the separate effects of domestic re-regulation and global 
disintermediation in increasing competition in the domestic and international markets for financial 
services. 
38 In 1995 the 3-firm, 5-firm and 7-firm concentration ratios in the building society industry (as rated by 
total assets) were 54.5 per cent, 67.3 per cent and 76.9 per cent respectively (source : Thesys 
Information Ltd. ). 
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insurance services together with full money transmission. Despite retaining their 
mutual status and memoranda underlining their primary aim of providing housing 
finance, an important corollary of the legislation has been to allow societies to develop 
into very similar institutions to banks (in terms of their financing and product lines). 
In the immediate years following the legislation coming into force, societies' 
expansion in non-traditional activities permitted by the 1986 Act was modest, mainly 
due to the buoyancy of the mortgage market at the time. Callen and Lomax (1990) 
argue that factors such as the increase in house prices, the rise in owner occupation 
(which grew from 54.7 per cent of the housing stock in 1979 to 66.4 per cent in 1993, 
facilitated in part by the decline of the rental sector), the number of new households, 
the withdrawal of housing equity, rising real incomes and financial deregulation all 
contributed to the boom in the market for housing finance during the latter half of the 
1980s. In addition, changes in government policy have proved to be instrumental, 
including the transfer of local authority housing stock to individual owners under the 
`right to buy' scheme of the 1980 Housing Act. It is only as mortgage business 
slowed down during the early 1990s (as a result of the collapse in the housing market) 
that societies have taken on considerably more non-traditional business and have 
demanded (and received) new legislation to extend their business further. 
However, not only has it been the case that building societies have ventured into the 
traditional areas of business of other financial intermediaries, but the reverse has been 
true also. During the mid-1980s, the rise in the mortgage rate to almost 14 per cent 
made mortgage assets attractive to institutions which had no branch-based network 
and traded mortgages in the secondary market (these institutions became known as 
`third tier' institutions). By using the wholesale markets to finance their business, 
these institutions could attract a considerable amount of finance at a lower cost than 
the rate on retail funds. As such, when the structure of rates moved upwards (as it did 
during the mid-1980s), third tier institutions benefited at the expense of building 
societies which were limited to financing their activities through the retail sector. 
Combined with excess demand in the mortgage market, this provided the impetus for 
the new mortgage lenders to participate, an example being the National Home Loans 
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Corporation (NHLC) which was floated in September 1985 acquiring its asset 
portfolio from a variety of other mortgage lending institutions. 
Innovation in both the mortgage and deposit markets has enhanced consumer choice 
over the past two decades as competitive pressures have forced lending institutions to 
focus more directly on the need to attract customers. Besides undercutting the 
mortgage rate offered by high street banks and building societies, third tier institutions 
have been catalysts in the provision of highly innovative products such as LIBOR 
linked loans and fixed rate mortgages. Recently, the housing finance industry has 
seen further and more dramatic innovative products being marketed by all types of 
mortgage lender including banks and building societies. For example, the Halifax Plc, 
the Woolwich Plc, National Westminster Bank and the Bank of Scotland have 
recently all launched `rental mortgages' designed for investors wishing to purchase or 
re-mortgage a property for the purpose of letting. Some of these products take into 
consideration the expected rental income in addition to offering the benefits of a 
standard variable rate mortgage (see Sunday Times (1997)). Many of these schemes 
offered by the institutions are part of the Buy to Let scheme set up by the Association 
of Residential Letting Agents (ARLA). 
Repayment flexibility has become an important innovation in mortgage provision in 
recent years as lending institutions have recognised the need to approach the problem 
of arrears and possessions (see Chapter 4 for a full discussion of the problems of 
mortgage arrears and possessions in the UK mortgage market during the early 1990s). 
The Mortgage Trust, for example, unveiled a new mortgage in September 1997 (called 
the `Early Payment Plus' mortgage) enabling the borrower to vary their monthly 
repayments and reduce the term of their loan by repaying greater monthly sums, taking 
`payment holidays' and to withdraw cash from accrued overpayments (see Chapter 3 
for a review of more standardised mortgage designs). However, the main innovative 
feature of their product was the combination of mortgage flexibility with a period of 
fixed-rate repayments. In fact, a survey undertaken by the Council of Mortgage 
Lenders confirmed that two thirds of lenders now offer flexible mortgages. 
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Remaining on the theme of product innovation and new entrants to the mortgage 
market, the financial deregulation of the 1980s also prompted insurance companies to 
enter the market (particularly towards the end of the 1980s) as competition in the 
insurance industry and the ability to offer a wider range of services associated with the 
house purchase has prompted diversification (some insurance companies, such as the 
Prudential and Direct Line, have begun to offer `telephone mortgages')39. The 
entrance of insurance companies into the mortgage market has been crucially 
dependent on the cost of wholesale funds; policy-holders' funds are rarely if ever used 
to finance a mortgage portfolio since the returns are deemed insufficient. Insurance 
companies have followed one of two paths, either acting as intermediaries selling 
mortgages provided by other lending institutions or offering their own products (this 
concept, known as `polarisation', will be addressed later in the chapter). Figure 2.7 
below confirms the trend in real mortgage lending by insurance companies and 
pension funds which bottomed out in the early 1980s, from where it continued 
towards a peak in the final quarter of 1988 (primarily due to the upward movement in 
the structure of building society interest rates) before resuming a declining path during 
the 1990s. Likewise, the fall in insurance companies' real mortgage lending from 
1989 onwards is associated with a period in which building societies' retail inflows 
(and thus mortgage loans) became relatively cheap (see Figure 2.4 below). 
A particularly popular form of mortgage instrument during the 1980s was the 
endowment mortgage, enabling insurance companies to take a more active role in the 
market for housing finance. An endowment mortgage requires the borrower to repay 
only the interest on the loan each month, the principal being repaid at the end of the 
term by the final proceeds of an endowment policy. The appeal of this type of loan 
proved to be the life assurance element of the endowment, which guaranteed 
repayment of the loan on the death of the borrower40. At the height of their popularity 
during the mid- to late 1980s, endowment mortgages accounted for more than 80 per 
cent of new mortgage lending, dwarfing repayment mortgage business. However, 
39 Not only have building societies faced new competition from insurance companies but other 
operators such as retailers (examples include Marks and Spencer, Tesco and Sainsbury's). 4 For borrowers later in the life cycle this may not be an advantage since the cost of an endowment 
policy will be a positive function of both age and health. 
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their popularity was not to last, with the proportion falling markedly to around only 30 
per cent today. This has been an important factor in the decline of insurance 
companies' mortgage business during the 1990s. 
Figure 2.7 : Real Level of Mortgage Loans Outstanding at 1990 prices: Insurance 
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Source : Financial Statistics 
There are a number of reasons for the fall from grace of the endowment mortgage, the 
first being its inflexibility. With the terminal bonus constituting a significant portion 
of the overall return to the endowment, the surrender value of an endowment policy is 
low41. This is made worse by the fact that a significant amount of the investment in 
the initial years is taken up by up-front charges42. In addition, endowment policies 
rely on long run equity market returns; there is no guarantee that the stock market will 
have appreciated enough to give the holder a profit if the policy is surrendered before 
maturity. Remaining on the issue of inflexibility, endowment mortgages are not 
extendable, unlike repayment mortgages under which it may be possible to suspend 
capital payments in times of repayment difficulty. 
41 That said, a better deal may be attained from selling the policy on the secondary market, although the 
market only exists for policies of a specific type and over a certain age. 42 Higher up-front commissions are paid to advisers selling endowment policies rather than repayment 
mortgages, encouraging the recent allegations of mis-selling. 
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Secondly, with equities typically forming a large portion of endowment portfolios, 
there is a risk that the terminal value of the endowment may not be sufficient to repay 
the mortgage. Indeed, the 1987 stock market crash hit new policy holders particularly 
hard, whereas policies taken out during the 1970s had already had time to accumulate 
large surpluses. In cases when the endowment looks like falling short of its terminal 
target, the insurer may suggest an increase in the borrower's monthly contributions. 
Finally, there are a number of issues associated with the fact that the principal remains 
unpaid in its entirety until the end of contract. It has been suggested that this can 
exacerbate the problem of negative equity in the short term as the borrower has, in 
effect, made no repayments to the principal sum. In addition, the move upwards in 
interest rates towards the end of the 1980s discouraged endowment loans as the 
increased cost of borrowing applies to the whole sum borrowed, rather than only the 
principal remaining (as with a repayment mortgage). This argument only holds, 
however, if the rise in interest rates exceeds the increase in the rate of return on the 
endowment. Nevertheless, cash flow problems may result from the fact that the 
capital gain on the endowment is not realised until maturity. 
After relatively subdued growth in banks' mortgage lending portfolios in 1984 (see 
Figure 2.2), expansion of around 15 per cent stimulated competition in the market 
once again in 1985. Innovations by banks in the mortgage market were of particular 
importance in securing this growth, although they were also obliged to offer 
competitive savings products in order that sufficient retail deposits could be attracted 
to ensure that mortgage demand was met in full. Both were achieved by banks 
making use of cross selling opportunities throughout their extensive branch network. 
However, as Leyshon and Thrift (1993) note, the combination of increased 
competition and contracting markets at various points in time during the 1980s and 
1990s stimulated financial intermediaries to, "systematically reduce costs and 
introduce strategies which seek to make better use of their human and fixed capital 
resources". 
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It is hardly surprising then that building societies experienced negative growth in their 
mortgage books during 1987, dipping to almost -20 per cent in 1989 (see Figure 2.2 
above, although some of this fall would have been a result of the Abbey National 
conversion). Drake (1989) points out that in an attempt to minimise the problem of 
the rising cost of retail funds, in 1986 building societies both reduced their liquidity 
ratio to within 1 per cent of the BSC's suggested minimum of 15 per cent (primarily 
through gilt sales) and increased their presence in the wholesale funds market; this 
latter trend is illustrated in Figure 2.8 below which shows that the net inflow of funds 
from the wholesale market in 1986 was almost the same as that from traditional shares 
and deposits. The former measure to arrest the declining growth in deposit inflows 
(and thus mortgage lending also) could only ever be temporary, and mortgage lending 
fell in the subsequent three years. The fall in deposit inflows was accentuated 
between the middle of 1986 and the end of 1987 as wholesale money became cheaper 
than retail funds (see Figure 2.9 below), leading to the inability of building societies to 
maintain their share of total mortgage lending. 
Figure 2.8 : Net Wholesale Funding versus Net Receipts of Retail Shares and 
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Figure 2.9 : Difference Between the 3 Month Sterling Interbank Rate and the Average 
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Indeed, the plight of societies' (with regard their funding requirements) was made 
even worse as significant levels of personal sector funds were invested in unit trusts, 
Personal Equity Plans (launched in 1987)43 and the big-name privatisation of 1986 
and 1987. As a result, building societies' net receipts proved to be extremely volatile 
(as illustrated in Figure 2.4 above)44. 
However, the outlook for building societies improved somewhat towards the end of 
1987 and the beginning of 1988. The wholesale funding limit was increased from a 
maximum of 20 per cent of total liabilities to 40 per cent in January 1988 and the cost 
of retail deposits began to fall relative to that of wholesale funds (see Figure 2.9 
above). The latter was largely due to the fall in competition for retail funds resulting 
from the 1987 stock market crash (at £5,314m, the net increase in societies' retail 
shares and deposits in the final quarter of 1987 was the third largest on record) and the 
start of an uptrend in the personal sector savings ratio in 1988 (Figure 2.10 below 
illustrates that in the third quarter of 1988 the savings ratio had fallen to less than 5 
43 Between the second quarter of 1985 and the third quarter of 1987, the total amount of outstanding 
funds in unit trusts and PEPs together more than doubled. 
as Building societies were particularly badly affected by the TSB and British Gas flotations during the 
Autumn of 1986, with their net receipts falling from £2220m in the first quarter of 1986 to only £168m 
in the third quarter of 1986 (source : Housing Finance). As Callen and Lomax (1990) write, "the banks 
proved more successful in maintaining their position when the personal sector's interest in equities 
revived in the second half of the decade [1980s]". 
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per cent, its lowest level for almost 30 years). With the increased availability of 
cheaper retail funds, the growth rate of real mortgage lending by building societies 
rose from almost -20 per cent in 1989 to 15 per cent in 1990. In contrast, 
however, 
the position of wholesale funded institutions worsened as a result of the fall in the 
mortgage rate relative to LIBOR (the cost of wholesale funds). 











Source : Financial Statistics 
In retrospect, however, the expansion of building societies' mortgage books in the late 
1980s was not to be envied given the significant and protracted fall in housing 
turnover and prices from 1989. The effects of the slump in the housing market, 
precipitated by dramatic interest rate rises between 1988 and 1989, was considerably 
worsened by the onset of recession. Not surprisingly, given their expansionary 
lending policies (during 1988-90 in particular) it was the building society movement 
more than the banking sector that suffered as a result of the accumulation of arrears 
and the necessity to possess the properties of households which had defaulted on their 
debt. The situation was compounded by the absence of mortgage insurance 
guarantees46, with societies' loss provisions increasing dramatically towards the end 
as The seasonally adjusted personal sector savings ratio is used since the savings ratio is particularly 
affected by seasonal swings, making the unadjusted time series plot incomprehensible. 
46 Insurance guarantees repay the lender the difference between the sale price of a possessed house and 
the mortgage owed on it up to a certain amount. Such guarantees were in general not taken out by the 
societies and in cases where they were, the amount of cover tended to be insufficient to compensate 
societies fully for losses made on possessed houses. 
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of the decade. As Doling and Ford (1991) note, "the mortgage market throughout the 
1980s was characterised by increased uncertainty for the building societies about 
which customers would meet their monthly repayments and which would not. No 
longer could they sit back with the knowledge that the money would more or less 
automatically be repaid". Mortgage loans advanced by third tier lenders in particular 
mushroomed during the late 1980s with their business being based on high loan to 
income and loan to value ratios. As such, the slump in the housing market had 
devastating effects on this type of lender, suffering more than most from arrears and 
possessions at a time when falling nominal house prices meant that mortgage lending 
was less secure47. As Leigh Pemberton (1986) warned, "there is no economic law that 
dictates that house prices will necessarily travel in an ever upward direction ... lending 
policies should not be based on the premise that house price rises will continue 
apace". 
More prudent lending policies were re-imposed in the early 1990s with the average 
loan to value ratio for first time buyers reaching a nine year low in the first quarter of 
1991 at 81 per cent (sources : Housing Finance and the Building Societies Association 
Bulletin). The lax attitude of lenders to arrears (which could be attributed to the 
apparent guarantee of the value housing collateral as security) was abandoned in 
favour of improved arrears monitoring techniques, special debt helplines and debt 
counselling services (following advice contained in the Council of Mortgage Lenders 
code of practice) as more attention was paid to risk management and risk reduction. 
Mortgage lenders have additionally introduced mortgage schemes that ease the burden 
of repayment (and thus reduce the likelihood of arrears or possession) on the 
mortgagee48. However, as the housing market has picked up again societies appear to 
have almost entirely dismissed the problems they faced during the early 1990s; the 
average loan to value ratio for first time buyers stood at an all time high of 91.2 per 
cent in the second quarter of 1997 with the average loan to income ratio for first time 
47 Doling and Ford (1991) discuss that, "in these circumstances, the house ceases to be collateral and being `safe as houses' becomes as untrue for the lender as it has become for the borrower". °S An example of such a scheme is the shared equity mortgage, in which a household purchases a share 
of equity in the housing asset (e. g. 50 per cent) and rents the remainder, with the right to purchase further tranches of equity later. 
53 
buyers at 2.25 (the only period in which the loan to income ratio has been higher was 
in the third quarter of 1973 when it stood at 2.26). 
In addition to the change in the management of arrears over the 1980s and 1990s, it is 
important to note that the profile of defaulters has changed during the 1980s. The 
relatively slight increase in arrears in 1981 could be attributed mainly to increases in 
unemployment and rising loan to value ratios, whereas the significant increases in 
arrears of the early 1990s occurred as a consequence of the combination of a number 
of factors : high mortgage interest rates, the onset of recession and rising 
unemployment, falling nominal house prices and less conservative lending policies 
during the 1980s. 
Both the mortgage and deposit markets in the 1990s have become ones in which 
competitive forces play an ever important role. It is impossible to understate the 
importance of the legislative framework under which building societies and banks 
have operated in shaping the mortgage market during the past two decades. Not only 
has it been responsible for influencing the balance of mortgage lending between 
mutual and non-mutual financial institutions, but has also had a considerable impact 
on the total market turnover of mortgage lending and the terms on which such funds 
are lent. Potential borrowers who were frequently frustrated in the past now find that 
loans are more freely available given that certain prudential criteria are met49. There 
are grounds, therefore, for believing that the regulatory environment and institutional 
structure of the mortgage market have been partly responsible for the more rapid 
growth in mortgage lending since 1980 and thus also for the rapid increase in 
mortgage default during the early 1990s. Given its importance, it is the regulatory 
framework and its effect upon mortgage lending to which we now turn. 
49 As we discussed earlier, however, such criteria have been relaxed as a result of increasing 
competitive pressures in the mortgage market throughout the 1980s. 
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2.4 THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR BUILDING SOCIETIES IN 
THE 1980s AND 1990s 
Prior to 1986, the original legislation governing building societies' behaviour was that 
of the 1874 Building Societies Act, which was gradually amended with the 
last of the 
changes being consolidated by the Building Societies Act of 1962. 
By the early 
1980s, however, it was clear that the legislation had become inappropriate and 
outdated, with building societies being restricted from full participation in the rapidly 
changing competitive environment. Legislation in the form of the 1986 Building 
Societies Act made some considerable headway in attempting to rectify the situation. 
2.4.1 The Building Societies Act (1986) 
It is worth briefly considering the motives for the introduction of the Building 
Societies Act of 1986 and the key role played by the Building Societies Association in 
securing the desired regulatory framework (see Boddy (1991)). 
During the period prior to the Building Societies Act being passed in July of 1986, the 
role of the BSA was crucial in securing the most appropriate legislation on behalf of 
the building society movement, and was given considerable access to the legislative 
process5°. The first formal proposals made by the BSA to the government appeared in 
a 1984 consultation document", where it was suggested that societies be permitted 
both to broaden the scope of their property based business and also be allowed to offer 
financial products more akin with those offered by the banking sector. 
However, it was not only the building society industry that had been pressing for 
legislative change. Indeed, pressure had come from the European Community in an 
attempt to create a `level playing field' in financial services, to which the government 
so Boddy (1991) notes that this was only possible in a new political climate of consensus, in contrast to, 
"the more formal structures of the 1970s" which were, "symptomatic of more conflictual relations". In 
political terminology, the incorporation of industry groups into the legislative process has been referred 
to as `corporatist interest intermediation'. 
11 The paper (entitled "New Legislation for Building Societies") resulted from the conclusions of a 
discussion group headed by John Spalding, then the chief executive officer of the Halifax building 
society. 
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was particularly responsive given the differential legislative background of domestic 
institutions (i. e., mutuals versus non-mutuals) and the lack of accountability in the 
building society industry (see Section 2.5 for a discussion of the existence of agency 
problems in the mutual sector). 
The Building Societies Act of 1986 (which came into force on 1 January 1987) 
established an entirely new structure under which building societies were to operate. 
The responsibility for the prudential supervision of building societies under the Act 
was assigned to the newly formed Building Societies Commission (BSC) which was 
to take over from the office of the Chief Registrar of Friendly Societies52. 
On the liabilities side, the Act set out limits on the use of wholesale funding, allowing 
societies to raise funds other than through traditional retail deposit taking channels. It 
was specified that non-retail funds were not to exceed 20 per cent of a society's total 
liabilities, with provision made for this figure to be increased to 40 per cent by 
statutory instrument (which it was from January 1 1988 as the initial limit began to 
restrict some larger societies from expanding their business). In addition, societies 
were obliged by the Act to maintain a `reasonable' liquidity ratio, although liquid 
assets were not permitted to rise above one third of a society's total asset base. 
On the asset side of the balance sheet, building societies were permitted to undertake 
unsecured lending business (as originally requested in the Spalding report) to enable 
them to compete more effectively in areas of traditional banking business activities. 
However, the Act constrained societies as to the proportion of different classes of 
lending they were permitted to undertake; these restrictions are summarised in Table 
2.1 below. 
In addition, the Act allowed building societies to provide a range of services that had 
been previously restricted or outlawed such as personal credit provision, house buying 
52 As of 1997, however, all financial institutions, whether they be privately owned, publicly owned or 
mutual come under the prudential supervision of the newly formed Financial Services Authority. 
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services (comprising estate agency services, conveyancy and surveyS53), pension 
provision and, from July 1989, making investments in other mortgage finance 
companies (including third tier institutions). The complete range of housing services 
permitted by the act were, however, restricted to societies holding commercial assets 
of over £100m, with smaller societies being barred from offering estate management 
services, providing personal equity plans (PEPs) or operating foreign subsidiaries to 
lend within the EC54. Specifically, the Act restricted the ability of societies to 
diversify their business activities by categorising each society into one of five groups 
ordered by asset size (Al, A2, B, C, D), with membership of the largest grouping 
(category Al) requiring the society to have an asset base over £7.5bn. 
Table 2.1 : Asset Categories and Limits of the Building Societies Act 1986 
Category Description Initial Limits 1990 Limits 1991 Limits 1993 Limits 
Class I First mortgage loans Minimum 90 % Min 82.5 % Min 80 % Min 75 % 
secured by owner 
occupied housing 
Class 2 Other advances secured on 
property, including loans 
to housing associations 
and builders, loans on 
non-residential property, 
and second mortgage 
loans on owner occupied 
houses 
Together with Class 3, Together Together Together 
not more than 10 % with Class with Class with Class 
3, not more 3, not more 3, not more 
than 17.5% than 20% than 25% 
Class 3 Unsecured loans up to Not more than 5% Unsecured Unsecured Unsecured 
£5,000 (£10,000 unsecured lending; lending not lending not lending not 
following a Treasury requires societies to more than more than more than 
review in February 1988), have at least £100m of 7.5% 10% 15% 
acquisition and commercial assets (as 
development of land, does the acquisition 
investments in subsidiaries and development of 
and associates land) 
Source : Drake (1989) 
The BSC conducted a radical overhaul of Schedule 8 of the Act in May 1988, 
allowing building societies to undertake activities in the following broad business 
53 This new range of housing services (made available under Schedule 8 of the Act) led to concerns 
being expressed by estate agency, legal and surveying businesses who were understandably 
apprehensive about the likelihood of increased competition in the industry. 
s The latter was made available to societies with over £100m in commercial assets as of 1 January 1988. 
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areas unless specifically restricted : banking, investment and insurance services, 
trusteeship, executorship and land services". This revised Schedule 8 conferred an 
important range of new powers upon building societies. For example, as a result of 
the revision, building societies were permitted to own life insurance and stockbroking 
companies (but only up to a 15 per cent stake in a general insurance company due to 
the higher risks involved), and can in general offer a far wider range of traditional 
banking services56. Finally, the revision to Schedule 8 allowed both an enlargement in 
the composition of non-mortgage assets and provided for increases in the legal 
maxima of such assets that may be held by societies (via the use of statutory 
instrument rather than further primary legislation); as Table 2.1 above shows, the 
extension of these percentage limits was achieved reasonably quickly. 
As we have seen above, the majority of provisions of the 1986 Act related to the 
extension of societies' business into areas traditionally dominated by the banking 
sector. Indeed, societies were permitted by the Act to make the ultimate move 
towards expanding into the banking sector : the permission to convert to public 
limited companies. The Act required that stringent conditions be met in order that any 
conversion may take place, perhaps the most burdensome being the demanding voting 
requirements. This, it was hoped, would not only ensure that each conversion was in 
the best interests of the society but would also help regulate the tide of societies 
expected to want to abandon their mutual status. Nevertheless, the Act contained 
provisions to encourage societies to convert; for example, it barred any group from 
holding in excess of 15 per cent of a converted institution's shares during the first 5 
years of its operation in order that early and possibly unwelcome take-over bids may 
be prevented. 
Finally, with respect to intra-industry mergers, the Act specified that the distribution 
of excess reserves as windfall payments following a merger must not exceed 1 per 
cent of the society's total assets in order to discourage unsuitable alliances based 
ss Restricted services have tended to be those relating to corporate banking activities. 56 Ball (1990) refers to these new emerging multipurpose financial institutions as 'financial 
supermarkets'. 
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solely on the size of a target's reserve ratio. Both society mergers and conversions are 
discussed in more depth in Section 2.5 below. 
2.4.2 The Building Societies Act (1997) 
Even before 1990, building societies were beginning to view the 1986 Building 
Societies Act as over-restrictive. Although it may have generally been considered 
appropriate at the time of enactment, a constant stream of statutory instruments were 
required to amend the legislation in the light of the rapidly changing mortgage and 
deposit markets. Because of these frequent and very involved changes to the 
legislation under which building societies operated (requiring societies to regularly 
change their rules and memoranda"), the movement began to argue that it should be 
regulated as is any other listed financial organisation (i. e. by a combination of 
prudential supervision of their operations by the newly instituted Financial Services 
Authority and regulations set out by the Banking Act of 1987 and the Companies Act 
of 1985). 
Following a review of the 1986 Building Societies Act during 1994 and 1995, the 
Conservative government announced in March 1996 draft legislation to be speedily 
enacted prior to the general election of May 1997. The Building Societies Act of 1997 
allowed societies to acquire up to a maximum of 50 per cent of their funds from the 
wholesale money markets and to hold up to 25 per cent of their assets in the form of 
non-mortgage loans, as long as the particular society is able to convince the regulator 
that it has sufficient financial and managerial resources to take on the activity. 
Subject to these two constraints (and some other restrictions on transactions involving 
securities, commodities, currencies and derivatives), societies are now broadly free to 
decide on the purposes and powers set out in their memoranda. Many societies 
changed their memoranda prior to their annual general meetings in the Spring of 1998 
to incorporate the provisions of the 1997 Act, the changes being put to the voting 
57 The memorandum of a building society is a document specifying its purposes and powers as opposed 
to its rules, which contain the constitution and procedures of the society (such as the definition and 
rights of a member, procedural and voting rules for the annual general meeting and the role of the board 
of directors, etc. ). 
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members of the society for approval. Rather than specifying particular areas of 
business in which the society will develop, societies' management have generally 
asked their members to vote for a flexible memorandum authorising the extension of 
their range of activities in the changing market as and when the management desires. 
The Act also gives borrowing members the same rights as shareholding members 
(namely the ability to vote at the AGM, nominate prospective directors, propose 
resolutions and propose special general meetings). 
However, the Act was criticised for being too little too late, as the process of de- 
mutualisation (which started as far back as 1989 with the Abbey National) had 
become unstoppable. The largest societies in the UK (such as the Halifax and the 
Abbey National) had already decided to forgo their mutual status in exchange for 
public limited company status (see Table 2.3 of Section 2.5). This enabled them to 
operate under more relaxed regulations in order to expand their previously constrained 
operations predominantly in the area of mortgages and savings but also in the more 
broadly based financial activities permitted by the Banking Act of 1987. 
The Building Society Acts of 1986 and 1997 have transformed the market for housing 
loans from being a specialist lending market towards a group of profit oriented 
financial conglomerates, thus enabling the building society movement to become 
more fully integrated in to the financial services sector as a whole. Nevertheless, as 
Thompson (1997) notes, "the financial services industry is probably unique among the 
principal areas of economic activity in having an extensive sector of mutual firms 
which coexist with - and compete against - joint stock companies on an equal basis". 
2.5 MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS AND CONVERSIONS FROM MUTUAL TO 
PLC STATUS 
Over the past 10 years the UK building society industry has undergone perhaps the 
most dramatic changes in its entire 220 year history. The trends in both mergers and 
acquisitions and conversions to Plc status during the 1990s have threatened the very 
existence of the building society movement and as such are addressed below. Section 
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2.5.1 considers the trend in friendly mergers and acquisitions between societies and 
discusses a number of papers which have focused on explaining the motives for such 
activities. Section 2.5.2 then analyses how the Building Societies Act of 1986 has 
encouraged an increasing number of the remaining mutual societies to opt for Plc 
status, abandoning their mutuality in favour of greater legislative freedom. 
2.5.1 Merger and Acquisition Activity 
Table 2.2 below shows how the number of building societies has fallen since 1900, 
although it must be interpreted with care since up to 1980 some of the reduction in 
numbers could be attributed to terminating societies winding up their business rather 
than merger or acquisition activity58. Nevertheless, both the annual rate of decline in 
the number of societies and the proportion of assets involved in take-over activity is 
higher now than at any other time during the twentieth century59. The average value 
of mergers and amalgamations has tended to be higher than that of transfers of 
engagements, but the latter have generally been greater in number as one would expect 
given the way in which these activities are defined (see Section 2.3.1 of this chapter). 
Indeed, Lawrence (1995) predicts that as a result of recent and expected future 
mergers and conversions, the retail financial services industry will in future be 
dominated by between 10 and 15 national organisations offering a wide range of 
financial products. 
The academic literature on recent building society mergers, amalgamations and 
transfers of business has undoubtedly been sparse. Two recent papers dealing 
explicitly with merger and amalgamation activity among mutual financial institutions 
are, however, particularly worthy of attention. 
sa See Appendix 2.1 for a list of all transfers of engagements between 1980 and 1997. S9 In fact, mergers were not uncommon even in the nineteenth century, although not on the scale nor at the speed of those more recent alliances. 
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Table 2.2 : The Number of Building Societies, 1900 -1998 
Year No. of Year No. of 
Societies Societies 
1900 2286 1985 167 
1910 1723 1986 151 
1920 1271 1987 138 
1930 1026 1988 131 
1940 952 1989 126 
1950 819 1990 117 
1960 726 1991 110 
1970 481 1992 105 
1980 273 1993 101 
1981 253 1994 96 
1982 227 1995 94 
1983 206 1996 88 
1984 190 1997 82 
1998 71 
Source : Housing Finance 
Thompson (1997) and Ingham and Wong (1994) have examined the process of 
mergers and take-overs within the UK building society sector. It is noted that despite 
the high rates of friendly acquisition activity, the absence of hostile take-overs means 
that it may be impossible to discipline management if power is abused (unlike the 
management of a joint stock company). Hostile take-overs are essentially impossible 
in the building society industry due to the lack of a secondary market in ownership 
claims (owner members cannot sell their claims to any accumulated surplus on a 
secondary market), the operation of `one-member one-vote' rules (making ownership 
claims particularly diffuse and thus concerted action very weak) and regulatory 
restrictions (the 1986 Building Societies Act dictates that merger proposals must be 
endorsed by the board of the target society). Managerial probity is therefore upheld 
mainly by the threat of members withdrawing their business, which in the case of 
depositors could lead to the partial liquidation of the society60. As Thompson (1997) 
writes, "the costless economic action of exit dominates the political process of voice". 
The ease by which disenchanted members can transfer business to another society 
(which may better reflect their interests) and the availability of 90 per cent depositor 
60 In addition, since executive remuneration will likely depend on either the size of the society's 
retained profits, member benefits or both, management will be encouraged to maximise efficiency. 
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protection have both reduced the incentive to participate in the monitoring of the 
incumbent management. 
Thompson (1997) considers three possible reasons that a society may be subject to an 
intra-sector non-hostile take-over : 
" `natural selection' : the elimination of under-performing societies through the 
transfer of assets to those societies which may be better placed to use them. 
" societies that have been unsuccessful in achieving management objectives (in 
particular size, growth and earnings stability61) are more easily persuaded to accept 
a proposed merger or acquisition. In addition, incentives to accept take-over 
proposals have increased for those societies constrained from full diversification by 
the £100m asset threshold under the 1986 Building Societies Act. Although such 
expansion could occur through internal rather than external growth, the latter 
option has been more appealing as societies may not have had the internal 
resources to expand their management team rapidly enough. Smaller societies have 
also tended to have higher management expense ratios and administrative burdens; 
since the abandonment of the interest rate cartel in 1983, interest rate spreads are 
no longer generous enough to permit the survival of such societies. 
" where a society has financial problems (especially liquidity concerns) the regulator 
may encourage its take-over by another society in order to avert losses or 
bankruptcy and so ensure sectoral stability (for example the Woolwich take-over of 
the Town and Country building society in May 1992 whose financial problems 
were a result of over-exposure in the South East housing market during the late 
1980s62). The request to take-over a failing society by the BSC has never been 
mandatory, but larger societies do tend to look to the regulator for advice. 
61 Evidence is mixed on profitability due to the diverse nature of building societies' objective functions. 62 Ingham and Wong (1994) discuss how the risky policies undertaken by the Town and Country 
(including the offering of high loan to value ratios to high risk borrowers) may have contributed to the 
failure of its merger talks with the Leeds building society in July 1986. 
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Thompson's (1997) study estimates a pooled logit model over a sample of 90 per cent 
of all societies between 1981 and 1993 in which the probability of any society being 
taken over is dependent on a number of variables designed to reflect the three 
hypotheses outlined above. The findings of Thompson's study support both the 
managerial objectives hypothesis (that smaller societies or those with lower growth 
rates are more likely to be taken over) and also the regulatory persuasion argument 
(that societies with negative profits or lower levels of free reserves63 are more 
susceptible to acquisition). However, no evidence was found to support the natural 
selection hypothesis, with the coefficient on profitability (profits divided by assets) 
being negative but insignifican t64. 
The conclusions were noted to be similar to other studies on joint stock companies, a 
result which was deemed surprising given the differences between the structure of 
building societies and public limited companies (however, changes in mutual 
behaviour over the period of estimation may be able to account for this similarity). 
Thompson finds that the effects of building society size in the estimations disappear 
after the re-regulatory legislation of 1986, as acquisitions among medium sized 
societies were encouraged (rather than small societies being subsumed by larger ones) 
to escape the diversification restrictions on asset size. 
Although Thompson's work considers the motives of target societies to be acquired, it 
does not analyse the motives of the acquiring societies to partake in the transfer of 
assets. Gough (1979) and Barnes (1985) have found that little benefit accrues to the 
acquiring society during a take-over, a result that has also been found for publicly 
owned companies (it has been suggested that a reason for this is generally the 
acquirer's over-use of discretionary spending on the take-over). However, Jensen 
(1986) has observed that it may be the availability of large surpluses that governs the 
desire of the acquiring society to take over another given that all intra-sector 
63 Free reserves are defined to be actual reserves less required reserves; the variable used in 
Thompson's paper was divided by the society's asset base. 
64 This serves to indicate that profitability is not the only building society objective; a society that 
redistributes all of its potential profits as preferential interest rates to its members may be no more likely 
to approve a take-over than any other society. Perhaps Thompson would have been better off to indicate profitability and efficiency using a combination of a managerial expense ratio, interest margins 
(to measure liquidity), asset growth and the society's surplus. 
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acquisitions must be internally financed (the `free cash flow' theory of mergers). 
Finally, Ingham and Wong (1994) in their case studies of two failed intra-sector 
mergers suggest that a number of factors may be important to the two parties in their 
decision to merge : the duplication of branch networks and geographic diversification 
opportunities, managerial aspirations of size and growth, measures of performance 
and the compatibility of management, computer systems and business strategies. 
2.5.2 Conversion from Mutual to Plc Status 
Procedures were laid down in the Building Societies Act (1986) to allow building 
societies to renounce their mutuality and convert to Public Limited Companies (Pies), 
a power that formally became available to the societies from 1 January 1988. This 
involves the loss of mutual status of the converting society which would then require 
authorisation as a bank under the Banking Act of 1987. Since 1989, an increasing 
number of societies have either converted to Plc status, merged with an existing bank 
or have indeed done both (as with the case of the Halifax and the Leeds Building 
Societies, the merged institution being floated on the stock exchange during the 
summer of 1997; the combined group at the time of conversion held around 30 per 
cent of total building society assets). Table 2.3 below gives details of societies 
forgoing their mutual status in favour of company status via the means of either 
conversion, merger or take-over. 
The Building Societies Acts of 1986 and 1997 have been instrumental in causing the 
rise of the multipurpose financial intermediary and have encouraged societies to 
convert to company status. As is noted by Lawrence (1995), "the traditional 
boundaries which separate banks, building societies and insurers are becoming 
increasingly blurred" as building societies during the mid-1980s, "grasped the 
opportunity to sell insurance on the back of strong sales of mortgages and savings 
products". Hamnett (1994) confirms this tendency and writes that, "there has been a 
trend away from specialist lending circuits of housing finance towards a system in 
which the commercial banks and other financial institutions compete to lend". This 
has happened as societies have polarised into two distinct categories : 
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" larger societies which consider regulations to be over-restrictive and thus 
desire to 
become broader based multipurpose financial intermediaries by converting to Plc 
status 
" small and medium sized societies preferring to focus on traditional building society 
business, namely mortgages and savings. 
Table 2.3 : Building Societies Ending their Mutual Status 
Institution Merger/ Flotation Date Announcement Bid Size Market 
Take-over Date Cap. 
Date 
Abbey National N/A 12 July 1989 March 1988 N/A £9bn 
Lloyds and Cheltenham 1 August N/A April 1994 £1.8bn £9bn 
and Gloucester 1995 
Halifax and Leeds 1 August 2 June 1997 November 1994 N/A £9.8bn 
Permanent 1995 
Abbey National Plc and 5 August N/A July 1995 £l. 35bn N/A 
National & Provincial 1996 
Woolwich N/A 7 July 1997 January 1996 N/A £5.3bn 
Alliance and Leicester N/A 21 April 1997 February 1996 N/A £2.5bn 
Northern Rock N/A 1 October 1997 April 1996 N/A £lbn 
Bank of Ireland and 28 July N/A April 1996 £O. 6bn £4.6bn 
Bristol and West 1997 
Halifax and Birmingham 19 April N/A December 1998 £O. 75bn N/A 
Midshires 1999 
Bradford & Bingley N/A Expected 2000 April 1999 N/A £2. Sbn 
Take-overs/mergers: the dominant firm is indicated in bold. Conversions : institutions are indicated in 
normal font. N/A indicates that the data is either not available or not applicable. 
However the Bristol and West, who have recently been taken over by the Bank of 
Ireland, have attempted to retain their traditional role whilst becoming part of a wider 
corporate structure. In fact their slogan remains, `Mortgages, Savings, Investments ... 
And Nothing Else'. 
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This polarisation has stimulated competition between the two groups of societies and 
has made the task of the BSA in representing their collective views more difficult as 
society objectives have become more diverse (see Boddy (1991)). Subsequent 
conversions and competitive pressures amongst the societies have thus undermined 
the influence of the BSA to a considerable extent. 
The decision by a society to convert from mutual to company status can be thought of 
as depending upon a number of factors, which are discussed extensively below in the 
remainder of this section. 
(i) Perhaps the single most important motivating factor cited by building societies in 
their decision to convert has been their inability to generate sufficient capital to 
finance the development of their business whilst remaining in the mutual sector. As 
mutual institutions, building societies cannot issue shares, and as such only have their 
reserve capital upon which to draw (which in turn is dependent upon their annual 
surpluses) 65. On the other hand, as a public limited company, the financial institution 
would be obliged to service its share capital (in the way of both dividends and share 
price appreciation") in contrast to the cost-free reserve capital enjoyed under 
mutuality. In effect, the lower cost of servicing capital allows mutuality to pay 
dividends in the form of lower borrowing rates and higher savings rates than could 
otherwise be achieved as a publicly quoted company67. Examples of such schemes 
include that offered by the Yorkshire Building Society, where a minimum rate is 
offered on all savings accounts irrespective of the credit balance, and 'loyalty- 
mortgages' whereby the borrower receives a discount only if they have been a member 
of the society for a specified number of years68. Smith (1996c) states that, "those 
which do not produce similar schemes for `positive mutuality' may find themselves 
65 It must be noted that building societies can raise a limited amount of subordinated debt capital (i. e. an 
issue of debt whose holders have a claim on the assets of the society only after members claims have 
been satisfied). However, this route is less favoured than the raising of equity capital due to debt 
service obligations. 
" In fact, a higher overall required return by shareholders may necessitate a higher spread between asset 
and liability interest rates, which may have implications for the new company's competitive position. 67 This is the premise of Chapter-. 5 of the thesis, in which borrowers and savers receive financial 
benefits from their membership of the society to the extent that the society's saving (borrowing) rates 
are higher (lower) than any alternative use (source) of funds. 
68 Equivalent `loyalty-bonds' for savers are also offered by a number of societies. 
67 
heading the list of possible acquisitions by Plcs, because they are not seen as 
committed to remaining mutual". Whether such schemes can be maintained in the 
long term, given the increasing intensity of competition as more and more societies 
renounce their mutuality is, however, questionable. 
(ii) Related to the above argument, the freedom of banks to operate under a less 
restricted legislative framework than their mutual counterparts has also been 
particularly important in the decisions of societies to convert. Building societies are 
regulated in accordance with the Building Societies Acts of 1986 and 1997 whereas 
the banking sector is regulated by the Banking Act of 1987. The Building Societies 
Act of 1986 represented the first stage of convergence of the two regulatory 
frameworks, which along with substantial changes in the financial system has fuelled 
the desire for building societies to convert to Plc status. Despite the fact that the 
Building Societies Act of 1997 has gone one step further by lifting a number of 
additional restrictions on societies' business, the ultimate goal of regulatory 
harmonisation is still a long way off and the gulf between the legislative frameworks 
under which banks and building societies operate is still significantly wide enough to 
encourage de-mutualisation. Specifically, on the asset side societies have been 
restricted to channelling a large majority of their funds into mortgage lending (see 
Table 2.1 above) whilst on the liability side, they have been denied full access to the 
range of alternative sources of funding long enjoyed by the banking sector. As such, 
building societies were simultaneously exposed to the risks of rising retail deposit 
rates (especially in a world of heightened deposit inflow volatility - see Figure 2.4 
above), a slowdown in the housing market and increased competition in the provision 
of mortgage finance, all of which were characteristic of the early 1990s. It is hardly 
surprising, therefore, that a significant number of building societies made their plans 
to convert during the early to mid-1990s. 
This argument may prove especially important for those smaller societies whose 
exclusion from certain types of particularly lucrative asset business has considerably 
intensified such problems. Moreover, Marshall et al (1997) argue that since the 
departure of larger building societies from the movement will lead to further increases 
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in competitiveness in the market for financial products (including mortgages), those 
smaller societies remaining mutual may find it less easy to withstand bad risks. For 
fear of the onset of a financial crisis among the remaining societies, it is suggested that 
the Financial Services Authority may be encouraged to interpret existing building 
society regulation more rigorously, inducing further conversions from mutual to Plc 
status. Thus it is of no surprise that following the announcements of some of the 
larger societies to abandon their mutual status, there has been widespread speculation 
that some of the smaller societies may be subject to take-over bids given their 
particular susceptibility69. 
A final point to note on the regulatory side is that the Building Societies Act of 1986 
precluded any hostile take-over bid during the first 5 years of operation of the 
converted society70, which should clearly act to encourage de-mutualisation. In 
addition, this limited period of grace may stimulate efficiency in the newly floated 
company; as the Lex Column of the Financial Times (1996) writes, "if they have not 
achieved critical mass by then [5 years after the flotation], they will be sitting ducks". 
(iii) It has been alleged that a positive aspect of conversion is that investors will gain a 
share of the society's reserves in the form of a windfall cash bonus on conversion. 
This can be seen as a fallacious argument for two reasons. Firstly, any such reserve 
payouts will undoubtedly be diluted to the extent that new members join the society 
purely for speculative reasons. Secondly, the argument breaks down due to the 'bird- 
in-the-hand' fallacy; by receiving cash bonuses, investors and borrowers in aggregate 
will be no better off than they would have been had they received the distribution in 
the form of increased savings rates or lower mortgage rates. In fact, the costs of 
conversion will mean that benefits accruing to members in the form of cash bonuses 
may be less than those arising from the adoption of favourable interest rates under 
mutuality. Nevertheless, the benefits of conversion are all apparent to the society's 
members and thus conversion is likely to be favoured over mutuality. 
69 Indeed, some have argued that the motivation of the lesser sized societies to renounce their mutuality 
in favour of share ownership (examples include Northern Rock and the Alliance and Leicester) has been 
to avoid the possibility of a future contested take-over bid. 
70 This is the case unless at least 75 per cent of its shareholders vote to remove protection or the newly 
converted society acquires a financial services institution during that time. 
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Indeed, the precedent for a cash or share distribution on the conversion of a society 
has now been set, making the whole process of becoming a Plc more expensive for the 
institution involved. Lawrence (1995) writes that, "the higher stakes will make it 
harder for the directors of building societies to persuade members that it is in their 
interest to give up their membership rights unless they realise some significant value 
from it". Building societies that have thus far decided to remain mutual (examples 
include the Nationwide, Skipton and Britannia) have been subject to considerable 
speculation that they may either convert or merge with a rival society. It is noted by 
Marshall et al (1997) that the latter is a more risky strategy given that the merger 
announcement may encourage a non-mutual financial institution (with access to 
considerably more funds) to make a more lucrative offer for the society, thus 
removing it from the mutual sector. The remaining mutual societies have attempted to 
detract potential speculation by cutting their margins (i. e., lowering their mortgage 
rate and raising their deposit rate) and making `pro-mutual' statements. The 
Nationwide, Britannia and Yorkshire building societies (among others) have even 
gone as far as to require that any new members (as of 2 November 1997 and 8 April 
1998 for the first two respectively) donate any benefits they may receive if the society 
were to convert to company status to a charity set up by the society if the conversion 
were to take place within five years of becoming a member. Clearly, the modification 
of the 1986 Act to avoid speculative inflows into societies by requiring depositors to 
have held investment accounts for at least two years to qualify for compensation has 
not had its desired effect. 
Of course, this has led to a considerable amount of speculative deposits being 'locked- 
in' to those building societies converting to Plc status; funds have become less mobile 
as depositors await their bonus payout (the Halifax conversion, for example, took two 
and a half years to complete). This has allowed converting societies to pay a lower 
rate of interest on retail funds than the market would normally require although newly 
converted societies may find it difficult to keep such funds after flotation is completed 
without substantial increases in their deposit interest rate. 
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(iv) Following a rise in competition among mortgage providers, the spate of recent 
conversions and mergers in the housing finance industry has suggested that there may 
be over-supply in the mortgage market. This excess capacity has occurred as a 
reduction in housing market transactions has significantly reduced the demand for 
mortgages whilst increased competition between lenders has acted to increase 
mortgage supply. 
The downturn in the housing market during the early 1990s essentially resulted from a 
higher perceived risk involved in the purchase of a house (as a result of dramatic 
interest rate rises and the onset of recession). Marshall et al (1997) suggest that low 
inflation reduced the demand for housing as potential buyers could no longer rely on 
either increases in income to ease the burden of mortgage payments71 or the prospect 
of capital gains on the housing asset. In addition, the labour market deteriorated 
rapidly during the recession of the early 1990s accompanied by a fall in job tenure, 
both of which operated to restrict the demand for mortgage finance. 
Figure 2.11 : The Real Cost of MIRAS and the Option Mortgage Scheme (OMS) to 











Source : Inland Revenue Statistics 
71 It is important to note that this view of the effect of inflation on mortgage demand is contrary to that 
presented in Chapter 3 of the thesis, in which the `tilt' effect of higher inflation is seen as a deterrent to households taking on long term debt. 
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Another important factor influencing the weakening of the mortgage market during 
this period was the increase in the debt burden of mortgage holders resulting from 
changes to government policy. The real value of MIRAS, for example, has declined 
significantly during the 1990s as illustrated in Figure 2.11 above. Finally, demand 
had been depressed by a decline in the number of first time buyers resulting from the 
fall in the birth rate during the early 1970s. 
This market contraction further encouraged competitive pricing in the industry and 
thus required dramatic rationalisation to reduce costs in order that margins may be 
defended, with all converting societies announcing plans to do as such (Leyshon and 
Thrift (1993) refer to this rationalisation as `restructuring for profit'). This has 
involved making more productive use of staff which in turn has led to job cuts in the 
building society sector. As is discussed in the Lex column of the Financial Times 
(1996), "with core markets stagnant, financial services businesses need to boost 
earnings by cutting costs - which is much easier through consolidation. Medium-sized 
societies ... face a tough 
fight for independence". The Halifax, for example, 
announced a year prior to its flotation that it would be cutting staff in its process of 
rationalisation, although new jobs were to be created as a result of product 
diversification (most notably in telephone banking and insurance). In addition, some 
mutuals announced plans to rationalise their cost structure (for example Bradford and 
Bingley prior to its decision to float). It is suggested that societies can more easily 
engage in this new rationalisation occurring throughout the financial services industry 
if they become Plcs rather than remain in the mutual sector since corporate status can 
offer them the ability to diversify in a financial market characterised by an over-supply 
of mortgages. Related to this argument is the fact that becoming a Plc means that the 
management must be more accountable to its shareholders which could be expected to 
encourage the process of rationalisation even further. Cost cutting rationalisation is 
expected to lead to, "a scaling back of the high street representation of financial 
organisations" (Smith (1996a)). 
Indeed, Drake (1989) points out that in increasing their size of operation through de- 
mutualisation, societies have been able to benefit from significant economies of scale. 
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It is generally agreed in the literature that economies of scale in the building society 
industry have primarily operated through the more efficient use of capital and lower 
average operating and funding costs. In addition, geographical economies have also 
played an important role given that many of the remaining societies are regionally 
based72. 
Nevertheless, one must not lose sight of the fact that some costs will undoubtedly rise 
for newly converted societies. Specifically, de-mutualisation has tended to be 
associated with increased management costs to the extent that the new company must 
serve its shareholders and is required to provide more comprehensive financial 
reports. As Lawrence (1995) writes, conversion will, "put the organisation and its 
directors under the microscope of reporting that goes with public ownership". In 
addition, the diversification of activities into new and growing business (which has 
inevitably occurred following conversions) means that expenses may be harder to 
control. It is also argued that it is the culture of `new mutuality' (referring to 
remaining mutual societies becoming more staunchly protective of their mutual status) 
rather than de-mutualisation that encourages greater accountability. 
As we have seen above, there are a number of significant and permanent benefits that 
may be achieved by building societies (and indeed their members/shareholders) from 
de-mutualisation. Nevertheless, there are non-trivial costs involved in the process of 
conversion, but these tend to be short-lived and are generally outweighed by the long 
run financial gains. As such, in the current regulatory climate one would be hard- 
pushed to argue the case for mutuality. 
2.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has examined the nature of the mortgage market in the UK from its 
beginnings in the eighteenth century up until the present day. Attention is focused on 
the more recent developments in the market that have occurred since 1970 and 
72 Ingham and Wong (1994) point out that (failed) merger talks between the Leeds building society and 
the Town and Country in 1986 were largely based on the benefits of geographic diversification, with the 
power base of the former being in the North of England and the latter in the South. 
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particularly during the 1980s and 1990s. A number of competing theories of how the 
mortgage market interacts with the economy as a whole were addressed in Section 2.2, 
with the consensus emerging that both the housing and mortgage markets have 
generally exhibited pro-cyclical rather than counter-cyclical behaviour. 
Against the historical background of the evolution of the market for mortgage finance, 
Section 2.3 analysed the development of the mortgage market post 1970. The reasons 
for the domination of building societies over any other form of financial institution in 
the market prior to the 1980s is discussed, following which we turn to the legislative 
changes during the 1980s and 1990s and the way in which they have acted to alter the 
balance between (most notably) bank and building society mortgage lending. Since 
1980 the market has moved from one characterised by considerable mortgage 
rationing in which mortgage and deposit rates were set collectively to the present day 
situation in which both banks and building societies compete vigorously against each 
other in order to maintain market share. 
The legislation under which building societies (and banks) operate in the mortgage 
market was considered in Section 2.4, acting as a precursor to an analysis of the trends 
in mergers, amalgamations and conversions within the mutual sector. Over the 220 
years of building society operations, up until only recently (1989) they have managed 
to retain their mutuality whilst undergoing dramatic changes in their financial 
structure. They have evolved from relatively unconnected groups of individuals to 
become major players as financial intermediaries with their present balance sheet 
structure being shaped by a combination of both practical experience and numerous 
changes in the legislative framework which have governed their operation. However, 
with competition across the spectrum of financial services becoming more intense, the 
restrictive nature of building society legislation would suggest a short future for 
mutual financial institutions. Unless further regulatory efforts are made to create a 
more level playing field, the trend in de-mutualisation is unlikely to cease. 
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CHAPTER 3 
The Effect of General Price Inflation on Long Term Mortgage 
Finance 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
During the past 25 years, the UK has witnessed periods of high and volatile rates of 
inflation. In contrast to the periods of relative general price level stability observed 
during the 1950s and 1960s, extraordinarily high rates of inflation were experienced 
throughout the 1970s (and into the early 1980s) reaching a peak of 26.5 per cent in the 
third quarter of 1975. However, after reaching a local peak of 21.5 per cent in the 
second quarter of 1980, the rate of inflation fell sharply as a result of the tighter 
monetary policies of the new Conservative government. 













In addition to the important implications of general price inflation per se, through its 
effect on nominal interest rates inflation has adverse effects on all sectors of the 
economy, and none more so than on that of housing. In fact, it is generally agreed that 
especially high, variable and unpredictable inflation and nominal interest rates have 
led to considerable turbulence in the housing and mortgage markets. Nevertheless, it 
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will be seen in this chapter that even a moderate level of inflation which is fully 
anticipated can cause serious financing problems for borrowers in the market for 
mortgage finance. 
This chapter is organised as follows. The distortions caused by inflation in the market 
for finance in general are considered in Section 3.2, which is intended to serve as an 
introduction to the more specific problems that arise when dealing with long term 
mortgage finance. This is the subject matter of Section 3.3, where the `front-loading' 
or `tilting' of real mortgage payments towards the initial years of the loan as a result of 
general price inflation is explored. Of course, this increase in real mortgage payments 
during the initial years of the loan will have the effect of increasing the likelihood of 
default (which is the central theme of the following chapter) and, ceteris paribus, 
reducing mortgage demand (which is explored in Chapters 6 and 7). Section 3.4 then 
goes on to show that in the presence of inflation it is the shortcomings of the 
traditional mortgage instrument that are the cause of the tilt problem, and as such the 
effectiveness of a number of alternative mortgage designs are reviewed as a means to 
mitigating or even eliminating the problem. Finally, Section 3.5 presents the 
summary and conclusions. 
3.2 THE GENERAL DISTORTIONS CAUSED BY INFLATION 
In order that the real value of any asset or contract may be maintained during periods 
in which there is a non-zero rate of inflation, there must be an equivalent change in the 
nominal value of such transactions. In the market for credit, for example, if the 
adjustment in the nominal rate of interest which results from a change in the actual or 
expected inflation rate is allowed to be undertaken freely, then one would expect there 
to be fewer real distortions in the market than if controls were imposed on attempts to 
adjust contracts for inflation. 
The terms of a contract specifying loan arrangements which are made in advance will 
take into account the rate of inflation expected during that contract period. However, 
from past experience, when the general price level has been volatile expectations of 
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future inflation have tended to be unreliable and financial contracts (especially those 
specified over long periods of time such as mortgage loans) have become more 
problematic to agree, the reasons for which are twofold. Firstly, if actual future 
inflation exceeds (falls short of) expectations, then creditors will lose (gain) and 
debtors gain (lose). Assuming that all available information at the beginning of the 
contract period is used to forecast the rate of inflation over the duration of the loan, 
the difference between the predicted and actual rates of inflation should be randomly 
distributed with a mean of zero; therefore, the gains and losses to borrowers and 
savers as a result of unexpected inflation should be entirely arbitrary in nature. 
Secondly, not only may creditors and debtors hold differing expectations as to the 
future path of inflation, but they may also attach a different level of importance to the 
perceived gains or losses which they would face given unexpected inflation'. 
Therefore, the higher is the rate of inflation, the lower will be the level of lending 
activity as financial contracts will require more regular renegotiation involving 
additional (and perhaps prohibitive) costs. This turns out to be important when we 
consider later in the chapter a number of alternative mortgage designs; here, varying 
expectations of future interest rates will lead to different borrowers choosing various 
instruments to finance the purchase of their house. As Goodman (1992a) points out, 
for example, "ARMs [adjustable rate mortgages] give homeowners the option ... of 
switching from long term to short term credit (rather than postponing their purchase) 
when they think interest rates are abnormally high" [emphasis added]. 
With specific reference to the housing market, Kearl (1978) tests empirically the 
hypothesis that inflation does not distort the proportional change in house prices in 
order to draw conclusions about the effect of inflation on the demand for housing. 
Using US data over the period 1963 to 1973, the relative change in house prices is 
estimated as a function of the excess demand for housing (assumed to capture any 
structural shift in the housing market) and the expected proportional change in the 
general price index. If the null hypothesis were true (that inflation indeed does not 
distort the proportional change in house prices), then it must be the case that the 
coefficient on the price expectation term will equal unity (i. e. house prices are 
In addition, each income group may face a different actual rate of inflation to the extent that they 
purchase different baskets of goods. 
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homogenous of degree zero with respect to inflation); in fact the null hypothesis is 
rejected, suggesting that expected prices are not fully incorporated into house price 
changes (or, that inflation is not neutral with respect to the housing market)2. As we 
will see throughout this chapter, an important way in which such distortions enter the 
market for housing are through the combination of liquidity constraints and capital 
market imperfections, which affect the ability of the borrower to fund repayments on 
the mortgage loan. 
Not only does inflation per se cause inefficiencies in the negotiation of financial 
contracts, but additional and important distortions in the market for finance occur 
when inflation is accompanied by externally imposed interest rate restrictions. One 
such example in the UK has been the BSA rate fixing cartel (operating up to 1983). 
The effects of an interest rate fixing agreement will clearly be dependent on the 
prevailing rate of inflation, and in the case of the BSA cartel was specified during a 
period of relative price stability in order to impose what Sandilands (1980) terms a 
"reasonable maximum" on the building societies' mortgage portfolio returns. 
However, the subsequent rise in the inflation rate during the 1970s meant that the 
interest rate `ceiling' began to bind which, as we have discussed in the previous 
chapter, led to a considerable degree of mortgage rationing. By encouraging mortgage 
borrowing to the detriment of saving, the resulting negative real rates of mortgage 
interest during the 1970s3 had the effect of stimulating consumption (both housing and 
non-housing), which served only to fuel inflation and led to further distortionary 
effects. 
2 See equation (4.7) in Section 4.2.1 of Chapter 4 for a formal proof that inflation will have the effect of raising real house prices. 
3 During the mid-1970s the real rate of interest on both savings and mortgages in the UK became 
negative for almost three years. 
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3.3 THE EFFECT OF INFLATION ON LONG TERM MORTGAGE FINANCE 
3.3.1 The 'Front-Loading' or 'Tilt' Problem 
General price inflation causes a number of distortions in the market for mortgage 
finance. For example, a real estate investor may take into account the rate at which 
house prices appreciate relative to the rate at which general prices are rising when 
deciding whether or not to purchase a dwelling. However, we generally take account 
of such decisions by modelling the housing and mortgage markets in constant price 
terms (i. e. the real demand for housing and mortgages, the real house price and the 
real rate of mortgage interest). In the remainder of this chapter we address the 
problem of the `front-loading' (or `tilting') of the stream of real mortgage payments. 
It is particularly important to consider this issue separately here since in the 
theoretical models of intertemporal housing consumption and mortgage demand 
presented later in the thesis, it has not been possible to incorporate this effect 
explicitly (unlike all other distortions created by the presence of general price 
inflation). One would hope to glean from the remainder of this chapter an insight into 
the appropriate specification of the demand for mortgage finance with regard to the 
inclusion of variables to proxy the effect of the front loading problem4. 
Under certain conditions within the market for mortgage finance, the front-loading 
problem is characterised by the borrower being forced to make higher real payments 
during the early years of the loan than under circumstances of zero inflation. The size 
of the initial real payment and the speed with which the real payments decline 
throughout term of the mortgage will then depend positively on the rate of inflation. 
As Lessard and Modigliani (1975) note for the US housing and mortgage markets 
between 1965 to 1975, "the recurrent crises which have plagued the housing industry 
in the last decade can be largely traced to the interaction of a rising and variable rate 
of inflation with two major institutional features .... [the] almost exclusive reliance on 
4 One may conceivably include a combination of any two of the following three variables in the 
equation of the demand for mortgage finance : the nominal mortgage rate, the real mortgage rate and the 
rate of inflation. Including all three would result in a multicollinearity problem (since they are linked 
according to the Fisher equation) and the use of only one would result in the standard demand and tilt 
effects not being independently accounted for in the mortgage (or housing) demand equation. 
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the traditional fully amortised, level payment mortgage .... and overwhelming 
dependence for mortgage funds on thrift institutions which secure the bulk of their 
funds through relatively short term deposits". Thus it is especially the coexistence of 
high and variable rates of inflation with the conventional level payment (often called 
`French') unindexed mortgage loan that leads to and exacerbates the front-loading 
problem. 
To examine in more detail the mechanism through which the tilt effect occurs, we first 
note that the Fisher effects implies that the nominal mortgage interest rate will rise by 
an `inflation premium' commensurate with the level of current or expected future 
inflation. Thus for any particular house value and loan to value ratio, the required 
annuitised payment will, in nominal terms, be higher than if inflation were zero. 
Nevertheless, this will not alter the sum of the real payments of interest and principal 
over the duration of the loan. In fact, the present value of the stream of annuitised 
payments over the life of the loan will remain the same irrespective of the rate of 
inflation. However, the inflation-induced increase in the nominal interest rate will 
affect the intertemporal distribution of the real annuitised payments. When inflation is 
zero, the real value of each payment will remain constant over the duration of the 
loan; when nominal interest rates are raised by a non-zero inflation premium, there 
will be, "an increase in the level of real payments in the early years of the contract 
with a commensurate reduction in the later years" (Lessard and Modigliani (1975)). 
Following Lessard and Modigliani, these propositions may be illustrated using a 
simple numerical example. Imagine that the initial mortgage debt of a borrower is 
£50,000 with an amortisation period of 25 years based on a fixed payment of interest 
and principal once a year at the end of the year7. It will also be assumed that the real 
s The Fisher effect defines the relationship between the real and nominal rates of interest (pm and r,, 
respectively) and the rate of inflation ('r) as (1 + rm) = (1 + pm)(1 +; r) . 
6 Essentially, the rise in the nominal rate of interest occurs as a result of the lender maintaining a 
constant real rate of return on the mortgage portfolio. 
Although the majority of UK mortgages are variable rate mortgages, the tilt effect remains important 
in such circumstances as we will see later. In addition, mortgage repayments tend to be scheduled 
monthly rather than on an annual basis. The standard level payment mortgage instrument being 
amortised with annual payments is used here to illustrate the front loading problem purely for ease of 
exposition. 
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interest rate is constant at 3 per cent per year, and that the income of the borrower 
(with an initial level of £15,000) grows at 2 per cent per year in real terms. Table 3.1 
below shows the effect of different rates of inflation on the nominal and real annual 
payments, the income of the borrower and the ratio of the nominal annuitised payment 
to nominal borrower income8. 













0% Inflation 1 2871.39 2871.39 15300.00 18.77 
3% Nominal 5 2871.39 2871.39 16561.21 17.34 
Interest Rate 10 2871.39 2871.39 18284.92 15.70 
15 2871.39 2871.39 20188.03 14.22 
20 2871.39 2871.39 22289.21 12.88 
25 2871.39 2871.39 24609.09 11.67 
2% Inflation 1 3547.62 3478.06 15600.00 22.74 
5% Nominal 5 3547.62 3213.19 18249.79 19.44 
Interest Rate 10 3547.62 2910.28 22203.66 15.98 
15 3547.62 2635.93 27014.15 13.13 
20 3547.62 2387.45 32866.85 10.79 
25 3547.62 2162.38 39987.54 8.87 
4% Inflation 1 4290.53 4125.51 15900.00 26.98 
7% Nominal 5 4290.53 3526.50 20073.38 21.37 
Interest Rate 10 4290.53 2898.53 26862.72 15.97 
15 4290.53 2382.38 35948.37 11.94 
20 4290.53 1958.14 48107.03 8.92 
25 4290.53 1609.45 64378.06 6.66 
8% Inflation 1 5937.01 5497.23 16500.00 35.98 
11% Nominal 5 5937.01 4040.63 24157.65 24.58 
Interest Rate 10 5937.01 2749.98 38906.14 15.26 
15 5937.01 1871.59 62658.72 9.48 
20 5937.01 1273.77 100912.50 5.88 
25 5937.01 866.91 162520.60 3.65 
a An illustration of how the real repayments required of the borrower will change as a result of a variable rate of inflation over the duration of the loan is shown in Table A3.2.1 of Appendix 3.2. 
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Examining Table 3.1 above, when there is zero inflation the real value of the 
annuitised payment will clearly remain unchanged throughout the amortisation period 
of the mortgage loan. The nominal annual payment of £2871.39 (denoted m below) is 
calculated using the formula for the present value of an annuity given by equation 





where M is the amount of the mortgage loan, r,  is the nominal mortgage rate of 
interest per period and n is the number of annuity payments. With zero inflation, the 
annual mortgage payments represent almost 19 per cent of the borrower's income in 
the first year falling to 11.67 per cent in terminal year of the contract. 
The remaining three cases illustrate how a positive fully anticipated rate of inflation 
affects the real and nominal annual payments, borrower income and the payment to 
income ratio. As the inflation rate rises to 2,4 and 8 per cent, the mortgage rate is 
raised by an equivalent amount9 and the nominal annual payments increase by 23.6, 
49.4 and 106.8 per cent respectively over that of the zero inflation case. This rise in 
the nominal annuitised payments occurs in order to offset the decline in the real value 
of each payment over the length of the loan (see column of Table 3.1 entitled `Real 
Annual Payment', calculated as R(m) =m/ (1 +'r) `, where ;r is the constant rate of 
inflation and t is the point in time at which the real value is calculated). 
Focusing specifically on the second case in which there is a constant and fully 
anticipated rate of inflation of 2 per cent (implying a nominal interest rate of 5 per 
cent given that the real rate of interest remains constant at 3 per cent), the real 
annuitised payments will decline at a rate of approximately 2 per cent per year, i. e. 
approximately at the rate of inflation. To recapitulate, therefore, if we were to assume 
zero inflation then real mortgage payments will remain constant throughout the life of 
9 For simplicity, the nominal rate of interest is taken to be the sum of the real interest rate and the rate of inflation, which is a reasonable approximation to the Fisher equation. 
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the loan, whereas with a non-zero rate of inflation real payments in the initial years of 
the loan will begin higher and decline to a lower level than that of the zero inflation 
case. In the example given above, when the inflation rate is 8 per cent the initial real 
payment will be almost twice the zero inflation level and the final real payment will 
represent less than one sixth of its initial value (or slightly above 30 per cent of the 
zero inflation level). 









-"-- 0% Inflation 
2% Inflation 
--- 4% Inflation 
8% Inflation 
Both Table 3.1 and Figure 3.2 above indicate clearly that the tilting of real payments 
towards the beginning of the loan and away from the final years of the mortgage 
contract is made significantly more pronounced the greater is the inflation rate1°. It is 
important to recognise also that under the standard level payment mortgage it is not 
simply the current rate of inflation that is the cause of the front loading effect. Indeed, 
given a positive expected future rate of inflation, even when current inflation is zero 
the mortgage lender will want to raise nominal interest rates by an inflation premium 
to cover the expected rise in the future cost of funds. 
10 Additionally, with a higher rate of inflation the build up of housing equity will be more rapid during 
the early years of the loan. 
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To elaborate, the use of the standard level payment mortgage ensures that the risk of 
inflation turning out to be greater than expected lies wholly with the lender. In taking 
account of the rate of inflation expected during the period of the mortgage contract, 
Scott et al (1993) note that the inflation premium will lead to a higher initial debt 
burden and, "an affordability problem in periods of high and volatile inflation" acting 
to deter especially those younger borrowers from the mortgage market. 
The example above suggests that the burden of a mortgage loan to a householder is 
related as much to the schedule of real payments as it is to the total interest cost. For 
the borrower, there is thus a considerable difference between paying 3 per cent interest 
on the given initial debt over the 25 year amortisation period with no inflation and 
paying 7 per cent interest on the same debt and over the same period when the annual 
rate of inflation stands at 4 per cent. During the early years of the debt, a mortgage 
loan with a high nominal interest rate will carry with it a substantially greater real 
burden than one with the same real but lower nominal interest rate. Thus for a given 
real interest rate, a higher rate of inflation will raise the nominal mortgage interest rate 
by a commensurate amount and will increase the initial mortgage debt burden. The 
real value of the borrowers debt service payments will then decline more rapidly in 
subsequent years, eventually falling below the constant real payment observed in a 
non-inflationary environment. However, it is important to reiterate that the present 
value of the stream of mortgage payments will remain the same whether the situation 
is one of fully anticipated or zero inflation; it is only the timing of real payments that 
is subject to change. 
3.3.2 Front-Loading and the Demand for Mortgage Finance and Housing 
It has been described above how the incidence of general price inflation may act so as 
to `tilt' the stream of real mortgage payments towards the initial years of the loan and 
away from the terminal years. There are two important effects which result from the 
problem of front-loading. Firstly, if the increase in inflation is not anticipated then 
those borrowers who have already purchased a dwelling with a mortgage loan (and 
indeed those who continue to demand mortgage finance) will be more likely to default 
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on the loan than they would in the absence of unexpected inflation since they will face 
an unforseen fall in their real disposable income and an unexpected rise in the 
payment to income ratio (see Chapter 4 for a discussion of the effect of the tilt 
problem on the recent trends in mortgage arrears and possessions in the housing 
market). Secondly, with (potential) borrowers facing greater difficulty in servicing the 
debt in the initial years of the loan when inflation is high, the demand for long term 
mortgage finance and thus also the demand for owner occupied housing will be 
reduced as households either purchase a lower quantity or quality of housing or even 
postpone their decision to buy". However, the demand for mortgages (and thus 
housing) will be reduced only for those households who have insufficient finances to 
satisfy the schedule of increased real payments during the initial years of the loan. 
Moreover, this is only true when financial markets are imperfect, since with perfect 
capital markets, borrowers would face no constraint in raising additional finance to 
fund the initial higher real payments (based on their future rising real income stream 
as collateral) 12. However, as Scott et al (1993) point out, "home buyers are unable to 
take advantage of expected increases in future incomes when attempting to qualify for 
the relatively high fixed payments of the FRM [fixed rate or `level payment' 
mortgage]". Indeed, it is generally the case that financial intermediaries will not make 
unsecured personal loans to borrowers for the purpose of repaying loan interest; 
assuming that there has not been sufficient time for the accumulation of unwithdrawn 
equity in the housing asset, nor will second mortgages normally be authorised. In 
addition, lenders in the past have tended not to make allowances for inflation-induced 
higher real payments by lengthening the maturity of the mortgage loan or increasing 
the loan to value ratio. 
11 Mortgage default carries with it a cost (see Brookes, Dicks and Pradhan (1994)) and thus the higher 
is the probability of default, the higher will be the expected user cost of owner occupation and the lower 
the demand for housing. In future work in modelling the demand for housing and mortgage finance it 
may prove informative to incorporate a measure of the expected cost to the borrower of mortgage 
arrears and possession in the expression for the user cost (see Chapter 4 for a discussion). 
12 As Hendershott and Hu (1981) note, "the unaffordability argument pertains to a perceived 
disequilibrium where inflation induced financial constraints hold effective housing demand below the 
equilibrium level". The reason for this is that initial repayments take a larger portion of household 
income when inflation is high, forcing households to substitute between housing, current and future 
consumption (where possible) and savings. 
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Despite the fact that both of these latter two measures would go some way to 
mitigating the higher initial real payments resulting from inflation, the former could 
accommodate only a very moderate rate of inflation and would be achieved at the 
expense of increasing the cumulative interest burden. In addition, any rise in the loan 
to value ratio would increase the moral hazard risk borne by the lender during the 
early years of the contract. In fact, a number of studies have found that lengthening 
maturity or raising the loan to value ratio have only a limited effect on the demand for 
mortgage credit and also on the number of housing starts. 
Not only will higher inflation influence borrowers to choose to take on lower levels of 
mortgage debt (and therefore consume fewer housing services) but will also cause an 
increase in borrowers' payment to income ratios (see final column of Table 3.1) 
thereby increasing the likelihood that potential mortgagors will be constrained by the 
prudential criteria of the lending institution (lower income borrowers may therefore be 
priced out of the market). As Alm and Follain (1984) note, "these liquidity 
constraints create a mismatch between the time sequence of mortgage payments and 
income" which, "reduces the number of borrowers who qualify for financing and that 
limits the value of the house purchased by those who do obtain financing". 
Additionally, the mortgage lender may limit the size of the mortgage in order to 
maintain a desired payment to income ratio during the initial years of the mortgage 
contract, implying the value of housing that may be acquired is limited by the 
borrowers initial income to a considerable extent13. In fact, it is stated by Sandilands 
(1980) that, "with relatively moderate rates of inflation .... positive real rates of 
interest cannot be imposed on long term debts without seriously curtailing demand for 
funds since it is unusual for lending institutions to allow borrowers' initial debt 
service payments to exceed about 30 per cent of income". A rise in the borrower's 
payment to income ratio due to higher inflation or a reduction in the initial payment to 
income constraint implies that where the ratio in the first year for a mortgage of 
certain size exceeds the specified maximum, a smaller mortgage must be issued 
resulting in a larger downpayment being required of the borrower for any particular 
Although mortgage lenders do occasionally restrict the payment to income ratio, it is more usual to 
specify prudential rationing criteria in terms of the loan to value and loan to income ratios. 
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house value. This tends to discourage mortgage 
borrowing and serves again to either 
scale down housing demand or prolong the purchase until 
the household has 
accumulated sufficient additional assets to meet the enlarged 
downpayment. 
















ý' ýýýý ý_ 
---- 0% Inflation 
--""-" 2% Inflation 
--- 4% Inflation 
8% Inflation 
Figure 3.3 above shows the behaviour of the payment to income ratio over time in a 
world of inflation under the circumstances described in the previous numerical 
example. We saw in Table 3.1 that if inflation rose from 2 per cent to 8 per cent, the 
proportion of a borrower's income consumed by mortgage debt service for the first 
annuitised payment would increase from around 23 per cent to 36 per cent despite the 
fact that the real interest rate remained unchanged at 3 per cent. It may also be 
observed that the higher is inflation the more significant will be the fall in the ratio of 
the annual nominal payment to income ratio over the life of the loan. The reason for 
this is that an increase in the fully anticipated rate of inflation will affect mortgage 
payments immediately, whereas borrower income is only affected over time. It is also 
worth noting that even in the absence of inflation, the ratio will decline as a direct 
result of the assumption that nominal income increases over time according to some 
predetermined rule; nevertheless, through higher inflation the tilt effect will 
exacerbate this decline (see Figure 3.3 above). The large increase in the debt service 
ratio during the initial years of the loan due to a rise in the inflation rate could prove 
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prohibitive to many potential borrowers and cause payment problems for those who 
take out the mortgage under the influence of money illusion. 
As we discussed above, the reduced demand for mortgage finance in the presence of 
inflation is not only caused by higher annual real repayments but also by the effect on 
the borrower's ability to meet the initial downpayment constraint. In the example 
above, the loan to value ratio is implicitly assumed to be 100 per cent, although in the 
majority of cases borrowers will be required to fund a certain portion of the house 
purchase (the downpayment). This is important to the extent that high inflation is 
often associated with low or negative real returns on financial assets (the UK during 
the mid-1970s provides a good example) and, as Hendershott and Villani (1977) 
comment, "households holding financial instruments are thus not able to meet [the] 
higher nominal downpayment as quickly as they would have in the absence of 
inflation". 
An additional point to note is that although this thesis will be dealing with the 
aggregate demand for (and supply of) mortgage finance, it is clear that the front 
loading problem will affect different types of households in different ways. One 
would expect the effect to be more substantial for households who have a strong 
desire for owner occupation yet rely on the availability of mortgage credit. This group 
tends to be made up of first time buyers (i. e. early in the life cycle) with average levels 
of income who desire mortgage credit based on high loan to value ratios. 
Alternatively, for households who have had a chance to accumulate assets (generally 
middle aged families further on in the life cycle) the high initial real annual repayment 
and payment to income ratio pose less of a burden since these can be satisfied by 
using savings rather than decreasing consumption; this group essentially has a greater 
ability to absorb higher inflation and thus higher nominal interest rates. Indeed this is 
true for any group of borrowers who can meet the higher real repayments through an 
adjustment to their existing asset portfolio rather than a reduction in their priority 
living expenses. 
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Only a limited number of studies have attempted to take into consideration the tilt 
effect in empirically modelling the demand for housing. Kearl (1979), for example, 
proposes a simple empirical model of the housing market whereby the interaction of a 
fixed housing stock and the demand for housing yields an equilibrium real house price 
equation. The tilt effect is then accounted for by the inclusion of terms representing 
the initial repayment on a standard fixed rate mortgage and the elasticity of the 
repayment stream with respect to the nominal interest rate (the `duration'), both of 
which are significantly negative in the house price equation as the tilt phenomenon 
would suggest (the equation is estimated on US data over the period 1961 to 1973). It 
is suggested that through its effect on house prices, the tilt effect will reduce 
constructors profit margins and thereby also the production of new houses, possibly 
intensifying cyclical movements in the housing market. Finally, simulations confirm 
that real house prices would have been substantially higher if an indexed mortgage 
contract had been available (through its effect on demand). A similar study to that of 
Kearl is provided by Thom (1983) who estimates a real house price equation over the 
period 1971 to 1980 on Irish data. Again, the use of the duration measure for the 
stream of real repayments and the level of the annuitised payment appear negatively in 
the price equation, echoing the findings of Kearl's study for the US'4. 
Schwab (1982), using a more integrated approach than previous studies, presents a 
two period model of housing demand from which he is able to prove theoretically the 
non-neutrality of inflation on the demand for housing and quantify the response of 
demand to changes in inflation. In the model, a representative consumer is assumed 
to maximise intertemporal utility subject to a budget constraint and a zero non- 
mortgage borrowing restriction. A negative elasticity of housing demand with respect 
to the rate of inflation is shown, although simulations undertaken suggest that the 
elasticity is small at -0.2 (relative to that on the real rate of interest of -0.6) as is the 
welfare loss incurred by the postponement of the housing purchase. A criticism of 
14 There was also found to be an inflation induced reduction of the after-tax user cost of capital given the increased tax benefits from the MIRAS scheme and the non-taxable status of capital gains on the 
owner's first house. In addition, Thom finds there to be a significantly negative effect of mortgage 
availability on the real house price. 
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Schwab's paper, however, has been the failure to take into account both owner 
occupiers and renters in the model. 
Finally, we must not overlook the fact that the presence of inflation will have some 
positive effects on the demand for housing and mortgages. Firstly, the real after-tax 
return on housing assets tends to increase during periods of general price inflation. 
Given that this is not the case for financial assets, one would expect a redistribution of 
wealth from financial assets to real estate for those households who can afford the 
initial mortgage repayments in times of high inflation. The favourable taxation of 
interest payments on mortgage loans (albeit diminishing - see Figure 2.11 in the 
previous chapter) and the absence of taxation on either the implicit rent or capital gain 
on the housing asset up to a certain level will act to increase the underlying demand 
for residential real estate (or at least the demand for leveraged funds to finance such 
assets) particularly for higher rate taxpayers during times of inflation since the user 
cost of housing will be reduced. Secondly, in the presence of inflation, housing equity 
will be accumulated more quickly as the ratio of outstanding mortgage debt to the 
value of the house will fall more rapidly given the positive correlation between house 
prices and the index of general prices. 'In addition, we have already seen that in real 
terms the borrower will repay the mortgage at a faster pace the higher is the rate of 
inflation. 
As a brief conclusion to this section, we may note that although inflation does not 
increase the sum of discounted mortgage payments, its effect on the demand for 
mortgage finance through the front loading phenomenon is entirely due to the way in 
which it alters the time profile of the real payments over the duration of the mortgage 
contract. The problem therefore does not arise from the fact that under inflation 
borrowers can no longer afford to pay the interest and amortise the mortgage debt 
(since higher interest rates as a result of inflation do not alter the overall real cost of 
owning a housels) but rather that the use of the standard level payment mortgage 
requires the borrower to repay the debt at, "an unreasonably fast pace" (Lessard and 
Modigliani (1975)). The demand for mortgage finance will therefore be different at 
's For a given real interest rate there will be no difference in the discounted sum of all future mortgage repayments at different nominal rates of interest and inflation. 
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various rates of inflation (and thus also nominal interest rates if the Fisher equation 
holds) even with a constant real rate of interest. That is to say, the demand for long 
term loanable funds will be negatively dependent not only on the real rate of interest 
but also on either the nominal rate of mortgage interest or the rate of inflation 
16. The 
tilt effect thus may have far reaching effects on both the housing and construction 
sectors as lower mortgage demand translates into a reduction in housing demand and a 
fall in housing starts. As Kearl, Rosen and Swan (1975) note, "the cycle in interest 
rates causes one in mortgage lending and home building". Nevertheless, their paper 
perhaps naively argues that where basic housing demand factors (such as real income, 
house prices, the user cost of capital etc. ) will influence the long run stock of housing, 
the design of mortgage instruments, credit availability and all financial variables will 
have little effect on stock values and more effect on the short run fluctuations in 
housing activity. 
3.3.2.1 The Importance of Uncertainty and Unexpected Inflation on the Demand for 
Mortgage Finance and Housing 
It has been described above how the level of inflation is important in reducing demand 
for housing finance. However, not only will the demand for mortgage loans be 
affected by inflation but also by the uncertainty of future inflation. In Table 3.1, it is 
assumed that the rate of inflation (and thus the nominal mortgage interest rate) will 
remain at a constant rate (whether it be 0,2,4 or 8 per cent) over the entire duration of 
the loan. Any deviation in the actual path of inflation from its expectation will lead to 
a change in real repayments (since the real repayment is calculated by deflating by the 
actual and not the expected rate of inflation) and also the present value of their stream. 
As Lessard and Modigliani (1975) point out, therefore, "in the presence of significant 
uncertainty about the future rate of inflation, the mortgage instrument becomes a risky 
one for the borrower as well as the lender". 
16 Not only will the nominal interest rate affect the demand for mortgage finance through its effect on 
the real repayment stream over the duration of the mortgage loan, but also higher nominal interest rates 
may encourage potential owner occupiers to delay the purchase of the house particularly if their 
expectations of future interest rate movements are downwards. 
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As discussed in Section 3.2, when the rate of inflation is high and variable, the future 
expectations of lenders and borrowers may diverge significantly. This is particularly 
true when the loan is contracted over a long period of time since there exists a greater 
potential for uncertainty for both parties. Over the duration of a long term mortgage 
contract, the possibility of future unexpected inflation is high; the real value of either 
long term savings or borrowers' liabilities then may well be changed by the actual 
inflationary outcome differing from that built into the initial loan contract"; this 
increased risk will have the effect of reducing the demand for mortgage credit and 
supply of savings. 
On the one hand, high inflation may have the effect of raising the nominal savings rate 
(and the mortgage rate if it is specified simply as a mark-up over the savings rate) by 
an inflation premium as savers guard against the possibility that actual inflation will 
turn out to be greater than expected inflation. 
On the other hand, the borrower of long term fixed rate funds is placed at risk from a 
fall in actual future inflation, which would have the effect of raising the real debt 
burden; the mortgagor would therefore be less willing to commit himself to high fixed 
nominal interest rates. This is more likely to be the case when there is a long history 
of inflation and where expectations of high inflation are already incorporated into 
nominal interest rates. Nevertheless, the fact that some mortgage contracts allow 
borrowers to repay their loan ahead of schedule means that the mortgagor can always 
withdraw from the original contract if interest rates fall, thereby mitigating to an 
extent the risk that actual inflation may turn out to be lower than expected (such a 
mortgage contract is said to contain a `prepayment option'). The use of the option to 
prepay may incur a financial penalty, the severity of which may be positively 
dependent on the rate and variation in inflation (higher interest rates may compensate 
the lender for the lower risk to the borrower implied by this prepayment provision' 8). 
Looking at the empirical evidence in the UK mortgage market, high unexpected 
17 Again, the widespread introduction of variable rate mortgages funded by short maturity deposits during the 1970s helped mitigate this problem. Since then, the emergence of mortgages with fixed interest rates over a pre-specified term have to an extent reintroduced the complications. 1E The resulting higher interest rates brought about by the transfer of risks from borrower to lender by 
means of this prepayment facility would tend to intensify the problem of front-loading. 
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inflation during the mid-1970s and a mortgage rate maintained at an artificially low 
level by the Building Societies Association cartel led to real mortgage rates remaining 
significantly negative for considerable length of time providing a relative advantage to 
the long term borrower. 
On balance, it may appear that the presence of high and uncertain inflation will have 
the effect of reducing the demand for mortgage finance as the loan becomes more 
risky and the expected carrying cost higher. For most borrowers, real income will be 
independent of the rate of inflation, implying that the debt service ratio will exhibit 
significant changes over time. Therefore, the possibility of the borrower facing an 
uncertain future stream of real repayments dependent on the possible erratic 
intertemporal path of inflation will thus deter households from borrowing mortgage 
debt to fund the purchase of a house. 
However, from the investor's perspective, physical assets such as real estate often 
provide a better hedge against inflation than do financial assets. In fact in a number of 
counties, evidence has been documented of a strong correlation between the rate of 
growth of house prices and retail price inflation (see Meen (1990a)). This leaves us 
unable to state any reliable a priori conclusions on the effect of future inflationary 
uncertainty on the demand for mortgage finance and ultimately the demand for 
housing. 
3.3.3 The Supply of Mortgage Finance 
The effect of inflation on the supply of mortgage finance emanates primarily from its 
variation rather than from its level'9. The reason that inflation per se should not 
influence the supply of mortgage lending is that the providers of mortgage funds (i. e. 
savers) are usually assumed to be influenced by the real rate of interest alone, i. e. the 
supply of mortgage funds will be the same at all levels of the nominal interest rate 
which yield identical real rates of interest. This implies that neither the rate of 
" Higher inflation is important in determining mortgage supply only to the extent that the equilibrium nominal interest rate may be driven above any legally or institutionally imposed maximum. 
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inflation nor the nominal rate of interest should play a role in the supply function for 
long term mortgage funds. 
As we have seen in the previous chapter, up until the early 1980s the supply of 
mortgage loans was dominated by building societies, although since then banks and 
other financial intermediaries have successfully entered the market thereby raising the 
level of competition faced by the incumbent mortgage lenders. By their very nature, 
building societies concentrate almost exclusively on long term mortgage finance, and 
although there has been a growing tendency to finance their lending through longer 
term liabilities, it is still the case that building societies (and indeed other financial 
institutions lending primarily for house purchase) are to some extent maturity 
mismatched. That is to say, a significant proportion of their liabilities are highly 
liquid deposits and their assets consist predominantly of long term mortgage loans. 
During the relative price stability of the 1950s and 1960s, this characteristically 
unbalanced portfolio was an acceptable strategy. However, with the onset of 
significantly higher and increasingly variable rates of inflation during the majority of 
the 1970s, rising interest rates made it difficult for societies to attract deposits at the 
rates that prevailed during the preceding period of relative price level stability. The 
savings rates offered by building societies became distinctly uncompetitive (relative to 
those offered by other financial intermediaries) since their long term fixed rate 
mortgage lending could not provide a sufficiently high enough income to allow more 
competitive rates to be paid on their deposits. Essentially, this had an identical effect 
to that of the imposition of a usury law on building societies alone. The difference 
here is that the maximum savings rate that a building society could offer was not 
specified by a legislative body but was instead constrained by the fixed nominal return 
on mortgage lending contracted by the society in the earlier period of low inflation (as 
recommended by the BSA agreement). The resulting failure of building societies to 
attract depositors during this period of high inflation, the competitiveness of their 
sticky mortgage rates and the subsequent lack of loanable funds is suggested by Figure 
3.4 below, which serves to illustrate the strong negative correlation between the rate 
of inflation and the loan to value ratio2° (a proxy intended to represent the degree of 
rationing of mortgage finance). With high inflation and sticky mortgage rates, the 
relative cost of mortgage finance fell substantially during the 1970s with building 
societies being forced to lower the loan to value ratio in order to ration the excess 
demand for mortgage funds out of the market. 
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Again, as with the tilting of real mortgage payments, the supply side problem that 
materialised in the UK during the 1970s may be attributed to the use of the traditional 
long term mortgage instrument accompanied by a heavy dependence on very short 
term liabilities as a source of funds. This situation only constitutes a problem when 
short term nominal deposit rates rise (due to rising inflation, say) with no 
accompanying increase in the (fixed) long term rate earned on mortgage funds. This 
complication has been largely resolved by building societies supplying variable rate 
mortgages which, by allowing the interest rate applying to the loan throughout its life 
to change, enables societies to earn a return commensurate with the variable short 
term deposit rates. This has been the practice in the UK for a long time, although 
other countries have adopted different techniques (for example the financing of 
standard long term mortgages via liabilities of equivalent maturity such as long term 
20 The correlation coefficient between the two series is -0.7377. 
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mortgage bonds) or have been slow to take up the variable rate instrument. 
Nevertheless, the preference has been to make alterations to the mortgage loan 
contract (i. e. to shorten its effective maturity) rather than attempting to lengthen the 
maturity of the building society's liabilities as mortgage lenders have benefited from 
the ability to access the relatively cheap short term retail deposit market (particularly 
during periods when the yield curve has been upward sloping). As Sandilands (1980) 
notes, "it is often very difficult to find any savers willing to accept long term bonds 
except at relatively high long term interest rates". Even so, if changes to mortgage 
rates lag behind changes in the rate on deposits then the supply mismatching problem 
may not be completely eliminated21. 
3.3.4 The Demand for and Supply of Mortgage Finance Under General Price 
Inflation 
In the previous two sections, demand side problems (resulting from the tilt effect) and 
supply side problems (due to the mismatching of asset and liability maturities) have 
been discussed and a number of general points have emerged regarding the 
implications for both demand and supply in the presence of inflation. This section 
(which draws on Sandilands (1980)) takes up some of these points and themes, which 
are incorporated into a basic but informative demand-supply analysis of mortgage 
funds under conditions of general price inflation. The important conclusion which 
will be shown here is that inflation has a non-neutral effect on the real quantity of 
loanable funds traded. 
To recapitulate, firstly it was argued that the demand for mortgage finance should 
depend negatively on both the real and nominal rates of interest, the latter capturing 
the effect of inflation on the tilting of the real debt burden towards the beginning of 
the loan (thereby reducing the borrower's ability to enter the long term mortgage 
contract). This conclusion assumes that mortgage repayments are calculated using a 
mortgage instrument which does not completely insulate the borrower from the tilting 
Z' The recent trend in the securitisation of mortgage portfolios has removed some of the interest rate risk faced by lenders running a maturity mismatched position. Asset backed debt swaps are now 
commonplace in the market. 
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of the real repayment stream (Section 3.4 which follows considers the effects of 
inflation on mortgage demand when different mortgage debt instruments are used). 
Any change in the mortgage rate would thus be expected to have two effects on 
demand. Not only will there be a direct effect on the demand for mortgage credit 
relative to owner's equity (with the level of housing demand unchanged) but there will 
also be an indirect effect as the rate of mortgage interest will influence the stock 
demand for owner occupied dwellings. Indeed the majority of studies estimating a 
demand equation for owner occupied housing find a negative interest rate elasticity 
(see for example Meen (1990a))22. Secondly, it is assumed that the supply of 
mortgage funds will depend positively on the real rate of interest but will otherwise be 
independent of changes in the nominal rate - there is no equivalent nominal effect for 
the supply function as there is for demand. 
Figure 3.5 : Equilibrium in the Market for Mortgage Finance 
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The interaction of the demand for and supply of loanable funds is shown in Figure 3.5 
above. We begin at point A, the initial point of equilibrium at which the nominal 
interest rate is r, 1 and the equilibrium volume of real lending and borrowing is Ml. 
The curves Ml and M, represent the real supply of and demand for mortgage funds 
for a given inflation rate of ;rl. 
22 However, such findings have generally not separated out the effect of the interest rate on mortgage 
demand and on the underlying demand for housing. As Kearl, Rosen and Swan (1975) note, "while the 
existing literature overwhelmingly suggests the negative impact of increases in nominal mortgage rates 
on the demand for starts, it is impossible to disentangle that effect into its several components". 
97 
If the rate of inflation rises to 7t2, then for any given nominal interest rate the real rate 
of interest will fall. Since mortgage supply is assumed to depend only on the real rate 
of interest, the supply curve will shift up by the change in the rate of inflation (i. e. by 
rm4 - r, 1, or 
from A to B) to M2; the quantity supplied at the higher rate of inflation 
and nominal interest rate will then be identical to the original volume supplied. 
If it were the case that mortgage demand was dependent only upon the real rate of 
interest then, as with supply, the demand curve would shift upwards by the full 
amount of the increase in inflation. However, due to the tilt effect, for any given real 
interest rate mortgage demand will fall as the nominal interest rate rises. Thus, if the 
inflation rate increases, the mortgage demand function will shift up by an amount less 
than the change in inflation to, say, MZ producing a smaller equilibrium volume of 
funds of M2 and a lower equilibrium interest rate of rni2. 
The analytics are presented above for a change in the nominal interest rate whilst 
holding the real rate of interest constant. However, during the mid-1970s, the real 
mortgage rate fell sharply to -11 per cent whilst the nominal rate remained relatively 
stable. In this case, higher inflation actually led to an increase in the demand for 
mortgages since the increased rate of inflation was not fully reflected in the nominal 
mortgage interest rate. With real deposit rates yielding negative real returns too, this 
had the effect of reducing mortgage supply as savers preferred to invest in non- 
financial assets. This generated significant excess demand for mortgage finance as the 
positive effect of the fall in the real rate of interest on mortgage demand more than 
compensated for the negative effect of the tilt resulting from the more subdued rise in 
the nominal rate. 
Finally, Sandilands considers the effect of a nominal interest rate ceiling on the supply 
of mortgage funds. An interest rate ceiling of rni3 (such as that generated by the 
building societies interest rate cartel) would cause excess demand of M4 - M3. If 
there operated a `voluntary trading rule' in such a disequilibrium situation such as 
M= min(M°, M') then the imposition of the external interest rate control would 
further lower both the interest rate and quantity traded relative to the final equilibrium 
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position (i. e. point C relative to point D in Figure 3.5). This serves to confirm the 
content of Section 3.2 above where the distortionary effects of interference external to 
the market were discussed. 
3.4 MORTGAGE INSTRUMENT DESIGN 
Section 3.3 explored the mechanism through which the coexistence of inflation and 
the level payment mortgage can distort the demand for mortgages and introduce 
potential supply problems in the market for housing finance. It is the case that such 
problems may be mitigated or even resolved by alterations to the design of the 
mortgage contract, and as such, a variety of alternative contract designs are discussed 
below23. The level payment mortgage offering a fixed interest rate throughout its 
amortisation period has largely become obsolete, although many financial 
intermediaries have recently begun to offer mortgages that provide for fixed interest 
rates which are periodically renegotiated (usually every 5 years)24. 
A number of innovations in mortgage design are considered in this section, and we 
address the extent to which each manages to either alleviate or exacerbate the 
problems outlined in Section 3.3 (most notably that of front-loading) and also the 
scope of their popularity in contemporary mortgage markets. It is hoped that this 
should give the reader some feel for how deeply instilled the previous concerns are 
within the current market for mortgage finance. This will prove to be important in 
assessing the effect of the front loading problem in the empirical analyses of house 
prices and the demand for and supply of mortgage finance presented later in the thesis. 
23 Subsidies have been used in the past to hold down the mortgage rate below its equilibrium level during times of excessively high inflation in an attempt to restore the demand for mortgage finance to its zero-inflation level. However, it is recognised that this is a particularly inefficient remedy not only 
since households may use the low priced mortgage credit for non-durable consumption expenditure but 
also since the subsidy will affect all repayments over the duration of the mortgage and not just the initial high repayments. 
24 Such mortgages and variants thereof are known as `rollover' mortgages. 
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3.4.1 The Variable Rate Mortgage 
The standard variable rate mortgage (VRM) has proved to be an important alternative 
to the traditional level payment mortgage instrument in the UK since the 1970s and 
enjoys by far the most widespread use as the vehicle to fund the house purchase. The 
main feature of the VRM is that the rate of interest paid by the borrower on their 
outstanding mortgage debt (also known as the `debiting rate'25) is flexible throughout 
the term of the mortgage contract and is set in accordance with some long term 
variable reference interest rate. As such, the exact future annuitised repayments will 
be unknown at the date of origination of the contract. The contract usually gives the 
lending institution the freedom to be able to choose both the reference rate to which 
the debiting rate is pegged (the preferred rate being that of the 3,6 or 12 month 
LIBOR (London Inter-Bank Offered Rate26)) and also the frequency with which the 
debiting rate may be adjusted. The VRM may be further categorised into the 
following two types of contract. 
3.4.1.1 Variable Rate Instrument 
With the standard variable rate VRM, a fixed amortisation period is specified in the 
mortgage contract with the periodic payment faced by the borrower varying in line 
with the debiting rate, which in turn is dependent on the relevant reference rate. For 
each change in the debiting rate, a stream of future constant nominal payments will be 
determined as if the mortgage loan were recontracted at the date of the rate change 
with the original maturity date remaining the same27. 
15 The `payment rate' on the other hand is the rate used in the annuity formula to compute the annual 
payment required of the borrower. The importance of distinguishing between these two rates will be 
seen later in the section. However, with the standard VRM the two rates are identical and thus may be 
referred to simply as the nominal interest rate. 
26 The choice of a standard benchmark reference rate has implications for the ease with which 
mortgages may be priced on the secondary market (see Section 3.5 which concludes the chapter for 
details). 
27 As previously mentioned, a combination of the standard VRM with a fixed rate element has become 
popular especially over the last 15 years as financial deregulation has encouraged product 
diversification in the mortgage market. Some VRMs provide the borrower with the option to recontract 
every five years or so at either a variable or fixed debiting rate of interest. However, such options are 
typically priced into the mortgage contract, with the borrower paying an interest rate premium to offset 
the lender's risk that the recontracting rate will be at a lower fixed rate than the prevailing market rate 
during the period. 
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3.4.1.2 Variable Maturity Instrument 
In the case of a VRM of variable maturity length, a fixed periodic payment is specified 
for the duration of the loan contract at the outset, as is the case with the traditional 
level payment mortgage. However, because the contract is specified with a variable 
rate of interest, the borrower is required to repay the loan effectively at the debiting 
rate which will vary with the chosen reference rate. Thus if the debiting rate diverges 
from the initial contract rate over the duration of the loan then this must be accounted 
for by either extending or shortening the length of time over which the borrower 
makes the regular fixed repayments (depending on whether the debiting rate 
undergoes a net rise or fall over the mortgage duration respectively). One serious 
drawback of the variable maturity VRM is that even a moderate rise in the debiting 
rate may require there to be considerable extensions to the amortisation period. In the 
most severe of cases, the rate rise may render the fixed periodic payment inadequate to 
ever pay off the debt, with the annuity payment being insufficient even to repay the 
interest owed on the debt each period. 
It is generally agreed that the design of the VRM has been more advantageous for the 
lender of mortgage funds than for the borrower. By bestowing upon the lender the 
ability to adjust the rate of interest on all new and existing mortgage loans at the same 
time as changes are made to the interest rate on its shorter term liabilities, the VRM 
addresses directly the problems of maturity mismatching. Essentially, the VRM 
allows the financial institution to establish a hedged position by reducing the effective 
maturity on its mortgage loans to the term of its deposit liabilities. 28 
However, the design of the VRM contract does nothing to alleviate the problems 
suffered by the borrower of long term funds, and may serve to make the position 
worse (if inflation rises on average during the course of the loan). The standard VRM 
does not remove the front loading problem since the nominal rate of interest (which 
depends positively on the rate of inflation) is still used in the computation of the 
28 Cohn and Fischer (1975) note that the VRM does not offer a perfect hedge since although the 
debiting rate responds to changes in the general interest rate, it is a long term rate in contrast to deposit 
liability rates which are usually of a more short term nature. 
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periodic payment. In addition, real payments under a standard VRM will be 
significantly more sensitive to changes in the rate of inflation and thus also the 
nominal interest rate. This higher risk on the part of the mortgagor has been 
confirmed by a number of studies which have found that whilst borrowers have 
switched to VRMs to take advantage of the generally lower cost of financing, they 
have simultaneously reduced their housing and mortgage demand to minimise the risk 
of adverse changes in the mortgage interest rate. Nevertheless, such higher default 
risk has not be borne out by risk premiums being applied to VRMs over the interest 
rate of the standard level payment mortgage, nor have we seen a reduction in the 
willingness of the mortgage lender to loan funds; in fact in both cases the opposite has 
happened given the benefits of floating rate mortgages to lenders29. 
We may compare the debt service ratio of the level payment and variable rate 
mortgages under various assumptions about the rate of inflation. Table A3.2.2 of 
Appendix 3.2 illustrates the way in which the stream of repayments changes as the 
rate of inflation varies throughout the life of a variable rate loan30. If we were to 
assume an initial inflation rate of 4 per cent (and an unchanging real interest rate of 3 
per cent), then the calculated annual payment for the initial period of £4,290.53 for the 
standard level payment mortgage will be the same as that for the standard VRM and 
the debt service ratio in both cases will be 26.98 per cent. Suppose that following the 
first periodic payment the rate of inflation rises from 4 per cent to 5 per cent in year 2, 
giving a nominal rate of interest of 8 per cent. With a standard fixed payment 
mortgage the annual payment would remain constant and the debt service ratio (or 
payment to income ratio) would fall to £4,29053 /; E17,013 or 25.22 per cent. 
However, with the VRM the mortgage loan is recontracted at the new nominal 
mortgage interest rate. The amount of debt outstanding at the beginning of the second 
year will be [£50,000 - (£4,29053 - £3500)] = £49,209.47 (where £3,500 is the first 
year's interest payment alone) and the new annual payment for year 2 being 
£4,673.82. 
29 Other studies have found that US mortgage lenders have in general allowed households to borrow a 
g°reater amount of funds with the VRM instrument relative to the traditional fixed rate financing vehicle. 
It is proven in Section 4.2.2 of the following chapter that a rise in inflation will raise the debt service 
ratio. 
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The payment to income ratio then rises to 27.47 per cent as a result of the 
discontinuous nature of changes in the periodic payment. Clearly, inflation will still 
cause adverse effects on the demand for mortgage finance when the VRM is used 
instead of the traditional level payments mortgage, and in addition the instrument will 
do nothing to abate the increased incidence of default which may be caused by the 
onset of unanticipated inflation. One way that the mortgage lender may reduce these 
problems for the borrower is to either choose a less volatile longer term mortgage 
reference rate or to limit the frequency with which changes to the debiting rate may be 
made. If anything, mortgage lenders have shortened the frequency of such changes 
with banks and building societies regularly revising their mortgage rates on the same 
day as the announcement by the Bank of England's Monetary Policy Committee 
(MPC) of a change in the repurchase rate. 
Finally, one would expect that borrowers would be more likely to choose the variable 
rate mortgage over the level payment mortgage instrument when their income stream 
is expected to rise with inflation, when the initial interest rate differential between the 
level payment mortgage and the VRM is positive and relatively high and when interest 
rates are historically high. With the exception of the expectation regarding the future 
income stream, these hypotheses are confirmed by Dhillon et al (1996) and also by 
Jones et al (1995). The former paper reports the results of a probit model of the 
probability of VRM choice for commercial real estate projects31. The latter study uses 
two stage least squares to estimate both the demand and supply for VRMs in the US 
between 1986 and 1992. Here, demand is specified as the market share of VRMs and 
31 The data set consisted of statistics on mortgage finance issued by a large US insurance company for 
commercial real estate projects. Although this thesis is concerned with residential mortgage demand, 
the study by Dhillon et al (1996) provides an important insight into the concerns of mortgage borrowers 
in choosing instrument design; commercial borrowers tend to be focused more on economic rationality 
in decision making than do residential borrowers, and as such the results will tend to be stronger. 
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the willingness to supply as the spread between the fixed level payment mortgage rate 
and the rate of interest on VRMs. The willingness to supply VRMs (as opposed to 
fixed rate mortgages) is found to depend positively on both future interest rate 
expectations (reflecting the desire of the lender not to be locked in to a relatively low 
fixed rate of interest) and also the percentage of VRMs that are securitised (reflecting 
the ease with which such mortgages may be sold in the secondary market). 
Related to these arguments on the demand side is the suggestion that the availability 
of VRMs lowers the cyclical swings in the demand for mortgage credit as it becomes 
less important for borrowers to lock in to a currently desirable rate. This proposition 
is investigated by Goodman (1992a) among others, who presents a simple model of 
the demand for mortgage credit which is estimated using US data over the 1980s32. 
The effect on total mortgage demand of the withdrawal of VRMs is simulated, 
whereby it is discovered that the availability of VRMs reduces cyclical swings in the 
demand for mortgage credit but has a small downward effect on the level of demand33. 
This is consistent with the discussion above in which it is shown that the tilt effect can 
be made significantly worse when the borrower uses the VRM as the funding 
instrument. 
In summary, therefore, we have seen that the use of the VRM is likely to be to the 
detriment of the borrower, since it may potentially worsen the effect of the tilt 
problem, and is highly beneficial to the lender to the extent that it reduces the 
problems associated with maturity mismatching. As such, the VRM has been 
important in alleviating some of the supply swings in the housing market which have 
in the past stemmed from funding constraints as a result of the inability of the 
financial intermediary to pay competitive deposit rates. 
32 It is proven theoretically that the effect of the availability of VRMs on the interest rate elasticity of 
mortgage demand will be dependent upon the covariance between the interest rates on fixed rate 
mortgage credit and VRMs. 
" This was also shown to be the case by Jones et al (1995) who found that the market share of VRMs 
was negatively related to average house prices; the interpretation was that with a higher level of 
principal at risk the borrower would prefer to lock in to a certain fixed mortgage rate. 
104 
3.4.2 The Dual Rate Variable Rate Mortgage 
The standard VRM described above does reveal an important conflict of interest 
between the borrower and the mortgage lender. The lender has a preference over the 
use of a short term interest rate, since this enables the rate of interest earned on its 
long term mortgage assets to be directly related to the cost of its short term liabilities 
(used to fund its mortgage business). On the other hand, however, the preference of 
the borrower is towards a long term interest rate due to its lower volatility; short term 
changes in the rate of inflation will less likely feature in a long term nominal rate, 
reducing the probability that a borrower will default after facing an inflated nominal 
interest rate during the initial years of the mortgage contract. 
The dual rate VRM represents an attempt to resolve this conflict by introducing two 
separate interest rates. In each period, the payment rate is used to compute the 
periodic payment made by the borrower using the standard annuity formula as 
described in Appendix 3.1, equation (A1.12). A long term rate is chosen as the 
payment rate to give the borrower a more stable intertemporal payment stream than if 
a short term rate were used. This total payment made by the borrower is then 
decomposed into an interest payment and the repayment of principal : the financial 
institution requires the borrower to repay interest on the loan at the short term debiting 
rate (for hedging purposes, as mentioned above) and thus the interest component of 
the total borrower's payment is calculated simply as the debiting rate multiplied by the 
amount of mortgage debt outstanding; the remainder of the borrower's total payment 
then goes to repayment of the principal. A new total periodic payment is then 
calculated for the following period based on the revised value of the outstanding debt 
and the process continues until the debt is repaid. Thus, the borrower will repay the 
mortgage loan at the long term payment rate, whilst the financial intermediary will 
charge interest on the loan at the short term debiting rate. 
A particular disadvantage with the dual rate VRM is that as with the traditional VRM, 
the lender's situation has been improved but the inadequacies of the standard rate 
mortgage from the perspective of the borrower essentially remain (the tilt problem is 
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not eliminated). As Lessard and Modigliani (1975) note, "the capricious changes in 
initial level of payments due to inflation-swollen interest rates" remains a 
characteristic of the dual rate VRM, depressing the demand for mortgage funds. 
However, it must not be ignored that under the dual rate VRM, the specification of a 
long term payment rate will go some way to insulating the borrower against any sharp 
and unexpected changes in the periodic payment as a consequence of changes in 
inflation. 
Finally, when the debiting rate differs from the payment rate, the periodic payment 
made by the borrower may either be larger than required (if the payment rate is larger 
than the debiting rate) or insufficient to amortise the loan (if the payment rate is lower 
than the debiting rate). Another way to put this is to say that if the payment rate is 
greater (less) than the debiting rate then the borrower will repay the loan more quickly 
(slowly) than the payment rate would suggest. This will hold throughout the duration 
of the mortgage loan but is most obvious in the final period when the final payment 
may or may not be sufficient to pay off the remaining outstanding debt (see example 
in Table A3.2.3 of Appendix 3.2). As such, the borrower may be required to make a 
final repayment of a different amount than that calculated34. Nevertheless, such 
divergences between the required and actual periodic payments should be small if the 
short term debiting rate and long term payment rate differ from each other only by a 
small amount. 
3.4.3 The Graduated Payment Mortgage 
The graduated payment mortgage (GPM), or `low start mortgage', is one of a number 
of mortgage instruments that have been designed to deal with the specific problem of 
front-loading, the central inadequacy, of the standard level payment mortgage 
investigated in Section 3.3.1 and also the two alternative designs suggested above. 
The GPM is characterised by comparatively lower nominal periodic payments during 
the initial years of the loan (in order to restrain the relatively high real payments 
usually induced by inflation when a standard level payment or variable rate mortgage 
34 In Table A3.2.3 of Appendix 3.2, the borrower's final scheduled annuitised payment is £298.71 
greater than required. 
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contract is used) which increase throughout the duration of the loan reaching their 
maximum in the final years of loan (when the real annuitised payments of more 
standard mortgage instruments would otherwise be low). 
The rate at which the annual nominal repayment grows, known as the rate of 
graduation, is agreed at the beginning of the contract period and (usually) remains 
constant throughout the duration of the loan". Clearly, the higher is the agreed rate 
of graduation, the lower will be the initial nominal repayments and the higher the 
nominal repayments made during the terminal years of the loan. If the borrower's 
preference is to remove entirely the front loading of real mortgage repayments, then a 
constant stream of real expected mortgage repayments may be generated by setting the 
rate of graduation equal to the expected rate of increase of the general level of prices. 
This would also imply a constant expected debt service ratio over the period of the 
mortgage loan if the rate of growth of borrower income was the same as the rate of 
inflation. 
In theory, therefore, the GPM can be used to completely insulate the borrower from 
the tilting of both the real annual repayment and the payment to income ratio, and in 
this respect the risk of default may be lower than that of the standard level payment 
mortgage. The pattern of repayments under a GPM is shown in the example given in 
Table A3.2.4 of Appendix 3.2 where both the rate of inflation and graduation are 
assumed to remain steady at 4 per cent per year. However, in practice the rate of 
inflation is particularly difficult to predict even over an intermediate term, let alone 
over the duration of a long term mortgage contract. For the stream of real repayments 
to remain constant over the duration of the loan, the rate of inflation must remain the 
same as the rate of graduation for the whole term to maturity, an assumption which is 
clearly not credible. Nevertheless, if the graduation rate is chosen such that it is equal 
to the average rate of inflation over the duration of the mortgage loan, then the stream 
of real repayments over the contract, period will be untrended despite exhibiting 
variation as inflation in the short term deviates from its long run rate. 
33 In the US, a variant of this type instrument specifies an initial period over which repayments are 
graduated (usually between 5 and 10 years), thereafter remaining constant (at a higher level than the 
standard level payment mortgage) until the date of maturity. 
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Thus, despite the fact that the design of the GPM is favourable from the borrowers 
viewpoint (since it has the potential to eliminate the cash flow problems associated 
with inflated real payments at the beginning of the loan), if the realisation of actual 
inflation turns out to be lower (higher) than expected, the borrower will face a stream 
of real repayments rising faster (slower) than was desired when the graduation rate 
was set. The principal risk to the borrower, therefore, is that inflation will turn out to 
be lower than expected, increasing the growth rate of real repayments and implying a 
higher payment to income ratio (since incomes usually rise in line with actual 
inflation) than would otherwise have been the case if the realisation of inflation was as 
expected. As Lessard and Modigliani (1975) suggest, the GPM is best suited to, 
"young families with expectations of wage growth substantially in excess of the rate 
of inflation". The cost in terms of risk to the borrower of using the GPM to reduce or 
eliminate the effect of the tilt also comes in another guise. Since the GPM comprises 
nominally fixed rising periodic payments, the real burden is even more sensitive to 
changes in the nominal rate of interest than is the standard level payment mortgage 
since the measure of duration is longer. 
An additional problem associated with the GPM arises from the fact that the steadily 
increasing stream of nominal periodic payments will have implications for borrower 
default risk. In providing for the borrower to make lower initial nominal repayments 
to the mortgage lender, the use of the GPM will not only imply that the mortgagor will 
face a slower build up of his equity in the property (i. e. a larger balance would remain 
outstanding at each payment date than with the traditional mortgage instrument, 
possibly causing a moral hazard problem if the risk of foreclosure were to increase) 
but also a heavier payment burden during the terminal years of the loan than would be 
the case with either the standard level payment mortgage or the VRM. In fact, during 
the early years of the GPM contract, the outstanding mortgage debt would be expected 
to actually increase and would continue to do so for a number of years until the 
steadily increasing periodic payments exceed the interest charges, at which point the 
amortisation of the debt may begin. Despite the fact that the principal and all interest 
due would be fully repaid by the maturity date, the mere fact that the principal grows 
during the initial years has proved an important source of scepticism on the part of 
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both the borrower and lender (see Figure 3.6 below). Indeed, these fears are not 
misplaced since a borrower defaulting during the period in which the level of 
outstanding mortgage debt is rising would face a more severe financial penalty as they 
would owe a greater amount of principal to the mortgage lender. 









In addition, the greater payment burden during this terminal stage of the loan is often 
associated with the part of the life cycle at which income growth has become more 
restrained, and therefore may result in raising the risk of default. Nevertheless, in 
general it may be argued that the relative risk of default is greater during the initial 
period of any loan contract, when despite the fact that borrower income is generally at 
the peak of its expansion, the borrower may be suffering from money illusion and thus 
may not appreciate the burden of the real repayment schedule he faces. If this were 
the case, then the GPM _ 
must surely be advocated on grounds of the lower risk of 
default. 
Finally, we must note that the use of the GPM does not resolve the mismatched 
portfolio situation of the lender since the nominal mortgage interest rate and the rate 
of graduation are fixed from the outset of the contract. As such, the GPM instrument 
36 The simulation data upon which this figure is based are presented in Table A3.2.4 of Appendix 3.2. 
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significantly improves the borrower's position with respect to the front loading of real 
repayments (albeit at a potential cost of risk) whilst commensurately worsening that of 
the lending institution. In summary, the risk to the borrower (lender) is that wage 
(price) growth will fall short of (exceed) the rate of graduation (see Section 3.4.4 for a 
discussion of the price level adjusted mortgage, the design of which can overcome this 
problem). Thus, there is essentially a trade-off between borrower risk and the front- 
loading of real payments for households deciding to use the GPM as the vehicle with 
which to borrow long term funds. We must therefore be aware of these added costs to 
the borrower and lender when assessing the attractiveness of the GPM instrument in 
addressing the problem of the tilt. 
3.4.4 The Price Level Adjusted Mortgage 
Despite their attempts to correct the distortionary problems within the market for 
mortgage finance, neither the VRM nor the GPM provide completely satisfactory 
solutions to the difficulties resulting from the existence of high and uncertain rates of 
inflation and nominal interest. As we saw, the VRM corrects for the maturity 
mismatching problems of the lender but at the expense of exposing the borrower to 
greater potential risk arising from changes in the rate of inflation (and thus to changes 
in the nominal rate of interest). The GPM, on the other hand, worsens (with respect to 
the VRM) the lender's maturity mismatched situation whilst simultaneously exposing 
the borrower to the risk that inflation may not turn out to be the same as expectations. 
The Price Level Adjusted Mortgage (PLAM) endeavours to overcome these problems 
and to offer a complete solution in which both the borrower and lender are better off 
than under either the standard level payment mortgage or GPM outlined above. 
The design of the PLAM enables us to recreate a constant real stream of periodic 
payments irrespective of the rate of inflation or indeed whether inflation is expected 
or unexpected. This is achieved by setting the debiting rate equal to the real rate of 
interest and revaluing the outstanding debt each period by the rate of inflation (i. e. the 
inflation rate multiplied by the outstanding value of the mortgagor's debt). Both the 
principal and the annual payment in the subsequent year will then be increased by the 
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rate of inflation ensuring the real periodic payment remains constant over the duration 
of the mortgage contract37. 
3 
The operation of the PLAM is illustrated in Table A3.2.5 of Appendix 3.2 . The 
payment rate (the real rate of interest) is assumed to be 3 per cent, which implies that 
the first periodic payment will be £2,986.2538. The interest charge and revaluation of 
principal are both added to the initial debt, and the annuitised payment is deducted 
having the effect in the initial years of the contract of raising the level of debt owed by 
the mortgage borrower. By recalculating the annual payment each period, the total 
cost to the borrower is actually the nominal rate of 6 per cent interest (3 per cent 
interest charges plus 3 per cent inflation of debt), although the low payment rate 
enables the nominal payments made during the initial stages of the loan to remain low. 
Not only will the annuitised real payment remain constant over the duration of the 
mortgage but so too will the nominal payment to income ratio if the borrower's 
income rises in line with inflation39. Again, however, the borrower will be subject to 
the risk that his income rises at a slower rate than the price level. In addition, 
although it is true that under inflationary conditions the PLAM carries a greater degree 
of default risk due to the rising stream of nominal periodic payments over the life of 
the loan, Cohn and Fischer (1975) argue that it may have the effect of attracting 
further lenders into the market for housing finance as a result of the inflation `hedging 
facility' it offers. 
Despite the many advantages of the PLAM in theory, practical success has been 
limited. It has been suggested that potential mortgagors suffering from money illusion 
have been deceived into thinking that the maintenance of a constant real periodic 
payment has increased the risk of higher payments relative to the standard level 
" The PLAM is derived from the family of alternative mortgage designs called shared appreciation 
mortgages, whereby the lender essentially `shares' in the appreciation of the value of the house in return 
for either a lower or more stable mortgage repayment stream. 
3s Because each repayment is made at the end of period, the periodic payments will be based on the 
level of outstanding debt revalued at the current period's inflation rate. For example, the first periodic 
payment will not be calculated based on the initial debt of £50,000 but rather for the revalued debt of 
£50,000 x 1.04 = L52,000. 
" In the example given in Appendix 3.2, the borrower's income rises at a real rate of 2 per cent and 
thus the payment to income ratio actually declines over the life of the mortgage loan. 
111 
payment mortgage (in other words, borrowers have perceived the risk of unexpected 
inflation to be on the upside only). This is untrue given the assumption that the 
expectation of inflation incorporated in the nominal contract rate of the level payment 
mortgage is unbiased given the set of available information at the contract date and 
also that the borrower's income rises at least at the rate of inflation. In such 
conditions, a fixed real payment over the life of the loan should actually reduce the 
risk to the borrower. However, as previously mentioned, to the extent that the income 
of the borrower may rise at a lower rate than the rate of inflation, the borrower will be 
exposed to inflation risk and the aversion to entering the contract is justified. 
Thus despite being a promising alternative to the standard mortgage in a world of 
uncertain inflation, the PLAM has proved exceedingly difficult to adopt in practice; 
the equal treatment of tax relief on both the interest payment and the revaluation is an 
example of such a complication. Nevertheless, recently a number of `hybrid' PLAMs 
have been suggested which combine the desirable elements from both the fixed rate 
mortgage and the standard PLAM discussed in this section. For example, Scott et al 
(1993) recommend a mortgage design whereby the parties to the contract decide firstly 
upon the degree to which they desire inflation risk to be partitioned between the 
borrower and lender, and secondly the rate of graduation of the borrower's nominal 
repayment stream, both of which are assigned a value between 0 and 140. The 
traditional PLAM assigns all of the risk of inflation to the borrower (in contrast to the 
level payment mortgage where the lender bears all of the risk) and tends to have the 
steepest repayment graduation schedule; the borrower may therefore wish to transfer 
some of this risk back to the lender. The hybrid PLAM allows him to do this without 
requiring the borrower to sacrifice some of the more desirable features of the PLAM 
(such as a graduated nominal payment streama1). 
Scott et al derive equations for the annuitised repayments and the outstanding balance 
on the hybrid PLAM which are then both simulated. Essentially, since the standard 
ao These parameters, which may be chosen independently, will clearly depend on the household's stage in the life cycle. 
41 Indeed the borrower may want to tilt the nominal repayment stream to match the expected rise in the 
level of his income. 
112 
level payment mortgage and the traditional PLAM represent the extreme cases of non- 
indexing and indexing respectively, all of the simulated repayment and outstanding 
debt paths for the hybrid instrument are bordered by these two boundary cases. 
However, an important criticism of their model is that they concentrate excessively on 
the effect of the hybrid PLAM on the path of the nominal stream of mortgage 
repayments, failing to recognise explicitly that the tilting of the real repayment stream 
may be a more significant factor in the determination of mortgage demand. 
A final mortgage design considered in this section is a hybrid of the traditional PLAM 
and the variable maturity mortgage and has been discussed extensively by Simonovits 
(1992) and Buckley et al (1993). In the paper by Buckley et al, it is noted that the 
indexation of mortgage payments to the general price level will subject the borrower 
to the risk that his income will rise at a lower rate than inflation (thus increasing the 
risk of borrower default), whereas the use of a wage index will present the lender with 
the risk that the percentage change in the price level will be greater than wage 
inflation42. To address both of these concerns, the dual indexed mortgage (DIM) is 
suggested, whereby the borrower's annuitised repayment is indexed to wage inflation 
and the outstanding loan balance is adjusted each period by the rate of general price 
inflation. The maturity of the instrument is then lengthened (shortened) to account for 
shortfalls (excesses) in the annual repayment as a result of wage inflation being lower 
(higher) than the rate of general price inflation. 
Although this hybrid instrument has the advantage of reducing the heavy repayment 
burden to the borrower during the initial years of the loan (and thus lessening the front 
loading problem) whilst preserving the present value of the lender's real receipts (and 
avoiding the mismatched maturity situation), there exist four important problems with 
the design. Firstly, the initial term to maturity must be set such that any subsequent 
variations in the amortisation period may be accommodated without difficulty. 
Indeed, both the lender and borrower will bear the risk that the spread between price 
and wage inflation becomes too large for the loan maturity to be rescheduled (thus 
requiring higher repayments). Secondly, if this were the case, then the real 
42 In both cases, therefore, the risk is that borrower income will not remain constant in real terms. 
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repayments received by the lender may not match their real liabilities, causing a real 
interest rate risk. Thirdly, when the future relationship between inflation and wage 
growth is uncertain, the borrower may be unable to make a decision on whether he 
will or will not be able to afford the mortgage over the duration of its term, the real 
repayment schedule and nominal payment to income ratio being dependent upon the 
vagaries of inflation. Finally, it has been argued that the use of a mortgage indexed to 
wage inflation would actually serve to fuel wage growth. 
Simonovits (1992) has also investigated the idea of a dual rate indexed mortgage, 
suggesting that either the annual payment could be recalculated during each period 
whilst holding the maturity constant (the `iterative' DIM), or alternatively upper and 
lower bounds could be specified for the expected periodic repayments (the `combined' 
DIM)43. Both are proposed as solutions to the problem inherent in the traditional DIM 
that expectations persistently differing from actual price and wage growth may lead to 
a significant lengthening or shortening of loan maturity44. 
3.4.5 The Constant Payment Rate Variable Rate Mortgage 
The constant payment rate VRM (CPVRM), like the PLAM described above is 
designed with the intent of smoothing the stream of real periodic payments throughout 
the life of the mortgage loan contract45. In order to achieve this objective, the 
structure of the instrument is similar to that of the dual rate VRM except that the 
payment rate in this case is fixed at the real rate of interest expected to prevail over the 
duration of the mortgage contract (the debiting rate remains floating, a short term rate 
being chosen to reflect the cost and maturity of funds). As Lessard and Modigliani 
(1975) note, the more stable are real interest rates, the more similar will be the 
payment stream to that of the PLAM. 
'" A drawback of the combined DIM is that it will lessen the flexibility of the lender in responding to 
changes in money and capital market conditions. 
" The paper works through the financial mathematics of the proposed changes to the DIM and presents 
the implications for the stream of repayments generated by divergent forecasts of wage and price 
growth. 
45 The CPVRM was suggested by Lessard and Modigliani (1975) among others at a conference 
organised by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. 
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The pattern of repayments made over the life of the CPVRM will still depend on the 
rate of inflation despite the fact that the payment rate remains constant for the entire 
duration. This may be seen in Table A3.2.6 of Appendix 3.2; the intertemporal paths 
of the annual repayment and outstanding principal are illustrated in Figure 3.7 below. 

























In this case, the outstanding balance of mortgage debt is non-linear with the level of 
outstanding debt rising until the eleventh year to over 125 per cent of the original debt. 
As mentioned previously with regard to the GPM and PLAM designs, this may act as 
a severe disincentive to the mortgage borrower; a default at the stage of the mortgage 
loan where the level of outstanding debt is at its peak clearly constitutes a greater 
financial burden to the borrower than would be the case in the later years of the 
contract when the borrower's equity is higher. Despite the constancy of the payment 
rate, the annuitised payment will rise in the subsequent period whenever the current 
period debiting rate exceeds the payment rate, since this will cause a rise in the 
outstanding balance of mortgage debt owed by the borrower. 
The structure of the CPVRM allows the debiting rate to be flexible with respect to 
both its term and level, which for purposes of prudence (i. e. maturity matching) could 
be set at the minimum length of time for which the funding rate may be held fixed. 
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The structure of this type of instrument can therefore be adjusted to reduce the extent 
of the intermediary's supply problem caused by unexpected inflation. 
3.5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The move towards more complex instrument designs in the market for mortgage 
finance over the last 25 years has been driven by the inappropriateness of the standard 
level payment mortgage especially during periods in which inflation is high. The 
main problem has been that the standard level payment mortgage ignores the changes 
in inflation and nominal interest rates, borrower income and the market value of the 
property during the period over which the loan is held. Among all of the alternative 
mortgage designs, from the borrower's viewpoint (and thus from the perspective of 
this thesis) only the PLAM acts to perfectly insulate the borrower against the front 
loading problem (even in the presence of unexpected inflation). The adoption of the 
PLAM instrument would therefore be expected to encourage additional mortgage 
demand which would have otherwise been latent in the presence of the severe 
liquidity problems created from the use of more standard mortgage instrumentsa6. 
Alm and Follain (1984) consider the effectiveness of a number of mortgage designs in 
increasing housing demand by modelling the household as maximising life cycle 
utility in a world of perfect certainty by choosing consumption, house size and the 
initial loan to value ratio subject to a number of constraints47 over a typical holding 
period. Simulations were undertaken for different levels of inflation and initial wealth 
and for four different mortgage instruments. It was found that when the standard level 
payment mortgage was used, moderate rates of inflation increased the demand for 
housing48 whereas the effects of the liquidity constraints at higher rates of inflation 
were more than offsetting, causing demand to fall below that of the zero inflation 
46 There exist considerably more mortgage designs than the main instruments outlined in this chapter. 
An example of the flexibility in formulating new mortgage designs is shown in a paper by Goodman 
and Wassmer (1992) who undertake a multi-period maximisation to determine an optimal theoretical 
payment schedule which takes into consideration the needs of both the borrower and lender. 
" These include payment to income and loan to value constraints, a budget constraint and a non- 
negative wealth constraint. 
48 As we saw in Section 3.3.2, the reasons for this were primarily the lower real return on competing 
financial assets and the reduction in the after-tax user cost of housing. 
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case; this conclusion echoes that of the earlier study by Alm and Follain (1982). The 
PLAM was confirmed to be the most effective instrument with which to combat the 
liquidity effects on housing (and thus mortgage) demand resulting from inflation; it 
was found that borrowers should be willing to pay up to 3.5 per cent49 over the rate 
charged on the standard level payment mortgage for the use of the PLAM instrument. 
However, we must be aware that because alternative mortgage instruments can do 
nothing to raise the wealth of the borrower, their effectiveness at addressing the 
reduction in demand as a result of the front loading problem is considerably 
diminished when the downpayment constraint on the borrower is binding. In addition, 
concern has been expressed given the slower build-up of homeowner equity when one 
uses an alternative mortgage instrument (see Figures 3.6 and 3.7 in the previous 
section for illustrations). 
The supply problem, whereby mortgage lending institutions have found themselves in 
a maturity mismatched position and thus exposed to interest rate risk has, since the 
mid-1980s, become less important with financial institutions being able to hedge their 
positions through the securitisation of their mortgage books. Essentially, the trend has 
been for lenders to swap tranches of their mortgage loans for assets yielding a variable 
rate of return thereby eliminating the risk that nominal interest rates may move against 
them. The introduction of more complex mortgage designs has not hindered the 
ability to engage in securitisation as much as could have been expected since 
investment banks offering such services have become equally more sophisticated. 
This was recognised even as early as the 1970s; as Marcis (1980) notes, "research 
indicates that, practically speaking, there are no real barriers to trading AMIS 
[alternative mortgage instruments] in the secondary market and there is no reason to 
doubt that a viable secondary market can exist [for alternative mortgage instruments]". 
The price at which these securitised instruments will be traded will then depend upon 
the volatility and uncertainty of interest rates, the shape of the yield curve, the risk that 
the borrower may default on the mortgage and the possibility that the maturity date of 
the loan will vary. One may have expected this move towards securitisation to allow 
49 According to a compensating variation calculation. 
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mortgage lenders to concentrate solely on their borrower's needs; however, the 
continued use of VRMs as the vehicle of mortgage finance, the re-emergence of fixed 
rate debt during the initial term of the mortgage contract and the lack of enthusiasm 
for the alternative mortgage designs discussed in the previous section confirms that 
the phenomenon of the front loading of real annuitised payments is an ever present 
problem for borrowers in the current market for mortgage financeso. 
Figure 3.8 : Number and Value of Gross Advances as a Percentage of All Mortgage 










Source : Council of Mortgage Lenders 
There is certainly scope for further work on the effect of the front loading of real 
mortgage repayments on the demand for mortgage finance, since for the majority of 
studies undertaken on the demand for mortgage finance (both empirical and 
theoretical) the tilt effect has largely been ignored S2. Specifically, the literature would 
benefit from a comparative study of various household types and the responsiveness 
of their demand for mortgage finance following changes in the rate of inflation and the 
nominal mortgage interest rate. Clearly, any such research must control for variations 
in demography between each household cohort and also the average value of housing 
50 Nevertheless, it has been suggested that the use of more standard mortgage instruments has aided the 
process of securitisation as such mortgages are more simple to value and sell in the secondary market. The figures in the bar chart are not mutually exclusive. 
52 Exceptions include Meen (1990a). 
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Mortgage Type 
which is desired by each group (among other factors). The result of such a study 
would aid in the identification of the group of potential mortgagors who would benefit 
the most from alternative mortgage designs as opposed to either the standard level 
payment mortgage or VRM. This would then allow mortgage lenders to be better 
placed in targeting borrowers when selling their variety of mortgage products. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Modelling House Prices, Arrears and Possessions 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The determination of UK house prices has recently attracted considerable attention 
from economists, reflecting concern over their observed instability over the past few 
years'. It has been alleged (see Allen and Milne (1994)) that a combination of high 
interest rates, declining output and employment, and falling inflation caused the 
serious problems that existed within the UK housing market in the early 1990s2. 
It is generally agreed in the housing finance literature that the origins of such problems 
may be traced back to the financial deregulation and liberalisation of the late 1970s 
and early 1980s which was to be profound in altering the structure of the UK housing 
and mortgage markets. The abolition of exchange controls in 1979, the abandonment 
of the building society cartel in 1983 and the introduction of bank and building society 
legislation in the latter half of the 1980s all contributed to a greater degree of 
competition between building societies and other financial institutions in both their 
mortgage and deposit markets (see Chapter 2 for a full analysis of these and other 
changes in the market). This led to a marked reduction in the extent of mortgage 
rationing, which underpinned the boom in mortgage lending, house prices and housing 
market activity in the second half of the of the 1980s. The reduction in rationing over 
the period can be appreciated by considering the movement of the loan to value ratio 
which is shown below in Figure 4.1. This ratio, which remained predominantly 
between 75 and 80 per cent throughout the 1970s, increased sharply from the second 
I Factors that are generally cited in the literature as important in generating house price instability 
include financial liberalisation (regime switching from a period of rationing to the absence of rationing 
could be expected to affect both the demand for and price of housing), demographic change, the attitude 
to owner occupation and consumers expectations. 
2 It has been observed in a number of countries (including the UK) that there has been a tendency for 
house prices to rise faster than the general price level, which prior to the 1990s was attributed to the 
combination of high inflation and, "a tax system which confers benefits to owner occupied housing that 
other forms of investment do not enjoy" (Meen (1990a)). 
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quarter of 1980 and has maintained a level of around 85 per cent for the majority of 
the 1980s and 1990s3. 
Brookes et al (1994) claim that as a result of the reduction in mortgage rationing, 
household sector mortgage debt has risen from less than 25 per cent of annual 
disposable income in 1980 to around 75 per cent in 1992. Coupled with high levels of 
nominal mortgage interest rates during the early 1990s, this growth led to increased 
concern over the number of borrowers facing repayment difficulties. 












While it would be difficult to isolate any single cause of the housing market boom, the 
coexistence of high inflation and the tax deductibility of nominal mortgage payments 
may certainly be pinpointed as an important factor in the growth observed in the 
housing market in the late 1970s. Following the boom in house prices between 1985 
and 1989, the late 1980s and early 1990s saw the end of the expansion in housing 
market turnover, and from 1989 to 1994, house prices fell in both real and nominal 
terms, representing the first sustained nominal decline since the 1950s5 (most notably 
3 This has been true up until only recently when we have observed significant increases in the ratio to 
above 90 per cent. 
4 All figures in this section are constructed using seasonally adjusted data. 
During the three years between 1989Q4 and 1992Q4, seasonally adjusted nominal house prices 
increased only once (in the final quarter of 1991); in all other quarters the nominal house price index 
fell, with the largest percentage drop in the seasonally adjusted series of over 2.3 per cent being 
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in the South East of England)6. The pattern of house price fluctuations since 1969 is 
illustrated in Figures 4.2 and 4.3 below. 
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recorded in the second quarter of 1992 (the unadjusted series fell by a staggering 3.57 per cent in the 
final quarter of 1992). 
6 For an empirical analysis of regional house prices and possessions see Reilly and Witt (1994) and for 
regional variations in mortgage arrears see Doling and Stafford (1987). 
7 The mix adjusted house price data is provided by the Department of the Environment, Transport and 
the Regions and is based on a5 per cent sample of building society mortgages (excluding dwellings 
purchased without a mortgage or loan from any other source). Since the mix (type, size, location and 
age of dwelling) changes through time, a weighted house price series that takes account of this provides 
a better measure of true house price movements than an index based on a simple average price (where 
variations in mix are ignored). 
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In addition to falling house prices, construction plummeted by 30 per cent during the 
period and turnover stagnated. This `boom-bust' type occurrence is, however, by no 
means new in the market for housing. Over the past 30 years, the cyclical nature of 
the market is illustrated by the fact that on three separate occasions house prices have 
increased at very rapid rates (from Figures 4.2 and 4.3 above these periods may be 
identified as 1972-1974,1978-1980 and 1985-1989), followed by falling real house 
prices. The uniqueness in the last cycle is not only the duration of the preceding boom 
period but also the ensuing sustained fall in nominal house prices. Recovery of the 
growth rate in both the nominal and real house price series has been particularly slow 
following the housing market slump of the early 1990s, although more recently (from 
the beginning of 1999) house prices have started to grow more rapidly once again. 
It is useful to examine the link between the slump, the rapid increase in the 
accumulation of arrears and the taking into possession of propertiesg. The 1980s' 
growth in owner occupation coupled with high levels of nominal mortgage interest 
rates and an acute boom in house prices towards the end of the decade led to 
increasing concern over the number of borrowers facing repayment difficulties, with 
many first time buyers (purchasing at the peak of the boom on high loan to value 
ratios) holding properties worth less than the mortgage secured on them (for a 
discussion of the trend in negative equity see Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin 
(1992)). Households simultaneously experiencing this so called `negative equity' 
phenomenon and mortgage repayment difficulties were less likely able to sell their 
property to pay off the debt or renegotiate a further loan (usually based upon the 
amount of unwithdrawn equity in the property). Clearly such households were left 
more vulnerable to being possessed by mortgage lenders9. 
Figures 4.4 and 4.5 below illustrate how, over the past decade, the number of 
borrowers whose properties have been taken into possession or who have accumulated 
arrears has increased significantly. However, both still represent only a small 
I This paper follows the convention of referring to a dwelling as being 'taken into possession' rather 
than `repossessed' since mortgage lenders are not the previous owners of the dwellings of which they 
obtain possession. 
9 Hendershott and Villani (1977) note that, "lenders who anticipate increasing house prices may 
acknowledge the decreased risk of their investment by lowering downpayment ratios". 
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proportion of the total number of mortgage loans outstanding. During 1991 (when 
household possessions reached their peak) the flow into possession constituted less 
than 0.8 per cent of the total number of mortgages outstanding (a total of slightly over 
75,000 households were taken into possession in 1991), while the proportion of 
borrowers experiencing arrears in excess of 6 months was, in the second half of 1992 
(when arrears of over 6 months reached their peak), just over 3.5 per cent (this is, 
however, over three times that of the proportion recorded in the first half of 1990). 





























(» - el Ul cm in rn ') in nn Co Co Co Co rn rn rn rn 0) rn rn rn 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) w 0) rn 
Year 
124 
Of M LO 1, mm Ul$ Pý O) .-M Y9 Co 1) 1- h 1- N. Co Co CO co co O) O) O) a) O) O) O) 0) C1 0) 0) O) 0) Of O) O) C) 
Year 
Clearly noticeable from Figures 4.4 and 4.5 above are the more recent trends in 
mortgage arrears and possessions, which have (from 1993 and 1992 respectively) 
started to decline. The total number of mortgages with arrears of 6-12 months was 
133,700 at the end of 1994, a reduction of nearly 19 per cent on its 1993 end-period 
figure of 164,620. Similarly, the number of households taken into possession by 
mortgage lenders during 1994 stood at 49,210 (its lowest level since 1990), a fall of 
almost 16 per cent from 1993. 
It is argued by the Council of Mortgage Lenders (CML)1° (1995) that the reduction in 
both the number of possessions and arrears could be attributed to, "the combination of 
lower interest rates, good arrears management [through lenders rescheduling payments 
and accepting reduced monthly amounts], the direct payment of income support and 
borrowers' own perseverance [making strenuous efforts to reduce their mortgage 
arrears by making additional payments]. " 
In addition, the CML accused the government of lacking any long term commitment 
to reducing mortgage arrears. Criticism was directed specifically at planned changes 
to income support, the further reductions in MIRAS benefits and the need to buy 
private mortgage insurance. It was also noted that the reversal in the previous 
downward trend in interest rates in 1994 would have added significantly to the 
difficulties faced by mortgage borrowers. As a consequence, the CML forecasted a 
rise in both mortgage arrears and possessions in 1996. In fact during 1996, the 
number of mortgages in arrears and properties taken into possession fell 
substantiallyl1. 
Explaining the causes of mortgage repayment difficulties has assumed a greater 
importance in the light of the growth in owner occupation and of household mortgage 
liabilities over the past decade, although there exists little consensus as to their precise 
determinants. An important feature of the 1980s' housing market boom and the 
subsequent slump has been the sale of council houses which resulted in a rapid 
10 Formerly the Building Societies Association (BSA). 
" This forecasting error may be due to the fact that the basic rate on mortgages fell by 1.5 per cent 
between 1995Q4 and 1996Q4, whereas the CML was anticipating a further rise. 
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increase in owner occupation. Ex-council house tenants enjoying a new type of tenure 
found themselves especially vulnerable to the inability to sustain the long term 
commitment of making regular mortgage repayments. It had been one of the Thatcher 
administration's primary goals to increase home ownership (this was successfully 
achieved with the percentage of owner occupiers rising from just under 55 per cent at 
the end of 1979 to almost 66 per cent at the end of 1990), and government policies 
were designed to accomplish this (for example the Housing Act of 1980 gave council 
house tenants the right to a local authority mortgage with which to purchase their 
home based on liberal financial criteria). It is widely agreed that this has been an 
important cause of the upturn in repayment difficulties during the early part of the 
1990s. 
Coles (1992) notes that the increase in arrears and possessions have been caused by 
the, "exceptional conditions in the mortgage market in 1987,1988 and 1989 [which] 
have meant that a relatively high proportion of loans made in that period were 
stretching the resources of borrowers, and hence have been more likely to result in 
default". 
As we will see, Breedon and Joyce (1993) provide a theoretical justification for the 
accumulation of arrears by borrowers and the possession of property by lenders under 
conditions of falling nominal house prices. Higher rates of possession may then in 
turn cause a further fall in the nominal house price by reducing the effective demand 
for' housing as households taken into possession are unlikely to be allowed to 
immediately re-enter the owner occupied housing market. This possessions-house 
price. spiral could clearly serve to prolong any housing market slump (such as that 
observed during the early 1990s). 
The boom and recession in the housing market continue to have a marked impact 
upon the UK economy, especially through their effect on households which found 
themselves unable to service the levels of mortgage debt incurred during the second 
half of the 1980s. This failure of many households to maintain their mortgage 
repayments led to the rapid increase in the number of dwellings taken into possession. 
The chapter is organised as follows. The next section reviews the theoretical model 
proposed by Breedon and Joyce (1993) (hereafter referred to as B&J) in which 
equations are derived for house prices, the probability of arrears and the probability of 
possession. Section 4.3 then discusses the empirical specification of the model and 
considers the data issues involved. Results are then presented and comparisons made 
between the findings of this research and those of other studies. The final section then 
summarises the findings and draws conclusions. 
4.2 THE THEORETICAL MODEL 
4.2.1 The Determination of House Prices 
The model of house price determination is based on an `asset market' approach in 
which housing provides a flow of services and acts as an asset for investment 
purposes. The model advocated by B&J is based on papers by Dougherty and Van 
Order (1981), Poterba (1984), Ermisch (1984) and Meen (1990a) amongst others. 
Although there is no consideration of risk in the model, some previous studies in the 
housing market have found that risk is not helpful in explaining house price 
movements 12. 
In the absence of a rented sector for housing, it is assumed that the representative 
household optimises intertemporal utility over housing services (assumed proportional 
to H, the stock of housing) and all other consumption goods C. Lifetime utility may 
then be written in continuous time as13 
Co Seu(Hs, C, )dt 
0 
(4.1) 
12 Gat (1994), for example, considers risk and return in residential property markets and finds that the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) is not helpful in explaining the relationship between risk and 
return. However, such results are not surprising given that the portfolio diversification assumption of 
the CAPM is contrary to the nature of owner occupation in residential real estate markets. In addition, 
the consumption and investment decisions are not separable for the housing market investor as they are for the capital market investor. 
13 The usual assumptions that the utility function is increasing, twice differentiable and concave in its 
arguments are made in addition to the existence of an interior optimum. 
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where r is the real discount rate. The utility function is maximised with respect to the 
following household budget constraint 
gtX, +S +c, = (i-9)Y, +(1-O)IA, (4.2) 
and two equations of motion defining the intertemporal growth of the stock of housing 
and savings 
H1 = XX - 8H, (4.3) 
. 
41 = SS - 7rA, (4.4) 
where gt is the real house price, X. represents real new gross house purchases, S, 
denotes real saving, YY is real household income, At represents real net non-housing 
assets, i is the nominal interest rate at which the household may both save and borrow 
freely, 6 is the marginal household tax rate, S is the rate of housing depreciation and ;r 
is the rate of general price inflation. 
The real user cost of housing is defined (at the optimum) as the marginal rate of 
substitution between housing services and the composite consumption good14 and, 
following B&J, may be derived from the first order conditions of the dynamic 
optimisation problem as 
Uh 
-=g1[(1-9)i-; r+S-S1 /S1]=R, 
uc 
(4.5) 
where uh and u, are the marginal utilities of housing and the composite consumption 
good respectively'5. 
14 At the optimum, the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) will be equal to the price ratio between 
housing and the composite consumption good, and therefore the expression for the MRS will simply be 
a measure of the relative price of home owning to consuming the composite good. 
15 Dougherty and Van Order (1981) define the user cost as, "the amount necessary to bribe a household 
to give up a unit of housing", which in real terms is measured by equation (4.5). 
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Dougherty and Van Order (1981) consider a second approach to deriving the real user 
cost of housing capital, whereby homeowners are viewed as profit-maximising 
landlords in a competitive market renting units of the housing asset to themselves. 
The real user cost must then equal this level of "implicit rent" (or the real price paid 
for the flow of services from a unit of the housing stock per period) defined as Rt in 
equation (4.5) above. If we assume a fixed stock of housing, R, must adjust to clear 
the market for housing services, whereas the real house price (g) will adjust to clear 
the market for housing capital. Rearranging equation (4.5), g, is determined as 
R, 
gr = [(1_O)i-1t° +8-gr I gt] (4.6) 
It is useful to note that it is the expected level (denoted by superscript e) of future 
general price inflation and house price appreciation rather than their actual values that 
are important in determining the current real house price. A number of procedures 
have been suggested in the past for modelling expected future house price 
appreciation, ranging from simple naive models (such as g; = g, or g, ` = g, _, 
) to 
more complicated distributed lag functions of current and past actual values such as 
autoregressive moving average models (the latter of which is undertaken later in the 
thesis). 
Following Meen (1990a) it will prove informative (given the discussion in the 
previous chapter on the effect of inflation on housing demand) to examine the 
response of real house prices to inflation. Setting the denominator of equation (4.6) 
equal to Jt for convenience and defining P, = gý l gr + ir` as the expected nominal 





dn° dn° d, r` 
(4.7) 
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We could expect both differential terms on the right hand side of equation (4.7) to 
equal unity in the long run16 implying that an increase in inflation leads to a reduction 
in Jt. Analysing the dynamics, with a fixed short run stock of housing capital, R1 will 
initially remain unchanged. However, the increase in inflation will lead to an increase 
in real house prices (as shown in equation (4.7)) which in the long run will encourage 
a rise in the stock supply of housing (assuming non-negative price elasticity of supply) 
and the ensuing fall in Rt will mitigate to some extent the initial increase in the real 
house price. 
The specification of the house price equation of (4.6) above only holds when 
households are not constrained from borrowing in the credit markets. If mortgages are 
rationed, then higher notional housing demand resulting from, say, a fall in the real 
user cost of housing capital may not be transformed into higher effective demand. In 
the presence of differential rates of interest on borrowing and lending, Dougherty and 
Van Order (1981) and Ermisch (1984) both show that binding constraints on total 
mortgage borrowing have the effect of increasing the real user cost of housing capital. 
The user cost in this case is revised upwards by the product of the real house price and 
the ratio of the shadow price of the rationing constraint (%) to the marginal utility of 




[(1- O)i -, r° + -g" Mgr + (8 +x+ r)] uc 
where the analysis is expanded to include property taxes (x) and transactions costs (Sr) 
which may be shown to appear as specified in equation (4.8) above. Clearly, in 
unrationed periods this constraint will be slack, forcing A to be zero (from the 
complementary slackness conditions of the Kuhn-Tucker conditions). 
16 Poterba (1984) performs simple tests to measure the responsiveness of the nominal mortgage interest 
rate to expected inflation, finding that the hypothesis di/di`=1 cannot be rejected over the sample 
period 1960 to 1980 for the US. 
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We may now examine how mortgage market constraints affect the response of real 
house prices to inflation by conducting a similar analysis to that of presented in 




di dPF, l d(A/u, 
) 
d7re d ; r" d, r` dice 
(4.9) 
Unlike equation (4.7), the introduction of mortgage lending constraints means that the 
sign of equation (4.9) (and thus the effect of inflation on real house prices) will 
depend on how inflation affects the rationing constraint. The ratio of the shadow price 
of the rationing constraint to the marginal utility of the composite good (AJuj is a 
purely theoretic concept; thus in the empirical work appearing later in this chapter, the 
ratio is ignored partly because it is unmeasurable and partly because we are unsure of 
how it is affected by inflation. The issue of mortgage rationing and its effect on the 
estimation of an empirical model of the demand for and supply of mortgage finance is 
addressed in more depth in Chapter 7 of this thesis. 
Following Bowden (1980), in order to specify empirically an equation for real house 
prices it is assumed that the demand for housing services by each household (i) 
depends upon permanent income (YPi)17, the real rental price of housing services (R) 
and demographic variables (DEM). In turn, the real implicit rental price is assumed 
to be determined by the demand for and supply of housing services. The aggregated 
demand function for housing services may then be specified as 
Ha =fd(R,, Ya, DEM, ) (4.10) 
17 Yp will be dependent on current income, financial wealth, the unemployment rate and other variables 
that define permanent income. In the estimations which appear in the second half of the chapter, it is 
assumed that permanent income can be completely described by current measured income and financial 
wealth. 
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With the flow of housing services proportional to the fixed stock of dwellings, H'8, 
the housing services supply function may be written as H, = f, (H, ) , which together 
with equation (4.10) will determine the equilibrium rental price as 
R, = f(Y,,, H,, DEM, ) (4.11) 
Finally, substituting out for R, in equation (4.8) gives the real house price function as 
g, = f(Ya, H,, DEM,, L(1-8)i-7c` + 
uc (4.12) 
- g; / g(, ) + (S +x+ r)]) 
Both B&J and Meen (1990a) point out that the specification of equation (4.12) does 
not take into consideration the front-loading or tilt effect (as examined in the previous 
chapter) whereby higher inflation and nominal mortgage interest rates have the effect 
of raising real debt service burdens and causing cash flow problems during the early 
years of the mortgage loan. Thus, with higher inflation one would expect a lower 
demand for owner occupied housing and a commensurate fall in the real house price. 
B&J suggest that the tilt effect may be accounted for by replacing the real user cost in 
the real house price equation with a measure of the nominal user cost, although the 
preferred methodology of this chapter is to keep unchanged the real user cost variable 
and instead include a measure of general price inflation in the specification. We noted 
in the previous chapter that the extent to which the tilt effect is a problem depends 
upon the nature of the mortgage contract. With an index linked contact in which the 
real level of mortgage repayments remains constant over the lifetime of the loan the 
concept of front loading becomes redundant. In addition, with perfect capital markets 
the mortgagor may simulate an indexed mortgage by borrowing against future income 
(which would rise in line with inflation) to meet the higher mortgage interest 
repayments. However, the fact that indexed mortgages have been met with little 
enthusiasm by mortgage borrowers and that capital markets are far from perfect 
16 In a full model of the housing market H would be endogenous. The fact that this model has a fixed 
supply side can be considered as a serious drawback, and thus scope exists for incorporating a supply 
side for the housing stock in future work. 
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implies that the tilt problem should remain an important feature of housing demand 
and therefore will have an effect on real house prices. 
Finally, both B&J and Joyce and Kennedy (1992) discuss the nature of the interaction 
between house prices and the flow of households into possession. Possessions are 
alleged to have a depressing effect on house prices as possessed households 
temporarily withdraw from the owner-occupier housing market. With no rented 
sector, housing supply cannot fall as a result of possessed houses being transferred to 
the rented market'9 but may be reduced if one believed that where households faced 
possession the depreciation rate on the dwelling accelerated, or if lenders temporarily 
held the possessed properties prior to resale. However, these supply considerations 
are assumed to be outweighed by the effect on demand and thus the ratio of the flow 
of possessions to the housing stock is unequivocally expected to reduce house prices 
by putting downward pressure on the demand for owner occupier housing. The final 
real house price specification is then given as 
gr =ft(1'pr, Hr, DEMJ(1-6)i-, r°+ 
-' 
uc (4.13) 
- gý l gr + (S + is + z)], POSS, / Hr +, rr ) 
4.2.2 The Determination of the Stock of Arrears 
The model of Brookes et al (1994) is proposed by B&J to determine the stock of 
mortgage arrears. Following the optimal choice of owner occupied housing20, it is 
assumed that the representative household with zero savings receives a full mortgage 
of amount Mat a nominal interest rate of rm (as long as the lender's prudential criteria 
19 The simplification of no rentable accommodation implies that households whose property has been 
possessed must be assumed to merge with other households. There is certainly scope to include a 
rented sector in this model and observe how the theoretical and empirical results are affected. One 
consideration when a rented sector is included is that a rise in possessions would cause an expansion in 
demand for rented sector accommodation, which would serve to raise the relative costs of renting to 
home owning. 
20 It is assumed here that the optimal level of housing demand is determined by the optimisation 
problem as set out in equations (4.1) to (4.4) of Section 4.2.1. In the model of Brookes et al (1994), 
households are assumed to choose their preferred level of housing to maximise a weighted expected 
utility function in which there is a trade-off between the benefits of additional housing and the costs of 
defaulting on the mortgage loan. 
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are met). If in the future the market house price of household i (PH) exceeds the value 
of the mortgage (M) then there is said to exist unwithdrawn equity in the property and 
additional finance can be raised by remortgaging. It is thus argued by Brookes et al 
(1994) that a household will face repayment problems if 
Yd, -rmM, +max{O, PH, -M, }<0 (4.14) 
where Yd, is the household's disposable income (i. e. net of what Brookes et al (1994) 
term `priority cost of living expenses') and (PH, - M, ) is unwithdrawn equity21. 
Inflation is introduced by assuming that it affects all variables (with the exception of 
the mortgage stock) at a rate of 'r The real mortgage interest rate, pn, is determined 
by the Fisher equation, i. e. (1 + pm) = (1 + r, ) 
/ (1 + n) , which may be rewritten for the 
nominal rate of interest as r,  = 
(pm + 2r + p. 7r) . 
It is assumed that a lender will be prepared to offer additional mortgage finance to the 
borrower on the basis of the amount of unwithdrawn equity in the property, and 
specifically an additional loan of up to a(PH, - M, ) will be made, where 0: 5 a: 5 1 
depends upon the lender's willingness to engage in additional mortgage lending22. 
Three cases are considered :a=0, a =1 and 0<a<I. 
" No additional mortgage lending granted on the basis of (PH, - MI) :a=0 
When mortgage lenders are completely unwilling to grant new loans on the basis of 
unwithdrawn equity, the arrears condition of equation (4.14) will become 
Yd, -rmM, <0 (4.15) 
21 Equation (4.14) is slightly different to that presented in Brookes et al (1994) and B&J, where 
unwithdrawn equity appears simply as (PHj - M, ). Inclusion of the maximum term in the 
specification above recognises that although positive equity may be a source of additional income for 
the household (acting as collateral for an extension to the mortgage loan), negative equity does not 
constitute an outgoing expenditure (except under distressed sale). 
u This in turn will depend upon the lender's desire to ration mortgages either for prudential reasons or 
to reduce the problems of moral hazard on the part of the borrower (see Chapter 7 for a full discussion 
of the motivation for rationing mortgage credit through variations in the loan to value ratio). 
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In the presence of inflation, we may use the Fisher relation to rewrite this revised 
arrears condition as 
(1+2V)Ydi -(Pm +r+pm2r)M, 410 
or 
(4.16) 
(1+2V)[Yd, -Pm M, -2cMi /(1+2)] <0 (4.17) 
In other words, households unable to raise additional finance on the basis of 
unwithdrawn equity have to make an additional `inflation induced' payment of 
'rM, / (1 + ir) (i. e. in addition to the pm M, already made), equivalent to the amount 
by which the mortgage could be increased without the borrower becoming any worse 
off. Inflation may also be shown to cause a rise in the debt service ratio; in the 
absence of inflation, the debt service ratio is simply 
DSR=PmM, /1di (4.18) 
since r,  = pm when -r = 
0. Allowing for inflation, as we do in equation (4.16), the 
debt service ratio becomes 
DSR(2r)=[(Pm+2r+p, 2)MM] 
I[(1+2r)Yd, ] (4.19) 
which will be larger than DSR since p,  < (pm +; c + pm'r) / (1 +; c) when n>0. 
Increases in inflation causing nominal interest rate rises could therefore be expected to 
have significant effects upon the household's debt service ratio (and therefore the 
probability of arrears), these effects rising as the ratio M, / Yd, increases. 
9 Additional mortgage lending granted to the full extent of (PH, - M, ) : a=1 
If agents are allowed to use the full extent of the unwithdrawn equity in their property 
as collateral against additional mortgage borrowing (which is assumed free of any 
non-interest rate costs), then inflation will have no effect on either the arrears 
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condition of equation (4.14) or the debt service ratio. The reason for this is that if 
house prices grow at the rate of inflation, then the borrower may increase the 
mortgage loan at the same rate. Thus the term representing unwithdrawn equity will 
grow at the rate of inflation, which is in line with the rate at which the other variables 
in the inequality are rising. As such, the arrears condition will be unaffected by 
inflation. 
" Additional mortgage lending granted as a percentage of (PH, - M, ) :0<a<1 
With house prices rising at the rate of inflation, the borrower can attain 
a[max (0, PN; (1 + 2t) - M, ) ] in additional mortgage finance from the mortgage lender 
whereas there is an additional finance requirement of rM,. This implies that there is 
a shortfall of irM, (1- a) assuming that initially PH, = M, (and of course that there 
subsequently exists positive unwithdrawn equity in the property). 
The important question is how does the model of Brookes et al (1994) suggest we 
should empirically model the incidence of arrears in the market for mortgage finance ? 
The above analysis would suggest that if a, the loan to value ratio on unwithdrawn 
equity, is strictly less than unity, then inflation will always have an effect on the debt 
service ratio for the household and thus also on the likelihood of arrears; as such, B&J 
make use of the debt service ratio explicitly to account for the effect of inflation on 
arrears. In fact, the use of the debt service ratio in the empirical model of arrears has a 
dual purpose : not only does it take into consideration the effect of inflation on the 
probability of default but also accounts for changes in the rate of mortgage interest 
that are not inflation-induced and the resultant impact on the ability of the household 
to repay the mortgage debt. The arrears condition will also be dependent upon the 
household's disposable income and the extent to which there exists unwithdrawn 
equity in the mortgaged property. 
Finally, in addition to these variables suggested by the model of Brookes et al (1994) 
discussed above, B&J posit that arrears will depend also on disturbances to personal 
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income, which are proxied in their model by the rate of unemployment (UR). Thus 
the model of arrears determination which is estimated by B&J is given by 
ARR = f2(R (Yft), PH, - M, DSR,, UR, ) (4.20) 
where ARR is the proportion of mortgage loans in arrear and R denotes a variable in 
real terms. 
4.2.3 The Determination of the Flow of Possessions 
In the model of possessions determination, B&J assume that a risk neutral profit- 
maximising lender will take action to possess a property if the borrower is facing 
repayment difficulties and 
i 
PH, -qr > Max{ör+rE, (PH, +, -qr+, 
)+ ar+º, Er(REP+n)) (4.21) 
n=1 
Equation (4.21) indicates that a mortgage lender will possess a property today if the 
total current value that may be realised from its immediate sale (net of the costs 
involved in the action of possession and subsequent sale, q) is greater than the 
maximum expected discounted future resale value of the property (again net of the 
costs of possession), where ä is the discount factor, plus the expected discounted 
future debt payments remaining (REP) to be received from the borrower before the 
property is possessed23. 
Based on the inequality above, the empirical model of possessions is specified as 
follows. Although B&J suggest that the lender's expectations regarding the change in 
house prices should influence the decision to possess, in a long run cointegrating 
model this is clearly infeasible (given that the change in house prices is stationary). 
With house prices in levels being integrated of order 1, it would be preferable to 
instead include this series in the cointegrating relationship. However, given that we 
23 The maximum value of i represents the time period at which the mortgage debt is completely repaid 
and the lender no longer has the opportunity to possess the property. 
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have postulated that possessions will reduce house prices (see Section 4.2.1 above), 
the coefficient on house prices may appear in the possessions equation with a negative 
sign. 
The stock of arrears of over 6 months (ARR) is included in the empirical model since 
it is considered a reasonable indicator of the borrower's ability to repay the mortgage 
debt in the future. Indeed, equation (4.21) will only be effective (and thus lenders will 
only want to possess) when the borrower is facing repayment difficulties, thus 
underlining the critical importance of the arrears variable in the estimation of the 
possessions equation. 
The value of unwithdrawn equity is included in the estimating equation since its 
existence provides an escape route for borrowers who potentially face repayment 
problems; positive equity may be realised by the borrower by either the sale or 
remortgaging of the property, and thus acts to reduce the probability that the lender 
will need to possess given a deterioration in the financial circumstances of the 
mortgagor. 
Finally, the real mortgage rate of interest (R(r, )) is included in the equation for 
possessions to account for the fact that the higher are real mortgage repayments, the 
more likely it will be that the household will default on the mortgage debt and 
ultimately face possession. The equation for the proportionate flow into possession 
(POSS) may therefore be specified as 
POSS = f3 (R(rm ), ARR, PH - M, g, ) (4.22) 
4.3 EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION 
4.3.1 Data Issues 
All of the data used in this chapter pertains to the geographical domain of the UK; for 
those series related specifically to the mortgage market the data is provided by the 
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Council of Mortgage Lenders, the membership of which includes the majority of bank 
and building society mortgage lending institutions in the UK. Data on arrears and 
possessions are published in Housing Finance (the arrears data is split into two 
categories corresponding to those households with arrears of 6-12 months and those 
with arrears in excess of 12 months) and are available annually from 1969 and bi- 
annually from 1982. In their study, B&J interpolate the annual arrears and 
possessions data to achieve biannual series on the grounds that poor results were 
observed for the estimated dynamic error correction models when quarterly 
interpolated data were used. However, given that the majority of variables in each 
cointegrating relationship are available on a quarterly basis, it would be inefficient to 
estimate the equations using bi-annual data. Thus in estimating equations for house 
prices, arrears and possessions, this chapter uses quarterly data (whether the series are 
interpolated or as observed). Four series in the raw data set were unavailable on a 
quarterly basis, their descriptions and frequency being listed in Table A4.1.2 of 
Appendix 4.1. A full description of the interpolation procedure is also given in the 
appendix. 
An additional and particularly important difference between the data set used in this 
chapter and that of B&J is the length of the time span. Although it is not possible to 
obtain aggregate arrears and possessions data prior to 1969, all variables used in the 
cointegrating analysis of this chapter have been collected for the period 1971 Q1 to 
1995Q4. This represents almost 5 years of additional quarterly data over that 
collected by B&J, and is significant because the extended data set captures the upturn, 
peak and subsequent fall in the level of arrears and flow of possessions (whilst that of 
B&J only reflects the beginning of the rise) and also the unprecedented prolonged fall 
in both real and nominal house prices (see Figures 4.2 to 4.5 of Section 4.1). 
Finally, in contrast to B&J all data in this chapter is seasonally adjusted. The seasonal 
adjustment procedure used is that of X11 available in the statistical package SAS (see 
Section 6.3.2 of Chapter 6 for more details) and is based on the technique used by the 
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US Census Bureau24. The benefits of using seasonally adjusted rather than unadjusted 
data are that we do not need to explicitly account for seasonal unit roots in testing for 
stationarity nor need we be concerned about the effects of seasonality in the estimation 
of the long run cointegrating vector (again, for a brief discussion see Chapter 6). 
4.3.2 Methodology 
The empirical analysis reported in this chapter is based on the two stage procedure as 
suggested in Engle and Granger (1987). Firstly, the long run cointegrating vectors for 
real house prices and the number of arrears and possessions as a proportion of the 
number of outstanding mortgages are estimated. Secondly, the residuals from these 
estimations are lagged by one period and included as error correction terms in 
dynamic regressions. The coefficient on the residuals then indicates the speed with 
which the dependent variable of the cointegrating model adjusts to equilibrium 
following an exogenous shock. The analysis is undertaken on an equation-by- 
equation basis rather than as a system in order to maintain comparability with the 
work of B&J, despite the fact that one may believe there to be grounds for the use of a 
system approach. 
The parameters estimated in the long run cointegrating relationship are particularly 
sensitive to the choice of estimation technique. There exist a wide variety of 
regression procedures for cointegrated systems, many of which yield estimates, t- 
ratios and standard errors that vary considerably; a key issue therefore is the 
appropriate choice of regression procedure. 
With regard to this question, it is of course well known that the estimation of long run 
time series relationships using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) leads to spurious 
regression results as conventional significance tests tend to imply a relationship 
between the dependent and explanatory variables in the model when in fact none may 
exist (although the estimators will remain consistent, their distributions will be non- 
24 All series are adjusted using this procedure with the exception of the unemployment rate, which was 
not available in a non-seasonally adjusted format. ' The issue of undertaking an estimation on data series 
which have been adjusted using different procedures is examined later in the thesis. 
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standard)25. This enables us to formulate a clear decision rule for the choice of 
estimation procedure : the models are estimated using a number of procedures for 
cointegrated regressions, the preferred methodology being that most resembling the 
unbiased parameter estimates of the OLS regression. The results of these estimations 
are reported in Appendix 4.3. On this basis, the preferred methodology for estimating 
the cointegrating regression is that of Park (1992) and as such is discussed briefly in 
the following subsection. 
4.3: 2.1 Park's (1992) Canonical Cointegrating Regression (CCR) Technique 
Park's (1992) (CCR) technique is a non-parametric method for the estimation of 
cointegrating vectors in models in which the variables all follow first order non- 
stationary processes (i. e. are integrated of order 1). It is shown by Park that there 
exists a transformation26 of the integrated series of the cointegrating model such that 
the standard OLS procedures, when applied to the transformed model, give 
asymptotically efficient estimators; in effect, conducting the regression on the 
transformed variables removes the inefficiency of OLS estimation. The asymptotic 
distributions of the estimators may then be considered normal, which allows us to 
interpret the standard errors and t-statistics in the usual way. 
The CCR technique is similar to that developed by Phillips and Hansen (1990), the 
main difference being that both the data and the estimates are transformed in their 
Fully Modified (FM) procedure (in contrast to Park's procedure which uses standard 
OLS on the transformed variables). 
It is important here to justify the use of Park's CCR procedure over some of the other 
more popular techniques available for the estimation of long run cointegrating models. 
Perhaps the most significant advantage over its rivals relates to the efficiency 
properties of the estimators. By modifying the non-stationary processes of the model 
using the long run covariance parameters, Park's procedure is able to correct the OLS 
27 See Phillips and Durlauf (1986) for a formal proof. , 26 The transformations involve making adjustments to the original integrated processes using the 
stationary components of the models. 
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estimators for the endogeneity between the regressors and the presence of serial 
correlation in the disturbances while maintaining the cointegrating relationship. 
Indeed, by building on the consistency property of the `static' OLS estimator, Park's 
methodology will always yield asymptotically efficient estimators27. Moreover, it is 
shown by Montalvo (1995) (using Monte Carlo simulations) that Park's CCR 
estimator yields vast increases in efficiency over the FM estimator of Phillips and 
Hansen. Previous studies have also shown that CCR estimators have better small 
sample properties (in terms of mean square error) than the Johansen estimators (see 
Cooley and Ogaki (1996) for a brief discussion). 
With the least squares procedure playing an important role in the CCR methodology, 
the advantages of the standard OLS model will also be applicable here, most 
importantly that the `super-consistency' property of the OLS estimator should ensure 
the precision of the CCR estimates. Indeed, the simple theory behind the least squares 
estimator makes the CCR estimator all the more tractable, particularly when compared 
to other more complicated procedures. However, while all statistical packages allow 
least squares estimation, very few provide routines for the transformations as 
suggested by Park (GAUSS is one exception). As a final point, while the advantages 
of using the underlying least squares procedure are all apparent, we must also be 
aware of its drawbacks, in particular that the parameter estimates can be overly 
sensitive to outlying observations. 
4.3.3 Estimation Results 
4.3.3.1 Testing for a Unit Root in the Data 
The Engle and Granger (1987) cointegration theorem requires all variables to be I(1). 
Therefore each of the variables (y) are tested for the presence of a unit root by using 
the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test. 
Z' It is for this reason that a number of studies (see for example Choi and Ahn (1995)) have used the 
residuals from Park's CCR procedure in devising LM tests for cointegration, as it has been proved that 
tests on CCR residuals will be free of nuisance parameters in the limit. 
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This is undertaken by running the OLS regression 
k 
oy, = a+ßt+yy, -, +Eo10Yv-j +el 
,., 
(4.23) 
and testing the null hypothesis that y=0 (implying the existence of a unit root). We 
compute two test statistics proposed in Dickey and Fuller (1979,1981) that may be 
used in detecting whether a series has a unit root, and thus whether or not that series is 
non-stationary. 
The t-test 
Dickey and Fuller (1979) propose the statistic z for testing the hypothesis Ho: y =0 
(implying the existence of a unit root) which is given by the t-ratio on the coefficient 
of yß_1 in equation (4.23) above (the relevant critical values for the t statistic are given 
in MacKinnon (1991)). Appendix 4.2 gives details of the results of this test on all 
variables included in the cointegrating models presented in this chapter. It was found 
that changing the number of lags (k) in the ADF regression substantially altered the 
outcome of the test, and thus a suitable criterion is required to choose the number of 
lags. The t-test is calculated in the appendix not only for the level series but also for 
the first differences of these series in order to test that the non-stationary series are 
integrated of order 1 (rather than of order 2 or higher)28. Clearly, we would hope to 
find that the level series are non-stationary and the differenced series stationary. 
" The F-test 
Dickey and Fuller (1981) propose two statistics for testing the hypotheses 
(a =ß=y= 0) and (/3 =y= 0) in equation (4.23). The relevant critical values for 
the F-statistics described above are given in Dickey and Fuller (1981) p1063, and the 
test is conducted by performing a simple variable deletion test. Because the F-test is 
not as widely used as the t-test for testing for a unit root (and tends to lead to the same 
See Dickey and Pantula (1987) for a more formal discussion of this approach. 
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conclusions) only the results of the above t-test are presented in Appendix 4.2 (again, 
it was found that the outcome of the F-test was highly sensitive to lag length). 
There are many techniques suggested in the literature which may be used to decide 
upon the truncation lag (k) in the ADF specification of equation (4.23). One paper in 
particular which investigates the issue of the correct choice of lag length is that of Ng 
and Perron (1995). Their paper shows that `deterministic rules' relating the truncation 
lag to the sample size, T, 29 are inferior to so called `data dependent rules', a number of 
which are considered below. 
Data dependent rules for the choice of k are those taking sample information into 
account and may be further categorised into information based rules and sequential 
tests for the coefficients on lags. The information based model selection rules select 
the order of an autoregressive process to minimise an objective function, which in its 
general form may be written as 
Ik =1n(Qk)+kC,. /T (4.24) 
where Qk is an estimate of the error variance when the model contains k lags and CT 
is a function satisfying the condition that CT >0 and C. /T-*0 as T tends to 
infinity. The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) (1974) is obtained as a special case 
of equation (4.24) above, where CT = 2, whereas the criterion suggested by Schwartz 
(1978) specifies CT= In T. These are perhaps the most popular, although it should be 
noted that other criteria do exist (such as the Rissanen and Hannan and Quinn (1979) 
Information Criteria). The results of the Schwartz, Hannan-Quinn and Akaike 
information criteria are presented in Appendix 4.2. 
The sequential test is a general-to-specific modelling strategy that chooses between a 
model with m lags and one with m+n lags. The strategy suggests that one should 
29 Ng and Perron (1995) refer to an example of a deterministic rule formulated by Schwert (1989) in 
which the truncation lag, k, is chosen according to the rule k= int(c(T / 100)1 1d), where c and d are 
given constants. 
begin with a model of high order, gradually decreasing the lag length until the 
coefficient on the truncation lag is tested to be significantly different from zero. 
Formally, we may write this as 
Ay, = a+ßt+V, -, +q 1oy1-1+,...., +OkL. vt-k +e, (4.25) 
Hl: ¢k =0 
H2: Ok =ok-I =0 
H3: Ok =,...., = 01 =0 
None of these tests, however, are particularly reliable for determining the optimum 
number of lags in the dependent variable for the ADF test. In this chapter the 
preference is to use the straightforward and popular Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test. 
The original ADF specification of equation (4.23) is estimated by OLS, the residuals 
( E, ) are saved and we run the regression 
kp 






This provides the basis of a simple test for serial correlation in the ADF model. It can 
be shown (see Breusch (1978) and Godfrey (1978)) that from this regression the 
statistic TR2 is distributed as a chi-square with s degrees of freedom (where s is the 
number of lags of the residuals in regression equation (4.26)) under the null 
hypothesis of no serial correlation30. Then the number of lags to be chosen in the 
ADF equation is the minimum number at which the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected. The logic behind this test is that if any fit is found in the residual regression 
it must be due to correlation between the current and lagged residuals. The results of 
this test are also included in Appendix 4.2. 
30 Given the use of quarterly data one may prefer the number of lagged residual terms included in the 
regression to be at least four. However, the difficulty in the choice of the number of lags in the 
residuals in equation (4.26) represents a potential problem which, as Greene (1993) notes, "pervades 
the literature". 
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All variables used in the models estimated below are found in Appendix 4.2 to be 
integrated of order 1, although for those series for which the ADF results are not clear 
a graphical examination of the time series and their autocorrelation functions is 
performed. 
4.3.3.2 Results from the Estimation of Long Run Cointegrating Vectors 
The results of the estimation of the three long run relationships for real house prices, 
arrears and possessions using Park's (1992) CCR technique are presented and 
discussed in this section. The specification of each equation differs slightly from that 
of B&J and all models are presented both with and without constant terms31; in fact, 
only in the long run arrears equation is the coefficient on the intercept term not 
significant at the 5 per cent level. 
For each model, preliminary estimations are undertaken according to the methodology 
developed by Johansen (1988) in order to test for the existence of at least one 
cointegrating vector among the variables of that model. The Johansen technique is 
based on the estimation of a vector autoregressive model (or VAR) in differences in 
which the vector of long run cointegrating variables is included. Under the null 
hypothesis that there are at most r cointegrating relationships among the set of non- 
stationary variables, the parameter vector on the these variables in the VAR will have 
a rank of r (i. e. it will have r independent rows)32. The choice of lag length in the 
VAR is governed by data dependent rules such as the Akaike Information Criterion 
and the Schwartz Criterion (see Section 4.3.3.1 above for details). To avoid repetition 
of the full methodology, the interested reader is directed to Section 7.2.4 of Chapter 7 
of this thesis. 
The long run cointegrating real house price relationship is presented below in Table 
4.1 with t-statistics shown in parentheses. Johansen estimations indicate that there are 
between 2 and 4 cointegrating vectors (depending on whether the Akaike or Schwartz 
31 Complete tables of results for all three equations using a number of estimation techniques over differing sample periods are presented in Appendix 4.3. 
32 The test is undertaken at the 5 per cent level of significance. 
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criterion is used to determine the lag length of the VAR) among the set of variables in 
the proposed house price equation. 
Table 4.1 : Estimates of the Long Run Cointegrating Real House Price Equation 
Dependent Variable: 1nR(PAHM 
With Constant Without Constant 
Constant -15.7793 
(-9.79) 
1nR(AIL1) -0.3750 0.1858 
(-0.90) (0.40) 
1nR(ALDO) 0.3118 0.5664 
(3.63) (4.56) 
1nDSTK 1.6619 -0.8708 
(2.93) (-1.72) 
InPOPN 1.6365 1.0941 
(7.94) (3.63) 
R(UC) 0.0104 0.0215 
(1.67) (2.03) 
1nINFL 0.1312 0.1507 
(5.25) (3.97) 
InPOSS -0.2256 -0.0041 
(-6.36) (-0.14) 
Sample 1971Q1-1995Q4 1971 Q 1-1995Q4 
7-statistics in parentheses 
where In represents the natural logarithm33 and R the real value of a variable 34, P. 4Hm 
is a mix adjusted owner occupier house price index (see Section 4.1 for details of the 
mix adjustment), AIIJ is personal disposable income (£m), ALDO represents total 
personal net financial assets (£m), DSTK is the stock of owner occupied dwellings 
(thousands), POPN is the percentage of the population aged between 25 and 29, 
R(UC) is the real user cost of owner-occupied housing capital as a percentage (for 
details of the construction of this variable see Section 6.4.3.5 of Chapter 6), INFL is 
the percentage rate of inflation and POSS is the ratio of the flow of possessions during 
the period to the number of outstanding mortgage loans at the end of the period. 
33 Where possible, the natural logarithm of a variable is taken since the use of logarithms in the 
estimation allows us to interpret the coefficients as elasticities. 
" Real variables are at 1990 prices and have all been deflated by the consumers' expenditure price deflator with the exception of R(UG) which is specified as a percentage of the real house price. 
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It is important to consider how the specification of the relationship has been altered 
from that estimated by B&J. Firstly, B&J argue that to account for the effect of the tilt 
or front loading problem on real house prices (see Chapter 3 for a discussion of the tilt 
problem) the user cost should be included in the estimation in its nominal form. 
Rather than follow this route it is argued here that the real user cost should remain in 
the estimation with the rate of inflation included as an additional explanatory variable 
to capture the effect of front loading on the house price. In addition, the nominal user 
cost variable is found to be stationary in B&J's analysis and thus is included as an 
additional 1(0) variable in their estimations, its stationarity precluding it from forming 
part of the long run cointegrating vector. In this chapter we argue that the real user 
cost variable is integrated of order 1 allowing us to include it in the estimated long run 
relationship. 
Secondly, B&J do not include a measure of possessions in their cointegrating 
relationship on the dubious grounds that, "the possessions variable was not necessary 
to form a cointegrating vector". It is hypothesised in Section 4.2.1 that possessions 
should be important in the determination of real house prices and as such are included 
here as a proportion of the number of mortgage loans outstanding. 
Finally, in all equations B&J do not explicitly distinguish a constant term in their long 
run cointegrating vectors35. From Table 4.1 above, the results appear particularly 
sensitive to the inclusion of a constant term in the estimation. In discussing the results 
of the house price equation we will concentrate on the estimation in which a constant 
term is included since one might expect its exclusion to cause misspecification 
problems; this is confirmed by considering Figure 4.6 below of the residuals of the 
two estimations. In addition, the constant term is shown to be highly significant. 
The autocorrelation functions for the residuals of the equations in Table 4.1 are 
presented in Figure 4.7 below. For both equations, the function drops quickly to zero 
33 Given that B&J use the Johansen (1988) methodology to estimate their cointegrating relationships, 
the constant term will appear only in the short run dynamic equations. Without appropriate restrictions, 
it is then impossible to partition the constant term between the cointegrating vector and the short run dynamic model. This issue is discussed more fully in Chapter 7. 
148 
as we increase the number of lags (k) indicating that the residuals are stationary and 
that the model estimated is indeed one of cointegration. 
Figure 4.6 : Residuals of Park's (1992) CCR Estimation of Real House Prices 
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Real personal disposable income was found to be insignificant in the real house price 
estimation and entered the equation specified with a constant with the wrong sign. In 
the equation without a constant, real house prices were found to react inelastically to 
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changes in real personal disposable income, with a1 per cent increase in real income 
leading to only a 0.19 per cent increase in the real price of housing in the long run. 
However, given the insignificance of the coefficients we clearly cannot draw any firm 
conclusions from these results. 
Nevertheless, there is a reasonable explanation for the poor performance of the real 
income variable in the results reported above. When the house price specification of 
Table 4.1 is estimated over a similar sized sample to that used by B&J (i. e. from 
1971Q1 to 1990Q3) the coefficient becomes positive and highly significant in both 
specifications (see Appendix 4.3 for details), in line with our a priori expectations. In 
fact the coefficient turns out not to be significantly different from unity when the 
equation is estimated with an intercept term, implying that a one per cent rise in real 
income will, by stimulating the demand for owner occupation, generate a one per cent 
rise in real house prices. Thus, the main reason for the observed low coefficient 
presented in Table 4.1 above appears to be the extension of the estimation sample to 
cover a period in which a sustained fall in real house prices has been accompanied by 
a (generally) non-declining level of real income. B&J estimate the coefficient on the 
log of real personal disposable income to be 2.87; indeed, since their model does not 
contain a constant term, this is broadly consistent with the coefficient of 2.69 reported 
in Appendix 4.3, obtained from estimating the model above without a constant. 
In reality, the true elasticity of the real house price with respect to a change in real 
personal disposable income is likely to lie somewhere in between the figures 
discussed above. We should not be surprised if the coefficient were actually greater 
than unity given that, in general, mortgage lenders will lend a multiple of the 
borrower's current income. Reilly and Witt (1994), for example, estimate the 
elasticity to be reasonably low at 1.19 whereas higher elasticities have been reported 
in Hendry (1984) and Nellis and Longbottom (1981) at 1.78 and 1.85 respectively. 
As expected, house prices were positively and significantly related to real financial 
wealth, with an elasticity of slightly over 0.336. This suggests that the average house 
36 This result compares with that of B&J who find a coefficient of 0.15 on their real gross financial 
wealth variable. 
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price will change (in percentage terms) by around one third of the percentage change 
in personal sector gross assets as a result of the effect of personal wealth holdings on 
the demand for housing. However, the coefficients on both 1nR(ALDO) and 1nR(AIIJ) 
must be interpreted with care since the correlation between real financial assets and 
real personal disposable income as measured by the correlation coefficient was found 
to be in excess of 0.9. This suggests that the measures of income and financial assets 
may be capturing a similar effect in the house price equation, which may possibly 
serve to reduce their explanatory power and size. 
Given that the estimated long run house price relationship is essentially a reduced 
form equation of the demand for and supply of housing, one would have expected that 
a rise in the stock of owner occupied dwellings would lead to a rightward shift in the 
supply of owner occupied housing and thus to an equilibrium at a lower real house 
price (ceteris paribus). Curiously, however, an increase in the stock of owner 
occupied dwellings was found to lead to an increase in the real house price37. This 
may reflect the fact that an increase in the supply of owner occupied housing may 
actually stimulate, or be stimulated by, greater demand; the rise in owner occupation 
during the 1980s following government policies to increase the availability of owner- 
occupier housing is a particularly good example. However, this result does contradict 
the findings of a number of other studies, including that of Hendry (1984) who finds a 
coefficient on the log of the housing stock of -1.16 in his level house price equation. 
Table 4.1 shows that real house prices depend positively on the proportion of the 
population aged between 25-2938 (intended as a proxy for the demographic variables, 
DEM, in equation 4.13). The coefficient on this variable is highly significant, 
suggesting that the higher the proportion of the `house-buying population' the greater 
will be potential demand for owner-occupied housing and thus the greater the real 
house price. Indeed this is confirmed by Mankiw and Weil (1989) who simulate the 
effects of a `baby boom' on the real price of housing under two varying assumptions 
" It may be noted that in the model estimated without a constant term the coefficient was found to be 
correctly signed and significant at the 10 per cent level. 
38 This is the typical age of first time buyers. ` This percentage ranges from a minimum of 6.34 per cent 
in 1971Q1 to a maximum of 8.29 per cent in 1992Q1, with an average over the whole sample period of 
7.45 per cent. 
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about house price expectations in order to show that the boom in demand will have 
the effect of raising house prices dramatically. Comparisons between studies of the 
coefficients on demographic variables are difficult for two reasons. Firstly, there are a 
variety of possible proxies for demography that may be used in the house price 
equation; Buckley and Ermisch (1981), for example, use the log of net household 
formation which entered their house price equation with an elasticity of 1.14, whereas 
Thom (1983) uses the log of the ratio of marriages to private sector completions, 
finding a considerably lower elasticity of 0.27. Secondly, it has in the past been 
common practice not to take the logarithm of proportional variables (such as the 
percentage of the population of house buying age) making the comparison of results 
across studies even more problematic. 
The real user cost of owner occupied housing (R(UC)) performed poorly in the model, 
entering the house price equation with a positive sign, albeit only weakly significant in 
the `with-constant' estimation. One would have expected that the higher the real cost 
of owner occupied housing the lower would be the house price as a result of its impact 
on demand. 
The inflation rate, which was included in order to capture the front loading effect on 
mortgage demand (and thus also on the demand for and price of owner occupied 
housing) appears in Table 4.1 with a significantly positive sign. This suggests that the 
expected negative effect of the front loading problem is significantly outweighed by 
the positive effects of inflation which serve to encourage home ownership. Equation 
(4.7) of Section 4.2.1 provides a formal theoretical proof that real house prices will 
indeed increase when inflation rises, although this conclusion becomes indeterminate 
when credit market constraints are introduced (see equation (4.9) of the same section). 
During times of high inflation, the investment demand for housing will increase if 
alternative fixed-interest-rate assets fail to maintain their real value. In addition, high 
inflation has in the past been associated with increased mortgage demand as the real 
rate of interest on the mortgage loan has fallen (particularly during the 1970s when the 
operation of the Building Societies Association cartel prevented mortgage rates from 
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increasing in line with inflation, leading to highly negative real rates of interest). 
Inflation therefore discourages investment in those financial assets which are not 
completely indexed and as such encourages borrowing for the purchase of real estate; 
the resulting increase in the demand for owner occupation therefore has the effect of 
driving up the real price of housing. 
The coefficient on the possessions variable is, as expected, negatively signed and also 
significant at the 5 per cent level in the preferred equation. As the number of 
possessions for a given stock of mortgages increases, the demand for housing will fall 
(as will the real house price) as previous owner occupier households are forced to 
withdraw (at least temporarily) from the market. In addition, an increase in 
possessions may serve as a signal for potential borrowers to delay their purchase of 
owner occupier housing since it may be the case that such an increase is, to some 
extent, a result of a period of tougher default policy on the part of the mortgage lender 
(discouraging mortgage borrowing and the purchase of housing and therefore lowering 
real house prices). Finally, a rise in possessions usually occurs in response to the 
adverse movement of other macroeconomic variables not explicitly accounted for in 
the cointegrating regression (such as the unemployment rate) which will act to reduce 
the demand for owner occupied housing and thus also its price. 
Turning to the estimation of the long run arrears equation, Johansen estimations point 
to the existence of between 2 and 4 cointegrating vectors (again depending on whether 
the Akaike or Schwartz criterion is used to determine the lag length of the VAR) 
among the set of variables of the arrears specification. 
In Table 4.2 below, ARA represents the stock of mortgages in arrears of 6 months or 
over as a proportion of the total number of mortgages outstanding39, UR is the 
percentage unemployment rate, AYR is the average loan to income ratio for first time 
buyers, UNEW is an index of the value of unwithdrawn equity in the property 
39 Brookes et al (1994) suggest that the measurement of both arrears and possessions relative to the 
stock of mortgages outstanding is the best means of gauging how widespread mortgage payment difficulties are, although argue that it may not represent the best method of measuring the social costs 
associated with such problems. In addition, it should be noted that in contrast to the estimations 
presented in Table 4.2, Allen and Milne (1994) model arrears as aglow rather than as a stock. 
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(calculated as a ratio of the average house price to the average mortgage loan) and 
DSR is the debt service ratio (calculated as the after-tax mortgage interest rate 
multiplied by the total value of mortgage loans outstanding as a percentage of personal 
disposable income)40. 
Table 4.2 : Estimates of the Long Run Cointegrating Arrears Equation 
Dependent Variable : 1nARR 
With Constant Without Constant With Constant 
Constant -0.8646 16.9203 
(-0.18) (2.95) 
InUR 0.1300 0.1043 0.1458 
(1.17) (1.33) (2.20) 
lnR(AIJ) 0.8749 0.8777 -1.0924 (1.78) (8.58) (-1.68) 
1nAYR 2.3487 1.8982 2.4029 
(2.93) (3.34) (5.87) 
InUNEW -2.7139 -2.9257 -2.2232 (-9.45) (. 14.73) (-10.43) 
InDSR 0.3982 0.5255 1.0307 
(1.99) (5.94) (4.63) 
Sample 1969Q4-1995Q4 1969Q4-1995Q4 1970Q3-1991 Q2 
t-statistics in parentheses 
The table above suggests that the arrears equation estimated without an intercept term 
is preferable to that estimated with a constant; although there is little difference 
between the size of the estimated coefficients of the two equations estimated over the 
whole sample period (the first two columns of Table 4.2 above), the t-statistics on the 
coefficients in the no-constant model are in most cases substantially higher. 
Given the similarity of the size of the coefficients in the two models, it is not 
surprising that the residuals from each regression were found to be remarkably similar. 
The autocorrelation functions for the residuals of the equations presented in the first 
two columns of Table 4.2 appear below in Figure 4.8. The functions both fall to zero 
speedily as the number of lags (k) is increased, suggesting that the residuals are 
stationary and that the variables of the estimated models do cointegrate. 
4o The mortgage rate is tax-adjusted by accounting for the effect of the MIRAS scheme. 
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The incidence of arrears is found to be a positive function of the unemployment rate, 
although the coefficient on this variable is insignificant for any reasonable choice of 
critical value. It is usually the case that the decision to purchase a house and the 
commitment to regular mortgage repayments is made on the basis of continued 
expected employment of the buyer. An increase in redundancies and layoffs therefore 
means that more borrowers will be impeded in their ability to make such repayments 
and will therefore increase the occurrence of arrears. Coles (1992) notes that, "most 
arrears problems result from relationship breakdown or severe loss of income, or 
frequently both", and that according to a telephone survey of the membership of the 
Council of Mortgage Lenders (CML) in December of 1991, "around 20 per cent to 30 
per cent of current arrears problems are associated with unemployment". 
The coefficient on the log of real personal disposable income (1nR(AIIJ)) was found to 
be positive (and highly significant in the preferred regression) in contrast to our a 
priori beliefs that higher personal disposable income should reduce the incidence of 
arrears. However, it is interesting to note that if we constrain the estimation period to 
be the same length as that used in B&J (the results of which are presented in the final 
column of Table 4.2), then the coefficient on real income becomes correctly signed 
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and significant at the 10 per cent level41. This may imply that the arrears equation as 
specified in B&J is unstable (Pain and Westaway (1996) also provide evidence to 
support the contention that B&J's model is unstable out of sample), and likely reflects 
the fact that real incomes did not fall by as much as one might have expected during 
the recession of the early 1990s. Dale (1995) confirms that income should have a 
negative effect on the number of households facing arrears problems, writing that, 
"future income plus future liquidity, less future debts and liabilities, provide the credit 
cushion against which a mortgage loan is advanced. Clearly, the larger the cushion, 
the greater an individual's ability to meet his or her potential obligations". 
The loan to income ratio for first time buyers is found to exert a positive and 
significant influence on the arrears-to-mortgages ratio; the higher is the average 
mortgage loan relative to personal income the greater will be the chance of default on 
the repayment of the debt42. The debt service ratio is a slightly different measure of 
the ability of the household to honour its mortgage debt repayments out of current 
income since it takes into account not only the level of mortgage debt but also the rate 
of interest on that debt; the coefficient on 1nDSR is, as expected, positive and 
significant at the 5 per cent level. 
The variable constructed to represent unwithdrawn equity appears negatively and 
highly significantly in the arrears equation. This suggests that as the average price of 
owner occupied housing rises relative to the average mortgage loan, there will be a 
greater potential for housing equity withdrawal either by the owner moving to a 
smaller dwelling, taking on a second mortgage or by remortgaging. By realising the 
unwithdrawn equity in the property in this way, the problem of arrears can be 
ameliorated. 
As Brookes et al (1994) point out, in a world in which agents are completely rational 
and have perfect foresight, repayment difficulties should never form part of the 
The critical value for the t-distribution at the 10 per cent level of significance with 80 observations is 
1.664. 
42 Other loan terms may also be expected to influence the level of arrears. Coles (1992), for example, 
suggests that, "a high loan to value ratio is the most important single characteristic of loans going into 
arrear and to possession". 
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equilibrium market outcome. Under such circumstances, households will calculate 
the current and expected future real costs of servicing the mortgage and will decide 
not to take on the loan if future mortgage default is inevitable. 
Finally, Table 4.3 below presents the results from the long run estimation of the 
possessions equation. Prior estimation of the Johansen VAR in differences suggests 
that there exists 1 cointegrating vector amongst the set of variables in the possessions 
specification. 
Table 4.3 : Estimates of the Long Run Cointegrating Possessions Equation 
Dependent Variable : 1nPOSS 
With Constant Without Constant 
Constant -14.3046 
(-2.01) 
1nARR 1.5199 0.7357 
(3.43) (7.42) 
R(rm) 0.0114 -0.0189 
(0.22) (-0.49) 
InUNEW 3.0814 -1.5976 
(1.25) (-2.93) 
1nR(PAHAd) -0.5768 1.0056 
(-0.51) (1.68) 
Sample 1969Q4-1995Q4 1969Q4-1995Q4 
t-statistics in parentheses 
where R(rm) is the real after-tax percentage rate of mortgage interest and all other 
variables are as defined previously. The specification differs from that of B&J in the 
incorporation of the real house price as an explanatory variable in the regression 
following the specification of equation (4.22). The autocorrelation functions for the 
residuals of both equations are presented below in Figure 4.9. The functions fall 
rapidly to zero as k rises, implying that the residual series are both stationary and that 
the estimated equations do represent valid cointegrating vectors. 














The arrears variable appears positively in the model of possessions, indicating that the 
greater the proportion of borrowers currently in arrears the greater will be the 
proportion of borrowers who will be possessed. Given that the possession of property 
results from the accumulation of arrears the sign of this coefficient is as expected. 
However, in the equation specified with a constant the elasticity on the arrears 
variable is greater than 1, which is a curious result given the long run nature of the 
equation. This would in fact suggest that a1 per cent increase in the proportion of 
arrears to mortgages leads to a 1.5 per cent increase in the possessions to mortgages 
ratio. 
The model estimated without a constant term appears to suggest a more plausible 
magnitude for the elasticity on arrears, indicating that for every 1 per cent increase in 
the arrears to mortgages ratio, the number of possessions as a proportion of mortgages 
will rise by around 0.74 per cent in the long run. Thus, on the basis of this result, the 
specification in which the constant term is excluded is preferred to that estimated with 
a constant. 
As B&J note, the real interest rate term should capture, "the impact of interest rates 
both on the probability of debt repayment by borrowers and on the opportunity cost of 
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not possessing for lenders". However, in both specifications presented in Table 4.3 
above the interest rate coefficient is insignificant and in the model estimated without a 
constant is of the wrong sign. 
An increase in aggregate unwithdrawn equity in owner occupied housing is found to 
lead to a reduction in the ratio of the number of possessions to mortgages outstanding 
for the same reasons as outlined in the discussion of Table 4.2 for arrears. The 
variable appears significantly and correctly signed in the preferred cointegrating 
vector of Table 4.3. 
The coefficient on house prices enters the preferred possessions model with a positive 
sign and is significant at the 10 per cent level, indicating that the higher is the real 
house price the greater will be the ratio of the number of possessions to mortgages. 
This sign is consistent with theoretical expectations, since according to equation 
(4.21) of Section 4.2.3, higher current house prices (PHI) will increase the benefits to 
the lender of early possession. 
Finally, before moving on it is appropriate to say something about the effect on arrears 
and possessions of relationship breakdown. Recent survey evidence has pointed to 
divorce as an important factor in causing households to slip into arrears and ultimately 
being possessed. In addition to the CML's 1991 survey on the causes of mortgage 
indebtedness (see previous discussion of the results from the long run arrears 
estimation), research by the Office of Fair Trading, the Policy Studies Institute and the 
National Consumer Council have all arrived at similar conclusions : that, "changes in 
the structure of the household - such as the birth of a baby or the breakdown of a 
marriage or relationship ... seemed linked to indebtedness" (Anderson (1990)). Coles 
(1992) also points out that those households most vulnerable to the accumulation of 
arrears or being taken into possession are young unmarried couples with joint 
mortgages, a social group particularly prone to relationship breakdown. With the 
percentage of cohabiting couples rising, this will clearly have had an effect on the rise 
in arrears and possessions. Indeed, unlike unemployment, rising divorce rates do not 
tend to be highly correlated with the economic cycle, and thus provide a reason for the 
rise in the trend rate of arrears and possessions (Figure 4.10 below charts the rise in 
the divorce rate). Thus an obvious area for future research would be the inclusion of a 
variable reflecting relationship breakdown in the long run arrears and possessions 
equations. 
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4.3.3.3 Results from the Estimation of Short Run Dynamic Equations 
The final stage of the Engle and Granger (1987) methodology is the estimation of an 
error correction model for each long run relationship. These dynamic equations 
include lagged difference terms in addition to the lagged residual series from the 
corresponding cointegrating model in order to capture the short run adjustment 
towards long run equilibrium. The short run dynamic equations for real house prices, 
arrears and possessions are presented in Table 4.4 below, where RESIDSHPt. t, 
RESIDSARRg. 1 and RESIDSpos ,. I are the lagged residuals from the cointegrating 
regressions of Tables 4.1 to 4.3 respectively, ZLVF is the loan to value ratio for first 
time buyers (as a percentage), A indicates the first difference of a variable and Chow 1 
and Chow 2 are Chow's (1960) structural stability and predictive failure tests 
respectively. The number of lags included in the equations are chosen using a general 
to specific modelling strategy with the maximum number of lags deemed acceptable 
being four (since we are using quarterly data). 
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Table 4.4 : OLS Estimates of the Short Run Dynamic Equations 
Real House Price Equation 
Dependent : A1nR(PAHM) 
Arrears Equation 
Dependent : O1nARR 
Possessions Equation 
Dependent : A1nPOSS 
Constant 0.0028 Constant 0.0007 Constant 0.0041 
(1.51) (0.36) (0.98) 
RESIDSHP,. i -0.1359 RESIDS4m,. 1 -0.0299 RESIDSpo ,. 1 -0.0209 (-4.76) (-2.78) (. 1.85) 
A1nR(PAHM),., 0.4430 AlnARR,. i 1.8304 A1nPOSS,., 1.5524 
(4.44) (26.20) (15.98) 
A1nR(PAHM),. 2 0.3801 AlnARR,. 2 -1.5560 A1nPOSS,. 2 -0.9471 
(3.85) (-13.73) (-5.97) 
O1nR(AIIJ),. i 0.2884 &InARR,. 3 0.7119 &InPOSS,. 3 0.2091 (2.72) (10.11) (1.96) 
AInPOPN,. 1 1.2735 AlnAYR,. I -0.3393 A1nARR,. 2 0.1418 (4.79) (-3.28) (1.95) 
A1nINFL,. 1 0.0300 AlnUNEW, 4 0.2268 AR(r,,, ),., 0.0059 (2.61) (2.54) (1.68) 
O1nINFL, _3 -0.0294 
&InDSR,. 3 0.0750 A1nZLVF,. 3 -0.5682 
(-2.80) (2.78) (-1.90) 
A1nPOSS,. 1 -0.1183 (-4.01) 
A1nPOSS,. 2 0.1317 (3.84) 
0.7885 0.9502 IR2 0.8932 
Adjusted R2 0.7669 Adjusted R2 0.9464 Adjusted R2 0.8850 
LM (Serial 2.6100 LM (Serial 5.1872 LM (Serial 12.3800 
Correlation) Correlation) Correlation) 
Chow 1 (LM) 8.5897 Chow 1(LM) 9.4752 Chow 1 (LM) 8.5798 
Chow 2 (LM) 12.9812 Chow 2 (LM) 13.4489 Chow 2 (LM) 13.8287 
Sample 1971Q3- Sample 1971Q2- Sample 1971Q2- 
1995Q4 1995Q4 199504 
t-statistics in parentheses 
The dynamic real house price equation is presented in the first column of Table 4.4 
above. At 13.6 per cent, the coefficient on the lagged residuals from the cointegrating 
house price equation was found to be significantly higher (at the 5 per cent level) than 
that presented in B&J and Joyce and Kennedy (1992), although may still be 
considered fairly low. Indeed, B&J find an adjustment parameter of 6.5 per cent 
whilst Joyce and Kennedy report a figure of 7 per cent. This suggests that the 
adjustment of real house prices to their equilibrium level following a shock to either 
the demand for or supply of housing is reasonably slow (with only 13.6 per cent of the 
adjustment being made each quarter it will take 5 quarters before more than half of the 
price adjustment is complete). The most likely reason for this fairly slow adjustment 
is the presence of significant adjustment costs which will affect households' demand 
for owner occupied housing. 
All of the difference terms in the estimation are significant at the 5 per cent level and 
the signs are broadly consistent with our a priori expectations. An interesting feature 
of the dynamic model is that the lag structure on the possessions variable suggests that 
a permanent rise in possessions has only a temporary effect on house prices in the 
short run. A one per cent rise in the possessions ratio is shown to lead to a 0.12 per 
cent fall in house prices in the subsequent quarter and a 0.13 per cent rise in the 
quarter after, suggesting little overall impact of possessions on house prices in the 
short run. The LM test statistic confirms that residual serial correlation is not a 
problem in the estimated equation (the critical value of the chi-square distribution at 
the 5 per cent level with 4 degrees of freedom is 9.49) and the goodness of fit 
measures are satisfactory. In addition to the regressions for the full sample period 
presented in Table 4.4 above, the model is estimated over the restricted sample period 
ending in 1989Q4 (i. e. the period immediately prior to the unprecedented fall in real 
house prices during the early 1990s) with the remaining 24 observations up to 1995Q4 
being used to test for the stability of the estimated parameters and the predictive 
ability of the model. Structural stability is tested using the Chow 1 test statistic in 
Table 4.4; at the 5 per cent significance level, the test statistic is less than the critical 
value (%2 (10) = 20.48) implying that we may not reject the hypothesis that the 
regressions of each period (i. e. 1971Q3-1989Q4 and 1990Q1-1995Q4) are the same; 
we may conclude therefore that the parameters of the estimated equation are 
intertemporally stable. Likewise, the Chow 2 test confirms the ability of the model to 
predict the considerable changes in real house prices during the first half of the 1990s 
using the model estimated up to 1989Q4 (the critical value at the 5 per cent level of 
significance of the chi-square distribution with 24 degrees of freedom is 36.42). The 
robustness of these findings is interesting in the light of recent work undertaken by 
Muellbauer and Murphy (1997) who find that the parameters of their house price 
equation undergo significant shifts as a result of the financial liberalisation of the 
1980s and 1990s. 
The dynamic equation for arrears includes difference terms in the lagged dependent 
variable, the loan to income ratio, unwithdrawn equity and the debt service ratio. The 
model proved to fit the data well as indicated by an R2 of 0.9502 and the absence of 
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serial correlation in the residual series. In addition, Chow tests confirmed both the 
structural stability of the parameters of the model estimated between the two sample 
periods and also the accuracy of the predictions made (using the model estimated over 
the restricted sample) for the stock of arrears during the 1990s. The coefficient on the 
lagged residuals of the cointegrating relationship was found to be smaller than that of 
the house price equation, indicating that only 3 per cent of the adjustment of the 
arrears ratio to its long run equilibrium level occurred during each quarter. 
The dynamic adjustment of the incidence of arrears was shown to be positively 
affected both by the debt service ratio and the term representing unwithdrawn equity, 
the latter against our a priori expectations. Additionally, the coefficient on the loan to 
income ratio appeared negatively in the equation, again not as expected. This is, 
nevertheless, consistent with the belief that in the short run mortgage lenders will only 
be willing to relax their lending policies on the basis of observed stability in aggregate 
mortgage repayments, whereas in the long run the greater the average mortgage loan 
relative to the income of the borrower will serve to increase the likelihood of default. 
Again, the possessions equation passed both the structural stability test and also the 
predictive failure test with ease, although at the 5 per cent significance level serial 
correlation remained among the residuals of the model (however, the null hypothesis 
of no serial correlation could not be rejected at the 1 per cent level). An increase in 
the real rate of interest or the relative number of arrears or a reduction in the loan to 
value ratio were found to be associated with a rise in the flow into possession. The 
negative sign on the loan to value ratio implies that the adoption of more relaxed 
lending policies goes hand in hand with greater leniency towards those households 
facing possession. Indeed, it is also likely that we are observing a similar effect to that 
seen in the arrears equation, that in the short run lenders will only raise the loan to 
value ratio if they are not concerned over the flow into possession. The results 
reported here would suggest that the short run response of possessions to an 
exogenous shock is extremely slow; the coefficient on the residuals of the long run 
cointegrating regression is only just over 2 per cent, which compares to 9 per cent 
reported in B&J. 
Finally, we must consider the autoregressive lag structure in both the arrears and 
possessions equations presented in Table 4.4 above. The general to specific 
methodology suggests that the current change in arrears and possessions depends on 
the first three autoregressive lags, and in both cases, the first and third lags are 
positive and the second negative. If we construct a series of the autoregressive 
components of the model alone (i. e. we are just considering the homogenous equation 
and ignoring the forcing process), when plotted against time both the autoregressive 
arrears and possessions series are found to be convergent and thus satisfy the 
stationarity restrictions for autoregressive models (see Figure 4.11 below). 
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4.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has examined in depth the models of real house prices, arrears and 
possessions as proposed by Breedon and Joyce (1993). The introduction to the 
chapter examined the trends in nominal and real house prices, arrears and possessions 
in the UK housing market. The financial market deregulation of the 1980s (which 
" The figure shows the path of A1nARR and A1nPOSS on the assumption that they are both of unit value in period 1 and zero before. In other words, we assume that InARR and InPOSS remain constant at their long run levels prior to period 1 at which point they undergo an exogenous one-off 1 per cent rise. 
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served to encourage competition in the mortgage market) led to borrowers taking on 
higher levels of mortgage debt relative to their income, making them particularly 
vulnerable to the general economic recession of the early 1990s. As the rate of 
unemployment rose (from 5.5 per cent in 1990Q2 to 10.5 per cent in 1993Q1) so too 
did the incidence of mortgage arrears. Moreover, with falling real and nominal house 
prices causing widespread negative equity, the higher rate of default inevitably led to a 
considerable increase in the number of households facing possession. 
The theoretical model of real house prices is based on previous work by Dougherty 
and Van Order (1981), Poterba (1984), Ermisch (1984) and Meen (1990a) in which a 
household maximises utility by consuming housing services and a composite 
consumption good subject to a number of standard constraints. The real user cost of 
housing capital is derived from this optimisation problem and, following the 
specification of the demand for and supply of housing, an equation for the real house 
price is proposed. 
The model for arrears is based on a paper by Brookes et al (1994) in which 
households fall into arrears if their mortgage repayments exceed the sum of disposable 
income plus the potential amount of equity which can be withdrawn from the housing 
asset. This `arrears condition' is shown to depend on the mortgage lender's 
willingness to grant further loans on the basis of households' unwithdrawn equity. 
Finally, the decision to possess a house by the lender is assumed to depend upon the 
current price of the house and the lender's expectation of both the future house price 
and the borrower's ability to repay the loan. 
Issues regarding the general specification of the data were addressed in Section 4.3.1, 
including the availability of the variables and the technique involved in seasonally 
adjusting the data (the cubic spline method of interpolating those series not available 
on a quarterly basis was addressed in Appendix 4.1). The two stage methodological 
framework of Engle and Granger (1987) was adopted for the estimation of all three 
models and specifically, the canonical cointegrating technique developed by Park 
(1992) was used to estimate the long run cointegrating relationships since it has been 
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shown that the parameter estimates are both efficient and most similar in size to the 
`superconsistent' OLS results. However, for purposes of comparison, Appendix 4.3 
presents the long run estimation results for a number of other estimation techniques 
Phillips Hansen (1990) and Phillips (1993) fully modified procedures and also OLS. 
Each long run equation was first estimated using the Johansen (1988) technique in 
order that the number of cointegrating relationships between the sets of variables 
could be determined; at least one cointegrating vector was found for each equation as 
required for cointegration. In addition, an examination of the residuals (and their 
autocorrelation functions) from the long run estimations confirmed their stationarity 
and therefore that the estimated models were indeed ones of cointegration. 
The specifications of both the long run and short run equations were modified from 
those presented by B&J and were estimated over a longer period of time. The sample 
period for estimation was extended over that of B&J to include the tumultuous period 
in the housing market in the early 1990s during which time there was a continued 
decline in real and nominal house prices and a further increase, peak and subsequent 
decline in the flow of possessions and stock values of loans in arrear. This has had an 
important effect on altering the parameters of the long run regressions (Appendix 4.3 
presents the long run cointegration results estimated over two sample periods, one 
including and one excluding the period post 1990/91). In particular, the failure of real 
personal incomes to fall significantly during the early 1990s' recession (compared to 
previous slowdowns) was the most likely cause of the poor performance of the income 
variable in both the long run house price and arrears equations. 
Barring such anomalies, however, the results presented in this chapter for both the 
long run and short run equations are similar to those reported in B&J, a conclusion 
which one may assume ratifies not only the theoretical approach discussed in Section 
4.2 but also the quarterly extended data set and indeed the method of estimation. The 
short run dynamic equations were shown to perform particularly well, the parameters 
being intertemporally stable and the models estimated over the restricted sample 
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period being able to forecast the dramatic changes in real house prices, arrears and 
possessions during the 1990s. 
Future work on the theoretical framework could potentially link the three models of 
Section 4.2 more closely together, since as they stand they are rather diverse and ad 
hoc. However, perhaps the most important criticism of the model presented in this 
chapter is the fact that no explicit account is taken of the rental sector in either the 
theoretical or empirical modelling. Yet the markets for rental and owner occupied 
housing are inextricably linked. The long term decline in the UK rental market has, 
for example, been associated with a trend for increased owner occupationaa. 
Government policy has been instrumental in influencing the balance between renting 
and owner occupation, such measures including rent controls, improved provision of 
public housing and the encouragement of owner occupation. Indeed, as a boom in the 
owner occupied market took root in 1985, the rate of decline in the rental sector 
housing stock, which had begun to stabilise during the 1970s and early 1980s, 
gathered momentum. By the end of the decade, the stock of private houses for rent 
accounted for under 10 per cent of the market. However, the decline was arrested 
following the passing of the 1988 Housing Act (which ended the system of rent 
controls by allowing landlords to set rents freely) and the ensuing slump in the owner 
occupier market. 
There is also more recent evidence to suggest the importance of the links between the 
owner occupied and rental housing markets. The current boom in the price of owner 
occupied housing has been influenced to a large extent by the fall in interest rates, 
which has encouraged not only owner occupation but also the purchase of houses to 
let. In the past, rising house prices have in general tended to imply rising rents as 
fewer houses are made available for rental purposes and landlords look to maintain a 
constant rental yield. This effect, however, may be more muted in the current 
environment given the popularity of buying to rent, which has had the effect of raising 
the supply of rental housing and thereby stemming any rise in rental charges. Indeed, 
44 In fact the stock of private rentable accommodation has fallen from around 90 per cent of the total 
dwelling stock in 1900 to 50 per cent at the end of the second world war, 20 per cent in 1971 and only 11 per cent in 1981 (sources: Down, Holmans and Small (1994) and Abisogun (1992)). 
167 
the effect of over-supply in the rental market is confirmed in a recent study by 
property research group FPD Savills who report that apartment rents in London have 
fallen by around 4.3 per cent between mid-1998 and mid-1999. 
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With regard mortgage default, a rise in possessions will also have implications for the 
rental sector since this should, according to the results presented earlier in the chapter, 
have a negative impact on house prices and possibly a positive effect on rents (a result 
of increased rental demand). Mortgage lending policies will additionally impact upon 
the rental sector to the extent that more stringent terms will deter potential owner 
occupiers. 
Thus, the extent of the interdependence between the rental sector and the market for 
owner occupied housing would suggest that the natural path for future research would 
be the integration of the rental sector into a model of house prices and mortgage 
default. We could clearly expect, however, the dynamics and simultaneities of such a 
problem to be complex. 
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CHAPTER 5 
A Theoretical Model of Building Society Interest Rate Setting 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, a theoretical model of building society interest rate setting is 
developed in order that the determinants of mortgage supply may be more rigorously 
identified prior to the formulation of an empirical model later in the thesis. In 
constructing the model it is argued that building societies will choose their rates of 
interest on mortgages and shares/deposits which in turn will determine the society's 
desired supply of each. In other words, the model is one of price rather than quantity 
setting. 
The model presented here is developed from a paper by Smith et al (1981). Their 
work focuses on the modelling of US `credit unions" (hereafter referred to as 'CUs') 
by assuming that each institution maximises a weighted function of its members' 
welfare and profits subject to the constraint that profits be non-negative. The 
weighting parameters then determine the precise form taken by the optimal equations 
for both the mortgage rate and the savings rate of interest. 
The model of Smith et al (1981) is adapted for UK building societies, and it is shown 
that by restricting the scope of the weighting parameters, the resulting optimal 
mortgage and savings rates chosen by the building society will not, up to a certain 
point, be a function of the weighting factors. Given that the weights chosen by the 
building society reflect the degree to which the society is oriented towards the 
maximisation of profit at one extreme or the allocation of financial benefits to its 
members at the other, the optimisation of the restricted objective function in the model 
presented in this chapter generates an important conclusion : that a building society 
with a higher regard for members' benefits than profitability (as given by the relative 
Credit unions are financial intermediation co-operatives in which the demand for and supply of 
loanable funds is made up solely by its members. They are similar in nature to UK building societies 
and are described in more depth in Section 5.2.1 below. 
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weights of the objective function) will not, in general, set its interest rates differently 
to a building society assigning equal importance to the two objectives2. With the 
recent trend in the building society movement of institutions opting to relinquish their 
mutual status and become profit maximising banking firms3, this conclusion 
obviously has important implications for the interest rate setting policy of mutual 
financial institutions embarking on the conversion route. 
Section 5.2 begins with a qualitative discussion of the similarities between credit 
unions and building societies and evaluates how the principles governing the way in 
which financial co-operatives have been modelled in the past may be applicable to the 
specification of an objective function for building societies. The preferred 
specification is then briefly discussed where it is shown that the objective function is 
simply a restricted form of that proposed by Smith et al (1981). Subsection 5.2.4 then 
applies the methodology of Patin and McNiel (1991) and Smith (1986) to UK building 
societies in order to provide an empirical justification for the restrictions placed on the 
theoretical model. The empirical proof is essentially a demonstration that UK 
building societies are in fact neutral in conferring financial benefits upon their 
borrowing and saving members through their policy of setting mortgage and 
share/deposit rates of interest. In Section 5.3 the optimisation of the model is 
presented and finally Section 5.4 concludes the chapter by summarising the findings 
of the model and discussing its implications. 
5.2 THE SPECIFICATION OF AN OBJECTIVE FUNCTION FOR BUILDING 
SOCIETIES 
Due to the unique institutional status of UK building societies and US credit unions, 
traditional models of financial intermediaries and co-operative enterprises cannot be 
applied directly to model their behaviour; profit maximising models may simply not 
be appropriate. This section endeavours to draw inferences as to the nature of the 
objective function of UK building societies by firstly analysing the way in which co- 
2 As we will see later, however, there is an important restriction on the applicability of the model. 3 See Chapter 2 for a discussion of the causes of and recent developments in the conversion of building 
societies to Plc status. 
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operative financial institutions have in the past been modelled and secondly by 
investigating empirically the extent to which any individual building society and the 
industry as a whole allocates a greater level of net monetary benefits to either its 
savers or borrowers. 
5.2.1 The Nature of Credit Unions and Building Societies 
In this subsection the essential characteristics of the credit union movement in the US 
and the institutional similarities to the UK building society industry are considered. A 
brief discussion of the way in which the objective function of a typical building 
society or credit union may differ from that of a profit maximising private enterprise 
then follows. 
A credit union is a financial intermediation co-operative in which the members are 
both the consumers of its output and suppliers of its input. The membership provides 
both the demand for and supply of loanable funds, the CU then intermediating 
between the borrower and saver members4. Because the credit union is a co-operative 
that deals exclusively with its members (without the need to interact with non- 
members), it has been referred to as the `purest' type of co-operative (see Taylor 
(1971)). In this respect (and this is perhaps most important from a modelling 
perspective), the CU movement in the US is not unlike that of UK building societies, 
although it must not be overlooked that building societies do interact with non- 
members for purposes of financial intermediation. In addition, US CUs are generally 
operated by their membership on a volunteer basis without pay. 
However, an important difference is that unlike building societies, the membership of 
a CU is limited by what is referred to as a `common bond'. Generally, these 
institutions cannot conduct business with the general public due to charter limitations 
restricting the CU to serving a membership characterised by a common bond, which 
4 In co-operative theory terminology, the credit union is considered a `purchasing' co-operative by its 
borrowers, and a `marketing' co-operative by its saving members. 
On the liability side, for example, building societies are permitted to borrow in the wholesale interbank money markets up to a limit of 50 per cent of their total liabilities. 
can be based on geographical area of residence, membership of a certain association 
or (more usually) common occupation. It is noted by Smith (1984) that CUs may 
have "once-a-member-always-a-member" clauses and allow family member 
participation, going some way to expanding the upper bound to potential CU output. 
The common bond restriction is a feature mainly of US CUs, with some other 
countries having open (or community based) membership policies7. For the purpose 
of constructing an economic model of building society behaviour, it is therefore 
informative to think of a building society as a CU with either liberal or non-existent 
membership restrictions. 
Taylor (1971) describes a CU in terms of its `subsidiary' nature, which involves the 
CU, "having no profit motive of itself, but existing only to attain the economic and 
social goals of the people who comprise its membership". Then it is alleged the 
economic behaviour of the CU is just an extension of the economic behaviour of its 
membership, not representing any independent behaviour or goals of its owns. This 
being the case, the CU must function in a way that is most advantageous to its 
members. The pecuniary benefits of CU membership are essentially the access to 
lower cost credit than that charged by alternative lending institutions and dividend 
rates on savings in excess of those offered by other depository institutions. 
In this respect, recent legislative developments within the UK finance sector that have 
served to deregulate the building society industry must be taken into account in 
specifying a building society objective function since this represents a significant 
erosion of the subsidiary or non-profit nature of societies. It is alleged that no longer 
are societies entirely focused on the maximisation of member benefits as they were 
prior to the 1980s, but rather an increasing number are attaching weight to their 
corporate profits in addition to net member benefits in their objective function. In the 
extreme, a significant number of building societies have cast aside their mutual status 
6 The purpose of the common bond restriction is allegedly to reduce the cost of gathering credit information and reducing losses from bad debts. 
It is important to point out that although credit unions may be found in many countries (including the 
UK), the US and Canada account for by far the largest share of CU activity. s In later work, Taylor (1979) refers to this as, "the theory of non-independence". 
to become Plcs, a corporate structure in which it is commonly assumed that 
unqualified profit maximisation be the objective. 
The objective function of a building society may then be assumed to contain elements 
of both member benefits and institutional profit, whereas the objective of a CU is to 
simply maximise its members benefits alone. Obviously, both CUs and building 
societies cannot maximise the deposit rate for savers whilst simultaneously 
minimising the loan rate charged to borrowers. Maintaining low loan rates may place 
a limit on the ability of the institution to pay dividends, while the maintenance of high 
dividend rates may necessitate higher lending rates. This heterogeneity of borrower 
and saver objectives gives rise to an inherent source of conflict between the net savers 
and net borrowers which make up the society's or CU's membership. In this respect, 
some credit unions are referred to as either borrower or saver dominated while others 
are considered neutral. This terminology relates to the partiality of the credit union (or 
building society) towards either borrowers or savers in choosing the relevant loan and 
saving rates (and thus the allocation of net benefits). This issue is addressed in more 
depth in the following Subsection 5.2.2. 
5.2.2 The Borrower-Saver Conflict and Tests for Variant Objective Functions 
As we said above, it is considered reasonable in the economic analysis of the firm to 
make the assumption of unanimity among shareholders with respect to the firm's 
objective function, usually the maximisation of profit?. However, this concept of 
homogeneity is not applicable to a credit union or building society. Since the 
membership of a financial co-operative institution may be divided into net borrowers 
and net savers, a conflict between the two groups exists as to the institution's 
objective. Savers would prefer the objective of high deposit rates to be pursued 
whereas borrowers favour an objective of low lending rates. As noted in Smith et al 
(1981), "One cannot simply assume that the members seek to maximise the profit 
generated by their transactions with the CU irrespective of the price and quantity of 
those transactions". 
9 Other objectives include the maximisation of the firm's market value or the rate of return on 
shareholders' equity. 
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This would imply that the general specification of the representative building society's 
objective function maybe written as 
Q= ONGL+ ONGS + Sic (5.1) 
where NGL is the net gain to borrowing members from transacting with the society, 
NGS is the equivalent net gain to savers10, r is the society's profit and ý, a and S are 
the weights attached to the components of the optimand (with b and o reflecting the 
relative allocation of financial benefits between borrowers and savers of the CU 
respectively). The recent movement by UK building societies from a position of 
member benefit maximisation to one of profit maximisation would suggest a fall in 
the parameters O and o over time and an upward trend in 5. If member borrowers and 
savers are treated equally by the society with respect to their net gains, then one would 
expect to find 0 =a . 
Taylor (1971) was perhaps the first to explicitly recognise the potential inherent 
borrower-saver conflict in credit unions. Since the publication of his paper, the 
majority of subsequent work (both theoretical and empirical) in the area has 
acknowledged that the conflict between the member groups in the CU may affect the 
way in which CUs are operated. Such papers include Flannery (1974), Walker and 
Chandler (1977), Smith et al (1981) and Smith (1984). It is argued that it is the 
borrower-saver conflict and its resolution that could lead to the existence of a variety 
of credit union types, ranging from complete borrower or saver preference in the 
extreme to an intermediate position of neutrality. 
Papers by Flannery (1974), Smith (1986) and Patin and McNiel (1991) address this 
issue directly by formulating tests to ascertain whether any particular credit union (and 
the industry as a whole) is `borrower-dominated', `saver-dominated' or `neutral'. The 
latter two papers (which are discussed more fully below) both present evidence to 
suggest that the variant objective function hypothesis (i. e. that the financial benefits of 
one member group dominate those of the other) is not empirically supported for CUs. 
10 The exact specification of net gains to borrowers and savers will be discussed in Section 5.2.3. 
174 
This is not particularly surprising for a number of reasons. Firstly, a neutral CU, 
according to Smith (1986), "typifies the altruistic motivations that lie at the heart of 
the co-operative philosophy". Secondly, borrowers and savers are not always 
mutually exclusive groups, a fact which serves to lessen the inherent conflicting 
attitudes. To clarify this point, the classification of an agent as a net borrower or net 
saver depends crucially upon the stage of the individual's life cycle. As a result of 
mortgage borrowing during the early and middle stages of the life cycle, an individual 
in this age group is more likely to be a net borrower than a net saver, whereas during 
the latter period in the life cycle (i. e. retirement), the agent is more likely to be a net 
saver. Thirdly, a CU must attain some balance between savings deposits and loans; 
the possibility of mass withdrawal (or even non-entry) by the non-preferred group 
should lead to neutrality as the only feasible objective. The importance of the result of 
neutrality is that one may subsequently focus on a simpler objective function in the 
modelling of CUs or building societies. 
5.2.3 The Nature of the Restrictions to the Model of Interest Rate Setting 
Smith et al (1981) propose a theory of CU interest rate setting whereby the level of 
lending and saving rates are chosen to maximise a weighted objective function of the 
welfare of the CU's members (referred to below as net gains on loans, NGL, and net 
gains on savings, NGS) and the profit of the institution. Simple linear specifications 
of loan demand and savings supply are assumed, the quantity of each depending on 
the spread between the CU's rates of interest and those of the rest of the market. The 
complete optimisation problem may be written as 
Max Q= bNGL + QNGS +; r (5.2) "LS 
subject to the following constraint that profits be non-negative 
=rLL-rSS-rDMD-CLL-CSS-K; O (5.3) 
where rL and rs are the CU's rates of interest on loans and savings respectively, the net 
gains to borrowers and savers (NGL and NGS) are assumed dependent on the 
relationship between the interest rates rL and rs and their market equivalents, L and S 
are the quantity of loans demanded from and savings supplied to the CU (again 
dependent on rL and rs and their respective market alternatives), D=L-S represents 
a debt issue by the CU if L>S and a wholesale money market investment if S>L 
(both of which attract a rate of interest rDM), CL and CS are constant average 
processing costs of loans and savings accounts respectively and E represents fixed 
CU expenditures. Clearly, the specification of the objective function is the same as 
equation (5.1) above with 8 =1. 
The model of CU interest rate setting as discussed above is modified for application to 
UK building societies by placing an equality restriction on the weights of NGL and 
NGS (S and o respectively) and adding a weight on the profit component in the 
objective function of equation (5.2). This amounts to the maximisation of the 
following function 
Max A(NGL + NGS) + (1-1%), r 
Pi as 
(5.4) 
where 0SAS1. Again, the optimisation of this objective function is subject to the 
non-negative profit constraint of equation (5.3). 
The fact that this model is more restrictive than that of equation (5.2) is not 
immediately apparent, since although a single weight is now applied to both NGL and 
NGS, an additional weight has been placed on the profit element in the maximand. 
However, by dividing through by (1- . %) as we do in equation (5.5) below, it may be 
more clearly seen how the specification of (5.4) is more restrictive 
Max O(NGL + NGS) +g (5.5) rL'S 
where 0=A/ (1- A) , which is clearly more restrictive than the 
formulation of 
equation (5.1). Since A must lie in the range between 0 and 1, the parameter 0 will lie 
in the range 0 and co. 
The addition of a weight on the profit component equal to one less the weight on 
member benefits allows us to interpret % as the degree to which building societies are 
committed to maximising member benefits rather than society profits (additions to 
reserves). Thus by observing the effects of the variation in A on the optimal interest 
rate setting strategy of the building society we may infer how the mortgage and 
savings rates of interest may change once the society converts from being a mutual 
institution to a public limited company. 
The primary reason for applying an equality constraint to the weights on NGL and 
NGS is that for a building society to achieve balance between its inflows and outflows 
of retail funds one may assume that it must be evenly handed in setting its mortgage 
and saving rates of interest". However, with increased access to wholesale deposit 
markets building societies can potentially correct for any such retail imbalances 
through the inter-bank lending markets. Thus in Section 5.2.4 which follows, the 
notion that financial benefits are allocated evenly between the borrowing and saving 
members of UK building societies is empirically investigated (the findings being 
compared with those for credit unions using similar tests) allowing us to justify the 
specification of the objective function of equation (5.4) above. 
5.2.4 Empirical Tests for Variant Building Society Objective Functions 
Prior to the evaluation and testing of the hypotheses for variant objective functions 
among building societies, it is useful to consider a description of dominated and 
neutral building society behaviour. A very broad definition in Patin and McNiel 
(1991) describes dominated behaviour as occurring when, "one of the two groups [net 
borrowers or net savers] is benefited at the expense of another", and neutrality as 
when, "the CU [or building society in this case] is managed so that both member 
" Other explanations in addition to this are given in Section 5.2.2. 
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groups are equally benefited". The exact specification of these benefits is rather ad 
hoc and is discussed further later on. 
The data set upon which the following estimations and analyses are performed is cross 
sectional data on all building societies with a level of total assets of £100m or more. 
This data was kindly supplied by Thesys Information Ltd. for the year 1995, during 
which the number of societies satisfying the minimum total asset requirement was 58. 
5.2.4.1 Smith's (1986) Methodology 
Smith (1986) employs a procedure similar to that of Flannery (1974). Following 
Smith, building societies are firstly arbitrarily classified into borrower preference, 
saver preference or neutrality groupings based on the finding by Smith (1984) that as a 
building society tends towards saver (borrower) preference, both the interest rate on 
loans and the dividend rate on savings will increase (decrease). A potential 
classification criteria is then to categorise building societies as saver (borrower) 
oriented if both their loan and dividend rates are above (below) their respective 
industry sample means for any particular year. 
However, a number of institutional factors will also affect the building society's 
mortgage and deposit rates, with the loan rate being additionally influenced by the 
composition of the society's lending portfolio (i. e. the type of loan and the risk 
associated with the borrower). Thus, in recognition of the effect of such factors, the 
mortgage and dividend rates are regressed against a number of proxy variables, the 
amended classification scheme then comparing the actual and predicted rate values. If 
the observed values for both the mortgage and dividend rates are greater than (less 
than) their predicted values, then the building society is deemed saver (borrower) 
preference, otherwise the society is considered to be neutral12. From this information 
we may construct two dummy variables for use later : BP =1 if the society is 
borrower preference, SP =1 if it is saver preference and BP = SP =0 otherwise. 
12 The method is therefore simply an analysis of the residuals of the estimated equations. Positive 
residuals are indicative of saver preference while negative residuals would suggest borrower 
domination. 
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The results of the classification equations are shown in Table 5.1 below. Variables 
measuring building society total assets (TA) and the liquidity ratio (LR) are included in 
both interest rate regression equations; additional variables included in the mortgage 
rate equation are average mortgage size (AVM), the percentage of debt in arrear 
(ARR), the value of new mortgage advances over the year as a percentage of total 
advances as a proxy for mortgage turnover (MT) and losses written off as a percentage 
of average advances (LOSS). 
Table 5.1 : OLS Estimation of the Classification Equations 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent Variable : 
Average Mortgage 
Rate 
Dependent Variable : 
Average Dividend 
Rate 
Constant 7.2787 5.5111 
(17.28) (20.51) 
TA -2.07888E-09 -1.572E-09 
(-0.62) (-0.59) 
LR 0.0371 0.0077 
(2.19) (0.01) 
AVM -0.0039 (-0.57) 
ARR 0.0077 
(2.03) 




R2 0.1915 0.0153 
t-statistics in parentheses 
Low R2 values for the classification equations indicate that the institutional variables 
have little explanatory power 13. An analysis of the residuals led to 29.3 per cent or 17 
of the 58 building societies being classified as borrower preference and the same 
percentage as saver preference according to the classification method described above. 
The remaining 24 societies (41.4 per cent) were unclassified. 
The empirical test of the variant objective function hypothesis is then formed on the 
basis of a further result in Smith (1984) that in a saver (borrower) preference society, 
the dividend (loan) rate will tend to absorb any exogenous shocks while the loan 
13 Obviously, in the absence of any explanatory power of these regressions, the classification scheme 
reduces to a simple comparison of actual rates to sample means. 
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(dividend) rate tends to remain unchanged. The intuition behind this result is as 
follows. As borrower dominated building societies will tend to minimise the loan 
rate, savers' financial benefits will be excluded from the objective function; with the 
supply of deposits being taken as given, the dividend rate will then be optimally set to 
minimise the cost of funds. Exogenous shocks not affecting the deposit supply 
function (such as an exogenous fall in income or rise in costs) will thus not alter the 
savings rate, the loan rate alone reacting to the shock. 
Similarly, in a saver preference society, the borrowers' demand schedule is assumed 
given, the loan rate being set to maximise the return on mortgage lending. The 
dividend rate then absorbs any exogenous shocks. The objective function of a neutral 
society would include both gains to borrowers and savers, with both interest rates 
reacting to any exogenous disturbances (borrowers and savers share in the positive 
and negative shocks). 
The rates of interest on mortgage loans and savings are specified as reduced form 
equations dependent on a number of variables, the changes in which may be 
considered to be exogenous shocks. These are specified as the society's capital 
reserves (CR), its average operating expenses (OP) and its additions to reserves for the 
year (AR) 14 as follows 
rL =ao+a, CR+a2OP+a3AR (5.6) 
rs =a4 +a5CR+a6OP+a7AR (5.7) 
The variant objective function hypothesis suggests the signs of the coefficients to be 
a, < O, a2 > O, a3 >0 and as = a6 = a7 =0 for borrower preference and 
a, = a2 = a3 =0 and as > 0, a6 < 0, a7 <0 for saver preference. In other words, in 
a borrower (saver) preference society, higher capital reserves, lower expenses and 
14 The use of additions to reserves in these equations, however, is debatable; since this profit measure is in part determined by the difference between rL and rs, the estimation may suffer from simultaneous 
equation bias. 
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lower additions to reserves allow the society to charge (offer) a lower (higher) rate on 
mortgages (savings) with the savings (mortgage) rate remaining unchanged. 
The empirical test then is to determine whether the parameters of the classified groups 
differ significantly; if they do then the homogeneous objective function hypothesis 
must be rejected. This is where the original classification of borrower and saver 
preference comes in; assuming that all parameters of equations (5.6) and (5.7) differ 
according to equation (5.8) 
aý = To, +y11BP+y21SP (5.8) 
we may substitute equation (5.8) into equations (5.6) and (5.7) to give 
rL =Yoo +Y1oBP+y20SP+Yo1(CR)+Y,, BP(CR) 
+y 21SP(CR) + y02 (OP) +y 12 BP(OP) +y 22SP(OP) (5.9) 
+703 (AR) + yBP(AR) +y 23SP(AR) 
and 
rs =Y04 +Yl4BP+y24SP+Yos(CR)+Y15BP(CR) 
+Y 25SP(CR) + Y06(op) +y 16BP(OP) +y 26SP(OP) (5.10) 
+y07(AR)+y17BP(AR)+y27SP(AR) 
Equations (5.9) and (5.10) are estimated by OLS, the results of which are presented in 
Table 5.2 below. Substantiation of the variant objective functions implies that 
Ti, r2l, a hypothesis that may be tested using the standard t-statistic for the equality 
of coefficients calculated as 




Table 5.2 : OLS Estimation : Empirical Test for Variant Objective Functions 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent Variable : 
Average Mortgage 
Rate (ri) 
Dependent Variable : 
Average Dividend 
Rate (rS) 
Intercept 7.0547 6.4936 
(15.47) (19.10) 
BP -0.6127 -0.4520 (-0.93) (-0.92) 
SP 1.4653 -0.5570 
(2.07) (-1.06) 
CR -1.2561 1.4231 
(-0.27) (0.40) 
BP(CR) -2.7152 3.6277 (-0.52) (0.93) 
SP(CR) -0.5516 -0.3191 
(-0.10) (-0.07) 
OP 50.7354 -37.3462 
(2.37) (-2.34) 
BP(OP) 44.5656 21.9572 
(1.52) (1.00) 
SP(OP) -58.0159 7.1026 
(-2.25) (0.37) 
AR 3.5788 -4.5242 
(1.07) (-1.82) 
BP(AR) 4.8111 1.3528 
(0.97) (0.37) 
SP(AR) -9.9524 2.9644 (-1.90) (0.76) 
0.6037 0.6749 
t-statistics in parentheses 
The t-statistics are calculated for each set of coefficients in both equations, the sign of 
which is expected to be negative for CR and positive for both OP and AR based on the 
Smith's (1984) finding as discussed above. Six t-statistics are calculated (since there 
are two interest rate equations and three exogenous variables) the results of which are 
reported in Table 5.3 below. 
Table 5.3 : ttest Statistics for the Equality of Coefficients 
CR OP AR 
rL -0.54 4.15 2.71 
rs 1.32 0.81 -0.40 
It can be seen from Table 5.3 above that t-test statistics for the rL equation are all 
correctly signed, with the statistics on OP and AR being significant at the 5 per cent 
level. This can be taken to be supportive of the variant objective hypothesis. 
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However, results from the rs equation are not at all supportive of the hypothesis, since 
two of the t-statistics are incorrectly signed and all are insignificant even at the 10 per 
cent level of significance. The results of the t-tests may thus be deemed inconclusive. 
While the t-test results reported above are not particularly supportive of the existence 
of borrower and saver preference building societies, the hypothesis of neutrality 
between the interests of borrowers and savers is substantiated by observing that the 
estimated coefficients on the exogenous variables alone were all of the correct sign in 
both interest rate equations" despite being of varying significance (to reiterate, 
borrowers and savers in neutral building societies both share in the positive and 
negative shocks). The estimated coefficients on OP are the most significant, tending 
to be about 36 per cent higher (in absolute terms) in the mortgage rate equation than in 
the dividend equation. The coefficients on CR and AR in the dividend equation are 13 
per cent and 26 per cent higher in absolute terms respectively than those of the 
mortgage rate equation. These results indicate that changes in profits and capital 
reserves will lead to a greater change in the interest rates to savers rather than 
borrowers while for a change in operating costs the reverse is true. 
5.2.4.2 Patin and McNiel's (1991) Methodology 
Patin and McNiel (1991) form a more explicit empirical test of the variant objective 
function hypothesis than does Smith (1986). They assume that the identification of 
dominated behaviour will be reflected by the allocation of financial benefits between 
the net savers and net borrowers of the co-operative. These benefits, referred to as the 
net gains to the society's borrowers and savers, are specified as 
NGL = (rte -rL)L (5.12) 
and 
NGS = (rs -r )S (5.13) 
15 As expected, in the mortgage rate equation the coefficients on OP and AR were positive and that on CR was negative. The signs were reversed for the savings rate equation, again confirming the neutrality hypothesis. 
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where rL and rs are the rates on mortgages and savings offered by the society, rLM and 
rsM are the best alternative market mortgage and saving rates and L and S are the 
levels of mortgage loans and savings respectively 
16. For each building society, the 
difference between net monetary benefits is calculated simply as 
d=NGS-NGL (5.14) 
where the building society allocates more net monetary benefits to its member savers 
(borrowers) if d is greater (less) than zero, and neutrality is implied by d=0. The test 
is constructed for the industry as a whole by summing d over all building societies17. 
In the calculation of the net gains to the borrowers and savers of building societies 
(equations (5.12) and (5.13)), the interest rate rL is computed as the ratio of income 
received on mortgage advances during the year (1995 in this case) to the average level 
of total outstanding mortgage advances over the year, and the savings rate rs is 
calculated as the ratio of the interest paid on retail funds during the year to average 
level of total outstanding retail funds over the year. In other words, these are effective 
weighted average interest rates on secured advances and retail funds. The alternative 
lending rate rLM is calculated as the average mortgage lending rate of the main high 
street banks during 199518, and the alternative savings rate rsM is calculated for banks 
in a similar way to that of building societies19. Finally, L and S are the average levels 
of total outstanding mortgage loans and total outstanding retail shares and deposits 
over the year respectively. 
Letting D represent the mean of the differences between NGS and NGL for all 
building societies in the' population, the test for the equitable allocation of benefits 
16 Both pairs of interest rates rL and rte, and rs and r should be specified as weighted averages since 
several types of saving and loan instruments may be offered by building societies and their competitors. 
In addition, Patin and McNiel in their test of net financial distributions adjust the CU's loan rate for 
interest refunds. Since such practices are not commonplace within the UK building society industry, 
this correction is omitted in the empirical analysis reported here. 
d, > 0, E d, <O ,jd, =0 suggests that the industry as a whole is saver dominated, borrower 
dominated or neutral (respectively) where n is the total number of societies in the sample. " The banks over which the average was taken are Abbey National, Bank of Scotland, Barclays, 
Lloyds, Midland, National Westminster, Royal Bank of Scotland and TSB. 
19 Due to data restrictions this effective alternative rate is taken to be that of the Midland Bank for 1995. 
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between the borrowing and saving members of building societies is based on a test of 
the null hypothesis of equality (Ho: D= 0) against the alternative hypothesis that 
there exists an inequitable distribution (HI: D# 0). Acceptance of the null 
hypothesis would imply that the building society industry as a whole balances the 
financial interests of its savers and borrowers, whereas its rejection would indicate 
dominated behaviour (the sign and magnitude of D indicating to which group the 
greater net benefit falls and the extent of the imbalance). 
Since values of NGS and NGL are calculated for each building society in the sample, a 
`matched pairs' situation is created in the process of computing d for each society. 
Applying the usual t-test for the differences in sample means is not appropriate 
because the assumption of independent samples can not be met. Thus, following 
Patin and McNiel (1991), the hypothesis is tested using the matched pairs t-test on the 
sample equivalent to D, namely d. This is a test procedure for analysing the 
difference between the means of two groups when the sample data are obtained from 
populations that are related. The matched pairs t-statistic is then20 
d- JUd 
to-1= SD /, r 
(5.15) 
where pd is the hypothesised difference and SD is the sample standard deviation of the 
difference. In this case, since ltd =0 the numerator simply becomes d. 
It was found that the mean value of d was £l1.9m for 1995, with a matched-pairs t- 
statistic of 2.53, suggesting that D is significantly different from zero at the 5 per 
cent leve121. This rejection of Ho suggests a benefit imbalance towards savers. Taking 
the sample as a whole (ý1ý1 d, ), building societies (with assets over £100m) allocated 
£688.7m more net monetary benefits to savers than borrowers in 199522. 
20 See Berenson and Levine (1989) for a complete discussion of this method. 21 The critical level of t with (n - 1) = 57 degrees of freedom is 2.00 at the 5 per, cent level of 
significance for a two-tailed test. 
u This is a'comparatively small amount in relation to the total asset size of the building society sample. In fact the ratio of net saver benefits to total assets was only 0.22 per cent for 1995. 
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In addition to considering the industry as a whole, individual building societies' 
imbalances were examined. It was found that 15.5 per cent of building societies 
exhibited d<0 and 84.5 per cent had d>0 in 1995. However, since d is not 
standardised it can be misleading and subject to size bias when differently sized 
building societies are compared. Thus following Patin and McNiel an index of 
domination, id, is constructed for each building society as id = (ds - 0) / SDO, where 
ds = (NGS / S) - (NGL / L) and Soo is the standard deviation of ds about zero. ds is 
simply a standardised version of equation (5.14) and may be interpreted as the 
difference between NGS and NGL per pound of savings or mortgage loans 
(respectively). On standardisation, id indicates whether a building society is 
dominated towards its saver (id > 0) or borrower (id < 0) members. The distribution 
of id for all building societies is shown below in Figure 5.1 
Figure 5.1 : Frequency Distribution of the Index of Domination (id) for all Building 
Societies with Assets of £100m and above (frequency intervals 0.25 wide) 
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Building societies with values of id in the tails of the distribution exhibit strongly 
dominated behaviour whereas those with values grouped around zero can be seen as 
being relatively neutral. We may then classify building societies into four groups 
(saver or borrower dominated, neutral or unclassified) by comparing the values of id 
with some arbitrarily chosen critical values; obviously, the result of the classification 
is crucially dependent upon how liberally or restrictively such types of behaviour are 
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Index of Domination (id) 
defined. Using very liberal criteria, it is found that of the classified building societies, 
79 per cent showed evidence of neutral behaviour, the remaining 21 per cent being 
saver dominated. Such results are consistent with those of both Patin and McNiel 
(1991) and Smith (1986) for US credit unions. 
Table 5.4 : Classification of Building Societies into Dominated and Neutral Groups 
No. of Building Societies 
Classification Liberal Restrictive 
Borrower Preference 0 0 
Neutral 19 2 
Saver Preference 5 3 
Unclassified 34 53 
Total 58 58 
Liberal critical values are defined to be -0-5: 5 id 5 0.5 for neutrality, id > 1.5 for saver 
preference and id < -15 for borrower preference. Restrictive critical values for id are 
-0.05: 5 id S 0.05 for neutrality, id > 2.0 for saver preference and id < -2.0 for 
borrower preference. 
Finally, we may address the question of whether the identified dominated building 
societies have distinctly different objective functions to the remainder of the 
population by comparing the expected characteristics of building societies with their 
actual behaviour. 
Compared to a neutral society, we would expect that the interest rate paid to savers 
and the rate charged to mortgage borrowers will both be higher for saver dominated 
societies and lower for borrower dominated societies. This is indeed the case as 
indicated in Table 5.5 below, where it is assumed that building societies are saver 
dominated if id >0 and borrower dominated when id < 0. On average, saver 
dominated building societies set both their savings and mortgage rates just over 40 
basis points higher than borrower dominated societies. 
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Table 5.5 : Average Savings and Mortgage Rates for Saver (SD) and Borrower 
Dominated (BD) Building Societies, per cent 
SD (di > 0) BD (di < 0) 
Average rS 5.72 5.30 
Average rL 8.08 7.65 
The results of the two methodologies presented above for the detection of building 
society partiality in allocating financial benefits to savers and borrowers are mixed. 
The methodology of Smith (1986) suggests that the neutrality hypothesis has greater 
validity than that of domination, whereas the Patin and McNiel (1991) approach 
implies that member group domination to some extent is an important feature of 
building society behaviour, with UK societies distributing a greater amount of net 
monetary benefit to savers than to borrowers in 1995. However, we must be cautious 
in drawing inferences from this latter conclusion since the number, asset size and 
member benefits of dominated societies in the sample was found to be relatively small 
in comparison to those that were classified as neutral; as we have already noted, the 
magnitude of the distribution of saver benefits in 1995 was minimal at only 0.22 per 
cent of total assets. In addition, the analysis was performed for the year 1995 alone 
yet it is likely that the distribution of benefits will have changed over time. On the 
basis of the conclusions discussed above, this thesis maintains the assumption of 
building society neutrality between borrowers and savers, which simplifies 
considerably the model of building society optimal interest rate setting set out in the 
following section. 
5.3 A THEORY OF BUILDING SOCIETY INTEREST RATE SETTING 
A theory of building society interest rate setting is developed as a straightforward 
Lagrange maximisation problem following Smith et al (1981). The building society is 
essentially viewed as a co-operative organisation which allows members to obtain 
higher returns on savings and pay lower rates on mortgages than they would through 
any other competing institution. Then the objective of the building society may be 
assumed to maximise a weighted function of a measure of borrowing and saving 
members' welfare (resulting from their transactions with the society) and the profit of 
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the building society by choosing the optimal interest rates on mortgages and savings. 
As before, these member benefits are denoted net gains on loans (NGL) and net gains 
on savings (NGS), and are specified in equations (5.12) and (5.13) in Section 5.2.4.223. 
Given the discussion of the most appropriate objective function in Section 5.2, we 
may restate the complete optimisation problem for the building society as to choose 
the rates of interest rL and rs in order to maximise the following objective function 
Max'%(NGL+NGS)+(1-, %), r (5.16) 
rLs 
subject to the non-negative profit constraint 
-t=rLL-rSS-romD-CLL-CSS-EZ0 (5.17) 
where all notation is as defined previously in Section 5.2.3. It is interesting to note 
that since L and S are endogenous and appear in the objective function via the 
equations for NGL and NGS, the building society can be thought of as maximising a 
weighted function of profit and some function of membership activity. 
To recapitulate, we noted briefly in Section 5.2.3 that the model differs from that of 
Smith et al by allowing weights to be attached not only to member benefits in the 
objective function but also to profit. In the model of Smith et al individual weights 
are attached to NGL and NGS whereas a unitary weight is applied to profit. In the 
objective function of equation (5.16) above, a single weight is applied to member 
benefits as a whole (0: 5 4 51) and one minus this weight is applied to profits (1- A). 
may thus be considered a behavioural motivation parameter, its value depending 
" In specifying rw and Ti (the best alternative market mortgage and saving rates), there exists an 
aggregation problem since it is the case that not all members will face the same alternative market rates. 
This is true not only of the mortgage lending rate but also of the savings rate, both of which will depend 
upon the circumstances of the individual borrower. Smith et a! (1981) cite charter limitations to credit 
union membership as possible mitigating factors; however, in the case of building societies, 
membership is more diverse. Here, the aggregation problem may be moderated on the lending side by 
the fact that the membership of societies is made up predominantly of first time buyers who most 
probably face similar alternative borrowing rates. Savings rates, on the other hand, vary explicitly with 
deposit size and as such are likely to suffer more from aggregation bias than lending rates. 
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upon the motivation of the building society towards maximising member benefits or 
profits. This may be of considerable importance in modelling the UK building society 
industry since over time one would expect the combined weight on NGL and NGS to 
be decreasing and the weight on profit to be increasing as societies have become more 
profit oriented and less focused on maximising member benefits. 
Although the formulation set out above does not allow for a situation in which 
building societies attach greater importance to the benefits of either borrowers or 
savers in the objective function, it has been shown in Section 5.2.4 that there are 
justifications for ignoring this conflict. 
5.3.1 The General Model 
In the formulation of the model presented in this section, mortgage demand and 
savings supply schedules are specified in their most general form. In equations (5.18) 
and (5.19) below, both functions are assumed simply to be dependent upon the 
relevant building society rate of interest. 
L =. f(rc), f'(rL)<O 
and 
S= g(rs ), g' (rs) >0 
(5.18) 
(5.19) 
Substituting the mortgage demand and savings supply schedules of (5.18) and (5.19) 
into equations (5.12), (5.13) for member benefits and (5.17) for profit, recognising the 
balance sheet equality that D=L-S and substituting the member benefits and profit 
equations into the objective function of equation (5.16), we may rewrite the 
optimisation problem as 








The Lagrangian may thus be formed as 
$=A, (r, -rL)f(rL)+A(rs -r )g(rs)+(1- . %)rLf(ri) 
-(1- )rsg(rs)-(1- )rDM{f(rL)-S(rs)}-(1-;, )CLf(ri) (5.22) 
-(1-'%)Csg(rs) -0- A)E - y[rLf(rL) - rsg(rs) 
-rDM{f(ri)-S(rs)}-CLI(rc)-Csg(rs)-E] 
where y is the Lagrange multiplier. Using the product rule of differentiation, the first 
order conditions for optimisation of the Lagrangian are then 
_ ArtMf' (rL)-'f(ri)-AlLf' (ri)+(1-A, )f(rL) &L 
+(1-2)rLf' (rL) - (1 - A)rDMf '(ri)-(1-A, )CLJ' (rc) (5.23) 
-)f(rL)-JrLf' (rL)+irDMf'(rc)+YCL. f'(rL) S0 
and 
Of 
5 =. 'sg'(rs)+Ag(rs)-A'sm9'(rs(1-A)rsg'(rs 
s 






Letting A= [f (rL) + rLf' (rL)] and B= [roe, f' (rL) + CL f' (rL )] for the mortgage loan 
rate condition and C= [g(rs) + rsg' (rs)] and D= [rDwg' (rs) - Csg' (rs)] for the 
savings rate condition, we may collect terms and simplify the notation in the above 
equations. 
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This allows us to write the Kuhn-Tucker conditions of this general problem as 










each with complementary slackness. With two non-negative variables and one 
inequality constraint, there are 23 =8 possible patterns of equations and inequalities. 
However, if we assume that for a viable solution we require rs and rL to be strictly 
positive, this allows us to write the optimal conditions (5.26) and (5.27) as 
equalities24. It is not certain as to whether the non-negative profit constraint will bind 
as a strict equality or if it will be slack, and therefore the inequality sign is maintained 
on condition (5.28). This reduces the complexity of the problem considerably since 
there are now only two possible patterns of equations and inequalities. Therefore, in 
the analysis which follows, all first order conditions for the two interest rate variables 
will be presented as equality constraints. 
5.3.1.1 Solutions of the General Model for Specific Values of A 
In the general solution, the optimum interest rates chosen by the building society on 
both mortgage loans and savings deposits will be dependent upon the weights in the 
objective function. As such, solutions for three specific values of A. (A = 0,1,0.5) 
are derived below. 
24 The trivial cases in which rL and/or rs are zero are of no interest and are thus ignored here. 
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" Case 1: A=0, Profit Maximisation 
In the case of profit maximisation, the building society ignores the value of 
transactions to its membership and the objective of the society becomes simply that of 
maximising profit. The conditions for optimality then turn out to be 




Using the simplifying notation defined above, these conditions may be written as 
follows 
°-ý 





=(1-y)[D-C]=0 or C=D ý 
(5.32) 
s 
Another way of writing these conditions is 
d 
rL f (rL) =d f(rL)(rDM + CL) (5.33) drc c 
and 
dr 
rs g(rs) - dr g(rs)(roM - 
Cs) (5.34) 
SS 
Equation (5.33) says that the building society will choose to set its mortgage rate of 
interest at such a level whereby an infinitesimally small change in that rate will lead to 
a change in total receipts from retail mortgage lending equal to the change in total 




change in retail savings). Similarly, equation (5.34) implies that a society will select 
its optimal savings rate such that any infinitesimally small change in that rate will lead 
to a change in the total interest cost of maintaining its retail savings deposits equal to 
the change in the total interest cost of using wholesale deposits instead. The cost of 
processing retail loans (savings) is shown to be added to (subtracted from) the money 
market rate rDM reflecting the fact that the return on lending and the cost of deposits in 
the wholesale market are free of non-interest processing costs, unlike their retail 
counterparts. 
" Case 2: A=1, Complete Member Orientation 
In contrast to Case 1, when % =1 the building society is not interested in profit 
maximisation. Rather, it will maximise the benefits of its members (as defined in 
equations (5.12) and (5.13)) subject to the condition that it does not make negative 
profit. In general, member orientation may be defined as occurring whenever A>0.5, 
with the preference towards members rather than profit being described as complete 
when the ratio of the weight on member benefits to the weight on profits, A/ (1- A), 
tends to infinity. The optimal conditions for this case may then be stated as 
& 




=-rs, g'(rs)+(1+Y)[g(ºs)+rsg'(rs)I &S (5.36) 
-Y[rrMS'(ºs)-Csg'(rs)l =0 
Using the concise notation as above, we may rewrite equations (5.35) and (5.36) as 
a 






" Case 3 : A= 0.5, Equal Weighting on Member Benefits and Profit 
In this case, member benefits and profit command the same weight of 0.5 in the 
objective function. The conditions required to derive the optimal rates of interest may 
be written as 
L= 
0S[r f' (rc )] - y[f (rL) + rLf'(ri )1 (5.39) 
+(y -0S)[rDMf' (rc)+CLf' (rc)) =0 
and 
_ -05[rs, g'(rs )] + y[g(rs) + rsg'(rs )] (5.40) 
-(y -0.5)[r. g'(rs)-Csg'(rs)J =0 
Again, using the more concise notation as defined above, these conditions may be 





[rsm S' (2) - D] =0 (5.42) 
s 
5.3.2 A Specific Problem 
In order to derive more specific results to make inferences as to the optimal behaviour 
of building societies when setting their rates of interest, we must now assume explicit 
forms for the equations describing the demand for mortgage loans and the supply of 
195 
savings. Both functions are assumed to be linear and are specifically given by the 
following equations 
and 
L=f(rL)=p+a(r,, u-rL), a>0 with 
°7L >0, ° <0 (5.43) &LM &L 
S= g(rs) =q+, ß(rs - rsw ), 83 >0 with 
-<0, - 
>0 (5.44) T'sM &, 
where p and q are constant terms. Equation (5.43) simply says that the quantity of 
mortgage loans demanded is proportional to the spread between the best alternative 
mortgage loan rate in the market and the interest rate offered by the building society 
on mortgage loans. Equivalently, equation (5.44) implies that the quantity of savings 
supplied is a constant function of the difference between the savings rate offered by 
the society and the corresponding best alternative rate. The positive coefficients of a 
and ß reflect the fact that the offer of more attractive interest rates by a building 
society will encourage a greater level of member transactions with the society. 
These specifications of loan demand and savings supply equations differ from those 
proposed by Smith et al in that they contain constant terms (p and q respectively), 
which does serve to complicate the algebra and the subsequent solution. There are 
good reasons for the introduction of constant terms in the mortgage loan and savings 
equations despite the complications. Firstly, by omitting a constant, the demand for 
mortgage loans and supply of savings depends only on the difference between the 
rates of interest offered by banks and building societies on mortgages and savings 
respectively. With parameters a and /1 greater than zero, this implies that a higher 
(lower) rate of interest on building society mortgages (savings) than their competitors 
will lead to a negative stock demand for (supply of) loans (savings) which is 
obviously infeasible. Second, without a constant term, the loan demand and savings 
supply schedules are clearly improperly specified. The demand for building society 
mortgage loans, for example, depends upon more than just a comparison of the best 
alternative mortgage rate with the rate offered by the society; it will also be a function 
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of household income, expected lifetime wealth, the user cost of housing and other 
factors (see Section 6.2.2 of Chapter 6 for a formal model of the demand for mortgage 
finance). Since we may assume that the building society will treat these as constant in 
its optimisation process, the intercept terms included in this model will capture their 
effects. 
0 
The optimal conditions may then be found by substituting in the specific mortgage 
demand and savings supply schedules described by equations (5.43) and (5.44) and 
their derivatives for the general formulas as set out in Section 5.3.1. In the following 
two subsections, optimal interest rate setting equations are derived for a non-specific 
value of A (i. e. 0: 5 A 51) and in addition the three alternative particular values of A. 
5.3.2.1 Solutions of the Specific Model for General ? 
When the value of A is unspecified, the optimal rates are derived as 
. 2Aru, +(y+A -1)(rcl+roM+CL) P rý 2(2, %-1+y) +2a 
(5.45) 
and 
. 2Arsm+(y+A-1)(rsu+rDm-Cs) q (5.46) rs __ 2(22 -I + y) 2ß 
When the non-negative profit constraint binds, y may be shown (after considerable 
algebraic manipulations) to be derived from the following formula 





_xx Z=4E- p+L +2p(rLw -rDM -CL)+2q(rrM -rs,, 1 -CS) (5.48) a 
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With no constant terms (i. e. p=q= 0) it will simply be the case that Z= 4E. Since 
(5.47) has been solved on the assumption of an equality constraint, this solution is 
only valid for such cases when the profit constraint is binding. When the constraint 
does not bind, the optimal rates can be determined by substituting y=0 into 
equations (5.45) and (5.46). Formally, the use of equation (5.47) in calculating ywill 
generally yield y#0 forcing the profit constraint to bind. Substituting equation 
(5.47) for yinto the optimal rate equations of (5.45) and (5.46) yields 
r __ 




+(ru-r_ -Cc) 1z 2 [a(rw-rDu-CL)2+, 3(rDm-rsw-Cs)]_ 
and 




(rDM - rs, - Cs) z 
2 [a(rl-rDM-Cc)2+ß(rD"-rw-Cs)2] 
Again, it is important to note that these optimal interest rate solutions will only be 
valid for cases in which the profit constraint is binding. 
Turning to the importance of E in the optimal interest rate solutions (5.49) and 
(5.50), if E=0 and there are no constants in the loan demand or savings supply 
equations, then the optimal rate solutions will not be functions of the elasticity 
parameters a and ß. In fact, in such circumstances the building society will simply set 
its optimal mortgage and savings rates equal to the alternative market rates (i. e. rj 
and rSM respectively) 
Finally, we may turn to the issue of the debt issue decision of the building society. 
For any particular building society, debt will be issued whenever the level of loans is 
greater than the level of savings. In other words, there will be a debt issue when 
L-S>0, or specifically when p+ a(rLv - rL) >q+ ß(rs - rte) . The debt issue 
condition may be determined by inserting the optimal rates of equations (5.45) and 
(5.46) into the inequality L>S, giving 
D0 iff a(rý, -Cc)+Q(rsM +Cs) +(P-4)(1-y-22) 
ýr 
(5.51) 
a+ß (a+/3)(1-y-A) 5 DM 
If it is the case that the profit constraint is binding then we may substitute in for y from 
equation (5.47) above, upon which the debt issue condition can be shown to be 
D? 0 iff a(rce. ý - 
CL) + ß(rsM + Cs) 
+ 
(P - 9) 1Z roM (5.52) 





[a(r -rDM-Cc)2+Q(rDM-r _CS)2J 
(5.53) 
Thus when the profit constraint binds, the debt issue condition is shown not to be 
dependent upon A. 
5.3.2.2 Solutions of the Specific Model for Specific A 
" Case 1: A=0, Profit Maximisation 
We know that in the case of pure profit maximisation, the society will face a 
particularly simple optimisation problem : to maximise profits subject to profits being 
non-negative. In such conditions, we know that in all interesting cases the profit 
constraint cannot bind; if it did, this would imply that societies were attempting to 
maximise profits subject to the constraint that profits are zero, which must amount 
simply to maximising zero. Clearly, when A=0 the only outcomes which are of 
interest are when the profit constraint does not bind, i. e. when profits are strictly 
positive. The formal proof that the profit constraint does not bind when A=0 is a 
proof by contradiction. If the profit constraint binds then the equation for the 
Lagrange multiplier can be written as an equality in (5.47) above, which on 
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substituting in for A. =0 gives y =1. When both A=0 and y =1 are substituted into 
the optimal interest rate equations of (5.45) and (5.46) an inconsistency is observed :a 
ratio of two zeros appears in both equations, which are said to be undefined and 
discontinuous at A=0 and y =1. This must imply that the profit constraint cannot 
be binding. 
Given that the profit constraint will be slack, the complementary slackness conditions 
of the Kuhn-Tucker theorem allow us to conclude that the Lagrange multiplier must 
be zero. Thus for the specific loan demand and savings supply schedules of (5.43) 
and (5.44) above, the optimal lending and saving rates of interest when the building 
society maximises profit alone may therefore be derived by setting A=0 and y=0 in 
equations (5.45) and (5.46) to achieve25 
r" _r 
+r2 +CL 
+ pa (5.54) 
and 
rs = 
rsM + rDu - Cs 
-9 2 2,8 
(5.55) 
By considering the objective function of Smith et al (1981) in equation (5.2) of 
Section 5.2.3 it can be seen that their model will yield the same results as that outlined 
above only under circumstances in which A=0 (i. e. profit maximisation) and there is 
no constant term in the model (i. e. p=q= 0). In this case, the second terms in 
equations (5.54) and (5.55) drop out. 
After substitution of equations (5.54) and (5.55) into equation (5.17) for profits, the 
maximum surplus may be shown to be 
; r" = 
a(rLw -roM - CL)2 +13(rDM -rs,,,, -CS)2 -Z >0 (5.56) 4 
u These optimal interest rates may equivalently be derived by substituting in for 
, 
c(ri) and g(rs) in 
equations (5.31) and (5.32) of the general solution and setting y=0. 
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where Z is defined in equation (5.48) of Section 5.3.2.1. When there exists no 
constant terms, Z= 4E and the maximum surplus simplifies to 
ý" - 
a(ruf -rDM -CL)2 +Q(rDM -rte -CS)2 
4 -E 
(5.57) 
Since we know that in this case ; c' > 0, the expression for optimal profit above places 
a ceiling on E, the expenditure on fixed costs. 
As we noted before, debt will be issued when D=L-S>0 (or L> S). Thus the 
debt issue condition for Case 1 may be formulated by substituting the optimal interest 
rate equations derived in (5.54) and (5.55) into the debt issue inequality, 
p+ a(r - rL) >q+ /ß(rs - rs") , or alternatively by substituting A=0 and y=0 
into equation (5.51), yielding 
D0 iff a(r., -CL)+ArSM +CS)+(p-q)ýrDM (5.58) 
s a+, 6 S 
9 Case 2: A=1, Complete Member Orientation 
When profit maximisation is ignored and member benefits alone appear in the 
building society's objective function, by substituting %=I into equations (5.45) and 
(5.46) (or alternatively substituting in for f (rL) and g(rs) in equations (5.37) and (5.3 8)) 
the optimal interest rates may be derived as 
2r. +y(rLm+rDM+CL )P 
rL 2(1 + y) 
+ 2a (5.59) 
and 
rs = 
2rß +y (rsw + rot - CS) 
-q (5.602(l +y) 2Q ) 
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These optimal rates may be written alternatively as 
rL 
r, X, +r2 +CL +0-5)rm +p (5.61) 
or 
rs - 
rSA f+ r2 - Cs + 2ý (5.62) 
where S=y/ (1 + r). From the complementary slackness conditions of the Kuhn- 
Tucker theorem we know that we must have yz0 which implies that both weights S 
and (1-5) are non-negative and range from 0 to 1, with S approaching 1 and (1-6) 
approaching 0 as y approaches infinity. In other words, the optimal interest rates on 
mortgage loans and savings are simply weighted averages of the respective profit 
maximising interest rates and the alternative rates of interest offered in the market. 
It must be the case that when A =1 and the building society is interested solely in the 
maximisation of member benefits that the non-negative profit constraint must bind, 
i. e. that profit must be zero ('c = 0) at the optimum interest rate combination. To see 
why, imagine that profits were positive at the rates of interest chosen by the building 
society. Then it must be true that the society can reduce the mortgage rate of interest 
and raise the savings rate to raise both the net gain on loans and the net gain on 
savings26 at the expense of profits. Given that the society's behavioural objective is to 
maximise members' financial benefits, it will continue to do this until profits are 
driven down to zero; the initial interest rate combination could therefore not have 
been an optimum. 
Given that we know the non-negative profit constraint is binding, the solution for yin 
equation (5.47) will be valid. The solution for ywhen A, -1 can be attained either by 
substituting both optimal interest rates of equations (5.59) and (5.60) into the budget 
26 Not only will the interest rate differentials be greater in the formulations for NGL and NGS of 
equations (5.12) and (5.13) but also with a, /3 >0 in equations (5.43) and (5.44) the value of loans and 
savings transacted with the society must increase. Taken together, this implies an unequivocal increase 
in net member benefits. 
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constraint of equation (5.17), or by substituting A=1 into the general solution for y as 
given in equation (5.47) to obtain27 
y-1z l/2 -1 (5.63) 
[a(rLm-rDM-CL)Z+Q(rDM-r -CS)2] 
where Z is as defined previously. 
The optimal rates of interest once we substitute in for yin equations (5.59) and (5.60) 
are then as given in equations (5.49) and (5.50) for the general solution. 
The debt issue condition may be formulated for Case 2 by substituting the optimal rate 
equations (5.59) and (5.60) into the debt issue inequality 
p+a (rLm - rL) >q+ ß(rs - rsj) or alternatively by inserting A=1 into the general 
condition of (5.51) to give 
D? 0 iff a(rLm -CL)+ß(rsm +CS)+(p-q)(1+y)/y 
z 
DM (5.64) sa+, 6 5 
Given that the profit constraint is binding, we may substitute in for y (as defined in 
equation (5.47)) in equation (5.64), the optimal debt condition then becoming that 
shown in the general solution of equation (5.52). 
" Case 3: ), =0.5, Equal Weighting on Member Benefits and Profit 
When member benefits and profit command the same weight in the objective 
function, the optimal rates of interest may be determined by either substituting 
equations (5.43) and (5.44) into the general solution of (5.41) and (5.42) or by 
substituting t=0.5 into equations (5.45) and (5.46). 




rL,,, +rrM + CL 
_ 
rDM -rLI4 + CL + (5.65) 
2 4y 2a 
and 
r" 
rSM + rf» - Cs + rsm - 
rDM + Cs 
-q (5.66) S2 4y 2,3 
When there exists no constant term, p=q=0 and the final terms of equations (5.65) 
and (5.66) drop out. Clearly it must be the case that y#0; if it were the case that 
y=0, the solution above for the mortgage interest rate would be infinitely negative 
and that for the savings rate infinitely large. This implies that the constraint must bind 
(through the complementary slackness conditions of the Kuhn-Tucker theorem). In 





a(rL,,, - rvaf - CL)' + ß(rDM -rsc - C5) Z 
where Z is as defined previously. 
The optimal rates of interest once we substitute in for yin equations (5.65) and (5.66) 
are then as given in equations (5.49) and (5.50) for the general solution. 
Finally, the debt issue decision may be formulated for Case 3 by substituting the 
optimal rate equations (5.65) and (5.66) into the debt issue inequality 
p+ a(r - rL) >q+ f3(rs - ray) or by inserting %= 05 into the general solution of 
(5.51) to give 
Z a(r,  -CL)+Q(r., +Cs)+(P-9)/(1-1/2y)Z D=O iff =rDM (5.68) < a+/i S 
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Given that the profit constraint is binding, we may substitute in for y (as defined in 
equation (5.47)) in equation (5.68), the optimal debt condition becoming that shown 
in the general solution of equation (5.52). 
When there exists no constant term in the loan demand or deposit supply equations, or 
when the two constant terms p and q are identical, the decision to issue debt for both 
Cases 2 and 3 is identical to that of profit maximisation (Case 1). In addition, it is 
useful to note that if in Cases 2 and 3 the building society were to incur a level of 
expenditure equal to the maximum ceiling as derived in equations (5.56) and (5.57) 
for the profit maximising Case 1, then the optimal rates for both cases would be the 
same as those derived for profit maximisation. 
Tables 5.6 and 5.7 below compare the optimal interest rates and debt issue conditions 
(respectively) for the three values of the behavioural motivation parameter (%) 
discussed above. These theoretical optimal mortgage and savings rate solutions and 
debt issue conditions turn out to be particularly interesting since for A=0.5,1 they are 
not dependent on the motivation weighting factor, A. This implies that the motivation 
of the building society towards maximising either profits or member benefits plays no 
role in determining the optimal rates of interest on mortgage loans or deposits as set 
by the society or whether or not a society will issue debt when A. Z 0.5. This finding 
allows us to conclude that a building society which is completely member oriented 
should not set its mortgage and savings rates any differently to a society in which 
profits and member benefits are allocated equal weights. However, we will see later 
in Section 5.3.3 that the nature of the mathematical model places restrictions on this 
conclusion. 
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Table 5.6 : Summary of Optimal Interest Rate Setting Policy 
A=O A= 0.5,1 
r +r +Ct p (rLM+rpM+CL) p 




2[ [a(r -r -CL)2+ß(rDM-r l-Cs)2] 
. r, w+rDM - 
Cs qr (r,, +r9-Cs) q 
rs 2 -2Q s2 2Q 
112 (rDM_rsf -Cs) 1Z 
2[ [a(r,, y-rDm-Cl)2+f3(rim-rw-Cs)2] 
Table 5.7 : Summary of Debt Issue Conditions 
A=0 A=0.5,1 
D=0 iff a(rw -CL)+A(r w+Cs)+(P-9)raa, D=0 ill 
a(rLm -Cc)+Q(rw +Cs) + 
(P-9) I ? 
raM 
5 a+ß 5S a+ß (a+P)lS 
Finally, it is worth comparing the optimal rates of interest under assumptions about 
the value of the behavioural parameter, A. When A; >- 0.5, rL will always be less than 
the profit maximising level of rL if we assume that (r,,,! < rDM + CL) and also that we 
take only the positive root of the term in square brackets in equation (5.49). 
Equivalently, when A; -> 
05 rs will always be greater than the profit maximising level 
of rs if we assume that (rDM < rsm + CS) and also that we take only the positive root 
of the term in square brackets in equation (5.50). Indeed this is what could be 
expected, with a higher level of A indicating a society is more member oriented and 
likely to have a higher rate of interest on savings and a lower mortgage rate. Over the 
period 1984Q1 to 1996Q1, the average rates of interest have been rLM=11.25 per cent 
(banks average mortgage rate of interest), rDM = 10.01 per cent (three month sterling 
interbank rate) and rsM = 9.04 per cent (average gross rate on clearing banks' 90-day- 
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access savings accounts with medium balance). The inequality assumptions stated 
above will then hold empirically for CL > 1.24 per cent and CS > 0.97 per cent. 
Using the above series for the observed exogenous interest rates and making a number 
of assumptions about CL , CS , a, A p, q and 
K, Figure 5.2 below plots the difference 
between the optimal and actual rates of interest on mortgages for both the profit 
maximising (A = 0) and the non-profit maximising cases (A = 05,1)28. The optimal 
rate of mortgage interest for the former case is constructed according to equation 
(5.54) and that of the latter case according to equation (5.49). Clearly, Figure 5.2 
indicates that the performance of the non-profit maximising interest rate as defined by 
equation (5.49) is superior when considered over the whole period, tracking the actual 
rate of mortgage interest set by building societies more accurately than equation 
(5.54). However, Figure 5.2 suggests that the profit maximising mortgage rate of 
interest has become considerably more accurate since 1990 in tracking the actual rate, 
which is consistent with the observed movement of societies away from the ideal of 
maximising member benefits to one of profit maximisation. 























Za In Figures 5.2 through 5.4, rL is taken to be the societies' average mortgage rate and rs the average 
gross rate on building societies' shares and deposits. 
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Figures 5.3 and 5.4 below graph the optimal mortgage and savings rates against each 
other for A=0 and A=0.5,1 respectively. The optimal mortgage and savings rates 
are calculated using equations (5.54) and (5.55) for the profit maximisation case and 
(5.49) and (5.50) for the non-profit maximising cases in which .A=0.5,1. As 
expected, the difference between the optimal mortgage and savings rates when 
building societies are assumed to maximise profit is shown to be higher than the 
difference observed when member benefits feature in the objective function. As such, 
although the model suggests that building societies should not change their mortgage 
or savings rates when the behavioural parameter varies between 0.5 and 1, societies 
will alter their rates as .% heads from 0.5 towards 0 (i. e. as societies become profit 
maximisers). This finding clearly accords with the anecdotal evidence that, on 
conversion to Plc status, societies have raised their lending rates whilst simultaneously 
reducing their savings rates as the maximisation of profits becomes the overriding 
concern. 
Figure 5.3 : Optimal Mortgage and Savings Rates, Profit Maximising Case (% = 0), 
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Figure 5.4 : Optimal Mortgage and Savings Rates, Non-Profit Maximising Case 

















5 Rate 1. co 
c d 
1 aýi a 
0.5 
00 
U) CO CO 0) (D C4 (o) to (D 
co co co co 0) M C) 0) ()) C) 
Year 







It turns out that an important problem is the way in which the value of % affects the 
optimand function and the constraint defined in equations (5.20) and (5.21). The 
theory of Lagrange optimality requires that both the objective and constraint functions 
be concave (concave programming theory), which in turn requires their respective 
Hessian matrices of second derivatives to be negative definite. This does not cause a 
problem in the case of the profit function; it may be shown29 that the Hessian matrix 
for the constraint equation is 
LitrarL 
rrLri. 7rrars 2f ' (rL) O 
(5.69) H= 
9l rsrs 
0 -Zg' (rs ý 
on the assumption that f" (rL) = g" (rs) = 0. Since f' (rL) <0 and g' (rs) >0 from 
equations (5.18) and (5.19), the Hessian matrix defined in equation (5.69) for the non- 
29 See Appendix 5.2 Section A5.2.3 for details. 
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negative profit constraint must always be negative definite, irrespective of the value of 
'30. 
However, using the same assumptions about the second order derivatives as above 










sr, ss0 -g'(rs)[2(1- 
2.1)1 
where Q represents the objective function as defined in equation (5.20). 
In this case, the Hessian will only be negative definite if we have 2(1- 22) >0 or 
A<0.5. To clarify the situation regarding the change in the objective function from 
being negative definite to positive definite when A becomes greater than 0.5, it is 
informative to consider the original components of the objective function in equation 
(5.16). From equation (5.17), n can be shown to be concave in rL and rs (see 
Appendix 5.2 Section A5.2.3) whereas it is the case that (from equations (5.12) and 
(5.13)) NGL and NGS are non-concave in rL and rs respectively (see Appendix 5.2 
Section A5.2.2 for a formal proof). Thus when NGL and NGS carry a higher weight 
in the objective function of equation (5.16) than does profit (i. e. A> (1- A) or 
2> 0.5) the whole function flips from being concave to convex as the Hessian matrix 
becomes positive definite. Thus the conclusions drawn from the optimal equations 
(5.45) and (5.46) only hold for A<0.5 and may or may not hold for A. > 0.5. 
To elaborate mathematically on the problem of finding a solution when '% Z 05, we 
know that in general the maximum of a continuous objective function on a bounded 
and closed feasible set must exist. If the objective function is smooth, then either the 
30 For the Hessian to be negative definite we require that its principal minors alternate in sign. In the 
Hessian matrix of (5.69) in the text, this condition is simply that ail <0 and 
Ia2I allx12 
a221 
>0, which is 
clearly satisfied. 
31 See Appendix 5.2 Section A5.2.1 for a formal proof. 
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maximum occurs at a local maximum (given by the Lagrangian optimisation) or on 
the boundary of the feasible set. When % changes from being less than to greater than 
0.5, the Hessian matrix for the objective function turns from being negative definite to 
zero (at A=0.5) to positive definite, and thus for A>0.5 the Lagrange optimisation 
actually finds a local minimum of the objective function. From the theorem above, we 
therefore know that if a solution exists at all, it must be the case that it is a boundary 
solution. 
To illustrate the optimisation problem graphically, it is possible to plot the objective 
function against the interest rates rL and rs on a three dimensional plane. Inserting 
values for the exogenous variables in the objective function (the rates of interest are 
taken to be the average rates as used in the previous section, i. e. rLM = 11.25 per cent, 
rDM = 10.01 per cent and rsM = 9.04 per cent, the non interest processing costs are 
assumed for ease of exposition to be CL = Cs = 0.05, the parameters of the loan and 
deposit rate equations are set at a=8=1.2, the constants p and q are set to zero, and 
fixed expenditures are set at E=0.015 ), the plane of the objective function will vary 
with A as shown in Figures 5.5 through 5.7 below. In each figure, the vertical axis 
represents the value of Q, the objective function, and the horizontal axes represent the 
levels of the interest rates rL and rs. 
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Figure 5.6 : Objective Map for %=1 
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Figure 5.5 with A=0 is clearly concave, as desired for the constrained optimisation. 
However, when A, > 0.5 (e. g. A=1 as in Figure 5.6) the function is clearly convex. 
Only where A=0.5 does the function Q graph as a linear flat plane. 





Finally, as discussed earlier, the constraint function is concave in the two interest rate 
variables rL and rs (shown below) irrespective of the value of A. 
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The conditions under which the Lagrange theorem does maximise the objective 
function subject to the constraint when %z 05 may be verified by considering the 
determinant of the Hessian matrix of second order derivatives of the Lagrangian 
bordered by the first order differentials of the constraint function (with respect to rL 
and rs). This determinant must be positive for maximisation, which may be shown to 
be the case32 when we have 
(1-2. %+y)> 0 (5.71) 
or, on substituting in for yfrom equation (5.47) 
<21 (5.72) 
4- 
z vý 1- 
[a(rLw -rDM -CL)Z +Q(rDM -rte -Cs)2ý 
32 See Appendix 5.2 Section A5.2.4 for a formal proof. 
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5.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has considered a model in which building societies are assumed to 
choose their mortgage and savings interest rates in order to maximise a weighted 
function of member financial benefits and additions to reserves. The first two sections 
of the chapter analysed issues as to the specification of an objective function 
appropriate to the UK building society industry; in doing so, it proved informative to 
consider the theoretical literature on credit union interest rate setting. This literature 
provided an insight into the conflict between the borrowing and saving members of a 
society, an issue which dictates the precise nature of the building society's objective 
function. The theoretical arguments for the neutrality of societies with respect to the 
disbursement of financial benefits to borrower and saver members were generally 
supported by mixed empirical evidence; using UK building society microeconomic 
data for 1995, the methodology of Smith (1986) suggests that neutrality is observed 
whereas that of Patin and McNiel (1991) implies that net saver benefits from 
transacting with a building society rather than with an alternative financial institution 
were marginally (although significantly) higher than borrowers' financial benefits. 
In the theoretical model of building society interest rate setting of Section 5.3, the 
results of a model in which the demand for mortgages and supply of deposits of 
building societies is assumed simply to be dependent in general on the relevant own 
rates of interest are presented. Then, specific loan demand and savings supply 
schedules are specified allowing us to derive optimal interest rate equations which are 
dependent on the parameters of the demand and supply functions and a number of 
exogenous interest rate variables. It is shown that under certain circumstances the 
interest rate decision of the building society will not depend on the extent to which 
that society is oriented towards either profit maximisation or the maximisation of 
member benefits. Specifically, when the building society operates predominantly to 
maximise member benefits, any move towards profit maximisation is shown to have 
no effect on the optimal mortgage and savings rates set by the society. When profit 
maximisation becomes the overriding objective interest rates will change; in general, 
the mortgage rate in this case will rise and the savings rate will fall as member 
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benefits drop out of the objective function and the society becomes a pure profit 
maximiser. However, the final section of the chapter shows that this conclusion is 
restricted somewhat by the nature of the mathematical model. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Aggregate Time Series Data 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapters, theoretical models of the demand for housing and the supply 
of building society mortgage finance have been presented, both suggesting a number 
of variables which could be expected to be influential in estimating an empirical 
model of the mortgage market. Following the discussion of a fairly standard model of 
the demand for mortgage finance, this chapter rigorously examines the data set to be 
used in the subsequent empirical estimations of the equilibrium quantity of mortgages 
traded in Chapter 71. 
The remainder of the introduction is devoted to setting the scene, briefly examining 
the relative importance of banks and building societies in the provision of mortgage 
finance and the way in which the three primary endogenous variables in the system 
(namely the quantity of mortgages traded, the mortgage interest rate and the loan to 
value ratio) have behaved over the period of estimation. 
The pattern of building society interest rate setting over the past 40 years is shown in 
Figure 6.1 below. Prior to 1984, the Building Societies Association (BSA) operated a 
cartel arrangement through which it would announce recommended mortgage interest 
rates which were then adhered to by its members (consisting of the majority of UK 
building societies). It was the policy of the cartel to recommend rates that were 
considered stable in relation both to other rates of interest and the rate of inflation, a 
policy which can be clearly observed in the figure. Between 1974 and 1978 the 
BSA's recommended rates remained remarkably stable in spite of massive inflationary 
pressures. Real interest rates became highly negative, reaching an all time low of 
-15.5 per cent in the third quarter of 1975. 
Discussion of the specification of the model and method of estimation are reserved for Chapter 7. 
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Following the breakdown of the BSA recommended rate system in 1984 and the 
increased involvement of banks in the mortgage market, competition within the 
market grew and building societies realised that they had to become more competitive 
in setting interest rates. The figure shows that during this period mortgage rates began 
to track the rate of inflation more closely, with higher real interest rate costs being 
passed on to the consumer rather than being borne by the societies. This may be 
shown by examining the correlation coefficient between the mortgage interest rate (r, ') 
and the rate of inflation (sr) (calculated as Cov(rm, n) / Qr a, where Cov is the 
covariance between the two variables and o the standard deviation of each), which 
between 1984Q I and 1997Q I stood at 0.85; over the whole sample period 1963Q1 to 
1997Q 1 the coefficient was less than 0.5. 
The period since 1980 has been one of considerable financial market re-regulation, 
with legislation being enacted to free the mortgage market from the lending controls 
which had served to exclude non-mutual organisations from lending for the purchase 
of private housing. As we saw in Chapter 2, the resultant increased competition in the 
mortgage market was inevitable as the removal of lending restrictions encouraged 
non-mutual organisations to become more active in the market. This is illustrated in 
Figure 6.2 below which shows the percentage difference between bank mortgage rates 
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(averaged over 8 major banks) and those offered by building societies (averaged over 
the top 20 building societies). 













It is clear from Figure 6.2 that banks have slowly begun to compete more effectively 
on price terms (mortgage interest rates) in the market for mortgage finance. During 
the majority of the 1980s, banks had found themselves offering higher mortgage rates 
than building societies, and it is only as recent as the 1990s that banks have been able 
to consistently offer more competitive mortgage rates of interest. The vigour with 
which banks began to accumulate mortgage business in the early 1980s can be seen in 
Figure 6.3 below. 
In Figure 6.3 below, the significant positive changes to banks' outstanding mortgages 
accompanied by commensurate reductions in those of building societies in periods 
1989Q3,1995Q3,1996Q3 and 1997Q2-4 have occurred as the result of the 
conversion of a number building societies to bank (public limited company) status 
(see Appendix 2.1). The `other' category represents loans on dwellings by central 
government, local authorities, public corporations, insurance companies and pension 
funds and miscellaneous financial institutions (the largest component of the latter 
being bank subsidiaries). Such institutions have experienced a declining influence in 
the mortgage market, with outstanding mortgage lending falling from almost 25 per 
218 
cent in the first quarter of 1967 to under 6.5 per cent in the first quarter of 
1998, a 
trend which may be seen more clearly in Figure 6.4. Within the group, 
insurance 
companies and pension funds have suffered the most significant 
fall from a position of 
owning a larger than 12 per cent share of the market in the first quarter of 
1967 to only 
0.4 per cent in the first quarter of 1998. 
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Finally, the loan to value ratio (see Figure A6.1.3 of Appendix 6.1) has been 
considerably higher during the 1980s than it was for the whole of the 1970s, the latter 
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being a period in which mortgages were severely rationed. In addition, during the 
1970s the loan to value ratio was relatively volatile, its seasonally adjusted value 
ranging from a high for the decade of 82.5 per cent in the first quarter of 1972 to an all 
time low of 71.6 per cent in the second quarter of 1974, a dramatic change of 10.9 
percentage points in only two and a half years. The 1980s witnessed a stabilisation of 
the ratio at an average of just over 83 per cent for the decade, following which it rose 
dramatically by more than 9 percentage points during the two year period between the 
third quarter of 1993 and the same quarter of 1995. 
The next section of this chapter briefly discusses the important theoretical results for 
mortgage supply derived in Chapter 5 and proposes the preferred model of mortgage 
demand, following which Section 6.3 investigates a number of issues regarding the 
general specification of the variables, including the method of seasonal adjustment, 
interpolation and the use of real (as opposed to nominal) variables. Section 6.4 then 
focuses on variable choice and construction and Section 6.5 present formal tests to 
examine the time series properties of the data. Section 6.6 then summarises and 
concludes the chapter. 
6.2 THE THEORETICAL BASIS 
In this section, we discuss the theoretical functions for the supply of mortgage finance 
derived in Chapter 5 and also outline the preferred model of mortgage demand as 
recently proposed by Jones (1993,1995). These theoretical foundations will provide a 
useful insight into the specification of the empirical relationships to be estimated in 
Chapter 7. 
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6.2.1 The Supply of Mortgage Finance 
The theoretical model of building society behaviour presented in Chapter 5 suggests 
that a building society's optimal strategy in setting the level of its mortgage interest 
rate is governed by equation (6.1) below2 
rS 
(rLAf +rDM +CL) 
+p+ 
(rc, ý, -rDM -CL) x 




-rDM -CL)2 +Q(rDM -rte -Cs)2] 
where the notation is defined fully in Chapter 5. Given that the empirical analysis of 
the following chapter will be concerned with the factors acting to determine mortgage 
supply (and indeed demand), we will need to be able to write the above equation as a 
supply function for mortgage finance. To do so requires an assumption about the 
relationship between the endogenous mortgage rate of interest set by the building 
society (rL in equation (6.1) above) and the quantity of mortgages that the society is 
willing to supply at that particular rate. Although the model would suggest that 
mortgage supply is independent of ri (since quantity supply does not appear in 
equation (6.1)), the model is very simplistic and it may be reasonably assumed that the 
higher is the optimal mortgage rate, the greater will be the willingness of any 
particular building society to lend mortgage funds, and vice versa. With mortgage 
supply a positive function of the rate of mortgage interest set by the building society, a 
change in any of the exogenous variables which affect the optimal rate of interest will 
have an effect of the same sign on the mortgage supply schedule. Thus the society 
will make a decision as to the level of its mortgage interest rate according to the 
relationship of equation (6.1), this rate then determining the amount of mortgage 
lending the society is willing to undertake. 
In practice, following an increase (decrease) in the mortgage rate of interest offered by 
the society to purchasers of real estate, mortgage supply may be expanded 
2_-1-his is true on the assumption that member benefits are at least as important as profits in the society's 
objective function. 
221 
(constrained) by use of the `non-price' terms of the mortgage contract (denoted by 
vector v in equation (6.2) below) such as the loan to value or loan to income ratio. 
The precise use of such terms will be considered in more depth in Chapter 7, but at 
this point it is suffice to acknowledge the existence of three endogenous variables in 
the mortgage supply relationship : the optimally set mortgage rate of interest, the 
resulting desired supply of mortgage finance and the non-interest terms of the loan. 
This allows us to specify the building societies' mortgage supply function as 
Md ss1 =f rL 11 rLM , rDM 2 rSM 31 LS$ (6.2) 
However, in empirically specifying the relationship it is likely that the four interest 
rate variables will be highly collinear and the cost of processing loans and savings 
accounts (CL and CS respectively) reasonably constant over the period of estimation in 
which we will be primarily interested (1984Q1 to 1995Q4). This would imply that 
building societies' mortgage supply will be dependent only on the mortgage rate of 
interest and the non-price terms of the loan; it may also be postulated that mortgage 
demand will depend on these variables too, implying that the usual order condition for 
identification of the demand function will not be satisfied. Thus, mortgage supply 
must be assumed to depend on a number of other variables which, as we will see in 
Section 6.4, will be suggested from previous empirical literature on the supply of 
mortgage finance. 
6.2.2 The Demand for Mortgage Finance 
This section discusses the preferred model of mortgage demand proposed by Jones 
(1993,1995). Various models of the demand for mortgage finance have been 
suggested in the literature, many of which are ad hoc and on the whole 
unsatisfactory3. Some papers model the demand for mortgage credit as a partial 
3 It is proposed by Jones (1993,1995) that a reason for the lack of theoretical models of mortgage loan 
demand stems from the common assumption that such demand is derived directly from the demand for 
housing; a standard hypothesis falling under this classification of model is that the household will borrow up to the limit of their housing collateral. Although to some extent this is true, it is not by any 
means the whole story as a growing number of households refinance by increasing their holdings of 
mortgage debt. Not only is additional finance used for capital improvements but also it is often used to 
support non-housing investment and consumption. 
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adjustment mechanism, in which the flow demand for mortgage finance is assumed to 
be a function of the difference between the desired level of mortgage debt and the 
level of debt outstanding. Examples include Huang (1966), Silber (1968), Kent 
(1980,1981) and Askari (1986) among others. Little or no theoretical justification is 
provided for the inclusion of variables in the equations describing the optimal level of 
mortgage debt and as such the resultant parameterised demand equations and 
subsequent estimations are somewhat atheoretic. Other studies such as O'Herlihy and 
Spencer (1972), Smith (1979) and Wilcox (1985) are even less specific, presenting 
almost purely econometric specifications of mortgage demand. Variables alleged to 
be important in influencing demand in these papers are invariably based on a 
considerable degree of speculation. 
Jones (1993,1995) updates the work of Ranney (1981) to provide a basis for 
identifying the level of mortgage debt derived directly from the optimal quantity of 
owner occupied housing demanded. The model represents a substantial improvement 
over alternative `linkage hypotheses' which view the demand for mortgage finance as 
inextricably based upon the value of the housing collateral4. There are a number of 
drawbacks associated with the linkage approach. Firstly, the optimisation process is 
usually based upon the determination of the quantity of housing alone whereas in 
reality, the desired mortgage loan and quantity of housing are chosen simultaneously. 
To address this problem, Jones (1993,1995) proposes a life cycle model in which 
both the demand for housing and mortgage finance are determined simultaneously at 
the date of house purchase. Secondly, since models that assume debt maximisation 
are implicitly based upon the behaviour of first time buyers, they do not address debt 
demand subsequent to the house purchase. Finally, linkage theories recognise neither 
the possibility that mortgage funds may be used to finance investment in non-housing 
assets nor the use of non-mortgage debt to finance the purchase of the housing asset. 
Kent (1980,1981) recognises that it is the underlying demand for housing services that drives the 
demand for mortgage loans. As such, he derives an expression for the implicit rental price or user cost 
of housing using a consumer choice theoretic framework in which consumers are assumed to maximise 
their utility over consumer goods/services and housing services. However, in both papers the fact that 
this user cost is included without justification in a partial adjustment model undermines the work 
substantially. 
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In Jones' model, households are assumed to maximise lifetime utility under perfect 
certainty where the life cycle runs from the date of house purchase (t = 0) to the date 
of retirement (t = T), at which point the house will be sold. The size of house 
purchased (H units) at time t=0 is endogenous to the model whereas the purchase 
price of each unit (PHO), selling price (Pm) and the dates at which the decisions are 
made to buy and sell are determined exogenously. The housing asset produces a 
continuous stream of housing services denoted h at a constant rate of 0, i. e. h= OH. 
A mortgage loan to fund the house purchase is available at a constant exogenous after- 
tax rate of r, 5 with mortgagors 
facing after-tax interest-only payments of rmM from 0 
to T (where the loan principal, M, is defined as M= mPHO H with 0: 5 m 51) at which 
point the principal is repaid6. The loan to value ratio is represented by m which is 
chosen by the household subject to the constraint that it cannot exceed the 
institutionally imposed maximum of, say, ß7. Initially, the optimal mortgage debt 
(M`) is determined under the restriction that m= m' is constant over the horizon 
0<t<T; no additional mortgage financing is available, implying M will remain in 
effect until repayment at time 7S. The house purchase is financed by an endogenously 
chosen combination of mortgage debt and the household's initial endowment of 
I It is assumed that households may only borrow against housing collateral. It is also assumed that the 
supply of other credit is zero, which is equivalent to making the less restrictive assumption that 
alternative finance is available at a higher rate of interest of rd > r, . So, in principle households may 
finance the house purchase using non-mortgage debt, although the cost of credit in this case is so high 
that no household will use it. As a result, the non-mortgage debt financing of the purchase of the 
housing asset is suboptimal. 
6 This assumption is in contrast to Ranney (1981) who assumes that the mortgage contract is 
continuously amortising over the period 0<t<T, i. e. repayment of mortgage debt and interest at a 
constant rate from 0 to T. Jones argues that an interest-only mortgage enables both the identification of 
the cost of debt with the payment rate and allows us to associate all changes in mortgage debt balances 
with explicit recontracting decisions. 
7 Nor can the value of m fall below zero, implying that mortgage debt cannot be 'shorted'. Jones makes 
the assumption that 6=1 implying that there are no downpayment constraints imposed by lenders; 
mortgage borrowing is then purely demand determined. However, it must not be overlooked that 
downpayment constraints (implying a value for Q of strictly less than one) have long been a feature of 
the UK mortgage market. In fact such requirements were particularly severe during the 1970s with the 
loan to value ratio reaching an all time low of 71.6 per cent in 1974Q2. 
A justification for this assumption is that the costs of selling the house are prohibitively high enough 
to be such that it is not sold until retirement. However, Jones goes on to show in his paper that under 
costless mortgage recontracting, the results discussed in this section will hold even when households are 
permitted to alter their mortgage holdings during the life cycle. 
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wealth, Wo. Any income remaining after each period's repayment is either saved or 
spent on other goods and services. 
In the model, a utility function (U) is specified in continuous time in which household 
lifetime utility is derived from the consumption of housing services and of non- 
housing goods and services (C, ) between periods 0 and T. The utility derived from net 
retirement wealth (WT)9 is measured by a function F which, like U, is assumed to be 
increasing, twice differentiable and concave. The household's problem is then to 
choose the size of the house and the quantity of mortgage debt in time 0 to maximise 
T 
JU(h,, C, )dt + F(WT) 
0 
subject to 
(i) So = Wo - (1- m) Pyo H with So z0 
(ii) S, >0 for0<t<T 
(iii) 05m51 
(iv) h, = OH 
(v) dS, /dt = E, +rS, -rm(mPHOH)-p, C, 
(vi) WT =ST+(Pm. H-M) 
(6.3) 
where Wo and So represent the stock of non-housing wealth immediately prior to and 
after the house purchase respectively, S1 is the household's stock of wealth exclusive 
of housing equity and mortgage debt for t>0 (upon which an exogenous after-tax 
rate of return of r is earned), Et represents labour income and pi is the exogenously 
determined price of non-housing consumption (C1). 
The first of the above constraints defines the stock of savings immediately after the 
house purchase (which is assumed to be non-negative) as the household's initial 
wealth less the downpayment on the house (the non-mortgaged portion of the house 
value). The second restriction requires savings to be strictly positive up until 
retirement, implying that the stock of accumulated savings must always be greater 
9 WT is composed of the value of accumulated non-housing financial assets plus the net proceeds from 
the sale of the house. 
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than zero subsequent to t= 010. The importance of this assumption for the modelling 
of the dynamic problem is considered in more depth below. Restriction (iii) maintains 
that the loan to value ratio (m) cannot be less than zero or greater than unity and 
restriction (iv) says that the flow of housing services at time t is equal to a pre- 
specified fraction of the size of the house purchased. The fifth restriction represents 
the budget constraint following the house purchase in which per period saving is equal 
to labour income (Er) plus the return on non-housing (rS, ) less mortgage repayments 
(r,, (mP ) and other non-housing consumption (p1C, ). The final restriction defines 
real retirement wealth (WT) as the stock of savings at retirement plus the sale value of 
the house minus the repayment of the mortgage principal, M (the final term of the 
equation in parentheses indicating either positive or negative housing equity). 
To explain assumption (ii) intuitively, in conventional life cycle models with perfect 
capital markets, households can borrow and lend at the same interest rate in order to 
achieve an optimal path for life time consumption. Subject to the present value of its 
lifetime income, the household can make use of the capital markets to create any 
intertemporal income stream it desires in order to maximise utility. In such cases, 
therefore, the distribution of household income over the life cycle is irrelevant and 
only the present value of the income stream matters in the optimal allocation of 
expenditure between the stream of consumption (C1) housing services (h, ) and net 
. wealth at retirement (WT)' 
1 
However, in Jones' (1993,1995) model, capital markets are imperfect since 
borrowing and savings rates are allowed to differ. In order that the same 
simplification may be made as in the perfect markets case above (i. e. that we may 
ignore the distribution of income over the household's lifecycle), we must make 
assumption (ii) which forbids households to borrow against future income in any 
10 With rd >r these first two assumptions effectively prevent households from holding non-mortgage 
consumer debt. 
ý1 Fu (1995), for example, presents a2 period certainty equivalent model in which the time path of income is important in affecting the demand for housing when capital markets are imperfect. 
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period12. By credibly assuming away the role of the time path of income, we allow the 
problem to be reduced to one of static optimisation 13. 
As a result of the maximisation process, Jones (1993,1995) goes on to show that the 
optimal amount of mortgage debt demanded by households is driven by the 
relationship between r,  and r (the rate of interest on mortgage loans and the rate of 
return earned on non-housing assets respectively, both after-tax). If rm <r, 
households will optimise by maximising their mortgage borrowing (subject to the 
constraints set out above, and in particular the loan to value restriction) because in this 
case, the cost of using mortgage lending to fund the purchase of the house is lower 
than the opportunity cost of using one's own financial wealth. In the UK, the erosion 
of the tax deductibility of mortgage interest payments under the Mortgage Interest 
Relief at Source (MIRAS) scheme over the last decade has clearly reduced the 
likelihood of this situation (see Figure 2.11 in Section 2.5 of Chapter 2). 
Alternatively, when rm >r optimisation implies mortgage debt minimisation. In this 
case households will fund as great a portion as possible of the value of the house 
purchased by means of their personal wealth and the remainder by mortgage finance; 
as such, the equation for the optimal demand for mortgage finance as suggested by 
Jones may then be written as 
0 if W, z PHIH* 
M ýH ýý jP, 
H-W ifW <PHtH' 
(6.4) 
The mortgage rate stability of the mid-1970s in the face of spiralling inflation meant 
that real mortgage interest rates over this period were substantially negative; if during 
this period rates of return on non-housing assets varied with the rate of inflation such 
that the real return to savings remained constant, we would expect there to be a greater 
chance that r,  <r and the validity of equation (6.4) above must be questioned. 
12 The constraint must be strictly positive since a level of savings of zero could obviously still be 
consistent with the desire to borrow. 
'3 Non-negative savings per period may indeed be justified if we are dealing with households that have 
already decided to become homeowners, since they will have reached the stage in their life cycle where 
they are saving for retirement (and thereby desiring to hold positive net wealth). 
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Indeed, the inclusion of a measure of personal wealth in the estimated demand 
function for mortgage finance will allow us to test Jones' theory; one would expect 'a 
higher positive or lower negative coefficient on the wealth variable in estimations 
undertaken on a data sample in which there existed a regime of higher inflation. The 
reason is that when nominal mortgage interest rates were sticky during the 1970s, high 
rates of inflation brought about a fall in the differential between the mortgage interest 
rate and the rate of interest on non-housing financial wealth (the latter adjusting more 
flexibly with inflation) encouraging the use of maximum quantities of mortgage debt. 
It would then have been less likely that the theoretical predictions of equation (6.4) 
that mortgage debt and financial wealth are substitutes would have held, thus reducing 
any negative impact of higher financial wealth on mortgage demand. 
The demand for mortgage debt may be specified empirically by assuming that the 
optimal level of housing demand (H) which appears in equation (6.4) may be written 
as follows 
Hd = fd(RY, DEM, ) (6.5) 
Equation (6.5), which is derived in Section 4.2.1 of Chapter 4, specifies the demand 
for housing as a function of the real rental price of housing services (and thus the real 
user cost of housing capital), real permanent income14 and demographic variables. 
Again, all notation is defined in Chapter 4. Thus, if either (a) r,  <r or (b) rm >r and 
W, < P,,, H* (i. e. the value of the house purchased is greater than the wealth holdings 
of the household), then the amount of mortgage debt demanded by the representative 
household will be a function of the purchase price of the house, PHI, the optimal 
demand for housing, HH, and household wealth, W,. 
14 As in Chapter 4, permanent income is proxied by current measured income (which will clearly be the 
most important component of permanent income) and financial wealth. Permanent income is used 
explicitly in a number of empirical models of mortgage demand, including Hewitt and Thom (1978), 
Kent (1980) and Askari (1986) among others. Nevertheless, a significant number of studies use either 
nominal or real current disposable income, including Huang (1966), Hall and Urwin (1989) Wilcox 
(1985) and Ostas and Zahn (1975). Holmes (1993) uses the wider measure of gross domestic product. 
The preference for including current income in the equations estimated in the following chapter is that 
potential homeowners tend to be constrained in their demand for mortgage finance by measured (and 
not permanent) income. 
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However, there are a number of additional considerations which must be taken into 
account when specifying the demand for housing (and thus also for mortgage debt). 
In particular, when formulating an empirical model we must consider the tilt problem 
(see Chapter 3 for a full discussion), mortgage rationing and taxation (in particular the 
MIRAS scheme). These issues are addressed in Section 6.4 of this chapter and further 
in Chapter 7. 
6.3 GENERAL DATA SPECIFICATION ISSUES 
Prior to addressing the precise nature of the variables to be included in both the 
mortgage demand and supply functions (see Section 6.4 below), this section deals 
with a number of issues regarding the general specification of the data. 
6.3.1 Real versus Nominal Variables 
All variables included in the empirical model of the mortgage market in Chapter 7 
will be specified in real as opposed to nominal terms. In this respect, we may 
distinguish between two types of variable : those measuring a financial quantity (such 
as the level of mortgages traded or total financial assets) and those which are 
constructed as a ratio or proportion (such as the loan to value ratio). Clearly, the latter 
category of variables have, through their construction, already been implicitly 
converted into real terms. The loan to value ratio, for example, tells us the average 
amount of mortgage loan granted to first time buyers as a proportion of the value of 
the housing collateral; as such, it is inappropriate to deflate any variable representing 
the ratio of two financial series. 
On the other hand, nominal financial variables must be explicitly deflated in order that 
we may obtain their real (or constant price) counterparts. There exist a number of 
deflators published by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) which may be used to 
convert nominal current price series to constant prices. To maintain consistency 
throughout, all nominal financial variables in the empirical model presented in this 
thesis will be converted into constant price series using the same deflator. Given that 
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we are modelling the personal sector mortgage market, it is most appropriate to use 
the consumers' expenditure implicit price deflator. The implied deflator is calculated 
by dividing consumers' expenditure at current prices by consumers' expenditure at 
constant prices. Thus, to convert the nominal series to constant prices we simply 
divide the current series by the implied deflator. 
6.3.2 Seasonal Adjustment 
There is an issue as to whether seasonally adjusted or non-adjusted data should be 
used in the empirical analysis of Chapter 7. It is argued here for the use of seasonally 
adjusted data in order to avoid the complications of testing for and estimating 
cointegrating equations and testing for unit roots in the presence of seasonal noise. 
For example, when using data which is not seasonally adjusted, the standard Dickey- 
Fuller procedure must be modified in order to test for seasonal unit roots (see Ghysels 
and Perron (1993)). Sims (1974) considers the implications of undertaking 
estimations on a data set containing seasonally unadjusted variables by evaluating the 
effects of seasonal noise on parameter estimates as an errors-in-variables problem. He 
analyses the nature of the asymptotic biases that result from OLS estimation of lag 
distributions when either seasonal noise is present in the data or the seasonal 
adjustment process is incomplete. However, we must not lose sight of the problems 
which may be experienced by using seasonally adjusted data in cointegrating 
equations, in particular the adverse consequences for the power of the ADF and 
Phillips-Perron tests for cointegration (see Otero and Smith (1996) for an examination 
of such difficulties). 
Although all of the data series required for the empirical estimation are available from 
the ONS databank in their raw seasonally unadjusted state, some are not provided in 
their seasonally adjusted form. There has, however, been a considerable empirical and 
theoretical literature examining the importance of consistency in using the same 
method of seasonal adjustment for the variable set of any single model. As Wallis 
(1974) shows, if all variables in a regression are adjusted according to the same filter, 
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the underlying relation between them will not be altered, although the error term will 
no longer be white noise but be a high-order moving average process. 
The process of any seasonal adjustment procedure attempts to separate from the 
original series (denoted 0) fluctuations due to the trend and cycle, C, trading day 
variations (occurring as a result of calendar composition), TD, the irregular 
component, I, and the seasonal component, S. It is conventional to assume that these 
components are related to each other multiplicatively as follows 
O=CxTDxSxI (6.6) 
with the seasonally adjusted series consisting of only the trend/cyclical and irregular 
components (C x 1). 
This section considers briefly two methods of seasonal adjustment. The first is the 
simplistic dummy variable method, in which an OLS regression is undertaken of a 
quarterly seasonal series yt on a constant and three seasonal dummy variables as 
follows 
y, = a1 +a2S2 +a3S3 +a4S4 +s1 (6.7) 
where S2, S3, and S4 represent quarterly seasonal dummy variables such that the value 
of Sl is unity in quarter i and zero otherwisels. The seasonally adjusted or 
`deseasonalised' series is then taken to be the residuals of the above regression plus 
the mean of the dependent variable (to account for the inclusion of the constant in 
equation (6.7) which serves to `de-mean' the resulting series), i. e. y, -" = El + yyt . 
However, on using this method it was found that for a number of data series the 
seasonal dummies were insignificant, and also that seasonally adjusting the series in 
this way appeared to induce seasonality in some series. This was found to be most 
's We include in the regression equation only three seasonal dummy variables as the inclusion of four 
would lead to perfect correlation amongst the dummies (i. e., s, + Sz + S3 + S4 =1). 
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notable for the mix adjusted house price series in both logarithmic and level form (see 
Figure 6.5 below). However, seasonally adjusting the log of the first difference in 
house prices in this way resulted in a seasonally smoothed series for house price 
changes, with the fourth order effects in the autocorrelation function for the seasonally 
adjusted change in the log of house prices being eliminated. 
Figure 6.5 : Seasonality in the Nominal House Price Index - Seasonal Adjustment 
Using the Dummy Variable Method 
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The second (and by far superior) seasonal adjustment technique proposed is the X11 
procedure and it is this method which is used in this thesis. It is an adaptation of a 
technique used by the US Census Bureau and is available as a procedure in SAS (a 
summary of how the procedure works is given in Appendix 6.2). Figure 6.6 below 
shows the same nominal mix adjusted house price series as in Figure 6.5, but this time 
plotted against its seasonally adjusted counterpart obtained from the X11 procedure. 
It can be clearly seen that in contrast to Figure 6.5, the X11 seasonal adjustment 
procedure has smoothed the original series and removed its seasonal component. 
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Figure 6.6 : Seasonality in the Nominal House Price Index - Seasonal Adjustment 

































Finally, quarterly data is used for all estimations, and where quarterly data is not 
available a quarterly series is interpolated. The cubic spline method of interpolation is 
the same as that used for the data of the model of arrears, possessions and house 
prices, and the interested reader is referred to Appendix 4.1 for a discussion. As the 
variables of importance in the mortgage model estimation have not as yet been 
discussed (see Section 6.4 below), it is sufficient to point out at this stage that 
interpolation from annual data was undertaken for the series representing the cost of 
the MIRAS scheme and the net capital stock and capital consumption of private sector 
dwellings. However, in using quarterly series we must be aware that building 
societies (and banks) have traditionally issued monthly statistics and have made 
decisions at monthly intervals with regard to interest rate setting. However, the lack 
of monthly data on a significant number of other non-interest rate variables to be 
included in the model binds us to using quarterly data. The quarterly data set spans 
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6.4 VARIABLE CHOICE AND CONSTRUCTION 
In this section, the specific choice of variables intended to represent supply and 
demand factors in the empirical model of the mortgage market to be estimated in the 
following chapter is analysed. Where raw data cannot be used the method of 
construction of the variable is discussed. The section is split into three subsections 
which deal with the three endogenous variables in the system, the exogenous supply 
variables and finally the exogenous demand variables (again, it must be noted that the 
formal specification will be discussed fully in Chapter 7)16. Figures plotting all 
variables in their seasonally adjusted constant price form are shown in Appendix 6.1. 
6.4.1 Variables Endogenous to the System 
6.4.1.1 Net Mortgage Advances (AAPR) 
The first consideration in modelling the supply of and demand for mortgage lending is 
the scope of the dependent variable, i. e. whether the dependent mortgage variable 
should be specified as mortgage lending by building societies, banks or aggregate 
mortgage lending across all financial institutions. 
The use of building society mortgage lending data poses a number of problems. 
Firstly, aggregate building society lending has in the recent past fallen substantially as 
a result of the conversion of a number of building societies to Plc status, a trend which 
may be seen clearly in Figures 6.3 and 6.4 of Section 6.1 above. Although it is 
possible to account for such changes by the inclusion of dummy variables the 
preference is to choose as parsimonious a model as possible especially due to the data 
intensive cointegration methodology presented in the following chapter. In addition, 
the reduced importance of building societies in the mortgage market suggests that we 
should not model their behaviour separately from that of other financial institutions. 
16 The name by which each variable will be referred in the subsequent estimation chapter appears in 
parentheses beside the variable title in the discussions below. 
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Secondly, by modelling mutual financial institutions separately from other mortgage 
lenders, a term to capture the mortgage interest rate differential between building 
societies and other lenders must be included in the estimation of the demand for 
societies' mortgage loansl7. Since banks and mortgage lenders other than building 
societies have only been active in the mortgage market from the early 1980s (data for 
banks' mortgage interest rates only commence in 1981Q1), the interest rate 
differential will only cover a limited time series, requiring a zero restriction on the 
parameter prior to this date. Moreover, augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests found 
the mortgage interest rate differential between banks and building societies to be 
stationary, precluding its inclusion in any long run cointegrating vector. 
The above discussions would suggest the use of total mortgage lending across all 
financial institutions as the dependent variable, although we must be aware of the 
possibility of aggregation bias. In addition, aggregating across all financial 
institutions will preclude the use of the model of building society mortgage supply as 
derived in Chapter 5. 
The ONS provide a number of series that may be used to represent aggregate 
mortgage lending : the total level of loans outstanding secured on dwellings, its first 
difference (i. e. net advances for loans secured on dwellings) or gross advances for 
loans secured on dwellings. With ADF tests clearly implying that total mortgage 
loans outstanding are integrated of order 2 and the gross advances figure only being 
available from 1986 onwards, the preference here is to use net mortgage advances. 
6.4.1.2 The Rate of Interest on Mortgages (rn) 
The choice of the appropriate mortgage rate of interest is an important consideration 
in the empirical specification of an aggregate model of the mortgage market. Over the 
periods in which the model is to be estimated, building societies have been the 
dominant players in the market for mortgage lending, and thus it is the rate of interest 
on building society mortgages that is used in the estimations of the following chapter. 
17 This type of differential term provides the basis for the mortgage demand function in the model of building society interest rate setting of Chapter 5 (see Section 5.2.4.2 equation (5.12)). 
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We may dismiss the use of bank mortgage interest rates due to the limited availability 
of data. 
There are three possible choices regarding the precise specification of this rate; we 
may use either the basic mortgage rate, the average rate (i. e. averaged rate across all 
mortgage loans of the society) or the rate of interest on new mortgages. As a means of 
inducement, financial institutions regularly offer discounted mortgage rates to new 
borrowers for the first few years of the loan, making the rate of interest on new 
mortgages considerably lower than that of either the basic or average rate. Assuming 
that mortgage borrowers (lenders) are rational, they will base their decision to take out 
(offer) a mortgage loan not only on the new mortgage rate but also on the basic rate 
which they will face in the future. Although this would suggest the use of the average 
mortgage rate, such data is available only over a relatively short period of time. In 
addition, if the average rate were used the strong assumption of a uniform distribution 
of borrowers in the society at each stage in the mortgage cycle (i. e. from new 
mortgagee to the household making its final repayment) must be made. If this were 
not the case, then the calculated average rate would not accurately reflect the actual 
average rate that the individual new mortgagee would expect to face over the lifetime 
of his own mortgage loan; with a boom (slump) in current new mortgage demand, for 
example, the average rate could be significantly downwardly (upwardly) biased. Thus 
the basic rate on mortgages charged by building societies (averaged across a selection 
of major societies) is used in the subsequent analysis. 
6.4.1.3 The Loan to Value Ratio (ZLVF) 
The stringency of the non-interest rate credit terms of the mortgage loan contract will 
be influential in the determination of both the supply and demand for mortgage 
finance. Jan Brueckner in a number of papers has examined the relationship between 
the household's demand for housing and for mortgage finance. In his 1986 paper, for 
example, he considers the effect of the downpayment ratio on housing demand by 
constructing a theoretical two-period model of utility maximisation in which it is 
concluded that the presence of a binding downpayment constraint leads the potential 
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owner occupier to reduce his optimal house size, essentially trading off his initial 
consumption against the benefits (namely tax incentives) of future home ownershipIS. 
Indeed this has been the general conclusion of the literature in this area, whether 
macroeconomic or microeconomic, empirical or theoretical; that the higher is the 
downpayment ratio the lower will be mortgage demand and the more likely will be 
mortgage demand deferral. Studies which report no effect of non-interest rate 
mortgage loan terms on the demand for or supply of mortgages have tended to be in 
the minority. For example, empirical studies by Dhrymes and Taubman (1969) on the 
US savings and loans industry and Silber (1968) for a variety of US financial 
intermediaries both find no evidence to suggest that loan terms other than the rate of 
interest have any independent effect on either the demand for or supply of mortgages. 
The use in this thesis of the loan to value ratio (or equivalently the downpayment 
ratio) for first time buyers with building societies to act as a proxy for all non-interest 
credit terms is discussed fully in Section 7.1 of the following chapter19. 
6.4.2 Exogenous Supply Side Variables 
6.4.2.1 Ratio of Housing Collateral to Outstanding Mortgage Debt (COLLAT) 
The inclusion in the supply function for housing finance of a ratio measuring the 
capital stock of personal sector dwellings relative to the total value of loans 
outstanding secured on dwellings is intended as a measure of risk. As Drake and 
Holmes (1997) suggest, the ratio would be expected to fall during a housing market 
slump, upon which the prospect of negative equity would increase, thus raising the 
probability of arrears and ultimately possessions; as such, financial intermediaries 
would be less willing to supply funds for mortgage lending, ceteris paribus. Other 
variables that have in the past been popular in measuring risk in the specification of 
" One drawback of the model is that Brueckner assumes (for tractability) that consumption of housing 
services is exogenous. 
19 Other potential non-interest credit terms include the average maturity of the loan, loan initiation 
charges and the loan to income ratio. It is the problem of collinearity between these non-interest rate 
credit terms that suggests the use of a single measure in the empirical model specification. 
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supply have included both the number of arrears and possessions as a proportion of 
the number of outstanding mortgages; the possessions measure has generally been 
favoured over that of 'arrears since a borrower can technically be in arrears whilst 
making substantial repayments to the mortgage lender. 
6.4.2.2 Availability of Mortgage Funds : Personal Sector Savings per Period (AAAU) 
Given that the change in the amount of funds deposited with financial institutions is 
an important factor in the determination of the net amount of mortgage lending per 
period (the more readily available are such funds, the more elastic will be the 
mortgage supply curve)20, an important component of the supply specification must be 
a variable representative of the availability of funds in each period. Arcellus and 
Meltzer (1973) measure the availability of mortgage funds to on-lend by the total 
stock of outstanding mortgage debt, which is problematic since it will not only reflect 
factors which act to change the quantity of funds willing to be supplied at any 
particular interest rate, but also the current and previous financing decisions of home 
owners. More appropriate variables to capture the dependence between mortgage 
supply and fund availability are considered below. 
" The change in total deposits held with mortgage lending financial intermediaries. 
This measure is adopted by both Browne (1988) and Drake and Holmes (1997) in 
their estimations of UK building societies' mortgage supply schedules. However, 
the use of this variable overlooks an important problem. Prior to the mid-1980s, 
the liability side of a building society's balance sheet consisted primarily of retail 
deposits21 and the asset side was composed almost exclusively of personal 
mortgage lending, the result of strict lending regulations. As such, increases in 
building societies' mortgage loans in any quarter prior to the mid-1980s must have 
been accompanied by an almost one-for-one increase in their deposits during that 
period. To the extent that societies' funds were attained primarily in the retail 
20 See Section 7.1.4 of Chapter 7 for a brief discussion of this proposition. 
21 Building societies only entered the wholesale deposit market in 1983 following which the Building 
Societies Act of 1986 laid down legislation permitting societies to access wholesale funds up to a 
statutory maximum of 40 per cent of their asset value (50 per cent following the Building Societies Act 
of 1997). 
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deposit market during the 1980s and early 1990s, Drake and Holmes have 
estimated what may be considered an accounting identity (i. e. that assets equal 
liabilities) rather than any behavioural relationship22. 
This problem is exacerbated during periods in which mortgages are rationed. 
When the inflow of funds to a mortgage lending institution is included in the 
mortgage supply function under a regime in which mortgage lending is rationed, it 
alone will determine the volume of mortgages actually traded. The estimated 
equation will then tend to be a near identity, devoid of any behavioural 
interpretation (see Emran and Shilpi (1996)). As a result, the exogenous supply 
side variables (z3) may yield nonsensical parameter estimates which may be 
statistically insignificant. In addition, if we were able to consistently estimate the 
structural supply schedule, then the estimated interest rate elasticity may appear 
very small as there would be little variation left to be explained with the inflow of 
funds almost completely determining mortgage supply. 
" Personal sector savings may be considered a better indicator of the ease with which 
a building society or bank may attract funds for the purpose of mortgage lending23. 
This avoids the problems of Drake and Holmes (1997) since the behavioural 
relationship will be extracted by using a supply variable which acts as a proxy for 
the potential ease of attaining deposits; this will influence the amount of mortgage 
funds that a building society is prepared to lend at any particular real mortgage rate 
of interest. In addition, since this thesis is focused on explaining total mortgage 
lending across all financial institutions, the use of a variable representing the 
21 In their long run cointegrating model of UK building societies' nominal mortgage demand and 
supply, Drake and Holmes found a coefficient of 1.163 on a measure of the net inflow of nominal total 
shares and deposits to building societies in the supply equation. This is hardly surprising given the 
identity discussed in the main text. However, the restriction that this coefficient was equal to unity was 
rejected. A possible reason for this was that during their chosen period of estimation (1980Q2 to 
1992Q4) legislation was introduced allowing societies to undertake non-mortgage lending and societies 
slowly began to fund their asset portfolio using a combination of retail and wholesale deposits. Given 
their study estimates that an increase in retail deposits by £1 would, on average, lead to an increase in 
mortgage supply of £1.16, the excess of £0.16 presumably would be met either by an increase in the 
building society's holdings of wholesale funds or a reduction in their non-mortgage lending business. 
u The use of alternative variables such as the change in total personal sector financial assets in 
attempting to capture the potential willingness of the personal sector to save may be argued to have too 
broad a remit. 
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inflow of funds to specific institutional groups (such as that used by Drake and 
Holmes for building societies) would be limiting, encouraging further the use of the 
wider personal sector savings series. 
Thus, given the arguments presented above, total personal sector savings per period is 
used to reflect the ease of attaining additional deposits by mortgage lenders to fund 
their asset business. We would expect that the higher is the level of savings, the 
greater the amount of mortgage funds a financial institution would be willing to on- 
lend as a result of the ease of availability. 
6.4.2.3 The Cost of Mortgage Funds (Cm) 
A criticism similar to that levelled at Drake and Holmes (1997) against the use of 
deposit inflows as an explanatory variable for mortgage lending is provided by Muth 
(1986). He points out that using such a measure would, "be similar to using the 
purchases of leather by shoe manufacturers to explain the quantity of shoes produced. 
The appropriate explanatory variable for a competitive producer is the unit cost of the 
input used". This line of thought suggests that in addition to the use of a variable 
measuring the availability of funds to mortgage lending financial intermediaries we 
should, also include a measure of the opportunity cost of these funds in the mortgage 
supply function. 
The opportunity cost of funds must reflect the return offered on alternative uses of 
building society or bank funds other than for mortgage supply; as such, the three 
month inter-bank interest rate would be the main contender. The higher is the inter- 
bank rate the higher will be the cost of borrowing additional funds to on-lend as 
mortgages and the greater will be the return from on-lending members' deposits in the 
inter-bank market rather than as mortgage loans. Despite the fact that mortgage 
interest rates have been notoriously sticky (especially during the 1970s and early 
1980s) they still tend to be highly correlated with the inter-bank rates and thus the 
latter cannot reasonably be included in the cointegrating relationship in its level form. 
As an alternative, it may appear appropriate to include in the supply function the 
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difference between the inter-bank rate and the mortgage rate of interest; however, this 
cannot be included in the cointegrating vector on the grounds that it is stationary. 
Therefore we have had to omit the use of any variable reflecting the mortgage lenders' 
cost of funds; instead it is assumed the opportunity cost of funds will be negatively 
related to the measure of fund availability discussed above in Section 6.4.2.2. 
6.4.3 Exogenous Demand Side Variables24 
6.4.3.1 House Prices (PAHM) 
Equation (6.4) representing the theoretical model of household demand for mortgages 
suggests that for any given level of wealth and housing demand, the higher the price 
of housing (PH) the greater will be the household's demand for mortgage finance. 
This reflects the fact that in order to purchase the same quantity of housing following 
a rise in the house price a greater mortgage loan will be required. 
However, it is possible that higher house prices may be associated with lower housing 
and mortgage demand as home ownership becomes more expensive (what may be 
referred to as a standard `price effect'). As such, the estimated coefficient on real 
house prices in the structural demand equation may be lower than expected. 
A mix adjusted index of house prices is used in the empirical model as compiled by 
the Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR) and published 
in the quarterly periodical Housing and Construction Statistics. The mix adjusted 
house price data is based on a5 per cent sample of building society mortgages. Since 
the mix (type, size, location and age of dwelling) changes through time, a weighted 
house price series that takes account of this provides a better measure of true house 
There are a number of other variables that one may postulate will influence the demand for housing 
and mortgages other than discussed in this section, including demography, permanent income, 
intertemporal income variability, the cost of rented housing, the level of non-mortgage consumer debt 
and employment mobility. However, in an effort both to adhere to the proposed theoretical model of 
Section 6.2.2 and to guard against over-specification, these are not included in the final estimated 
model presented in Chapter 7. 
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price movements than would an index based on a simple average price (where 
variations in mix are ignored). 
6.4.3.2 Wealth (ALDO) 
We may postulate that wealth will have two effects on the demand for mortgage 
finance. Firstly, we would expect to observe the usual `wealth effect' whereby an 
increase in a household's financial wealth (or discounted lifetime earnings) will lead 
to the purchase of higher priced or larger quantities of housing (raising PHtH"), in turn 
requiring a commensurately larger mortgage. 
The second effect of wealth on mortgage demand occurs directly through its effect on 
the demand function for mortgages (Ar) rather than through the demand for housing 
(H'). From equation (6.4) we can see that the level of personal wealth has an 
important influence on the household's decision to take on mortgage debt irrespective 
of the demand for housing. When rm >r households will minimise their mortgage 
borrowing and use their personal wealth as a substitute for mortgage debt. This will 
act against the wealth effect described above, reducing the expected positive 
coefficient on wealth in the structural mortgage demand function. Alternatively, when 
r,, '<r households will maximise their mortgage borrowing; in this case, the only 
influence that wealth will have on mortgage demand will be through the positive 
wealth effect on the underlying demand for housing. Thus, as discussed in Section 
6.2.2, one would expect a higher coefficient on wealth in the mortgage demand 
function when estimated over the 1970s, a period in which r,  <r 
during a number of 
quarters due to the presence of high inflation and relatively static rates of mortgage 
interest. 
In specifying the variable to represent financial wealth, it is aggregate wealth across 
the entire population' of owner occupiers and non-owner occupiers that will be 
important in the demand for mortgage finance; existing owner occupiers and potential 
owner occupiers will (respectively) adjust and choose the value of their house and 
mortgage depending on their financial wealth (with regard to existing owner occupiers 
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see Jones (1993,1995) for a discussion of costless mortgage recontracting). Thus 
financial wealth is represented by the total value of gross financial assets outstanding 
which is published quarterly in Financial Statistics. 
In addition, it is worthwhile to point out that the parameter on the wealth variable in 
the model of mortgage demand may confuse the wealth effect with what may be 
termed a `constraint effect'. Specifically, since the household's current wealth must 
be sufficient to cover the initial downpayment on the mortgage loan, the lower is the 
household's wealth the less able the household will be to meet the downpayment. 
This will force those wealth constrained households to purchase housing of a lower 
value and in the extreme to rent rather than purchase, both leading to a reduction in 
mortgage demand. In micro-econometric studies, both Haurin (1991) and Linneman 
and Wachter (1989) separate out the two effects; they determine whether a household 
is constrained by current wealth by comparing current housing demand with a measure 
of desired housing demand. The `degree of constraint' is then taken to be the 
difference between the minimum downpayment on the desired house and current 
wealth. Further, Haurin finds that if a household is lacking current wealth with which 
to finance the downpayment on a house, then the probability that a typical 35 year old 
head of household will decide to become an owner occupier will fall from 0.92 to 
0.37. In addition, he concludes that wealth constrained households become 
homeowners by, "significantly downsizing their purchased amount of housing 
compared to their desired house". 
Finally, Follain and Dunsky (1996) argue that there is an issue as to whether wealth 
should be excluded from the mortgage demand function since it is an endogenous 
variable in their model of housing and mortgage choice (and of course also in Jones' 
model presented earlier in this chapter). As such, their paper presents regression 
results both with and without a variable measuring net worth. Wealth has, however, 
been used successfully in a significant number of studies of empirical housing tenure 
choice. For example, Jones' (1989) study based on Canadian household data 
concludes that accumulated non-human wealth (rather than human capital2S) is the 
The latter being derived from human wealth as the discounted sum of expected future earnings. 
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dominant factor in determining the stage at which a household will decide to become 
an owner occupier rather than a renter of housing. 
6.4.3.3 The Rate of Inflation (INFL) 
The emerging literature during the 1970s and early 1980s on the demand for housing 
began to question the previously accepted notion that anticipated inflation should be 
neutral with respect to housing consumption. Indeed, general price inflation which 
leaves relative prices and real incomes unchanged will still have significant effects on 
both housing consumption and mortgage decisions for two reasons, both of which are 
considered below. 
Firstly, the tilt effect suggests that for any constant real rate of interest, the demand for 
mortgage finance will be lower the higher is the rate of inflation. To restate the 
conclusions reached in Section 3.3.2 of Chapter 3, the demand for mortgage finance 
will depend not only on the real rate of mortgage interest but also on the nominal rate. 
The effect of inflation is to force the borrower into having to make higher real 
mortgage repayments in the early years of the loan, encouraging potential borrowers to 
either postpone or even abandon the house purchase decision. The problem is 
manifested in the way that monthly repayments rise disproportionately following a 
rise in the nominal mortgage rate of interest due to an increase in inflation. Thus even 
if inflation is correctly anticipated and nominal incomes adjust accordingly, the real 
cost of a mortgage in the early years of the loan may, depending on the type of 
contract, rise significantly. 
Secondly, when mortgage payments are tax deductible and capital gains and imputed 
income from owner occupation are tax free, higher inflation will reduce the after-tax 
user cost of housing (assuming that nominal interest rates respond to inflation) and 
thereby increase mortgage demand even if inflation is anticipated and relative prices 
are constant. 
244 
The discussion above suggests that the rate of inflation should be included in the 
empirical specification of the mortgage demand function. To maintain consistency 
with the way in which constant price series were constructed above (see Section 
6.3.1), inflation is measured as the percentage rate of increase of the implicit 
consumers' expenditure price deflator. Although the tilt effect would suggest the 
finding of a negative coefficient on the rate of inflation, the effect of inflation on the 
after-tax user cost measure and the desire by investors to purchase housing assets to 
hedge against high inflation may both act to reduce the negativity of the estimated 
coefficient on the rate of inflation in the mortgage demand function. 
6.4.3.4 Mortgage Interest Relief At Source (MIRAS) 
The MIRAS scheme allows homeowners to offset a certain proportion of their 
mortgage interest payments against their income tax liability26. Over the past decade, 
the rate at which individuals may offset this interest payment has been falling. Relief 
could be deducted up to the higher rate of income tax until 1990/91 and at the basic 
rate until 1993/94, following which the rate fell to 20 per cent from 1994/95,15 per 
cent from 1995/96 and 10 per cent from 1998/99. Prior to 1974/75, relief was given 
for the interest on the full amount of any size of loan, following which MIRAS was 
limited to the interest paid on £25,000 (and £30,000 from 1983/84). Before August 
1988, each borrower was allowed relief up to the limit even if their loans were for the 
same property. Since then, the limit for new loans has been £30,000 for each 
property, irrespective of the number of borrowers. The MIRAS scheme whereby 
borrowers pay the mortgage lender the interest less the tax relief was introduced in 
April 1983 (with lenders being reimbursed for the amount deducted), prior to which 
interest was deducted from taxable income via assessment or through PAYE (Pay As 
You Earn). 
26 MIRAS is given for the interest paid on loans for the purchase of a property which will be the only or 
main residence of the borrower. Before April 1988 it was also given for home improvement loans for 
the only or main residence of the borrower and loans for the purchase of a house for a dependent 
relative or divorced/separated spouse of the borrower. 
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It is assumed that mortgage demand will be a function of the total amount of MIRAS 
benefits27 received per pound of mortgage debt outstanding. Specification of the 
MIRAS variable in this way rather than simply as the `headline' rate of relief has two 
benefits. Firstly, changes in not only the rate of relief but also mortgage limits and the 
rules applying to the MIRAS scheme will be reflected by changes in this ratio. 
Clearly this is desirable given the variety of changes to the scheme as discussed above. 
Secondly, by dividing the total amount of MIRAS benefits by the level of outstanding 
mortgage debt the exogeneity of the variable is ensured. Data on the cost of MIRAS 
(and its forerunner the Option Mortgage Scheme28) to the exchequer are provided 
annually in the publication Inland Revenue Statistics. 
It should be noted that this measure of MIRAS is included in the demand equation 
separately as well as being a component part of the real user cost variable. The 
usefulness of including the variable separately in the demand function is that it will 
allow us to gain an insight into the effect of the gradual reduction in MIRAS benefits 
on mortgage demand, which could not be provided by simply examining the 
coefficient on the user cost variable. Inclusion of MIRAS benefits in the composite 
user cost variable alone would mean that the variability in the percentage of mortgage 
relief paid would not completely or accurately be reflected on mortgage demand. 
Thus, both the real user cost and MIRAS measures are included in the estimations of 
-, the 
following chapter, with the coefficient on the MIRAS measure accounting for the 
variation in MIRAS as a proportion of mortgages over and above that already 
accounted for by the coefficient on the real user cost29. The size and significance of 
the individual MIRAS variable in the model will clearly have important implications 
for government housing finance policies. 
r Or their equivalent prior to 1983. 
?s The Option Mortgage Scheme applied only to homes in England, Scotland, Wales and the Isles of 
Scilly, but not to homes in Northern Ireland, the Channel Islands or the Isle of Man. 
29 It is decided not to adjust the user cost variable by deducting the MIRAS measure since this would 
then cause difficulties in interpreting the coefficient on the real user cost. 
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6.4.3.5 The Real User Cost of Owner Occupied Housing (R(UC)) 
It is supposed in Section 6.2.2 that the real user cost of owner occupied housing will 
be an important factor in the demand for housing and therefore, through equation 
(6.4), will also be influential on the household's demand for mortgage finance (the 
theoretical derivation of the user cost variable is discussed fully in Chapter 4). The 
empirical specification of the real user cost is as follows 
R UC)= K-MIRAS+ýt+B +(1-6)i-E, (Pr) (6.8) ( 
Value of personal sector dwellings 
where the individual components are discussed fully below. 
" Property Taxes (x) 
Taxes on property (denoted K in the user cost equation) may be separated into two 
different tax rates : the amount of local property taxes paid (KLP) and the amount of 
stamp duty paid (xsD) both as a proportion of the net capital stock of personal sector 
dwellings30. 
The most direct form of property tax in the UK currently is the Council Tax which is a 
tax payable to the local authority, the amount being dependent upon which of the eight 
valuation bands the property belongs. Local authority taxes have, however, existed in 
two other'guises. Prior to April 1990 the tax was known as the Domestic Rates, the 
calculation of which being similar to that of the Council Tax. However, for the period 
between April 199031 and April 1993 the tax was superseded by the Community 
Charge which required the payment of a blanket per-capita tax of a fixed nominal 
amount (although varying across local authorities) irrespective of housing tenure 
30 ? he formulation of the taxation component of the user cost variable (both property taxes and MIRAS) 
as total taxation revenue as a proportion of the value of the personal sector dwelling stock alleviates the 
need for dummy variables to take account of such events as the abolition of double tax relief on 
mortgages in 1988Q4 and the suspension of stamp duty on housing during 1992 in specifying the model 
of mortgage finance. The dummy variable approach has been suggested by Drake and Holmes (1997). 
31 And from April 1989 in Scotland. In addition, the Rates system remained operative in Northern 
Ireland beyond 1990. 
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status. Both the Community Charge and Council Tax differ from the Domestic Rates 
system in terms of liability; in the former case it has been the occupant of the house 
(whether owner occupier or renter) who has tended to pay the tax whereas in the latter 
case it has generally been the owner32. This provides a justification for the exclusion 
of both the Community Charge and Council Tax from the local property tax series in 
the real user cost since they do not represent the additional cost faced from ownership 
of the property. However, given that the Council Tax increases with the value of the 
property, the presence of the tax will reduce the demand (in terms of housing value) 
for both rental and owner occupied housing33. In the case of owner occupation, this 
will have the effect of lowering the demand for mortgage finance and hence the 
Council Tax should indeed remain in the property tax component of the user cost. 
The Community Charge on the other hand is not at all related to the housing tenure 
decision. Thus, in order that we may keep the Community Charge component in the 
property tax series (thus preventing a large structural break in the series) we make the 
simplifying assumption that the Community Charge was expected by households to be 
only a short term measure; as such, households would not have made any long term 
housing tenure decisions on the basis of the introduction of the short term tax". 
The total amount of Community Charge and Council Tax received by local authorities 
per quarter are available from the publication Financial Statistics, whereas the 
Domestic Rates series was provided directly by the ONS. All of the data are 
measured net of rebates and on an accrued basis, thus recording local authority 
receipts when they fall rather than when they are paid. 
Stamp duty is paid on the conveyance and transfer of land, buildings and property, 
with the tax rate and threshold level varying considerably over the last forty years (see 
Table 6.1 below). At present, the threshold under which no stamp duty is paid is 
32 Although owners of rented property often passed on Domestic Rates to their tenants in the form of higher rents. 
33 The tax would not, however, cause there to be a substitution from one type of tenure to another since 
both tenures will be affected by the tax identically. It would merely reduce the demand for any 
particular type of tenure. 
34 This assumption is reasonable given the considerable lack of public support for the tax. 
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£60,000; for transactions of over £60,000, £250,000 and £500,000 a duty of 1,1.5 and 
2 per cent respectively is levied on the whole of the transaction price. Total stamp 
duty receipts received by the Inland Revenue are available quarterly from the 
publication Financial Statistics35. One may expect to see clustering of housing 
demand just under the stamp duty thresholds due to the sudden leap in the marginal 
stamp' duty paid once the threshold is exceeded. 
Table 6.1 : Rates of Stamp Duty on Conveyances and Transfers of Land, Buildings 
and Property other than Stocks and Shares36 
Commencing Threshold and 
date rates of duty 
Nil Rate 0.5% 1% 1.5% 2% 
Considerations up Considerations exceeding 
to 
£ £ £ £ £ 
1 Aug 1958 3,500 3,500 4,500 5,250 6,000 
1 Aug 1963 4,500 4,500 6,000 
1 Aug 1967 5,500 5,500 7,000 - - 
1 Aug 1972 10,000 10,000 15,000 
1 May 1974* 15,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 30,000 
6 Apr 1980 20,000 20,000 25,000 30,000 35,000 
22 Mar 1982 25,000 25,000 30,000 30,000 40,000 
13 Mar 1984 30,000 - 30,000 - 
20 Dec 1991 250,000 - 250,000 - - 
20 Aug 1992 30,000 - 30,000 - - 
16 Mar 1993 60,000 - 60,000 - 
8 July 1997 60,000 - 60,000 250,000 500,000 
Northern Ireland I August 1974 
" Mortgage Interest ReliefAt Source (MIRAS) 
The implicit rate of mortgage interest tax relief appears negatively in the formulation 
of the user cost variable, with a rise in the rate of relief leading to a fall in the cost of 
owner occupation. For inclusion in the user cost formulation this variable is specified 
as the total amount of MIRAS benefits received per pound of owner occupied 
dwelling stock (rather than as a percentage of the mortgage stock) since the real user 
js Due to industrial action, stamp duty figures for the second to fourth quarters of 1981 are unavailable. 
We do know, however, that the total figure for the three quarters as a whole is £591m. The missing 
data are then interpolated using the cubic spline technique, the total amount for the three quarters being 
constrained to be £591m. The resulting data is £184m, £202m and £205m for the three quarters 
respectively. 
36 This table is reproduced from Inland Revenue Statistics 1998. 
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cost relates to the percentage cost of servicing one pound of owner occupied housing 
rather than one pound of mortgage borrowing. For more information on the MIRAS 
scheme the interested reader is referred back to Section 6.4.3.4. 
" Insurance, Repairs and Maintenance Costs Cu) 
It is likely that the ratio of insurance, repairs and maintenance costs to the value of the 
personal sector dwelling stock are not intertemporally constant; rather, increases in the 
quality of construction over time may have reduced the real costs of housing repairs 
and upkeep. In construction of the variable u as a component of the user cost measure 
we use consumers' expenditure at market prices on housing maintenance by owner 
occupiers, which includes contractors charges and structural insurance. 
" The Rate of Depreciation of the Housing Asset (5) 
We must account for housing depreciation in the real user cost of owner occupied 
housing since theoretically, the amount by which the property depreciates over the 
length of holding period will mean an equivalent reduction in the final sale price of 
the asset over and above that of the general rate of house price inflation (thus 
increasing the user cost of housing capital). The data series used to reflect 
depreciation in the construction of the real user cost of housing is that of total capital 
consumption on personal sector dwellings, measured at current replacement cost 
published annually in the ONS Blue Book. 
. The After-Tax Savings Rate ((1- 9)i) 
The after-tax national savings rate is included in the formulation of the user cost as a 
measure of the opportunity cost of the funds tied up in the housing asset. 
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" Expected Future House Price Changes (E, (Pa) ) 
The real user cost variable defined by equation (4.5) in Section 4.2.1 of Chapter 4 
includes a measure of anticipated future house price appreciation. The inclusion of 
expected house price appreciation will account to some extent for the investment 
component of the demand for owner occupied housing; as such, a higher expected 
increase in the future price of housing will act as an inducement to purchase (through 
its reduction of the user cost of housing capital) and stimulate a greater amount of 
mortgage borrowing. As is noted by Hamnett (1994), although the ability to invest 
may be restricted to certain specific groups, "the exchange value of housing is now a 
major consideration in house purchase decisions". However, in contrast to the 
discussion above, the theoretical model of Fu (1995) suggests that a greater expected 
house price appreciation, or lesser uncertainty as to the future price of housing, need 
not induce housing investment (unlike the theoretical results of Henderson and 
loannides (1983)37). 
Kent (1980,1981) empirically models the expected future percentage change in house 
prices, E, (APH, / PH, ), to be included in the user cost measure as a weighted function 
of current and past percentage changes in house prices as follows 
n 
E, (AP HI PH)1 = I: (1- t),, '(APH 
/ PH)r-i (6.9) 
r-o 
In'both papers, Kent found that the best results were obtained by using i=9 and 
A. = 0.975. Modelling expected future house price appreciation using equation (6.9) 
is, however, largely ad hoc and unsatisfactory. A superior way of modelling the 
expected percentage change in house prices would be to make in-sample forecasts 
using an autoregressive moving average model, or ARMA(p, q); given that the 
percentage change in nominal house prices (as measured by the change in the log of 
37 As is discussed in their paper, "renting becomes more attractive if housing is subject to random 
capital gains or losses". 
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the nominal mix adjusted house price index) is stationar? 8 the estimated ARMA 
model is equivalent to estimating an ARIMA(p, d, q) on the log of the nominal house 
price series where d=1. The specification of the parameters of the ARMA, namely 
the number of autoregressive terms (p) and the number of moving average terms (q) 
depends on the nature of the data and the process that we expect is generating the 
series. The approach taken to ARMA model selection is based on the Box-Jenkins 
(1976) three stage procedure for identification, estimation and diagnostic checking. 
The first stage, identification, involves a visual examination of plots of the time series 
itself, the autocorrelation function and the partial autocorrelation function. The 
identification stage leads to the suggestion of a number of possible tentative 
specifications which may be considered more fully on estimation. 
The sample autocorrelation with lag k (denoted pk) of a variable yy is simply the 
covariance between y, and yi+k (yk) divided by the variance of y, (yo), or 
T-k 
j: ('t Y)( 
t+k -y) Yk 
pk = ``' T=- (6.10) DYt Yo 
t. ý 
and the autocorrelation function is shown by plotting pk on the vertical axis against k 
on the horizontal axis. For a stationary time series one would expect to see the 
function falling rapidly to zero for successively larger values of k, and for a non- 
stationary series to tail off only gradually. Figure 6.7 below shows a time series plot 
of the mix adjusted nominal house price index and the first difference of its logarithm, 
Figure 6.8 the autocorrelation function for the first difference in log of the house price 
index and Figure 6.9 the partial autocorrelation function for the log difference series. 
3S This can be confirmed by graphing the series itself, checking its autocorrelation function or 
performing augmented Dickey-Fuller tests with appropriately chosen lags. 
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Figure 6.7 : The Seasonally Adjusted Nominal Mix Adjusted House Price Index and 
ff, the First Difference of its Logarithm (A In Pxr = in PH, - in p _1)39 
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In considering the autocorrelation function and the partial autocorrelation function for 
the change in the log of the nominal house price series, it is important to take into 
consideration any seasonality that may be present in the data. The presence of 
seasonality in a data series will influence the autocorrelation plot; in the case of the 
house price series, a plot of the autocorrelation function for the seasonally unadjusted 
change in the log series revealed important fourth order peaks and troughs, suggesting 
that it contained a strong seasonal element. 
It is quite clear from Figure 6.8 below that the autocorrelation function suggests that 
the first difference of the log level series is stationary since the function tails off 
towards zero very rapidly as the number of lags is increased40. In addition, it is useful 
to point out that the majority of the quarterly peaks and troughs that were present in 
the seasonally unadjusted series are no longer present in the adjusted series. Thus the 
31 The actual series modelled in the ARMA procedure below is that of O ln(PH1+1) = In PH,, ,- In P., 
(denoted PH, in the remainder of the chapter) since it is the expected future proportionate change in 
house prices that is important. Note that all references to house price changes in this section are 
quarterly. 
40 The results from examining the second difference in the series and its autocorrelation function do not 
seem qualitatively different from those of the first difference; it is thus concluded that differencing once 
should be sufficient to ensure stationarity. 
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process of deseasonalisation has enabled us to distinguish between those spikes in the 
autocorrelation function indicative of the presence of moving average terms and those 
representing seasonal variations. 
Figure 6.8 : Autocorrelation Function for the First Difference in the log of the 














It is important to test the joint hypothesis that all (or a group of) values of the 
autocorrelation function (for k> 0) are zero; if this were the case, it would imply that 
the underlying series (i. e. the first difference in nominal house prices) is white noise. 
This would clearly be undesirable given that we require to use the series to predict its 
future value. To undertake such a test requires the use of Box and Pierce's (1970) Q- 
statistic. Box and Pierce show for a sample size of Tthat 
Qi = Tj>k2 -. x2 (K) (6.11) 
k-I 
under the null hypothesis of no significant autocorrelations. If the calculated value of 
Ql exceeds the appropriate critical value, we must conclude that at least one 
autocorrelation is non-zero. 
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Ljung and Box (1978) report that a problem with the Box-Pierce Q-statistic is that it 
works poorly even in reasonably large samples. The Ljung-Box modification is a 
superior small sample test and is defined below as 
K 
Q2= T(T+2)>pk /(T-k)-ß, '2(K) 
k=1 
(6.12) 
Thus if the calculated Q-statistic is greater than the critical Chi-square distribution 
with K degrees of freedom at the 5 per cent level of significance (the level of 
significance is often taken to be 10 per cent in such tests) we can be 95 per cent (or 90 
per cent in the case of 10 per cent significance) confident that the true autocorrelation 
coefficients, p,... pK are not all zero (i. e. at least one value of pk is statistically 
different from zero at the specified level of significance)41. With the number of 
observations for the first difference in the log of the nominal house price index 
totalling 111, the Q-statistic is found to be (for the first 25,20,15 and 10 lags 
respectively) 217.68,215.60,204.60 and 193.35 for Q2 and 206.56,204.95,195.82 
and 186.11 for QI, all of which exceed the critical values of the Chi-square 
distribution at the 95 per cent level (37.65,31.41,25.00 and 18.31 respectively). Thus 
one may conclude that the autocorrelation function is significantly non-zero along its 
length and thus is not a white noise process (it is therefore predictable). 
In addition, and perhaps of more use, we may use a well known rule of thumb to test 
whether any particular value of the sample autocorrelation coefficient, pk , is close 
enough to zero in order to permit the assumption that the true value of the 
autocorrelation coefficient, A9 is indeed zero. Since all of the autocorrelation 
coefficients (for k> 0) are approximately normally distributed with a mean of zero 
and variance of 1/ (see Bartlett (1946)), it is possible to check whether any 
coefficient is statistically significant at the 5 per cent level, say, by observing if it 
41 The calculation of both Q-statistics requires the assumption of stationarity. 
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exceeds 1.96 / IT in magnitude (thus the dotted lines in Figures 6.8 and 6.9 represent 
the 95 per cent confidence limits)42. 
Although we may be able to make an informed guess as to the specification of the 
number of moving average terms to include in the model by consideration of the 
autocorrelation function, the specification of the number of autoregressive 
components of the ARMA process is, however, more difficult if the decision were to 
be based on the original data and the autocorrelation function alone; the partial 
autocorrelation function yields more information in determining the number of 
autoregressive terms, and as such is presented below in Figure 6.9. The partial 
autocorrelation function of yl and y, _k 
is simply the least squares regression 
coefficient on ye_k in a regression of y1 on a constant and k lagged values of y,. This 
is computed for K= 40 lags and shows the correlation of y, and ye_k after removing 
the influence of the intervening lags. 
Figure 6.9 : Partial Autocorrelation Function for the Change in the log of the 



















42 With 111 observations on the change in the log of the nominal mix adjusted house price index, the 
critical values become ± 0.1860. 
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The order of the autoregressive process may be inferred from the above figure; if the 
true order of the process is p, then we should observe all partial autocorrelation 
coefficients, aj, to be zero for j>p and non-zero for jSp. Again, since all of the 
coefficients are approximately normally distributed with a mean of zero and variance 
of 1/J, any particular coefficient is statistically significant at the 5 per cent level if 
it exceeds 1.96 / V-T in magnitude (again represented by the inclusion of the dotted 
lines in Figure 6.9). Ignoring the slightly large partial autocorrelation coefficient at 
lag 4, examination of the partial autocorrelation function would suggest an 
autoregressive component of p=2. 
In choosing the most appropriate ARMA model, it is also informative to consider the 
summary statistics for a number of alternatively specified models; these are presented 
in Table 6.2 below for ARMA models with parameters p and q from 0 to 5. This is 
the estimation stage of the Box-Jenkins procedure, with the parameters of the model 
being estimated using the econometric package Shazam. A brief discussion is in order 
regarding the routines used by Shazam to estimate the ARMA model. Whereas a pure 
autoregressive model may be estimated by OLS, the inclusion of moving average 
terms requires the use of a non-linear estimation method (Shazam uses Marquardt's 
algorithm (1963)). The second column of Table 6.2 represents the number of 
iterations of the non-linear algorithm before model convergence is achieved. 
Obviously, a lack of speedy convergence in the non-linear search procedure would 
imply the possibility of parameter instability (i. e. adding only a few observations to 
the series may greatly affect the coefficients). 
The RZ statistic of column 6 must be interpreted with care since the `fit' will 
necessarily improve the more parameters that are included. Adding further moving 
average or autoregressive lags requires the estimation of more coefficients with a loss 
of degrees of freedom. The inclusion of unnecessary coefficients will also reduce the 
forecasting ability of the model. 
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Table 6.2 : Summary Statistics for ARMA Models of the Change in the log of 
Seasonally Adjusted House Prices43 
Specification No. 
Iter. 




ARMA(0,1) 13 1.6714 1.7202 1/1 0.3569 0.3510 
ARMA(0,2) 13 1.4053 1.4785 2/2 0.5182 0.5093 
ARMA(0,3) 15 1.1738 1.2715 3/3 0.6245 0.6140 
ARMA(0,4) 152 1.1530 1.2750 4/4 0.6441 0.6307 
ARMA(0,5) 33 1.1297 1.2762 5/5 0.6633 0.6473 
ARMA(1,0) 11 1.1919 1.2408 1/1 0.6016 0.5979 
ARMA(1,1) 13 1.1588 1.2320 2/2 0.6251 0.6181 
ARMA(1,2) 14 1.0516 1.1493 3/3 0.6715 0.6622 
ARMA(1,3) 16 1.0641 1.1862 3/4 0.6765 0.6643 
ARMA(1,4) 22 1.0865 1.2330 2/5 0.6785 0.6632 
ARMA(1,5) 22 1.1105 1.2813 2/6 0.6798 0.6613 
ARMA(2,0) 12 1.1186 1.1918 2/2 0.6399 0.6332 
ARMA(2,1) 12 1.1349 1.2326 1/3 0.6438 0.6338 
ARMA(2,2) 17 1.0531 1.1751 4/4 0.6807 0.6687 
ARMA(2,3) 22 1.0724 1.2189 3/5 0.6817 0.6666 
ARMA(2,4) 17 1.0982 1.2690 3/6 0.6826 0.6643 
ARMA(2,5) 200+ 1.1251 1.3204 6/7 0.6835 0.6619 
ARMA(3,0) 12 1.1174 1.2150 2/3 0.6498 0.6399 
ARMA(3,1) 13 1.0928 1.2149 3/4 0.6676 0.6551 
ARMA(3,2) 15 1.0778 1.2242 3/5 0.6816 0.6665 
ARMA(3,3) 13 1.1054 1.2763 0/6 0.6816 0.6633 
ARMA(3,4) 19 1.1096 1.3049 3/7 0.6882 0.6671 
ARMA(3,5) 58 1.1126 1.3323 6/8 0.6945 0.6706 
ARMA(4,0) 12 1.0728 1.1949 3/4 0.6739 0.6616 
ARMA(4,1) 12 1.0912 1.2377 1/5 0.6771 0.6617 
ARMA(4,2) 20 1.1050 1.2758 2/6 0.6817 0.6633 
ARMA(4,3) 14 1.1057 1.3010 2/7 0.6894 0.6683 
ARMA(4,4) 17 1.1218 1.3415 4/8 0.6927 0.6685 
ARMA(4,5) 17 1.1129 1.3570 9/9 0.7028 0.6763 
ARMA(5,0) 12 1.0846 1.2310 2/5 0.6792 0.6639 
ARMA(5,1) 12 1.1112 1.2820 0/6 0.6794 0.6609 
ARMA(5,2) 30 1.1325 1.3278 in 0.6818 0.6602 
ARMA(5,3) 21 1.0797 1.2994 6/8 0.7003 0.6767 
ARMA(5,4) 19 1.1185 1.3626 8/9 0.6992 0.6724 
ARMA(5,5) 39 1.1100 1.3785 6/10 0.7097 0.6806 
The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Schwartz Criterion (SC) are more 
appropriate and popular measures of fit in evaluating ARMA models since they take 
into consideration the Box-Jenkins requirement that the model be parsimonious. 
43 All models for which summary statistics are presented were found to be invertible and the AR 
components less than unity implying a stationary model. Invertibility is a requirement of the Box- 
Jenkins approach and implies that the series can be represented by a finite-order or convergent 
autoregressive process. This turns out to be important since use of the autocorrelation function and the 
partial autocorrelation function implicitly assumes the sequence may be well approximated by an 
autoregressive model. 
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They are calculated as 
AIC =1n(& )+ 2(p +q+ 1) IT (6.13) 
and 
SC=1n(&)+(p+q+1)1n(T)/T (6.14) 
where T is the sample size and Qk is the residual variation from the particular 
estimated model. Ideally we require AIC and SC to be as small as possible. In each, 
increasing the number of regressors increases the term (p +q+ 1) but will decrease 
the residual sum of squares. Thus if a regressor has no explanatory power, adding it to 
the model causes AIC and SC to increase. Also, since ln(T) > 2, SC will select a more 
parsimonious model than AIC; as Enders (1995) notes, "the marginal cost of adding 
regressors is greater with the [SC] than the AIC". The SC has more desirable large 
sample properties; it is asymptotically consistent whereas AIC is biased towards 
suggesting an over-parameterised model. 
To aid the choice of a parsimonious model, Table 6.2 also reports the proportion of t- 
statistics on the autoregressive and moving average coefficients that are greater (in 
absolute value) than 1.96 (i. e. significant at the 5 per cent level)44. 
From, a combination of the summary statistics of Table 6.2 above, the autocorrelation 
function and the partial autocorrelation function, the ARMA(2,2) model is chosen to 
represent the process determining the change in the log of nominal house prices. The 
predictions given by the ARMA model are used to construct a series of the expected 
future percentage change in house prices (as required in the construction of the user 
cost). The ARMA(1,2) model is rejected despite exhibiting the lowest overall AIC 
and SC figures since the partial autocorrelation function suggests that we should use a 
model with at least a second order autoregressive component. The ARMA(2,2) model 
has the second smallest values for AIC and SC and a higher adjusted R-squared than 
the ARMA(1,2). 
4' Note that the calculation of tstatistics requires that the original data series be stationary. 
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The estimated relationship is given by 
PH, = 038+ ý 33 PH, _, -0 . 
49 PHt_2 + Ct + 0.8 Et _, -0 *55 Et-2 (6.15) 
where PHt In PHA,, - In PHA and t-statistics are shown in parentheses. Thus the fitted 
series may be constructed as follows 
Et (Px1) = PH, = 038 + 133PH, _, - 
0.49PH1_2 +0.81c _1- 
0.55sß_2 (6.16) 
In the diagnostic checking stage of the Box-Jenkins approach, plots of the residuals 
and predicted values from the above estimation are shown in Figures 6.10 and 6.11 
below. 









There appears (graphically at least) to be little difference in the residuals of the 
ARMA(2,2) model than of any other model. It is important from a forecasting 
perspective that there should be no serial correlation between the residuals, since this 
would imply the presence of a systematic movement not accounted for by the ARMA 
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model. We can check for serial correlation in the residuals by constructing their 
autocorrelation function, which is presented in Figure 6.12 below. 
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Figure 6.12: Autocorrelation Function for the Residuals of the ARMA(2,2) Model 
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The residual series appears to resemble a white noise process since its sample 
autocorrelation function A is close to zero for all k>0. To determine whether this 
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is indeed the case, both Q-statistics are calculated for the first 10,15,20 and 25 lags 
and are presented in Table 6.3 below. 
Table 6.3 : Box-Pierce and Ljung-Box Q-statistics for k =10,15,20,2545 
k 10 15 20 25 
Q1 2.99 4.84 7.03 12.79 
Q2 3.35 5.69 8.72 16.81 
x2(k) 18.31 25.00 31.41 37.65 
It can be seen clearly from Table 6.3 that the null hypothesis of a white noise error 
cannot (by a wide margin) be rejected, indicating that the residuals are not serially 
correlated. This may also be confirmed by conducting a Wald test for the joint 
significance of the lagged residuals in the following OLS regression. 
ü, = PO +ß1P11-1 +ß2P111 2+ al4-1 +a2ä1-2 + a34 3 +a4ä1-4 (6.17) 
where ü, is the residual series from the ARMA(2,2) model. Under the null hypothesis 
that äI = a2 = ä3 = ä4 =0 the Wald statistic follows a chi squared distribution with 
4 degrees of freedom. For the above test, the calculated Wald statistic turns out to be 
0.797, which is well below the critical value of 9.49 implying that we may not reject 
the null hypothesis that the residuals of the ARMA model are not serially correlated. 
As a final check on the applicability of the ARMA model fitted to the data, the same 
ARMA(2,2) is fitted to two subsamples containing the first 55 and the last 56 
observations. This provides useful information regarding the assumption that the data 
generation process is stable over the entire period. The two regressions estimated are 
PHA 81+ 0u PH, 
-I + 
021 PHI-2 + Irir +0 11e, -1 
+ 021c, 2 (6.18) 
for t=1,..., m and 
pHr ° s2 + 012 pHt-i + 022 A Ht-2 + E21 + 012 Er-1 + 022 6r-2 (6.19) 
for t=m+1,..., T 
43 Chi-square critical values are for the 5 per cent level of significance. 
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where T is the total number of observations in the two subsamples, with m 
observations in the first and (T - m) in the second. Denoting SSR as the sum of 
squared residuals over the whole period of estimation, and subscripted by 1 or 2 to 
denote the first and second periods, we may test the restriction of coefficient equality 
(i. e. 01, , 40129021 _ 022 etc. ) using the F-test 
F, - 
(SSR-SSR, -SSR2)I n F(n, T-2n) (6.20) 
(SSR1+SSR2)/(T-2n) 
where n is the number of parameters estimated (which with a constant equals 
p+q+ 1). Calculating F we have 
F, - 
(278.09 -127.67 -129.69) /5_1.627 (6.21) 
(127.67 + 129.69) / (111-10) 
This is smaller than the critical value of F at the 5 per cent level with (5,101) degrees 
of freedom (which is 2.31) suggesting that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of 
equal coefficients. 
Although we will use the predictions from this ARMA model of future expected 
house price changes as the house price appreciation component of the user cost 
variable, it is interesting to note that a number of authors have suggested the use of 
other variables which may also capture the investment motive for holding real estate. 
For example, given that the purchase of housing is frequently looked upon as a hedge 
against inflation, a number of studies propose the difference between the change in the 
mix adjusted house price index and the change in the home ownership component of 
the retail prices index as a measure of the investment potential of home ownership. If 
the former is greater than the latter, then owner occupied housing has proved an 
effective hedge against inflation and the demand for mortgages should rise. As is 
noted by Rothenburg (1983), house price inflation can exceed general price inflation 
for a number of reasons. Firstly, "demographic trends and industrial sector changes 
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may suggest more stringent demand and supply pressure in this sector ... than for 
average industrial sectors" and secondly, "the combination of physical durability of 
the asset and solidity of trends making for strong future excess demands may give 
prospective investors the perception of housing investment as safer than any other 
kinds of investment". 
Finally, Ioannides (1989) argues that, "the relationship of housing assets with other, 
especially financial, assets must in some sense reflect households' hedging needs". In 
this respect, an alternative formulation of the variable intended to represent the 
hedging motive for home ownership is the appreciation of the house price with respect 
to the appreciation of financial assets. A measure of the increase in the value of 
financial assets may be the appreciation of the stock market (as recorded by a FTSE 
index) or indeed the rate of interest available on deposit or share accounts with 
financial institutions. Essentially, the variable must capture how effective housing is 
at increasing its value in contrast to alternative financial assets. 
We have now considered all of the variables which make up the empirical 
specification of the real user cost of housing capital, and we may now look briefly at 
how the constructed series varies over time (see Figure 6.13 below). The negativity of 
the real user cost variable for a substantial portion of the estimation period means that 
it will be included in the regressions of the subsequent chapter in levels rather than in 
logarithms. This negativity is caused by large and positive anticipated future house 
price changes, which would suggest positive financial benefits to those purchasing and 
holding owner occupied housing during these periods. 
The rapid boom and subsequent fall in the housing market in the late 1980s can be 
seen clearly, with the real user cost reaching a localised minimum in 1988Q3 and a 
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6.5 TESTING FOR A UNIT ROOT IN THE DATA 
This Section presents a brief analysis of the time series properties of the data 
described in the previous Section to ensure that the variables included in the 
cointegrating relationships of the subsequent chapter are all non-stationary of order 
I(1). As in Chapter 4, each variable is tested for the presence of a unit root by running 
an Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) OLS regression, as described fully in Section 
4.3.3.1 of Chapter 4. Tests are conducted for the null hypothesis Ho : y= 0 (implying 
the existence of a unit root) in equation (4.23), which is given by the t-ratio on the 
coefficient of y,. l. Details of the results of these tests are given in Appendix 6.3. 
The tables presented in Appendix 6.3 show the Akaike Information Criterion, the 
Schwartz criterion and the Hannan-Quinn criterion all of which may be used to 
determine the optimal lag length (k*) for the dependent variable in the ADF 
specification of equation (4.23); again, the interested reader is referred back to 
Chapter 4. In addition, the results of an LM test for lag length are presented in the 
appendix which is also described fully in Section 4.3.3.1. 
46 The real user cost is specified as a percentage of the real house price. 
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ADF results are reported in the tables of Appendix 6.3 for the whole data sample 
period (1969Q1 to 1995Q4) and the two mutually exclusive subsample periods. For 
each sample period ADF t-statistics are calculated for the variables discussed in this 
chapter and also for their first differences in order to test for integration of order 2 or 
higher (a methodology similar to that proposed by Dickey and Pantula (1987)). 
The Dickey-Fuller procedure discussed above requires strong assumptions to be made 
regarding the errors of the equation (namely that they are independent and have 
constant variance). The methodology of Phillips and Perron (1988) is a generalisation 
of the Dickey-Fuller technique which does not make such restrictive assumptions; in 
this case, the disturbance term (u1) may be weakly dependent and heterogeneously 
distributed (the only requirement made is that E(u1)=0). The Phillips-Perron (PP) tests 
are thus modified Dickey-Fuller t-statistics after accounting for the heterogeneity in 
the error term. Their method is to use a non-parametric correction for serial 
correlation rather than including lag terms to allow for serial correlation as suggested 
by Dickey and Fuller. 
As with the previous Dickey-Fuller procedure, the Phillips-Perron tests are performed 
on the regression model with both a constant and time trend included and also with a 
constant and without a time trend. Although the results are not reported in the 
appendix, a summary of the main findings is discussed. 
As a summary of the findings of Appendix 6.3, both ADF and PP t- and F-tests 
suggest that the majority of the variables under consideration are integrated of order I 
for all three sample periods. However, the formal tests tentatively suggest that during 
both subsample periods the housing collateral series (1nCOLLAT) and real house 
prices (1nR(PAHM)) are both integrated of order 2. Nevertheless, this conclusion is 
overturned by an examination of the graphical evidence (see Figures A6.3.1 and 
A6.3.2 in Appendix 6.3)47. 
47 If indeed it was the case that house price inflation was non-stationary, this may invalidate the standard 
errors of the ARMA model above. However, on the basis of graphical evidence of the original series 
and the autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation functions, we are confident that this is not the case. 
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6.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Based on an analysis of the results emerging from the theoretical mortgage supply and 
demand models presented in the previous two chapters, this chapter has provided an 
investigation into the most appropriate data series for use in the subsequent empirical 
model of the mortgage market. The precise specification and construction of the 
relevant variables has been examined, including the use of the full Box-Jenkins (1976) 
framework in determining an appropriate forecasting model for expected future house 
prices; although this model was designed in order to construct a series reflecting the 
expected appreciation of house prices to be used as a component part of the user cost 
variable, it may also be viewed as a stand-alone model in its own right. 
Not only have the individual data series been scrutinised, but additionally a number of 
general issues regarding the specification of the data have been considered, including 
a discussion of the most appropriate method of seasonal adjustment of the data set. 
Finally, each seasonally adjusted variable is subjected to rigorous tests for stationarity 
from which it is concluded that all variables are integrated of order 1 and thus can be 
included in the cointegrating models specified and estimated in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 7 
The Estimation of a Long Run Cointegrating Model of the Supply of 
and Demand for Mortgage Finance in the United Kingdom 
7.1 A PRELIMINARY TO THE ESTIMATION 
Before discussing cointegration tests on the variables in the long run model of 
mortgage demand and supply, it will be useful to consider a number of specification 
issues. 
One of the main problems which must be addressed is the way in which we should 
account for rationing in the mortgage market. As noted by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), 
"the usual result of economic theorising : that prices clear markets, is model specific 
and is not a general property of markets - unemployment and credit rationing are not 
phantasms". A number of studies (for example Meen (1989,1990b)) estimate that 
mortgage rationing in the UK ended in the early 1980s. The identification problem 
posed by the existence of mortgage rationing (see later in the section for a fuller 
discussion) has been circumvented in a number of ways in the past. Peterson and 
Kidwell (1983), for example, in their empirical analysis of US credit unions remove 
the need to account for credit rationing by estimating a reduced form model. One 
particular drawback with this approach is that demand and supply elasticity estimates 
cannot be deduced from the empirical results. In fact, the model hypothesised by 
Peterson and Kidwell is not truly a reduced form since it includes endogenous 
variables such as the rate of mortgage interest in the estimated equation for the 
equilibrium quantity of mortgages traded. 
Paisley (1994) also avoids the problem of mortgage rationing by estimating her profit 
maximising model of building society interest rate setting on data post 1984 to avoid 
the period in which societies' interest rates were non-market clearing. An additional 
complication encountered in the estimation of an interest rate equation is that due to 
the nature of the Building Societies Association rate setting procedure prior to the 
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early 1980s (interest rates tended to be sticky; see Chapter 2 for a discussion), rates of 
interest would have to be treated as limited dependent variables, again conveniently 
avoided by the appropriate choice of estimation period in Paisley's study. Hewitt and 
Thom (1979) circumvent the rationing issue by approaching the market for mortgages 
from the supply side. Their study essentially neglects mortgage demand and all the 
problems of identification that are associated with the demand schedule. 
Meen (1990a) in his theoretical model of house prices notes that in the presence of 
mortgage market constraints, the real user cost of housing capital may be higher than 
that given by equation (4.5) in Chapter 4. The denominator of equation (4.8) of the 
same chapter shows the effect of capital constraints (mortgage rationing) on the user 
cost equation; the real user cost is raised by an amount equal to the ratio of the shadow 
price of the rationing constraint to the marginal utility of the composite good'. As 
noted in Chapter 4, the derivation of equation (4.8) assumes that the constraint is 
represented by a limit on the total volume of borrowing rather than limits to the loan 
to value and loan to income ratios. Dougherty and Van Order (1982) and Ermisch 
(1984) show that rationing in the latter case can be accounted for by substituting a 
weighted average of the interest rate on financial assets and mortgage lending for the 
interest rate i in equation (4.5). The inability to measure A or uc in equation (4.8) 
means that it will be impossible to empirically account for mortgage rationing on the 
demand for mortgage loans in this way. In Meen's empirical investigation of real 
house price determination, the extent of mortgage rationing is measured by 
(A In M, ° -e in M, ), where in rationed periods A In M, equals the actual percentage 
increase in mortgage advances, and in unrationed periods excess demand equals zero. 
Microeconometric studies of the market for mortgage funds can more explicitly 
account for the occurrence of mortgage rationing as many cross sectional databases 
contain information that may identify whether or not (and indeed the extent to which) 
any particular borrower is credit constrained (such information ranges from the 
answers to direct questions to the use of proxy variables). Follain and Dunsky (1996), 
for example, use the Tobit procedure to estimate their empirical specification of 
It is also shown that the presence of rationing can distort the effect of inflation on real house prices. 
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mortgage demand (based on a theoretical model of household utility maximisation) 
for three different groups of borrower : those who are liquidity constrained, those for 
which the liquidity constraint is not binding and the whole sample. Although it is 
confirmed that the demand for mortgage debt is influenced by the nature of the credit 
constraints and the degree to which they bind, Follain and Dunsky point out that their 
empirical model is best applied to those households that are not constrained. 
Sections 7.1.1 through 7.1.4 below discuss in depth the problem of mortgage rationing 
and how differing degrees of severity of rationing may or may not be accounted for in 
the mortgage supply, demand and reduced form equations. 
7.1.1 Mortgage Rationing : Some Definitions 
It is clear at this stage we must define exactly what is meant by mortgage rationing. 
This thesis adopts definitions of rationing which are consistent with those given in 
Kent (1980) and subsequently by a host of other papers including Nellis and Thom 
(1983) and more recently Drake and Holmes (1997). There is said to exist a 
competitive market if the adjustment of the mortgage rate of interest is sufficient to 
equate the desired demand for and desired supply of mortgages, whereas in a rationed 
market the interest rate does not always adjust to this market clearing or equilibrium 
level. In the latter case, for any given mortgage interest rate it falls upon the 
adjustment of other non-interest terms to allocate available mortgage funds. 
We may distinguish between two types of mortgage rationing essentially depending 
upon the severity of the methods used to ration funds. Equilibrium rationing is 
defined as where the adjustment of a vector of non-interest rate terms of the mortgage 
loan contract (such as the loan to value ratio and the loan to income ratio2) is 
2 If we were to incorporate all possible non-price equilibrium rationing terms in the subsequent 
estimations it would lead to severe problems of multicollinearity. Thus, only one non-interest term is 
used and must be seen as representative of all other equilibrium rationing terms. Lenders may wish to 
ration mortgages according to the loan to income ratio during periods of high (in absolute terms) 
mortgage rates in order to minimise the front-loading problem. In addition, mortgage lenders will be 
concerned with the borrower's ability to finance the periodic mortgage payments; in periods of interest 
rate rises, gross repayments will tend to rise disproportionately with respect to income, making the loan 
to income ratio the preferred choice. However, despite these arguments, the loan to value ratio is 
probably the better measure of equilibrium non-interest mortgage rationing since the definition of 
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sufficient to clear the mortgage market given that the rate of mortgage interest is not 
by itself equilibrating. On the other hand, where the adjustment of these non-interest 
terms is still insufficient to clear the market, lenders must engage in disequilibrium 
rationing which occurs in the form of mortgage queues or rationing according to 
savings records with a particular financial institution3. 
7.1.2 Mortgage Rationing in Reality 
When it is stated that mortgage rationing was ended in the early 1980s we are 
referring to the concept of disequilibrium mortgage rationing. We can safely assume 
that there always exists equilibrium rationing in the mortgage market if only for 
reasons of financial prudence on the part of the mortgage lender4. For example, there 
exists an upper limit on both the loan to value and loan to income ratios despite the 
fact that mortgage lenders have become considerably more competitive over the past 
two decades (and thus could possibly satisfy all mortgage demand at the going rate of 
interest alone by acquiring additional readily available funds)5. In fact in the second 
quarter of 1997 the average amount of mortgage loan a first time borrower could 
expect to receive was 91.2 per cent of the value of the house purchased, the highest 
borrower income has changed considerably both over time and between societies, making the use of the 
loan to income ratio somewhat inconsistent. The loan to value ratio is calculated for first time buyers 
rather than existing owner occupiers since in the presence of house price inflation, it will be difficult to 
distinguish between a fall in the loan to value ratio for existing owner occupiers as a result of increased 
rationing or due to the desire by existing owner occupiers to hold capital gains in the form of housing 
equity. Thus, it is the loan to value ratio for first time buyers that is the most appropriate proxy for 
equilibrium rationing as rationing measures can be applied more effectively to those who do not have 
the proceeds of a house sale at their disposal. 
3 It is important to note that other authors have used the same terminology in referring to different types 
of rationing. For example, Ostas and Zahn (1975) refer to equilibrium rationing as the case in which 
the adjustment of the mortgage rate is sufficient to clear the market, and disequilibrium rationing as 
where the adjustment of non-interest terms is required to clear the market when the actual mortgage rate 
differs from its equilibrium level. On the flip side of the coin, Nellis and Thom (1983) refer to the 
definitions of equilibrium and disequilibrium rationing as set out in the main text as `market clearing' 
and `non-market clearing' rationing respectively, and likewise Pratt (1980) refers to the terms as 
'passive' and `active' rationing. 
4 As is noted by Kent (1980), "non-price terms such as the loan to value ratio and maturity are always 
used by lenders in the home mortgage market to allocate funds, but during periods in which there are 
substantial shifts in the demand and/or supply curves, there is a qualitative shift in the use of these terms 
to allocate funds". A similar point is developed by Nellis and Thom (1983), who state that, "when 
mortgage demand has been relatively slack in the UK, borrower's income has not been the binding 
constraint, but rather that mortgagors have set their own limits on the level of borrowing in the interests 
of prudence". - 
s As we saw in Chapter 2, this increase in competition has been the result of the structural and 
legislative changes in the mortgage market over the 1980s and 1990s. 
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proportion since records began (although this has since fallen). In effect what the 
lender is trying to do by setting a maximum loan to value ratio is to reduce the 
problem of moral hazard. In this case, the average first time borrower must make an 
8.8 per cent downpayment on the house which acts as a disincentive to a borrower 
taking on mortgage debt which they may find difficult to repay. The disincentive of 
defaulting on a mortgage loan when the downpayment required by the lender is zero is 
far lower than if the borrower has some of their own capital tied up in the property. 
As noted by Buckingham (1990), when prices are falling those borrowers with 100 per 
cent mortgages may find themselves with negative equity and are likely to, "struggle 
less hard to keep up with payments and retain their houses than those who have made 
a substantial equity commitment". In addition, the presence of a loan to value ratio of 
less than 100 per cent serves to lessen the problems of asymmetric information and 
adverse selection, as the ability of the borrower to meet the downpayment will act as a 
screening device indicating to the lender the probability of future default. 
The main point which emerges from the discussion above is that the rationing of 
mortgages via the use of the non-interest terms of the loan is not simply a temporary 
short run phenomenon which disappears when interest rates adjust to their competitive 
equilibrium levels. Rather, non-interest rate credit rationing represents a permanent 
and equilibrium response by mortgage lenders for the reasons outlined above. It may 
be the case that changes in interest rates and non-interest rate loan terms move 
together to reinforce each other in rationing mortgage credit (the `multiple term' 
hypothesis - see Guttentag (1960)) or alternatively that such terms are considered 
substitutes for one another (these propositions are examined in more detail in Section 
7.1.4). 
Building Societies prior to the mid-1980s operated a policy of setting mortgage 
interest rates below their market clearing levels, reflecting their long-held attitudes 
that mortgagors should be protected as far as possible from fluctuations in market 
interest rates and that owner occupation be promoted by keeping the cost of borrowing 
down. In addition, the administrative costs involved in changing borrowing rates 
often meant that societies were reluctant to change the mortgage rate even when 
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market conditions implied a change was necessary. The resulting swings in 
competitiveness of societies' assets and liabilities were initially absorbed by the use of 
the liquidity ratio as a stabilising buffer, which in some cases deferred the need to 
ration funds. 
7.1.3 Empirically Accounting for Mortgage Rationing : The Demand Curve 
The method of accounting for the presence of rationing on the demand side of the 
mortgage market depends critically upon the type of rationing that is observed. 
Equilibrium Mortgage Rationing 
Traditionally, mortgage demand (Md) has been specified as a function of the after-tax 
rate of interest on mortgage loans (rm) and a vector of independent demand-side 
variables (zd) 
Md = d(rm, zd) (7.1) 
and mortgage supply (M') equivalently as 
M` = s(rm, z') (7.2) 
where (z3) is a vector of independent supply-side variables. 
The main problem that exists in the modelling of the market for mortgages in this way 
is that when lenders use terms other than the interest rate to ration funds, observations 
may not fall simultaneously on the mortgage demand and supply curves (i. e. there 
11 
exists an identification problem). With equilibrium rationing, however, the remedy is 
straight forward. Rather than specifying mortgage demand as a function solely of the 
mortgage rate of interest and a vector of independent variables, we may include a 
vector of non-interest rate variables (v) which may be manipulated by lenders to 
achieve equality between desired mortgage demand and supply, implying the 
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existence of a regime of equilibrium rationing. Nellis and Thom (1983) comment that 
this methodology, "treats the `price vector' as multi-dimensional, including non- 
interest variables (such as the loan-income ratio) as well as the interest (mortgage) 
rate". The benefits of the use of a price vector (rather than simply the mortgage rate of 
interest) has been confirmed empirically by Zumpano et al (1986) who estimate 
simultaneously models of demand and supply on US data with and without the non- 
interest price terms, finding the former specification to be superior. In concluding 
they write that, "to specify price properly and avoid a bias in the estimates, the non- 
contract rate terms should be included with the contract rate in the demand and supply 
equations". After all, it is noted by Zumpano et al that, "market clearing through the 
use of interest rates, non-rate loan terms, or a combination of both is still effectively 
credit allocation through price if it is the potential borrower who decides the price is 
too high". The equation for mortgage demand then becomes 
M" = d(rm, v, zd ) (7.3) 
The study by Ostas and Zahn (1975) was one of the first to treat the non-interest terms 
of the mortgage contract as market equilibrating. In fact they propose that equilibrium 
rationing exists in the short run as the interest rate adjusts sluggishly to its market 
clearing level. The non-interest terms will adjust instantaneously to temporarily 
equilibrate the market until the mortgage rate finally adjusts, at which point the non- 
interest terms will return to their long run levels. There are three main problems of 
the Ostas and Zahn paper. Firstly, the existence of disequilibrium mortgage rationing 
is ignored completely. Secondly, interest rate changes are modelled in a partial 
adjustment framework, and as such the interest rate will be postulated to adjust even if 
there exists a situation of equilibrium rationing. This has clearly not been the case in 
the UK mortgage market as mortgage lenders have in the past been content in the long 
run to lend at lower rates of interest and ration by manipulating the terms of the 
mortgage. For example, building society interest rates have in the past remained 
constant over a number of periods while non-interest mortgage terms have served to 
ration the excess mortgage demand out of the market6. In other words, equilibrium 
6 Most notably, building societies interest rates remained constant at 6 per cent for the 12 quarters between 1962Q2 and 1965Q1, and at 11 per cent for the 9 quarters between 1974Q1 and 1976Q1. The 
rationing should be considered as part of the mortgage lenders' long term optimising 
plan. A final criticism of the Ostas and Zahn paper is that a two stage least squares 
procedure is used to estimate demand and supply, which may lead to incorrect 
inferences in the light of the developments in the area of long run cointegration 
modelling over the past decade. 
It will prove informative to illustrate the way in which both the demand and supply 
sides of the mortgage market interact in the presence of equilibrium (and indeed 
disequilibrium) mortgage rationing. 
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In Figure 7.1 above, the mortgage demand schedule is depicted as a negative function 
of the mortgage interest rate and the mortgage supply curve a positive function. 
Beginning at the equilibrium point A, assume that mortgage demand increases to M2 
following a shock to zd the vector of independent demand-side variables7. In a 
competitive market, the mortgage rate will adjust upwards to achieve an equilibrium 
at point B. With equilibrium rationing, in the extreme case the mortgage interest rate 
will be completely unresponsive to the increase in demand and it is left to the vector 
of non-interest rate variables (v) to adjust in order to ration funds by shifting the 
latter period is probably the most exceptional due to the especially high rates of inflation making the 
mortgage lending rate negative for the whole period. 
7, A similar exposition can be given if we begin with an initial supply side (rather than demand side) 
shock. 
275 
demand curve back to its original position (Md and thus point A)8. Without any 
change in either v or the rate of interest following the demand shift to M, ", there 
would be a disequilibrium of quantity D-A; the rule of voluntary exchange would 
then mean that quantity Ml would be traded. Changes in the vector of non-interest 
mortgage terms will also be expected to influence the supply of mortgage funds (see 
later for a more detailed discussion of the reasons for this). However, we may also 
expect that any shift in the demand curve as a result of a given change in the non- 
interest mortgage terms will be greater than the shift in the supply curve9, and thus for 
ease of exposition we assume no effect on the supply curve in the diagram. 
The motive behind the use of equilibrium rationing terms in the multi-dimensional 
vector of prices in determining mortgage demand is that the extent to which 
mortgages are (equilibrium) rationed by lenders not only physically restricts mortgage 
demand but also reflects an important cost to the borrower. The greater the degree of 
equilibrium mortgage rationing (usually reflected by a fall in the average loan to value 
or loan to income ratio), the higher the cost to the borrower for two reasons : 
" there are higher search costs, as additional funds must be acquired from a source 
other than the mortgage lender. 
" additional funds needed to satisfy the required downpayment are likely to be more 
expensive, as unsecured loans generally attract a higher rate of debit interest than 
does long term secured mortgage debt1°. However, if the borrower held sufficient 
savings upon which he could draw to pay the initial downpayment, the additional 
I The negative effect of increasing the downpayment ratio on the demand for housing (and thus the 
demand for mortgage finance) is confined theoretically in a number of papers. Brueckner (1986), for 
example, reports the results of his theoretical model that, "when the intertemporal allocation of 
consumption is distorted by the downpayment constraint, the homeowner will attempt to lessen the 
impact of the distortion by reducing his house size, which lowers the required downpayment". 
9 The reason for this is that the effect on the supply curve following a change in the loan to value ratio is 
unclear and depends on whether mortgage lenders view equilibrium rationing terms as substitutes for or 
complements to other means of rationing funds (such as interest rates). Section 7.1.4 deals with these 
two opposing hypotheses in more detail. 
10 Home buyers will not usually be granted an unsecured personal loan for the explicit purpose of 
funding the downpayment on a house. Rather, a personal loan for the purchase of consumer goods 
(such as a car loan) may be requested with the funds originally set aside for these purposes being freed 
up and diverted towards the downpayment. 
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cost to him from using his own funds rather than mortgage funds would be the 
difference between the after-tax savings rate he receives on his own funds and the 
after-tax borrowing rate on the mortgage. For any level of general interest rates, 
the savings rate may be higher than the mortgage rate during the initial years of the 
loan given that the mortgage rate is often discounted during this period. 
Despite the success of a number of papers in modelling equilibrium mortgage 
rationing terms in the mortgage demand function, it is important not to lose sight of 
the fact that there have been some studies which have failed to find any significant 
effect of such variables. For example, Dhrymes and Taubman (1969) in their 
estimations using US Savings and Loans data find no evidence to suggest that terms 
and conditions on mortgage contracts (namely the maturity of the loan or the loan to 
value ratio) have an independent effect on mortgage demand". This is also true of 
Silber's (1968) study of the demand for mortgages provided by US mutual savings 
banks, commercial banks and savings and loans institutions. Only the demand for 
mortgages provided by life insurance companies was found to be affected by the terms 
and conditions of the mortgage contract (specifically the loan to value ratio and the 
length of amortisation). 
Disequilibrium Mortgage Rationing 
Despite the fact that the mortgage interest rate and the vector of non-interest rate 
variables work together to regulate demand and thereby ration mortgage credit, the 
existence of a regime of disequilibrium rationing would indicate that the adjustment of 
these variables is insufficient to ensure mortgage market clearance. Referring back to 
Figure 7.1 above, following the initial shock to mortgage demand (a demand curve 
shift from M1 to M2) the vector of non-interest rate variables will be adjusted in the 
usual manner in an attempt to clear the market. With disequilibrium rationing they 
fail to do so, and the adjustment of the vector of equilibrium rationing variables only 
shifts the demand curve back to M; , say, and not all the way to Mf as is the case 
This was the case despite their finding of a distinct correlation between the loan to value ratio and mortgage interest rates (a change in the mortgage interest rate of between 0.3 and 0.4 per cent was found to be associated by a change in the loan to value ratio of 0.1). 
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with equilibrium rationing. The adjustment of v does serve to ration an amount ED 
out of the market but leaves an excess demand of AE. This excess demand cannot be 
met under the current supply conditions, but instead lenders must resort to other more 
strict non-price rationing techniques such as mortgage queues or length of savings 
record in order to ration mortgage funds (i. e. disequilibrium rationing). 
An important question which must be asked is why can we not treat those 
disequilibrium rationing variables in an identical manner to the way in which we 
treated the vector of equilibrium rationing terms (v) ? In other words, why can we not 
simply expand the vector v to incorporate such disequilibrium rationing terms as 
length of mortgage queues or the length of an individuals savings record with a 
particular institution ? After all, this would solve the problems involved in estimating 
a disequilibrium model of the mortgage market as there would only exist equilibrium 
mortgage rationing. In fact, the methods by which a lending institution engages in 
equilibrium rationing are not fundamentally different from those disequilibrium 
rationing methods. Both lay down requirements that must be met by borrowers in 
order that they may qualify for a mortgage of a certain value. 
However, measures of equilibrium and disequilibrium rationing do differ in two 
important respects. Firstly, where equilibrium measures generally ration the amount 
of mortgage finance willing to be on-lent to any particular borrower (usually 
--dependent upon 
their financial characteristics), disequilibrium rationing tends to be 
less financially discriminatory and more discrete in nature as borrowers are limited in 
their access to any amount of mortgage funds. The only way in which the mortgagee 
may satisfy the disequilibrium rationing requirements and thus acquire any mortgage 
at all is to wait. Secondly, disequilibrium rationing terms are generally more difficult 
to measure than their equilibrium counterparts. For example, consistent information 
on mortgage queues has only been available since October 1983 (after which point 
there has generally been an absence of disequilibrium mortgage rationing). After 
accounting for all measurable rationing terms, the market may remain in 
disequilibrium as the mortgage lender engages in forms of rationing that are either 
unmeasurable or are poorly statistically documented. 
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7.1.4 Empirically Accounting for Mortgage Rationing : The Supply Curve 
This now leaves the supply curve to be defined under mortgage rationing. One would 
expect that due to the increasing presence of other mortgage lenders in the market12 
and the break-up of the Building Societies Association cartel towards the end of 1983 
that we could roughly identify the end of disequilibrium rationing in the UK mortgage 
market in 1983/84 (although Meen (1989,1990b) suggests that mortgage rationing 
ended in 1981, re-emerging in 1987/88 as the housing market heated up). As such, it 
is thus informative to look at how the supply curve has changed over the two time 
periods (i. e. prior to and post 1983/84). 
Firstly, consider the case in which there operates a regime of disequilibrium mortgage 
rationing. During the period prior to 1984, the supply of total funds to building 
societies was fairly inelastic as mortgage lenders found it difficult or costly to obtain 
additional funds to on-lend. In turn, it is likely that the supply of mortgages to 
borrowers during this period was considerably inelastic as depicted by curve M; in 
Figure 7.2 below. 
Figure 7.2 : Rationing and the Elasticity of the Supply Curve 
rm M' t 
M 
12 In the third quarter of 1997, building societies accounted for only 25.2 per cent of total mortgage 
lending outstanding, banks 68.1 per cent and other financial institutions 6.7 per cent. Building 
societies' mortgage lending was especially low due to recent transfers from mutual to Plc status (most 
notably the Halifax, the largest mortgage lender in the UK). 
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In addition, the supply curve could have been expected to become more inelastic 
along its length (i. e. as supply is increased) as lenders were only willing to supply 
additional mortgage credit at an accelerating interest rate to reflect the fact that 
increasingly larger deposit interest rate changes were required to attain the same 
additional amount of deposit liabilities the greater were their levels of deposit 
holdings 13. The reason for this prior to the 1980s was that building societies were the 
main mortgage market players and were restricted in the volume of funds that they 
could acquire from the wholesale market to finance their mortgage business. Thus 
when retail savings approached their maximum level and rises in the real interest rate 
could not command a considerably higher level of savings, mortgage lenders could not 
look to any other source to boost their available funds. Thus one could reasonably 
have expected an exponential supply curve, becoming vertical as the real rate of 
interest approached infinity. 
For any finite rate of mortgage interest, we would never expect the mortgage supply 
curve to become vertical as it is assumed that the lender can always command 
additional liabilities with which they can fund their mortgage business by offering a 
high enough deposit rate (the extra cost of funds being met by an increase in the 
interest rate on mortgages). 
Although it may appear reasonable to assume that mortgage lenders will not lend at all 
when the real interest rate is zero, in the past it has been the case that building 
societies have advanced mortgage funds at significantly negative real rates of interest. 
For example, the spiralling inflation of the 1970s led to building societies maintaining 
a negative real mortgage rate between the fourth quarter of 1973 and the first quarter 
of 1978, reaching its lowest level of -12.2 per cent in the third quarter of 1975 (see 
Figure 7.3 below). Thus it is the case that the mortgage supply schedule need not 
necessarily pass through the origin of Figure 7.2 above. 
13 Of course, this relies on there being sufficient inelastic mortgage demand such that the additional cost 
of funds can be recouped through real mortgage interest rate rises. 
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As banks and other mortgage lenders entered the mortgage market in the early 1980s 
and legislation was introduced to free up the market (banks were permitted to 
undertake mortgage lending and building societies were allowed greater access to 
wholesale funding), mortgage funds became more freely available to borrowers. The 
supply of deposits schedule became more elastic with respect to both the rate of 
interest and non-price variables (such as account access) and thus as a result the 
mortgage supply schedule became flatter reflecting the relative ease with which 
mortgage lenders could attain additional mortgage funds at little extra costla. 
This is shown in Figure 7.2 in which at every interest rate, the mortgage lender is 
willing to supply a greater level of mortgage loans. By combining Figures 7.1 and 7.2 
it can be seen that the flatter is the mortgage supply function the smaller will be the 
required change in the rate of interest in order to re-impose mortgage market 
equilibrium following a demand shock (Figure 7.4 below). Thus for any initial 
upward shift in demand, a smaller change in the rate of mortgage interest may offset 
or reduce the need to resort to either equilibrium or disequilibrium rationing as the 
mortgage supply curve becomes less steep. This has been borne out in reality as both 
equilibrium and disequilibrium rationing of mortgages have become less prevalent 
14 Section 6.4.2.2 reviews the arguments for the choice of variable to reflect the ease of societies 
attaining additional funds to on lend as mortgages. 
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since 1980, the decline in equilibrium rationing being reflected by a considerable rise 
in both the loan to income and loan to value ratios over the 1980s and 1990s15. 
Figure 7.4 : Rationing and the Demand for and Supply of Mortgages 
r,  i M', 
Md 2 
M 
One may expect from the above discussion that changes to the structure of mortgage 
finance during the 1980s and 1990s have encouraged a regime shift in the mortgage 
supply curve from M; to MZ in Figure 7.4 as the necessity to ration mortgage funds 
has been reduced. Thus, on the assumption that the supply curve can be identified, we 
would expect to observe a steady increase in the coefficient on the real interest rate 
variable in the long run structural mortgage supply equation. 
It was mentioned briefly in Section 7.1.3 that non-interest mortgage loan terms may be 
expected to influence the supply of mortgage finance. However, the relationship 
between the desired level of mortgage supply, the mortgage interest rate and the 
mortgage loan contract terms (equilibrium rationing terms) is not unambiguous, and 
may be characterised in one of two ways. Firstly, changes in the non-interest 
mortgage contract terms will alter the overall risk composition of mortgage lenders' 
asset portfolios. In general, the higher the loan to value or loan to income ratio the 
higher will be the lender's risk, since for any given level of mortgage lending a larger 
average loan size would concentrate risk in fewer obligations16. In turn this would be 
's Some banks now offer mortgages with loan to value ratios of up to 100 per cent, and the average loan 
to income ratio has remained high at between 2 and 2.5 since 1986, prior to which it had reached a low 
of 1.64 in the second quarter of 1980. 
16 This is contested by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) based on adverse selection and moral hazard 
arguments, who argue that, "increasing collateral requirements [reducing the loan to value ratio, for 
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expected to lead to a fall in mortgage lenders' willingness to lend funds for house 
purchase. This may be referred to as the `trade-off argument' since in this case the 
financial intermediary is willing to lend less the looser (and thus more risky) are the 
credit terms. Non-interest mortgage terms are thus substitutes for other rationing 
terms (such as interest rates). 
However, we may alternatively expect that as credit terms are loosened (a rise in the 
loan to value or loan to income ratios) mortgage lenders will desire to increase 
mortgage lending, since their net return on the mortgage portfolio will be higher as 
overheads and mortgage origination costs can be spread over a larger volume of 
repayments. In other words, lenders' average costs will fall the looser are the non- 
interest credit terms. As Hall and Urwin (1989) note, "a higher loan to value or loan 
to income ratio will indicate that the societies are currently keen to expand lending 
relative to deposits". This may be referred to as the `reinforcing argument' (and is 
similar to Guttentag's (1960) multiple term hypothesis) since movements in the non- 
interest credit terms are indicative of the general willingness of the financial 
intermediary to lend mortgage funds. Such terms are used as complements to other 
methods of rationing. Given these two arguments, the cumulative effect on supply of 
changes in the non-interest mortgage terms will therefore be indeterminate ex ante; if 
the supply function can be identified in a cointegrating framework then the direction 
of the sign on the loan to value variable in the estimated supply function would 
confirm which of the two propositions dominates. However, we will see later in 
Section 7.2.5 that estimation of the reduced form equation will be sufficient to identify 
the relative importance of the two arguments. 
example, ed. ] could increase the riskiness of the bank's loan portfolio, either by discouraging safer investors, or by inducing borrowers to invest in riskier projects". They conclude, therefore, that financial institutions will ration credit by limiting the number of loans made rather than their size. 
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7.2 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
7.2.1 Structural Supply and Demand Functions and the Reduced Form Model 
To be able to estimate the demand and supply curves over any time period we must 
assume that both functions can be identified. Identification requires that at least one 
exogenous variable in the demand equation (i. e. a component of the vector zd) is 
excluded from the supply equation (i. e. does not appear in z3) and vice versa17. We 
must therefore be able to set demand equal to supply in Figure 7.4 above such that the 
equilibrium values trace out both the underlying demand and supply curves. 
However, by doing so we are implicitly assuming that a combination of the real rate of 
interest and equilibrium rationing variables is sufficient to clear the mortgage market, 
i. e. that we are in a position of equilibrium rationing; from the previous discussion 
this was obviously not the case during the period prior to 1983/84. We would expect 
the supply function to be identified over the whole period (both prior to and post 
1984) despite exhibiting a structural break (see previous discussion). The demand 
function is expected to be identified for the period post 1984 (when rationing 
disappeared and the market became competitive) and unidentified in the period 
preceding 1984. This being the case, in order to estimate the demand function over 
the estimation period prior to 1984 one of two assumptions must be made regarding 
the state of mortgage rationing during that period : 
" That disequilibrium rationing did not exist in the mortgage market. This is the 
finding of Nellis and Thom (1983) in which the demand for UK mortgage finance 
is modelled as a function of the interest rate and a number of non-interest 
equilibrium rationing terms18. 
17 The information contained in these excluded variables must be able to shift the demand and supply functions independently of any other explanatory variable. In other words, excluded variables must not be perfectly correlated with any other variable in the system. 
Nellis and Thom (1983) argue that lending criteria (i. e. equilibrium rationing terms) are different for first time buyers and existing owner occupiers, and as such they disaggregate the estimation of the demand side of the market between the two types of borrower. 
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" That the equilibrium rationing variables are closely correlated with disequilibrium 
measures (such as length of queues or length of time required to be a saver with a 
particular financial institution in order to qualify to be considered for a mortgage) 
to the extent that equilibrium rationing terms, v, reflect accurately the 
disequilibrium measures. 
The first conjecture, given the documentary and statistical evidence on the mortgage 
market during the 1970s, appears implausible and is thus rejected; queues of potential 
mortgagors apparently being able to satisfy societies' prudential criteria did indeed 
exist during the 1970s. By making the second conjecture we are essentially assuming 
that disequilibrium rationing terms are a component of v. Because such terms do not 
lend themselves easily to measurement the assumption here is that they can be 
captured by measurable `equilibrium' rationing terms. This notion is particularly 
appealing since it negates the need to divide rationing terms into two types - all 
rationing would then simply become `equilibrium' rationing. Mortgage queues and 
savings history requirements simply become an additional cost to the borrower which 
the lender would choose as just another component of the vector of non-interest terms, 
V. 
However, these assumptions may not be well founded. There is no compelling reason 
to believe necessarily that disequilibrium rationing must be associated with strict 
equilibrium rationing. In fact it could be the opposite case that the offer of a high loan 
to value ratio has in the past led to the need of building societies to ration credit 
through disequilibrium means. In short, this thesis takes the view that, without 
resorting to disequilibrium econometric techniques (which may be incompatible with 
the relatively recent theory on cointegration procedures to deal with long run 
relationships between non-stationary variables) there is no adequate way of directly 
estimating the demand for mortgages over the period of rationing prior to 1984. 
Due to, the current state of time series econometric knowledge, it is in practice 
problematic to observe the structural parameters of the demand and supply functions 
irrespective of whether or not mortgage demand is rationed. Although there exist a 
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number of techniques to estimate structural models of simultaneous equations when 
the variables under consideration are stationary (namely two and three stage least 
squares and seemingly unrelated regression estimation), no such methodology exists 
for variables integrated of order 1(1) or more. In other words, even if we can 
theoretically identify equations for supply and demand there exists no technique that 
allows us to adequately estimate these structural equations in a cointegrating 
framework. Although Johansen's (1988) maximum likelihood procedure does allow 
the estimation of up to r cointegrating vectors from a set of r+1 variables, the results 
can often be misleading and uninterpretable (in general, the greater the number of 
cointegrating vectors amongst a particular set of variables the more acute this problem 
will become). In preliminary estimations using Johansen's procedure, it was hoped 
that out of the complete set of variables (both supply and demand) we would be able 
to observe both structural a supply and structural demand relationship; however, this 
proved not to be the case, with none of the six cointegrating vectors that emerged 
from the set of nine variables being particularly informative. 
Thus it was deemed more appropriate to estimate a reduced form model in a 
cointegrating framework over the period in which mortgage rationing was absent. 
Estimation of the reduced form equation essentially allows us to circumvent the 
problems of identification and simultaneous estimation, although as previously 
discussed, it becomes more difficult to interpret the parameters in a structural context. 
However, given that we have not accounted for disequilibrium rationing in either the 
underlying supply or demand functions, it could be the case that the reduced form may 
be misspecified if estimated over a period in which there was a change in the regime 
of mortgage rationing which caused the functional relations to change 
Despite the inability to estimate and interpret the structural parameters of the supply 
and demand functions, this chapter will show that a number of interesting and useful 
results do emerge from the estimation of the reduced form equation. These results are 
attained by varying the period of estimation and backcasting using the estimated 
model over the unrationed period to infer the degree to which mortgages were 
rationed during the 1970s and early 1980s. 
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7.2.2 Empirical Specification 
As discussed in the previous section, the supply and demand functions are specified as 
Mt = s(rmt, vt, zý) (7.4) 
and 
Md = d(rm,, v,, zd) (7.5) 
where rmt is the after-tax rate of interest on mortgage loans, zd and z; are the vectors 
of demand and supply side variables (the inclusion of which has been suggested by 
theoretical considerations regarding the demand for housing and mortgages and the 
supply of mortgage finance respectively) and vt is the vector of non-interest mortgage 
terms (as proxied by the loan to value ratio). The precise empirical specification of 
the structural equations of the demand for and supply of mortgages is as follows : 
Supply : 
1nR(AAPR), = ao +aiR(rm), +a21nZLVF 
+a31nCOLLAT +a41nR(AAAU)r +u,, 
(7.6) 
Demand : 
InR(AAPR)r =/0 +Q, R(rm)r +Q2 InZLVF 
+ß3 1n R(PAHM), +ß4 1n R(ALDO), (7.7) 
+ /1351n INFL, +ß6R (UC), +ß71n MIRAS + u2t 
where 
"R denotes a real value (as deflated by the consumers expenditure price deflator)19 
" In denotes the natural logarithm of a variable 
" AAPR represents total net advances of loans secured on dwellings (£m) from all 
sources 
" rm is the after-tax interest rate on building society mortgages (per cent) 
. ZLVF is the average loan to value ratio of building societies' first time borrowers 
(per cent) 
Real variables are at 1990 prices and have all been deflated by the consumers' expenditure price deflator with the exception of R(UG) which is specified as a percentage of the real house price. 
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" COLLATis the ratio of the value of the personal sector dwelling stock to the value 
of total loans outstanding secured on dwellings (per cent) 
" AAA U is personal sector savings (£m) 
" PAHMis a mix adjusted index of house prices 
" ALDO is the total level of financial assets (£m) 
" INFL is the inflation rate implied by consumers' expenditure price deflator (per 
cent) 
" R(UC) is a measure of the real user cost of housing capital (per cent) 
" MIRAS is the total cost of the MIRAS scheme as a proportion of outstanding 
mortgage debt (per cent) 
All data pertain to the UK and are seasonally adjusted using the X11 procedure in 
SAS (see Appendix 6.2 for a discussion of this technique). The reduced form 
equations for the three endogenous variables MI, rm, and vt (where M, = M; = Md ) 
can then be written as M, = fl (za, z7 ), rm, = f2 (zd , zý) and yr = f3 (z, 
°, z; ) , the 
empirical specification becoming 
1nR(AAPR), = yo +Y11nCOLLAT +Y2lnR(AAAU), 
+y31nR(PAHM), +y41nR(ALDO), (7.8) 
+y51nINFL1 +y6R(UC)1 +y71nMIRAS1 +v1, 
R(rm), =80 +8,1nCOLLAT +82 lnR(AAAU)1 
+S3lnR(PAHM)1 +84InR(ALDO), (7.9) 
+8, In INFL1 + S6R(UC), + 87 In MIRAS, + vet 
InZLVF = ýo +ý11nCOLLAT, +ý21nR(AAAU), 
+ ý31n R(PAHM), + ý41n R(ALDO), (7.10) 
+ýs 1nINFLL +ý6R(UC), +ý, InMIRAS1 +v3, 
In the following analysis, reduced form estimations are initially conducted over the 
periods 1969Q1-1995Q4 (the full sample period of 108 observations), 1969Q1- 
1983Q4 (the first subsample period of 60 observations) and 1984Q1-1995Q4 (the 
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second Subsample period of 48 observations). From the discussion of Section 7.1 it is 
hypothesised that the first subsample period be characterised by a regime of 
disequilibrium mortgage rationing and the second subsample by either equilibrium 
mortgage rationing or competitive equilibrium. This does not mean that we cannot 
estimate the reduced form model over the rationed period, although it is the case that 
any results from doing so must be interpreted with care since, as we discussed above, 
the reduced form equation may be misspecified20. The division of the full sample in 
to two subsamples at these dates was the natural way to progress; one would 
hypothesise a structural break in the market in around 1984 given the breakdown of 
the Building Societies Association cartel at this time and the recent entrance of banks 
into the mortgage market and of building societies into the wholesale deposit market. 
7.2.3 Testing for Cointegration : The Residual Approach 
Engle and Granger (1987) propose seven asymptotic residual based tests for testing 
the null hypothesis that a certain set of variables do not cointegrate against the 
alternative hypothesis of cointegration. It was noted in their paper that it is the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test which is preferable in most situations to any of 
the other six tests. 
The first step of the Engle and Granger methodology is to pre-test the variables to be 
included in the reduced form cointegrating relationship for their order of integration. 
Cointegration requires that the variables all be integrated of the same order. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron F- and t-tests are used to test for the 
order of integration; the results are discussed in Appendix 6.3. The results of the tests 
(and plots of the series and autocorrelation functions for the first differences of the 
variables 1nCOLLAT and 1nR(PAHM)) confirm that the variables are all non-stationary 
and specifically integrated of order 1. 
20 Misspecification can cause the resulting parameter estimates to be inconsistent to the extent that the 
omitted variables are correlated with those included in the estimations. 
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The point estimates of the long run relationship between the variables may then be 
consistently estimated using OLS in the form 
yl =, 130 +, 6, z, + e1 (7.11) 
where y, is the dependent variable and z, represents a vector of independent 
variables. If the variables are cointegrated, then as proved by Stock (1987), the 
probability limits of the parameter estimates converge more quickly to the true 
parameter values than an equivalent regression using stationary variables (i. e. the 
estimators are `super-consistent'). The Engle and Granger test for cointegration is a 
test of whether the residual series from the OLS regression of equation (7.11), e,, are 
stationary, in which case we may conclude that the series y, and z, are cointegrated. 
Because the ADF test is performed on the residual series we should not include either 
a constant or a time trend in the residual ADF equation (the residuals will necessarily 
by assumption have a mean of zero), and thus the ADF equation may be written as 
follows 
Der = ae, -1 
+ a, (Aer-1) + Er 
t"t 
(7.12) 
When adding lags up to an order of p, the series {el, e2.... e1_ p} will not have a mean of 
exactly zero, but will always be very close to zero except where T (the number of 
usable observations) is small or where eý_p, e, _p+l,... 
e,, are unusually large in absolute 
value. Hence adding a constant to equation (7.12) will have only a negligible effect. 
If the hypothesis that ao =0 cannot be rejected, then we may conclude that the 
residual series contains a unit root and we may therefore not reject the hypothesis that 
the variables are not cointegrated. Rejection of the hypothesis ao =0 implies a 
stationary residual series and thus the conclusion is reached that the variables must be 
cointegrated of order CI(1,1). 
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Since the series e1 is generated from an OLS regression, we only know an estimate of 
the error and not the actual error. As a result, it has been shown (see Engle and 
Granger (1987)) that the use of the usual Dickey-Fuller critical t-values for a unit root 
test prejudices the outcome of finding a stationary error process. Engle and Granger 
prove that the distribution of the t-ratio for the test of ao =0 is non-standard and 
present critical values based on Monte Carlo simulation results. Subsequently, critical 
values for the ADF test have been published in Engle and Yoo (1987) and MacKinnon 
(1991). 
Table 7.1a : Results of Engle and Granger's (1987) Residual Based Test for 
Cointegration : The Reduced Form Mortgage Equation21 
Statistic 
19691_1995Q4. 






ýý - Constant Constant 
and Trend 
DF -4.0926 -4.2598 -2.4297 -2.7888 -4.1247 -4.3388 
ADF(1) -5.0050 -4.7625 -3.2282 -3.5216 -4.7722 -5.0992 
ADF(2) -4.4074 -4.2379 -3.4299 -3.7306 -3.3150 -3.4403 
ADF(3) -4.2743 -3.7881 -3.3500 -2.7567 -3.6872 -3.8061 
ADF(4) -3.7584 -3.5288 -3.2357 -2.5266 -3.4188 -3.5308 
ADF(5) -3.9080 -3.4183 -3.3188 -2.8515 -2.9678 -3.0335 
ADF(6) -4.3550 -3.6474 -4.1205 -3.5030 -3.1078 -3.1522 
ADF(7) -4.3951 -3.9046 -5.6697 -5.0709 -3.2910 -3.2927 
ADF(8) -3.7057 -3.1289 -4.0771 -3.6284 -3.1996 -3.1865 
AIC 1 1 7 7 1 1 
Sc 1 0 1 1 1 1 
HQC 1 1 7 7 1 1 
LM 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Critical 15% -5.3433 -5.6641 -5.5645 -5.8997 -5.7048 -6.0493 Critical t 10% -4.9882 -5.3413 -5.1297 -5.5228 -5.2189 -5.6372 
where AIC, SC, HQC and LM are the Akaike Information Criterion, the Schwartz 
Criterion, the Hannan-Quinn Criterion and the LM decision respectively (the latter 
being the smallest number of lags in the residual ADF equation such that serial 
correlation is eliminated). The columns entitled `Constant' and `Constant and Trend' 
21 Critical values for the ADF statistics on the residual series are given in the tables in the text for a5 
and 10 per cent significance level. However, MacKinnon (1991) does not provide response surface 
estimates when there are more than six variables included in the original cointegrating OLS regression. 
Given that there are eight variables in each of the three reduced form equations here, MacKinnon's 
critical values are updated by undertaking an OLS estimation of each on a constant, N (the number of 
variables in the cointegrating equation) and N2, following which a prediction of the critical values is 
made for N=8. Six regressions are undertaken (there are three sample sizes and the "no trend" and "with trend" cases) on the critical values attained at the 5 per cent level of significance and six on those 
at 10 per cent. 
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refer to the specification of the underlying cointegrating model; the reduced form 
functions (which exclude a time trend) are specified in equations (7.8) through (7.10) 
in Section 7.2.2 above. 
Table 7.1b : Results of Engle and Granger's (1987) Residual Based Test for 
Cointegration : The Reduced Form Mortgage Interest Rate Equation 
. Statistic ........... 
196991^199594............ 








............. Constant Constant 
and Trend 
DF -3.0440 -3.5968 -3.2305 -3.1929 -3.1871 -3.1223 
ADF(1) -2.9905 -3.5096 -3.5460 -3.5014 -3.9151 -4.1776 
ADF(2) -3.1797 -3.6546 -3.6863 -3.6325 -3.0153 -3.6335 
ADF(3) -3.6802 -4.3580 -4.6577 -4.6059 -3.8725 -3.9900 
ADF(4) -2.7390 -3.2777 -3.1066 -3.0678 -2.9632 -3.1539 
ADF(5) -2.5937 -2.6957 -2.4848 -2.4581 -1.8967 -1.7991 
ADF(6) -3.4258 -3.1954 -2.8407 -2.8227 -2.4961 -2.5082 
ADF(7) -3.7511 -3.5964 -2.4410 -2.4363 -3.0973 -3.6319 
ADF(8) -3.3820 -3.3294 -2.1692 -2.1874 -2.9104 -2.8104 
AIC 7 7 4 4 7 7 
Sc 0 0 0 0 1 7 
HQC 6 0 3 3 7 7 
LM 4 4 3 3 0 0 
Critical t 5% -5.3433 -5.6641 -5.5645 -5.8997 -5.7048 -6.0493 
Critical t 10% -4.9882 -5.3413 -5.1297 -5.5228 -5.2189 -5.6372 
Table 7.1c : Results of Engle and Granger's (1987) Residual Based Test for 









_ Constant Constant 
and Trend 
DF -2.3810 -2.2801 -1.9747 -1.7959 -1.6476 -1.6136 
ADF(1) -3.6825 -3.8808 -2.8557 -3.3975 -3.1987 -3.3019 
ADF(2) -4.0515 -4.2278 -3.6093 -3.5656 -4.0815 -4.0797 
ADF(3) -3.8749 -3.5831 -3.5631 -2.9419 -3.2281 -3.2597 
ADF(4) -3.3072 -3.4227 -3.5463 -2.9671 -2.3771 -2.6335 ADF(5) -4.1908 -4.2660 -4.7324 -4.3730 -2.8443 -3.0653 ADF(6) -4.5192 -4.6369 -4.2998 -4.0836 -2.9758 -3.1106 
ADF(7) -4.3396 -3.9652 -4.4502 -3.5521 -2.8064 -3.0190 ADF(8) -3.6816 -3.3687 -3.0573 -2.6980 -2.8158 -2.7954 
AIC 6 6 5 5 2 2 
Sc 1 1 2 1 2 2 
HQC 5 1 5 5 2 2 
LM 1 1 1 5 2 1 
Critical t 5% -5.3433 -5.6641 -5.5645 -5.8997 -5.7048 -6.0493 Critical t 10% -4.9882 -5.3413 -5.1297 -5.5228 -5.21 R9 -S A'tY) 
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Turning to the tables presented above, with few exceptions the results of the lag length 
selection criteria are not particularly consistent; nevertheless, in all but one reduced 
form equation the LM criterion suggests that we use a low number of lags22. The 
number of lags suggested by the AIC and HQC tests is often large, a result which must 
be interpreted carefully since if we were to reduce the possible number of lags in the 
frame, the selection criteria would be forced to suggest the use of a lower number of 
lags. From the results presented above, there is no evidence to suggest that the 
equations estimated with a constant and a time trend perform any better than those 
with only a constant (i. e. the residuals do not appear `more stationary'), and therefore 
from this point on when estimating cointegrating relationships we will concentrate 
solely on the estimation of reduced forms with a constant but without a time trend. 
The ADF test results on all equations generally suggest that the variables are either 
almost cointegrated or are cointegrated at a low level of significance23. However, 
there are severe limitations associated with the Engle and Granger methodology for 
testing for cointegration in small samples (as will be discussed briefly in the following 
section) and as such, we must not attach too much credence to the results presented 
above. Nevertheless, given the drawbacks of the Engle and Granger technique the 
results of this section should be viewed as moderately encouraging. 
7.2.4 Testing for Cointegration : The Johansen (1988) Approach 
One of the principal problems of the residual based tests for cointegration in finite 
samples as described and conducted in the previous section is that to apply the tests 
requires us to decide explicitly which variable we should include on the left hand side 
and which variables should be the regressors. For example, in testing for 
22 Out of the AIC, SC and HQC tests, the results of the HQC test are the most similar to those results 
provided by the LM test, with 5 out of 18 of the results of Tables 7.1 a through 7.1c giving the same 
number of lags. The SC test is less `reliable', with 4 out of 18 of the results in agreement and the AIC 
the worst performer, with only 2 of the results agreeing. However, the AIC and HQC tests are the most 
similar to each other in terms of lag recommendations, with 12 out of the 18 results being the same. 
" Because the choice of the left hand side variable will influence the result of the cointegration tests, 
ADF tests could be undertaken on the residuals of all of the equations substituting each independent 
variable in turn for the current dependent variable in the regressions. However, from preliminary 
estimations it was clear that there was very little difference in the ADF results when this procedure was 
followed. 
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cointegration in the reduced form mortgage equation above we could have used any 
one of the eight variables as the dependent variable (although an endogenous variable 
should be used as the regressand if the equation is to make any economic sense). 
Asymptotically, it will be the case that whichever variable is used to test for 
stationarity in the' residual series we should attain the same result. However, with 
smaller sample sizes we may find that using a different variable on the left hand side 
does influence the result, leading to the undesirable property that the tests can 
potentially suggest contradictory conclusions as to whether or not the variables are 
cointegrated24. The reason for this is that the equations have been estimated using 
OLS and may thus be subject to small sample bias; as the sample size tends to infinity, 
the bias will disappear due to the super-consistency property. Moreover, the Engle 
and Granger methodology does not represent a systematic procedure for estimating 
multiple cointegrating vectors. Thus the Johansen (1988) maximum likelihood 
procedure is used since it represents a more unified framework in testing for the 
existence of cointegrating relations through the estimation of vector error correction 
models, and as such an outline of the methodology follows. 
The vector error correction model (VECM) of the supply and demand model of 
mortgage lending may generally be written as 
I 
Dyt = a0 +a, t+l1y, 
-1 
+2rAy, 
-, +Tw, +u, (7.13) 
where y, is an (mxl) vector of 1(1) variables (in this case yt will include all of the 
variables featuring in the demand and supply equations whether endogenous or 
exogenous), ao is an (mxl) vector of intercept terms, a, is an (mx1) vector of 
coefficients on the linear time trend t, are (mxm) matrices of unknown 
parameters on the stationary lagged first differences of y, (such that at least one 
element in each matrix r, is non-zero), yr is an (mxs) matrix of coefficients on an 
(sx 1) vector of 1(0) variables w,, and ur is an (mx 1) vector of error terms which are 
24 Although the value of the test statistic may vary depending on which series is used as the regressand, 
the distribution of the test statistic will remain the same. 
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assumed N(0, Z) . Under the assumption that the rank of the matrix of long run 
coefficients (II) is r, then there exist r cointegrating relations among the variables in 
y,. 
The vector of 1(0) variables (w, ) is included separately in the VECM of equation 
(7.13) above but since it does not enter the long run cointegrating vector no long run 
coefficients are derived for these variables. Since all of the variables to be included in 
the models presented in this chapter are 1(1), w, appears in equation (7.13) above 
merely for reasons of completeness. These stationary variables would usually be 
included simply to ensure that the error terms of equation (7.13) are white noise25. 
Using the complete set of endogenous and exogenous variables of the supply/demand 
model of mortgage finance we employ Johansen's (1988) maximum likelihood 
approach to test for the number of cointegrating relations. From this set of variables, 
at least three cointegrating relationships would be expected to emerge : equations 
determining the amount of mortgages traded (equation (7.8)), the mortgage rate of 
interest (equation (7.9)) and the loan to value ratio (equation (7.10)). If these 
equations were to be estimated by the Johansen technique, then each one of the three 
cointegrating vectors would have to be appropriately restricted to allow for their exact 
identification 26. To the extent that disequilibrium rationing cannot be adequately 
captured by a single equilibrium rationing variable, the expectation of there being 
three correctly identified long run equilibrium relationships may be over-optimistic 
during those periods in which mortgage rationing was prevalent (namely the first 
sample period and the full sample period). It is during these periods that there is a 
possibility that the estimated relationships may be misspecified. 
Is It was noted in Section 7.2.2 that we could not include in the cointegrating relationship a variable 
representing the difference between the mortgage rate of interest and the cost of funds to lending 
institutions since the variable was found to be stationary. The specification of the VECM does, 
however, allow us to include such a variable in the vector w,. 
26 For example, there would have to be zero restrictions on variables R(rm) and InZLVF in equation (7.8), 1nR(AAPR) and InZLVF in equation (7.9) and on lnR(AAPR) and R(rm) in equation (7.10). 
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7.2.4.1 Step 1: Choice of Lag Length for the Johansen (1988) Test 
The results of the Johansen eigenvalue and trace tests (carried out on the parameter 
vector 11 in equation (7.13)) for the number of cointegrating vectors can be quite 
sensitive to lag length. The most common procedure adopted in selecting the lag 
length for the VECM of equation (7.13) is to estimate (using OLS) an underlying 
vector autoregression (VAR) using the undifferenced I(1) series y1, and to undertake 
standard tests for the optimal lag length structure. The specification of the 
unrestricted VAR is as follows : 
P 
Y, =bo+b, t+1: cD, Y, _, +v, , _I 
(7.14) 
where (Di are (mxm) matrices of unknown parameters on yt, the (mxl) vector of lagged 
variables as given in the complete supply and demand model above. The length of lag 
used in the VECM specification defined by equation (7.13) will then always be one 
less than that of the estimated underlying VAR given that the VECM essentially 
represents the VAR in first differences, i. e. if the optimal lag order of the VAR in 
levels is found to be p, then the lag length to be used in the VECM will be p -1. The 
lag length test results that follow are presented for VAR estimations which include 
both a constant and a time trend. It is preferable to specify the underlying VAR with a 
time trend since this would imply the desirable property of the existence of a constant 
term when differenced (i. e. in the VECM specification). 
There are a number of methods we may adopt in calculating the optimal lag structure 
in the VAR of equation (7.14) which are discussed fully below. With all selection 
criteria, we must be aware when choosing the optimum number of lags that the 
remaining sample for estimation must be large enough for the asymptotic theory to 
work well. In the analysis which follows, the maximum lag length is set to 4 for both 
the full-sample and subsample estimations due to the limited number of observations. 
The preference would be to opt for a reasonably short lag structure and certainly no 
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greater than of order 427. Because some of the lag selection criteria are dependent 
upon the sample size (notably the Akaike Information Criteria and the Schwartz 
Criterion), when comparing across equations with different lag lengths we must 
ensure that the sample size remains constant. In the estimations below, therefore, the 
tables of lag-length selection results are based on a constant sample size of T-4 for 
the full sample, Tf -4 for the first subsample and T, for the second subsample 
(where T is the total number of observations in the whole sample period and the 
subscripts f and s relate to the first and second subsample periods respectively) 28. 
A final point to note relates to the endogeneity/exogeneity of the model variables. In 
the complete theoretical model, we have three endogenous variables and seven 
exogenous variables. When we come to estimate the VECM to determine the number 
of cointegrating vectors (r) in Section 7.2.4.2 below, no distinction is made between 
endogenous and exogenous variables29 although when estimating the underlying VAR 
it is possible to make such a distinction. Thus it is contentious as to whether we 
should estimate the underlying VAR specifying lnR(AAPR), R(rm) and InZLVF as 
endogenous variables and the remainder exogenous, or whether all variables should be 
considered endogenous. In the latter case, all variables (whether endogenous or 
exogenous) would be included in the vector y, of equation (7.14) whereas in the 
former, yt will be formed of only endogenous variables with a vector of current period 
exogenous variables (qt) additionally being included on the right hand side. 
P 
Yr = bo +blt+1: cb, Yl-i +®9r +v, (7.15) 
, _I 
_' Multivariate techniques are particularly data intensive especially when the number of variables is 
large. For example, with eight variables, a constant and a time trend in each of the individual equations 
of the VAR, there are 8(2 + 8p) parameters to estimate, where p is the number of lags in the underlying 
VAR. Thus the specification of a parsimonious model is a particularly important consideration in lag 
selection. 
2$ There are other methods of choosing the optimal lag length to those presented in this section, one of 
which would be to examine the t-statistics of the individual equations of the VARs estimated. We could 
add lags to the VAR until the t-statistics of added lags in each equation become insignificant. However, 
given the number of variables in the underlying VAR and the number of equations estimated the output 
from such a procedure would be considerable. We therefore make use only of the more formal tests 
outlined in this section. 
29 See later for a discussion of this. 
297 
Here, the estimation of the underlying VAR for the complete model would involve the 
estimation of three equations. However, since these estimations would be subject to 
simultaneous equation bias, the preference instead is to estimate the VAR 
specification of equation (7.14); in addition, this is consistent with the estimation of a 
VECM (equation (7.13)) in which all variables are included in the vector y,. 
The Akaike Information Criterion and the Schwartz Criterion 
Firstly, we may use the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) or the Schwartz Criterion 
(SC) to determine the number of lags, although in practice these measures may lead to 
the selection of different lag lengths30. The results of these tests are shown in Table 
7.2 below. 
Table 7.2 : AIC and SC Lag Selection Tests for the Underlying VAR based on T-4, 
Tf -4 and T Observations 
»»............. 
Sample 





The results indicate a lack of agreement between the AIC and SC criteria regarding 
the number of lags to be chosen for the underlying VAR for the whole period and the 
second subsample. For two of the three estimation periods, the SC suggests a lower 
lag length than that of the AIC, the former of which may be preferable due to the risk 
of over-parameterisation of the model. In addition, the closer correlation of the results 
of the SC test and the LM test (the latter of which is often considered the best 
measure) and the somewhat poorer performance of the AIC rule (as shown in Tables 
7.1 a through 7.1 c) gives added weight to the use of the lag length suggested by the SC 
test. 
30 Calculation of the AIC and SC statistics is shown in equation (4.24) of Chapter 4. 
31 The maximum number of lags here is 3 (rather than 4) due to sample size restrictions. 
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The Likelihood Ratio Test 
A further procedure to determine the length of lag to be included in the underlying 
VAR relationship is that of the likelihood ratio (LR) test. This allows us to test the 
null hypothesis of independent restrictions on specified lag lengths of the underlying 
VAR and is essentially a test to guard against the over- or under-specification of the 
model by checking the joint significance of the included lags. It involves calculating 
the following LR test statistic 
LR = 2[1n(Lu) - ln(LR )] - . %(0 05) (m2 ) (7.16) 
in which ln(Lu) and ln(LR) are the system log likelihoods of the restricted and 
unrestricted models respectively. Under the null hypothesis that all of the parameter 
restrictions on any particular lag length in the VAR (of which there are m2, where m is 
the number of equations in the VAR) hold, the LR statistic follows a x2 distribution 
with m2 degrees of freedom. The conventional way of undertaking the test is to 
choose a maximum number of lags (again, the same maximum lag length is chosen for 
the likelihood ratio test as is for the AIC and SC tests) and to calculate the statistic by 
restricting the model successively by one lag. For example, if we choose a maximum 
of 4 lags then the first statistic to be calculated will be LR(4: 3) = 2[ln(L4) - ln(L3)] 
followed by LR(3: 2) = 2[ln(L3) - ln(L2 )] and so on until 
LR(1: 0) = 2[ln(Ll) - ln(L0 )] . If the calculated test statistic is greater than the critical 
value of the x2 distribution at the 5 per cent level with m2 degrees of freedom then we 
may reject the null hypothesis but only when all of the test statistics below a certain 
lag are greater than the critical value of the x2 distribution. The results of these tests 
are shown in Table 7.3 below. 
The likelihood ratio tests for the underlying VAR specification suggest that the 
maximum number of 4 lags be used for all sample periods. 
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Table 7.3 : Likelihood Ratio Tests for the Number of Lags in the Underlying VAR 
based on T-4, Tf -4 and Ts Observations 
LR Statistic 1969Q1-1995Q4 1969Q1-1983Q4 1984Q1-1995Q4 
Whole Sample First Subsample Second Subsample 
LR(4: 3) 230.0 695.8 N/A32 
LR(3: 2) 175.5 361.2 344.6 
LR(2: 1) 548.2 384.9 381.1 
LR(1: 0) 2621.8 1276.4 997.5 
x2 (100) = 124.34 at 5 per cent significance 
Lagrange Multiplier Tests for Residual Serial Correlation 
It is important to check the residuals of the individual equations of the underlying 
VAR for possible serial correlation. The LM test as suggested by Breusch (1978) and 
Godfrey (1978) is used whereby the residual series from each individual equation in 
the VAR estimation is regressed on the original variables in the VAR and additionally 
ü, 
_p 
(the order p=4 is chosen due to the quarterly nature of the data). As 
suggested by Greene (1993), the statistic TR2 - x2(4) is calculated33 based on the 
missing values for the lags of the residuals being set to zero rather than altering the 
estimation period to exclude such observations. 
The results of the LM tests for each equation of the estimated system VAR are 
presented in Appendix 7.1 for lag lengths of between I and 4 inclusively. A 
calculated LM statistic which is greater than the critical value of the chi-squared 
distribution with 4 degrees of freedom (the critical values being 9.49 at the 5 per cent 
level, 11.14 at the 2.5 per cent level and 13.28 at the I per cent level of significance) 
implies that we may reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation in favour of the 
alternative hypothesis that the equation contains serially correlated errors. 
32 In estimating the underlying VAR over the second subsample there are not enough observations to be 
able to select 4 lags, and thus the maximum lag length used (and the length suggested by the test) is 3. 
`N/A' is used to indicate that there are insufficient degrees of freedom to estimate the model at a lag 
length of 4 in this and subsequent tables. 
37 This distribution is correct despite the fact the variables of the underlying model are non-stationary 
since the residuals being tested are assumed stationary. 
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Obviously, it would be favourable if the individual equations of the underlying VARs 
were found to contain serially independent errors, although it might be expected that 
undertaking a VAR system estimation on non-stationary I(1) series may not deliver 
this desirable property. This turns out to be the case, with the tables presented in 
Appendix 7.1 showing serially correlated errors in the majority of equations. Oddly, 
the serial correlation problem becomes no better as we add lags up to the fourth order 
suggesting that we should choose a relatively low number of lags in the VECM when 
testing for cointegration. The presence of serial correlation in some equations may 
indicate the fact that the dependent variables in question are not endogenous (and thus 
their behaviour should not be `explained'). However, it must not be overlooked that 
the estimation of the VAR system is not the end product but rather a means to an end; 
it is estimated simply in order to suggest the optimal number of lags for the stationary 
VECM estimation. As such, although it is desirable for the errors of the VAR to be as 
serially independent as possible (and a lag structure should be chosen to reflect this) it 
will not be of major concern if some residual serial correlation remains in the system 
model. 
The Issue of Including a Time Trend in the underlying VAR 
Thus far we have assumed that the VAR model estimated to determine the optimal 
number of lags in the VECM specification contained both a constant and time trend. 
It may be reasonably assumed that we should always include a constant in the 
equations of the VAR, although the arguments for the inclusion of a time trend are not 
as compelling. Therefore it will be useful to undertake likelihood ratio tests in order 
to test zero restrictions on the deterministic trend coefficients. The statistic is 
calculated as in equation (7.16) above; if the calculated test statistic is greater than the 
critical value of the distribution with m degrees of freedom (where m is the number 
of equations and also the total number of restrictions placed on the time trends) then 
we can reject the null hypothesis of the zero coefficient restrictions, i. e. we may 
conclude that the coefficients on the time trends in each VAR equation are not zero. 
The statistics are calculated for lag lengths of between 1 and 4 and are presented in 
Table 7.4 below. 
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Table 7.4 : Likelihood Ratio Tests for the Inclusion of a Deterministic Time Trend in 
the Unrestricted VAR (Critical x2 (10) = 18.31 at 95 per cent level) 
Lags LR Statistic 







...... ........................... 1969Q . 1983Q4 








The results of Table 7.4 above unanimously indicate that we may reject the null 
hypothesis of zero restrictions on the coefficients on the time trend variable in the 
VAR system over all periods of estimation, implying that the underlying VAR should 
be estimated with both a constant and a time trend when identifying the optimal 
number of lags. This implies that in estimating the VECM of equation (7.13) we 
should include a constant in the specification (although not necessarily a time trend). 
In conclusion to this section on lag selection, it is clear that there is a considerable 
lack of agreement between the various criteria we may use to determine the lag length 
in the underlying VAR specification. AIC and likelihood ratio tests for the number of 
lags would suggest the use of a relatively high number of lags whilst the SC and LM 
tests imply the use of a more parsimonious lag structure. Given the divergence of the 
results presented above, it would be imprudent to state a preferred exact lag length 
choice for each sample period. However, the desire to choose as parsimonious a 
model as possible both to allow sufficient degrees of freedom for the estimations to be 
valid and also for tractability of the VECM is consistent with the results of the SC and 
LM tests, and as such it is decided to opt for a relatively low lag length structure of 2 
in all estimations. However, we will see later in Section 7.2.8 that when we come to 
estimate the error correction representations practicalities prevent us from using the 
same number of lags for all exogenous variables. 
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7.2.4.2 Step 2: Testing for Cointegration 
For the complete set of non-stationary 1(1) variables we may test for the existence of r 
cointegrating vectors in the model, which is given in equation (7.13) by the rank of the 
matrix H. Obviously, if we were to find that r=0 then we may conclude that the 
model is neither one of error correction nor of cointegration, but rather simply a VAR 
in first differences. The test results for the number of cointegrating vectors are 
presented in this section based on Johansen's (1988,1991) eigenvalue (EV) and trace 
(TR) tests. Johansen's EV test involves estimating the rank of the matrix II which is 
found by determining the number of non-zero characteristic roots (or eigenvalues) of a 
certain related matrix. The test is undertaken by calculating a likelihood ratio statistic 
using the estimated values of the characteristic roots. Although the statistic has a non- 
standard distribution, most time series statistical packages calculate and report the 
appropriate critical values with which we can test the null hypothesis that there are at 
most r cointegrating vectors. The two tests tend (EV and TR) to yield ambiguous 
results in practice. 
In the following analysis, the VECM equations as defined in (7.13) are estimated 
without trends; as noted previously, the specification of the underlying VAR with a 
deterministic time trend implies simply that we must have an intercept term in the 
VECM but not necessarily a time trend. However, the way in which we specify the 
intercept term in the VECM will have important implications for the specification of 
the long run cointegrating relationships. If, when estimating the VECM, we wish to 
be able to identify a constant term in the long run cointegrating relationships of the 
matrix rI (which we will, since the long run cointegrating vector will be used to 
identify periods of excess mortgage demand later in the chapter, and the long run 
equations may be misspecified without the inclusion of a constant term) then it is 
necessary to restrict the constant ao in equation (7.13). If we were to estimate the 
VECM with an unrestricted intercept term it would be impossible to separate the 
portion of the estimated constant which is attributable to the VECM and that which is 
attributable to the long run cointegrating relationship itself. 
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Table 7.5 below indicates the number of cointegrating relations observed for various 
lag lengths (the optimal lag length being chosen in the previous section). Figures in 
bold type indicate the number of cointegrating vectors at the 5 per cent level of 
significance and those in normal type at the 10 per cent level. 
Table 7.5 : The Number of Cointegrating Vectors Detected Among All Variables of 
the Complete Model of Mortgage Supply and Demand 
1969Q1-1995Q4 (full sample) 
Lags in Number of Cointe ratin Vectors 





1969Q1-1983Q4 (first subsample) 
Lags in Number of Cointe grating Vectors 
VAR EV Test TRACE Test 
1 44 44 
2 22 78 
3 7 10 9 10 
4 10 10 10 10 
1984Q1-1995Q4 (second subsample) 
Lags in Number of Cointe ratin Vectors 
VAR EV Test TRACE Test 
13345 
26699 
3 10 10 10 10 
4 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Recent research by Pesaran and Shin (1995) and Pesaran et al (1996a, 1996b) allows 
us to differentiate between those variables in the VECM that are endogenous and 
those that are exogenous. However, since this research is still in its infancy and there 
has been little criticism of the techniques used, all variables are considered to be 
endogenous in the analysis presented here34. 
3' In addition, the only package explicitly allowing for the specification of I(1) exogenous variables in 
the cointegrating relationships is Microfit Version 4.0 (developed by Pesaran and Pesaran (1997)). 
However, the number of exogenous variables permitted by this software is limited to five, two less than 
the number in the mortgage model of this chapter. 
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It is clear from the results above that the suggested number of cointegrating vectors 
varies considerably with the period of estimation, the type of test undertaken (EV or 
TR), the number of lags used in the VECM when carrying out the test and the level of 
significance of the test. It can be seen that the number of cointegrating vectors 
increases as the sample size is reduced. This may be attributable to the fact that over a 
shorter time period it is easier to find a long run cointegrating relationship amongst a 
set of variables than over a longer sample period. If the sample is large, it is more 
likely that structural changes to the model will have occurred (which is especially true 
in relation to the model considered in this chapter due to changes in the nature of the 
mortgage market over the whole estimation period) making it more difficult to find a 
cointegrating vector that will satisfy the whole period. 
In Step 1 (Section 7.2.4.1) it was determined that the appropriate number of lags to be 
included in the underlying VAR was 2 for all periods. Thus at the 5 per cent 
significance level the eigenvalue test suggests that there are two cointegrating vectors 
for the whole sample and the first subsample and six for the second subsample, 
whereas the trace test suggests the existence of four cointegrating vectors for the 
whole sample, seven for the first subsample and nine for the second. Since the 
eigenvalue test is probably more often used in empirical studies than the trace test, we 
concentrate here on the number of cointegrating vectors as suggested by the former. 
The a priori expectation is that we would hope to find at least three cointegrating 
relationships among the complete set of variables, representing functions for the 
determination of the equilibrium quantity of mortgages traded, the mortgage interest 
rate and the loan to value ratio35. In the second subsample period a sufficient number 
of cointegrating relations are found to support this contention. However, in the first 
subsample period only two cointegrating vectors are found. This is not unexpected, 
since during the 1970s and early 1980s, mortgage lending institutions used both the 
mortgage interest rate and the loan to value ratio in tandem to restrict the quantity of 
31 To be completely rigorous, the Johansen test is also used to determine the number of cointegrating 
vectors amongst each set of reduced form variables separately. The conclusions drawn are consistent 
with those presented for the complete model in the main text, namely that at least (and often 
substantially more than) one cointegrating vector can be supported by each set of reduced form 
variables. However, the output from this procedure is lengthy (as all the results presented here for the 
complete set of model variables are derived for an additional three sets of variables representing the individual reduced form relationships) and thus is not presented here. 
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mortgage loans traded. This may in turn imply that we might not expect to find 
linearly independent long run reduced form vectors for both the interest rate and loan 
to value ratio; rather they would have been set as a single `price vector'. The situation 
has been different following the move towards a competitive market in the mortgage 
finance industry in the early 1980s. In the absence of disequilibrium mortgage 
rationing, the loan to value ratio has become less constrained to be set at the discretion 
of the mortgage lender independently of the mortgage interest rate36, thus implying the 
possibility of detecting of a greater number of cointegrating vectors. 
Given that only three relations were expected to emerge from this set of variables, the 
high number of cointegrating vectors that were detected in the second subsample was 
surprising. This may reflect the presence of other long run relationships in the system, 
for example the household's budget constraint and other constraints faced by 
households and mortgage lenders. 
7.2.5 Long Run Cointegrating Equation Results 
7.2.5.1 Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Results 
The following tables present the OLS results for the long run reduced form equations 
determining the equilibrium quantity of mortgages traded, the mortgage rate and the 
loan to value ratio. We should stress that if OLS had been used (or indeed any other 
single equation technique) to estimate the structural models of demand and supply it is 
likely that we would have observed the reduced form parameters rather than structural 
estimates37; specifically, using OLS to estimate the structural relationships would have 
had the effect of incorporating supply effects in the demand equation and vice versa. 
Rather, multivariate techniques (such as Johansen's maximum likelihood approach) 
should be used in order to tease out the individual structural relationships. However, 
poor results were obtained from the Johansen estimations (we were unable to observe 
36 This relates to the discussion in Section 7.1.4 on the complementarity and substitutability of the mortgage interest rate and the loan to value ratio. 37 They would not have been the true reduced form coefficients since the structural models contain both 
exogenous and endogenous independent variables. 
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clearly the individual structural supply or demand relationships) and essentially this is 
the motivation for explicitly specifying and estimating the reduced form model. 
Given that all of the variables are I(1) and that there exists at least one cointegrating 
relationship for each reduced form equation, the OLS point estimators of these 
relationships will be super-consistent. However, although the standard t-statistics are 
presented in parentheses in Tables 7.6a through 7.6c, they will not be valid when the 
variables are non-stationary. This is a considerable drawback of the OLS procedure, 
undermining any statistical inference as to the significance of the estimated 
coefficients. The motive for including the OLS results here is that in the search for an 
estimator which can deliver consistent coefficient estimators with valid standard 
errors, it is reasonable to choose that estimator which yields coefficients most similar 
in size to those of the super-consistent OLS results38. 
Table 7.6a : OLS Estimates : The Reduced Form Mortgage Equation 









Constant -16.4101 -16.5102 1.0988 
(-4.78) (-2.88) (0.12) 
1nCOLLAT 0.9637 -0.3871 0.8832 
(2.96) (-0.53) (1.39) 
InR(AAAU) -0.1791 0.1250 -0.7445 (-1.83) (0.63) (-4.03) 
lnR(PAHM) 0.7169 0.7017 0.6576 
(4.18) (2.69) (2.11) 
InR(ALDO) 1.4149 1.7547 0.5225 
(6.68) (4.56) (1.19) 
InINFL -0.2789 -0.0658 -0.0612 (-4.08) (-0.42) (-0.59) 
R(UC) -0.0419 -0.0362 -0.0109 (-4.60) (-2.72) (-0.70) 
InMIRAS 0.9516 1.2610 0.3668 
(9.38) (2.97) (2.67) 
No. Obs. 108 60 48 
R2 0.8719 0.6864 0.9193 
Adjusted R2 0.8629 0.6442 0.9052 
DW-Statistic 0.5315 0.3753 1.2705 
r-statistics in parentheses 
3s The size and signing of the OLS coefficient estimates are not examined here. Discussion of the long 
run parameter estimates of the reduced forms is reserved for later estimations undertaken using Park's 
(1992) methodology in which the standard errors are valid. The OLS coefficients are presented here 
purely for purposes of comparison. 
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Table 7.6b : OLS Estimates : The Reduced Form Mortgage Interest Rate Equation 









Constant -76.4074 -160.2541 -174.0332 
(-3.06) (-5.72) (-3.26) 
1nCOLLAT 4.8339 16.1783 10.0709 
(2.04) (4.53) (2.67) 
lnR(AAAU) -1.0037 -0.2286 2.1156 
(-1.40) (-0.23) (1.93) 
InR(PAHM) 2.1024 0.7560 4.5823 
(1.68) (0.59) (2.48) 
InR(ALDO) 5.0658 6.6517 7.0298 
(3.28) (3.54) (2.69) 
InINFL -6.7484 -7.6638 -3.8805 
(-13.55) (-10.01) (-6.32) 
R(UC) 0.3226 0.3251 0.2313 
(4.86) (5.01) (2.51) 
InMIRAS 4.7400 -3.6494 4.3513 (6.41) (-1.76) (5.34) 
No. Obs. 108 60 48 
RZ 0.9086 0.9354 0.7524 
Adjusted R2 0.9022 0.9267 0.7091 
DW-Statistic 0.3475 0.6547 0.9521 
t-statistics in parentheses 
Table 7.6c : OLS Estimates : The Reduced Form Loan to Value Ratio Equation 









Constant 2.2548 3.4171 1.4032 
(4.43) (4.58) (1.06) 
InCOLLAT 0.0848 -0.1691 0.3329 
(1.76) (-1.78) (3.55) 
1nR(AAAU) -0.0154 -0.0032 -0.0314 (-1.06) (-0.13) (-1.15) 
1nR(PAHM -0.1237 -0.0976 -0.0817 (-4.86) (-2.87) (-1.78) 
InR(ALDO) 0.1809 0.1880 0.1377 
(5.76) (3.76) (2.12) 
WNFL -0.0401 -0.0600 0.0165 (-3.95) (-2.94) (1.08) 
R(UC) -0.0010 -0.0027 -0.0004 (-0.72) (-1.59) (-0.15) 
InMIRAS 0.0496 0.2336 -0.0595 (3.30) (4.24) (-2.94) 
No. Obs. 108 60 48 
R2 0.7134 0.7032 0.4950 
Adjusted R2 0.6934 0.6633 0.4066 
DW-Statistic 0.2840 0.3075 0.3462 
t-statistics in parentheses 
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As a result of the hypothesised existence of disequilibrium mortgage rationing in the 
first sample period it may be the case that the only reduced form equations which are 
not misspecified are those estimated over the period 1984Q1 to 1995Q4. This 
conjecture can be checked by considering both the goodness of fit measures and the 
Durbin-Watson (DW) statistics of each regression39. In the OLS estimation of the 
reduced form mortgage equation presented in Table 7.6a, the DW statistics suggest 
that serial correlation of the residuals constitutes a greater problem in the model 
estimated over the first sample period than that of the second subsample. In addition, 
the R2 and adjusted R2 measures are higher for the second sample period than either 
the first subsample or whole sample periods. This would tend to point to the 
misspecification of the reduced form mortgage equation when estimated during 
periods of disequilibrium rationing. As such, any results based on estimations 
undertaken using a data set which includes the first subsample period must be 
interpreted with care. 
However, the same cannot be said of the reduced forms for the mortgage interest rate 
and the loan to value ratio. In the former, although for the second period estimation 
the DW statistic is higher, the R2 measures are lower, and in the latter neither the DW 
statistic nor the coefficient of determination can offer evidence to suggest that the 
second period estimation is more appropriately specified. However, although it is 
clear that the amount of mortgages traded will depend on the degree of disequilibrium 
mortgage rationing, it is by no means obvious ex ante how (or even f, /) either the 
mortgage interest rate or loan to value ratio will respond to such mortgage rationing. 
Thus it could possibly have been expected that intertemporal comparisons of the DW 
or R2 statistics for these equations would be fruitless. 
7.2.5.2 Park's (1992) Canonical Cointegrating Regression Technique (CCR) Results 
Park's (1992) non-parametric CCR technique for estimating long run cointegrating 
relationships between a set of first order non-stationary variables is found to provide 
parameter estimates most accurately matching those estimated by the OLS procedure. 
39 Despite the fact that the models contain non-stationary variables, these statistics are valid because the 
equations are cointegrated and the residuals stationary. 
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As pointed out in Chapter 4, a further reason for favouring its use here is that it has 
been proven to provide econometrically superior results, specifically in the form of 
more efficient estimators. 
To recapitulate briefly, Park's procedure transforms the non-stationary 1(1) processes 
of the cointegrating model by making use of the model's stationary components such 
that the inefficiency of the OLS procedure in estimating the long run model is 
removed. Section 4.3.2.1 of Chapter 4 discusses this technique in more detail. Tables 
7.7a to 7.7c below present the long run estimation results based on this procedure. 
Since this chapter is interested in explaining how the equilibrium level of mortgages 
per period is determined, the main focus of this section is the reduced form mortgage 
equation of Table 7.7a. There will, nevertheless, be an analysis of the results from the 
reduced form mortgage interest rate and loan to value ratio estimations albeit in lesser 
detail. 
Table 7.7a : Park's CCR Estimates : Reduced Form Mortgage Equation 









Constant -14.3305 -9.9864 -13.3542 
(-2.71) (. 1.80) (-2.14) 
InCOLLAT 0.8823 0.3944 1.9398 
(2.12) (0.78) (4.65) 
1nR(AAA&) -0.1755 -0.5122 -0.6683 (-1.25) (-2.55) (-6.16) 
InR(PAHM) 0.8783 1.3357 0.9457 
(3.09) (5.14) (6.02) 
1nR(ALDO) 1.2577 1.2250 1.0515 
(3.37) (3.02) (3.57) 
1nINFL -0.3980 -0.3616 -0.2573 (-3.53) (-3.66) (-3.66) 
R(UC) -0.0642 -0.0474 -0.0312 (-2.99) (-2.90) (-2.57) 
InMIRAS 1.0392 1.8558 0.4140 
(6.05) (8.24) (6.70) 
No. Obs. 108 60 48 
t-statistics in parentheses 
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Table 7.7b : Park's CCR Estimates : Reduced Form Mortgage Interest Rate Equation 









Constant -110.9353 -160.7143 -372.2512 (-2.26) (-7.21) (-7.55) 
InCOLLAT 5.2833 16.1005 23.5127 
(1.31) (7.24) (7.51) 
lnR(AAAU) -0.4986 0.1332 4.1545 
(-0.37) (0.15) (4.36) 
InR(PAHM) -2.0552 0.5664 7.4523 (-0.77) (0.65) (5.69) 
lnR(ALDO) 8.4598 6.6231 14.2839 
(2.54) (4.20) (5.90) 
1nINFL -7.2478 -8.1182 -5.6595 
(-5.92) ("17.76) (-9.87) 
R(UC) -0.1842 0.2982 0.0072 
(-0.68) (3.53) (0.07) 
1nMIRAS 6.6490 -2.9510 4.7720 
(4.11) (-3.36) (8.11) 
No. Obs. 108 60 48 
t-statistics in parentheses 
Table 7.7c : Park's CCR Estimates : Reduced Form Loan to Value Ratio Equation 









Constant 0.9445 4.8877 -0.6797 
(0.79) (4.08) (-0.29) 
InCOLLAT 0.1594 0.0284 0.5006 
(1.70) (0.28) (3.30) 
lnR(AAAU) -0.0310 -0.1421 0.0408 (-0.98) (. 3.14) (0.84) 
InR(PAHA? ) -0.1553 -0.0109 0.0930 (-2.69) (-0.18) (1.21) 
InR(ALDO) 0.2718 0.0689 0.1321 
(3.30) (0.79) (1.03) 
1nJNFL -0.0521 -0.1056 -0.0578 (. 2.08) (-0.93) ("1.68) 
R(UC) -0.0031 -0.0043 -0.0116 (-0.69) (-1.24) (-2.10) 
1nMIRAS 0.0903 0.3149 0.0061 
(2.51) (6.47) (0.18) 
No. Obs. 108 60 48 
I-statistics in parentheses 
It is particularly important to check that the estimations presented in Tables 7.7a 
through 7.7c are indeed cointegrating relations. This can be done by checking for the 
stationarity of the residuals from each regression; stationarity of the residual series 
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would imply that there is a long run cointegrating relationship among the set of 
variables. To test for stationarity, the autocorrelation functions for the residual series 
are plotted and presented in Figures 7.5 to 7.7 belowao. 
Figure 7.5 : Autocorrelation Function for the Residuals of Park's Estimation of the 

















Figure 7.6 : Autocorrelation Function for the Residuals of Park's Estimation of the 
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40 It should be noted that it is not possible to test for residual stationarity using ADF tests since we do 
not know the underlying distribution of the residuals generated by Park's (1992) CCR technique. As 
such we do not know the critical values against which hypotheses of non-stationarity should be tested. 
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Figure 7.7 : Autocorrelation Function for the Residuals of Park's Estimation of the 

















For all three equations and estimation periods, the autocorrelation function drops off 
quickly to zero as the number of lags (k) increases, indicating that the residual series 
are stationary. 
The similarity of the parameters estimated by Park's methodology and OLS is 
particularly striking. Over 83 per cent of all parameters estimated using the CCR 
technique possess the same sign as those of the OLS procedure. The reduced form 
loan to value ratio equation exhibits the greatest number of sign differences between 
the two procedures. Additionally, the signing of the coefficients in the equations 
estimated using Park's procedure was fairly stable across all three estimation periods, 
with none of the seven variable coefficients in the reduced form mortgage equation 
changing sign between the three sample periods, two out of the seven in the loan to 
value ratio equation and four in the mortgage rate equation. However, this provides 
little indication of parameter stability over time, an issue which will be addressed later 
in the chapter (see Section 7.2.6). 
The a priori expected signs of coefficients in the reduced form mortgage equation are 
given in Table 7.8 below. However, in the interpretation of the results below, one 
3 
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must be careful in making any inferences about the structural parameters based solely 
on the coefficient estimates of the reduced form. 
Table 7.8 :A Priori Expected Signs for Reduced Form Mortgage Equation 
Coefficients 
Variable Expected Sign 
InCOLLAT + 






In the reduced form mortgage equation the signs of the coefficients on the collateral 
variable are positive as anticipated, with a higher value of dwelling stock per pound of 
mortgage loan outstanding (and thus lower credit or default risk) associated with 
increased desired mortgage supply. The coefficient is insignificant between 1969Q I 
and 1983Q4 but becomes higher and significant in the second Subsample (1984Q1 to 
1995Q4), a phenomenon for which there is a possible explanation. Building societies, 
being almost the sole suppliers of private mortgage lending during the 1970s, were 
forced to ration mortgages as savings to fund their business were being misallocated 
to banks and other private financial institutions which were barred from lending in the 
mortgage market. As such, it was the availability of funds that restricted building 
society lending. During the 1980s and 1990s, mortgage lending has essentially 
become demand-determined, with the result that lenders (who have become almost 
entirely unrestricted by fund availability) now constrain their lending in response to 
other factors such as risk considerations. 
The evidence on the total per period savings measure (1nR(AAAU)) across all samples 
is that it is negatively related to the level of mortgages traded, becoming more 
significant in the second subsample. Since savings were included as a supply variable 
in the reduced form this result contrasts with the expectation that a higher level of 
savings should allow mortgage lenders to increase supply. Indeed, the negative 
coefficients on this variable may possibly be capturing a demand effect, with a higher 
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level of savings allowing mortgage borrowers to afford a greater downpayment on a 
house and thus require a lower mortgage. Another plausible explanation for the 
negative coefficient on this variable is that in periods of low demand for housing (and 
thus also mortgages), households will tend to accumulate savings which will be spent 
on mortgage repayments or downpayments in times of a housing and mortgage market 
boom. 
We may interpret the consistently positive and significant coefficients on the house 
price variable in two ways. The first implication is that as real house prices rise, a 
larger real mortgage loan is required in order to purchase a house of the same size 
yielding the same level of housing services. This finding is therefore consistent with 
the theoretical predictions of Jones' (1993) model (see equation (6.4) of Chapter 6). 
Secondly, the positive coefficient may also suggest that the investment motive for 
holding a property is important in encouraging mortgage lending over and above the 
effect captured by expected future house price changes in the real user cost variable. 
From Table 7.7a it may be seen that the effect of financial wealth on the equilibrium 
level of mortgages traded per period is clearly positive and enjoys a reasonable and 
intertemporally constant level of significance. A positive coefficient indicates that the 
standard wealth effect prevails, whereas a negative coefficient would suggest the 
importance of financial wealth as a substitute for mortgage borrowing. As we 
discussed in Section 6.2.2 of Chapter 6, Jones' (1993) theoretically derived mortgage 
demand function would suggest that the coefficient on the financial wealth variable 
will be higher for estimations during the 1970s given that for much of the period the 
real mortgage interest rate was lower than the real rate of return on financial wealth, 
reducing the desire to substitute financial wealth for mortgage debt (see equation (6.4) 
of Section 6.2.2). This theory is confirmed by the results presented in Table 7.7a, with 
the coefficient on the log of financial wealth in the reduced form mortgage equation 
decreasing from 1.23 during the first subsample period to 1.05 in the second. Further, 
since we can interpret the coefficient on the real wealth variable as an elasticity, we 
observe that there has been a reduction in the real wealth elasticity of mortgage 
demand between the first Subsample and the second. This implies that mortgages 
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have become less of a `luxury good' between the first and second sample periods, a 
reasonable conclusion in the light of the changes in both home ownership and 
mortgage provision between the two periods41. 
The rate of inflation has a negative and significant effect on real mortgage demand 
during all estimation periods as one would expect given its power to tilt the stream of 
real mortgage repayments towards the beginning of the loan. The higher is the rate of 
inflation, the greater will be the burden of initial real mortgage repayments for any 
given level of nominal mortgage debt, and thus the lower the demand for mortgages. 
The fact that the coefficient on inflation is fairly small suggests that there may be an 
offsetting positive effect of inflation (primarily reflecting the desire to invest in 
housing as a hedge against inflation and for tax purposes42) on the underlying demand 
for housing working against the negative impact caused by financial constraints. A 
slightly higher coefficient (in absolute terms) in the first Subsample period than in the 
second may suggest that the stickiness of mortgage interest rates during the period 
served as a disincentive for mortgage lenders to on-lend funds when inflation was 
high and rising. 
The coefficient on the variable representing the real user cost of owner occupation is, 
as expected, negative and significant in all three sample periods. A rise in the real 
user cost of housing capital serves to detract potential owner occupiers from 
purchasing real estate and thereby reduces mortgage demand. The finding of 
consistently negative coefficients in the reduced form mortgage equation across each 
estimation period helps in validating the construction of the real user cost and its 
component parts (most notably the ARMA model determining expected house price 
movements presented in the previous chapter). Finally, the coefficient on mortgage 
tax relief as a percentage of the value of outstanding mortgages is positive and highly 
significant, indicating that the effective percentage at which MIRAS is deductible is 
important in shaping the demand for mortgage finance. The significant decline in the 
4' Nevertheless, this conclusion is very tentative given that in all three sample periods it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis at all reasonable levels of significance that the coefficient on real financial 
wealth is unity. 
42 See Section 3.3.2 of Chapter 3 for a more in depth discussion of the tax advantages of holding housing assets when inflation is high. 
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size of the coefficient between the first and second Subsample periods indicates the 
reduction in importance of MIRAS over the last three decades as government policy 
has slowly eroded the financial benefits of the scheme to mortgage borrowers. 
The results from the reduced form mortgage interest rate equation are presented in 
Table 7.7b above. The t-statistics in general are substantially higher for the subsample 
periods than they are for the whole period, although as previously mentioned this is 
not unusual given the regime shift expected. In fact this is also the case (albeit to a 
lesser extent) in the mortgage and loan to value ratio equations and is consistent with 
the correct identification of the date of the structural break in the market. 
The coefficient on 1nCOLLAT (the measure of risk in the structural supply function) in 
the reduced form mortgage interest rate equation is positive for all three estimation 
periods and highly significant in the subsample periods. One may have expected this 
coefficient to possess a negative sign since an increase in the amount of housing 
collateral per pound of outstanding mortgage debt could be considered a reduction in 
the lender's risk thus stimulating mortgage supply. However, what the variable is 
most probably capturing is an intertemporal adjustment effect. Given that on the 
demand side there exists an optimal or desired level of mortgage debt as a proportion 
of the total value of the housing stock, during those periods in which this proportion is 
low we would expect to see a positive stock adjustment of mortgage debt to re-attain 
the long run desired proportion. This would tend to imply that when the variable 
1nCOLLAT is high we may expect to see an increase in mortgage demand and a 
subsequent increase in the mortgage rate of interest. This would also explain the 
positive coefficient in the reduced form mortgage equation of Table 7.7a. 
The coefficient on the measure of savings is negative in the whole sample and positive 
in both subsamples, but only significant in the second period estimation. Although it 
may initially be expected that a higher level of savings would exert a positive 
influence on supply (and thus lower the interest rate), it was pointed out in the 
discussion of the results in Table 7.7a that a rise in household savings could occur at 
the expense of mortgage borrowing as households typically increase their savings in 
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order to fund a future downpayment on a dwelling. Both explanations imply that a 
higher level of savings is associated with a lower equilibrium mortgage rate43, 
although this is not borne out by the reduced form estimates. A possible reason for 
the observed positive coefficients in the two subsample periods is one of reversed 
causality :a higher mortgage rate has the effect of encouraging potential borrowers to 
save rather than spend their savings on downpayments. In reality, there are 
undoubtedly a multitude of behavioural links between savings and the mortgage rate, 
possibly offsetting each other and thus pulling the coefficient in opposite directions. 
In both subsample periods the results indicate that higher real house prices and 
financial wealth or lower inflation will stimulate mortgage demand and therefore lead 
to a higher real equilibrium rate of interest. A rise in MIRAS benefits is also shown to 
lead to an increase in mortgage rates in the second subsample estimation, again a 
result of demand side influences. The signing of the coefficients on the log of real 
savings, the log of real house prices and the real user cost diverge in the full sample 
from that of the Subsample period estimations, although the coefficients are 
insignificant in the former. 
The results from the estimated cointegrating reduced form equation for the loan to 
value ratio in Table 7.7c should be able to shed some light on the way in which the 
mortgage interest rate and loan to value ratio interact with each other, i. e. whether they 
are complementary to or substitutes for one another. Recall that substitutability 
implies that a loosening of the non-interest mortgage loan terms (i. e. an increase in 
InZLVF) will be accompanied by an increase in the mortgage rate of interest whereas 
the complementarity argument suggests that a loosening of the loan to value ratio 
would be indicative of a general easing of mortgage credit availability and thus a fall 
in the mortgage interest rate. Thus if the mortgage interest rate and the loan to value 
ratio move together in the same direction following a change in one of the exogenous 
variables of the model we would argue that the two are substitutes whereas if they 
were to move in opposite directions they could be considered complements. Table 7.9 
41 In addition, with a greater amount of savings, ceteris paribus, the rate of interest paid on retail deposits should fall as mortgage lenders will have a greater amount of retail funds at their disposal. 
Then if the mortgage rate is simply a mark-up on the deposit rate the former should fall also. 
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below shows for each of the three sample periods whether we observe substitutability 
between the interest and non-interest terms of the mortgage contract (denoted by a `+' 
indicating that a change in the relevant exogenous variable leads to a movement in the 
same direction of both the mortgage interest rate and loan to value ratio) or 
complementarity between the two (denoted by a'-' sign). 
Table 7.9 : Complementarity and Substitutability Between the Mortgage Interest Rate 
and the Loan to Value Ratio 
Variable 1969Q1- 1969Q1- 1984Q1- 
1995Q4 1983Q4 1995Q4 
1nCOLLAT ++ + 
InR(AAAU) +- + 
1nR(PAHM) +- + 
1nR(ALDO) ++ + 
InINFL ++ + 
R(UC) +- - 
InMIRAS +- + 
It is clear that from the table that there has been a change in how mortgage lenders 
perceive the interaction between the mortgage interest rate and loan to value ratio 
between the two estimation periods44. During the first subsample, the changes in four 
out of the seven exogenous variables led to changes in opposing directions of the 
mortgage interest rate and the loan to value ratio. This general complementarity of the 
two mortgage terms suggests that in times when credit became tight, mortgage lenders 
reduced the loan to value ratio in order to reinforce a higher interest rate so as to ration 
mortgage demand out of the market (in an equilibrium sense). However, by the 
second period of estimation the situation had changed considerably. Six of the seven 
interaction signs of Table 7.9 suggest that it is the substitution argument that 
dominates, implying that the loan to value ratio is seen as an alternative to the 
mortgage interest rate in restricting mortgage lending. The reason for this is that in 
the second subsample estimation it is postulated that disequilibrium rationing was 
non-existent; as such, increases in the mortgage interest rate tended to be the result of 
base rate rises rather than as a means to stave off mortgage demand (as was the case in 
"We may ignore the results on the whole period here since essentially they are capturing the mixed 
effects of both subsample periods. 
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the first subsample period). Thus during the 1980s and 1990s, mortgage lenders were 
able to offer higher loan to value ratios as a means of compensation to the borrower 
(in order to maintain mortgage demand) for enduring periods of high real mortgage 
interest rates. 
7.2.6 Regime Shifts in the Mortgage Market 
The change in sign of a small number of coefficients in the estimated reduced form 
equations has prompted the analysis in this section of the intertemporal stability of the 
parameters. Regime shifts between the two subsample periods will allow us to 
backcast using the estimated reduced form model for mortgages traded over the 
second Subsample period in order to infer the degree to which disequilibrium 
mortgage rationing persisted in the mortgage market during the 1970sas. 
One way in which we may test the conjecture that the estimated parameters of the 
reduced form mortgage equation changed over the period 1969Q1 to 1995Q4 is by 
undertaking rolling reduced form estimations over a subsample of periods 1 to t 
(representing the first t years of the total sample period) and then to re-estimate the 
relationships between periods 2 and (t+l) and so on until a final estimation on a 
subsample of the data between periods in and T, where T= (t + in -1) is the total 
number of observations in the whole sample. In this case, m is chosen to be 48 
quarters (12 years), representing the length of time of the shortest regime (that of the 
second subsample in the analysis above). The choice of m to be any longer than this 
would result in an over-smoothing of the observed path for the intertemporal 
coefficients and the model would in fact never be estimated on the competitive regime 
hypothesised to operate between 1984Q1 and 1995Q4. 
Figure 7.8 below shows how the coefficients of the reduced form cointegrating model 
for the equilibrium level of mortgages traded change as we successively alter the 
estimation period. The dates on the charts relate to the years at which the estimation 
45 Because of the significant amounts of output and analysis produced by the procedures of this section, 
we only discuss the way in which the parameters of the reduced form mortgage model have changed. 
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periods end, with the solid lines representing the coefficient paths and the dotted lines 
the 95 per cent confidence intervals. The charts indicate that the estimated parameters 
do vary substantially over time; for a number of coefficients in Figure 7.8 we are able 
to identify two or more distinct regimes. 
The estimated parameters on the variable 1nCOLLAT remained negative for almost the 
whole period with the exception of the regressions on the final seven periods. The 
performance of this variable thus appears to be unsatisfactory for the majority of the 
estimations, although it is possible to take heart from the fact that it is correctly signed 
to account for risk considerations in the most important final estimation periods (in 
which both demand and supply may be assumed to be identified)46. This is perhaps 
not surprising since the variable will be picking up an effect from the significant rise 
and subsequent dramatic fall in house prices during the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
The boom in the housing market during the period prior to 1990 would have led to an 
increase in the measure of collateral whilst the subsequent slump would have served 
to encourage mortgage lenders to become more `risk conscious' (both of which are 
suggestive of a positive coefficient on 1nCOLLAT). However, to reiterate the 
argument presented earlier in Section 7.2.5, the negative (and largely insignificant) 
coefficients in the remainder of the estimations may be attributed to the fact that prior 
to the early 1980s mortgage lending was constrained by the availability of funds rather 
than risk considerations. This ties in with the argument below for the way in which 
the coefficients on savings have changed over time. 
46 In fact the variable was correctly signed for all three original sample periods illustrating the dangers 
of not undertaking the intertemporal analysis of the coefficients as we do in this section. 
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The coefficients on the measure of personal savings (lnR(AAAU)) have steadily 
declined over the estimation periods, being positive for approximately the first half of 
the sample periods and negative for the latter half (the coefficients in both periods 
enjoying a reasonable level of significance). It was originally postulated that higher 
personal savings per quarter would allow mortgage lenders to be more prepared to on- 
lend housing finance, implying a positive coefficient. However, as time has 
progressed, mortgage lenders have become less reliant on personal sector savings 
following their entrance to the wholesale deposit markets47. Thus the negative 
coefficients on the measure of savings indicate the rise in importance of the 
households' trade-off between savings and the downpayment on a house (the size of 
which is dependent upon the size of the mortgage loan as specified through the loan to 
value ratio) relative to the postulated supply effect. 
The coefficients on house prices have been positive during almost every regression 
period, although were more highly positive for regressions estimated over the 12 years 
beginning between the final quarters of 1974 and 1977 (i. e. ending between the third 
quarters of 1986 and 1989). It is likely that this is the result of a considerably higher 
observed inflation rate during these periods serving to encourage investors to purchase 
real estate (and in particular to use relatively cheap mortgage finance) rather than 
financial assets, the real return on which fell dramatically during the mid- to late 
1970s. 
The financial wealth variable has generally enjoyed positive coefficients for most of 
the estimations despite being considerably smaller and in some cases negative from 
estimations beginning in 1974 (i. e. ending in 1986) onwards, although only 
significantly negative in two estimations. This may be seen as a confirmation of the 
theoretical prediction by Jones (1993) that in times of high inflation and sticky 
mortgage rates (causing the mortgage interest rate to be relatively low compared to the 
return to financial wealth) the negative impact of the wealth-substitutability argument 
would be diminished (see Section 6.2.2 and equation (6.4) of Chapter 6 for a lengthier 
discussion). As the sample period is extended further, the competitive equilibrium 
47 Although banks have always been allowed to make investments and lend money in the wholesale 
deposit markets they have only been permitted to make mortgage loans since the early 1980s. 
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which has characterised the market since the early 1980s dominates and the positive 
effect on wealth begins to unwind. However, it may also be interpreted as a reduction 
in the influence of the wealth effect over time. 
The coefficients on inflation have generally been lower and negative for regressions 
ending after 1987 (i. e. beginning after 1975), although prior to this are mainly 
positive. Indeed, the dramatic fall in the coefficient on inflation which can be seen 
towards the middle of the relevant chart above is consistent with the fact that the tilt or 
front loading problem discouraged mortgage demand to a greater extent during the 
period of high inflation between 1974 and 1980. Any positive effect on mortgage 
lending that might have occurred as a result of declining real returns to financial assets 
(i. e. alternative assets to housing) and a highly negative real rate of mortgage interest 
during the period were clearly more than offset by the compounding of the front 
loading problem. 
The real user cost coefficients are negative for estimations beginning in the first four 
and a half years of the overall sample period as expected, following which they 
become positive for the middle regressions and resume on a negative path for 
estimations ending in 1990 and later. The finding of positive coefficients on R(UC) 
for estimations ending in the five years from 1985 onwards may be associated with the 
fact that we have not taken into consideration how average real rents have changed 
over the period. Given that renting is the main alternative to owner occupation, any 
such changes in rental yields may have had important spillover effects into the market 
for owner occupied housing. 
Finally, the parameter estimates on 1nMIRAS fall for the first half of the estimations 
(with the exception of a highly positive spike in the coefficient path for the regression 
ending in the final quarter of 1983) then rise again reaching a local peak of almost 1 in 
the regression ending in 1993Q1 from which point on there has been an almost 
consistent fall. This fall may be attributed to the reduction in importance of MIRAS 
benefits during the 1990s (as a consequence of changes in the rate of deduction) 
feeding into the estimated coefficients of the final eleven estimations (1981Q3- 
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1993Q2 to 1984Q1-1995Q4). A possible reason for the observed negative 
coefficients during the middle estimations could be that with a high average 
unemployment rate during these periods the MIRAS scheme presented fewer 
opportunities to offset mortgage interest payments as income tax revenue was 
relatively lower. 
The results presented in this section confirm the findings of Leece (1995) who argues 
for the presence of a regime shift in the mortgage market during the early 1980s based 
on changes in parameter values in an estimated cross section mortgage demand 
equation. Indeed, the trends exhibited in all of the charts of Figure 7.8 above appear 
reasonably strong and tell an intuitively appealing, plausible and consistent story, 
allowing us to confirm the shift in regime with a considerable degree of certainty. 
7.2.7 Disequilibrium Rationing in the Mortgage Market 
As we have discussed previously, no account of disequilibrium mortgage rationing is 
taken in any of the estimated equations, implying that strictly each reduced form 
equation should perform best over the period in which disequilibrium mortgage 
rationing does not exist (i. e. 1984Q1 to 1995Q4). In the previous section the reduced 
forms have been estimated over periods in which disequilibrium mortgage rationing 
has been alleged to be prominent, and thus it is important to be aware that these 
equations could be misspecified. 
It will prove informative to measure the extent to which disequilibrium mortgage 
rationing prevailed in the market for mortgage finance during the 1970s, since thus far 
in the chapter disequilibrium rationing has simply been a conjecture based on 
documentary evidence and previous studies. A relatively simple way of estimating the 
amount of mortgage finance that was rationed out of the market by disequilibrium 
methods during the 1970s is to use the reduced form mortgage equation estimated 
over the second subsample to backcast the expected level of mortgages traded per 
period. The resulting series will represent the estimated amount of mortgages that 
would have been traded if disequilibrium rationing had been absent (i. e. notional 
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mortgage demand). If indeed disequilibrium rationing was a significant feature of the 
mortgage market during the 1970s then we would expect to observe the backcasted 
series to be greater than the observed amount of mortgages traded. 
Figure 7.9 illustrates the results of the above procedure, confirming that 
disequilibrium rationing was indeed a prominent feature of mortgage lending during 
the 1970s. We may infer from the figure that during the 1970s, building societies 
were unable to manipulate sufficiently the loan to value ratio in order to match the 
relatively low levels of available funds with the high demand for mortgage finance 
(which had been encouraged by the lure of a low and steady rate of mortgage interest). 
To allow a more precise analysis of the extent of disequilibrium rationing, Figure 7.10 
plots the difference between the logs of the actual and predicted series for mortgages 
traded. 
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Figure 7.10 : The Difference Between Actual and Predicted (Backcasted) Levels of 










Between 1984Q1 and 1995Q4, this difference is simply the residual series from the 
reduced form cointegrating mortgage regression estimated over that period. However, 
prior to 1984, we may refer to the graph as a `backcasted residual series', indicating 
the amount of mortgage funds rationed out of the market as a result of mortgage 
queues, savings records and other disequilibrium rationing techniques. 
From Figure 7.10, three peaks in the level of disequilibrium mortgage rationing are 
observed in the final quarter of 1969, the second quarter of 1974 and the final quarter 
of 1976. Converting the data in Figure 7.9 from its logarithmic form, in constant price 
terms (the base year being 1990) the estimated model predicts that in 1969Q4 an 
amount of £2,049.0m of mortgage lending was disequilibrium rationed, £2,281.5m in 
1974Q2 and £3,185.3m in 1976Q4, all of these figures being greater than the actual 
quantity of mortgages traded during the respective periods. Over the whole of the 
1970s, the model suggests that an average of £l, 455m of mortgage finance per quarter 
was rationed out of the market whereas the average amount traded in the market was 
£2,959.8m per quarter. In other words, on average there was approximately 49 per 
cent more mortgage demand than the market could actually support. 
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One would be ill-advised to argue that the results presented above reflect precisely the 
extent of disequilibrium mortgage rationing prior to the competitive environment 
during the 1980s and 1990s; rather, they are likely to be an exaggeration of reality. 
Backcasting over such a long period of time will clearly yield residual estimates with 
large forecast errors and extremely wide confidence intervals. Nevertheless, the clear 
negative direction of the backcasted residuals before 1982 is surely convincing 
evidence to suggest the presence of considerable disequilibrium rationing. Indeed this 
is indicated by the calculation of a significantly negative matched-pairs t-statistic48 of 
-12.28 for the difference between the actual and backcasted series over the first 
subsample period. 
These results confirm the empirical analysis of Meen (1990b) who makes use of 
Hendry and Anderson's (1977) procedure to characterise mortgage rationing. Meen 
finds peaks in mortgage rationing around 1965/66,1969,1973 to 1975 and 1978/79 to 
1980, results which are similar to those presented in this section. However, the results 
of this section contrast with those of Nellis and Thom (1983) who find no evidence to 
suggest the presence of disequilibrium mortgage rationing in the UK mortgage market 
between 1969Q1 and 1980Q4. 
7.2.8 Estimation of the Short Run Dynamic Error Correction Model (ECM) 
The Granger representation theorem states that the restrictions necessary to ensure that 
a set of variables are CI(1,1) will guarantee the existence of an error correction model; 
likewise, if there exists an error correction specification for a set of 1(1) variables then 
this will in turn imply cointegration. The format of the error correction model is given 
by equation (7.13) of Section 7.2.4. 
Table 7.10 below presents the short run dynamic ECM for the reduced form mortgage 
equation estimated over the second subsample period (1984Q2 to 1995Q4)49. We 
focus in this section on the reduced form mortgage ECM alone since the main purpose 
'a See Section 5.2.4.2 of Chapter 5 for a discussion of the methodology of this test. 
49 The estimation period begins in Q2 (rather than Q1) of 1984 due to the inclusion of the lagged 
residual series from the cointegrating regression. 
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of this chapter is to identify an equation to determine the equilibrium amount of 
mortgages traded based on demand and supply factors; as such it is not necessary to 
estimate the reduced form mortgage interest rate and loan to value ratio ECMs in 
order to estimate the reduced form mortgage ECM. The error correction specification 
may be consistently estimated using OLS since the differenced variables in the 
regression are stationary (their level series are all I(1)) and therefore the t-statistics are 
valid. 
We noted in Section 6.4.2.3 of Chapter 6 that the cost of funds to the mortgage lender 
relative to the rate of mortgage interest received should be important in influencing 
the supply of mortgage lending. However, this measure could not be included in the 
cointegrating relationship since the series was found to be stationary. The error 
correction model allows us to include any number of additional contemporaneous 
stationary exogenous variables (denoted by w1 in equation (7.13)) which are 
considered to be important in influencing the change in quarterly mortgage lending. 
With the variable specified as the real difference between the three month inter-bank 
rate and the mortgage rate of interest (which is a measure of the real effective interest 
rate cost of undertaking additional mortgage lending), preliminary error correction 
estimations yielded no discernible improvement in either the results or diagnostic 
statistics over ECM estimations in which the variable was excluded. The ECM 
estimation presented below was therefore undertaken without this variable. 
The short run reduced form dynamic mortgage equation is estimated with a constant 
and without a time trend (see earlier discussion), and there is no need to include 
dummy variables to reflect quarterly changes in housing market activity given that the 
data has previously been seasonally adjusted. It is assumed that potentially up to four 
lags of the exogenous variables may be important in determining the change in the 
endogenous variable in the reduced form ECM equation. Preliminary estimations are 
undertaken on the complete reduced form mortgage ECM specification in which all 
exogenous variables are included in the regression with four lags; for reasons of 
brevity these results are not reported here. This general model is then tested down 
(using both the t-statistics on the individual coefficients and F-tests for the joint 
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insignificance of the group of deleted variables) in order to achieve a more 
parsimonious specification for the short run ECM. It is important to follow such a 
procedure since we must recognise that high lags in some variables but not others will 
be important in the error correction representation and that the desire to include high 
lags must be traded off against the requirement of parsimony for the purposes of 
tractability. 
The general ECM is specified such that the endogenous variable 1nR(AAPR) changes 
in response not only to changes in the exogenous variables and stochastic shocks (the 
latter denoted by u, in equation (7.13)), but also to the previous period's deviation 
from long run equilibrium (as captured by the residual series from the three reduced 
form cointegrating regressions); the general ECM formulation also includes the lagged 
dependent variable on the right hand side. The results of testing down the model 
suggest that no reasonably parsimonious error correction specification exists in which 
either O1nR(AAPR)1.1(the lagged dependent variable) or RESIDS1,. 1(the residuals from 
the cointegrating loan to value relationship) are significant. Nevertheless, the 
specification remains a valid ECM since the lagged residual series from both the long 
run cointegrating reduced form mortgage and interest rate equations are significant, 
ensuring that, "the short-run dynamic model retains information about the long run 
relationship between the variables" (Drake and Holmes (1997)). These `error 
correction terms' are denoted by RESIDS in the table below and are subscripted by m 
and r to denote that they are the residual series from the cointegrating reduced forms 
of lnR(AAPR) and R(rm) respectively. 
For the reduced form mortgage ECM presented below, an F-statistic is calculated to 
confirm the null hypotheses that zero restrictions on the coefficients dropped from the 
complete ECM with four lags do indeed hold50. The LM test statistic of 2.4251 
suggests that serial correlation of the residuals is not a problem in the models' and 
Chow tests confirm that the parameters of the model are stable between the periods 
so The F statistic is found to be 0.2726, which is less than the critical value of the F distribution with 26 
and 11 degrees of freedom at the 5 per cent level implying that we cannot reject the null hypothesis. 51 The LM statistic follows a, 2 distribution with 4 degrees of freedom, which at the 95 per cent level 
has a critical value of 9.49. 
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1984Q2-1989Q4 and 1990Q1-1995Q4 (Chow I in Table 7.10 above) although the 
predictive failure test statistic exceeds slightly the 5 per cent critical value (Chow 2 in 
the above table)52. In the light of the tests undertaken earlier in Section 7.2.4.1 for the 
inclusion of a time trend in the estimation of the VAR, a variable addition test is 
performed to confirm that the error correction model shown in the table above without 
a time trend is indeed the appropriate specificationS3. Finally, the goodness of fit 
measures for the reduced form mortgage ECM may be considered reasonable. 
Table 7.10: The Short Run Dynamic ECM 










.3 -1.1465 (-1.97) 
AInR(ALDO),. 1 -0.8969 (-2.78) 




A1nMIRAS,. i -0.9042 (-2.44) 
A1nM1RASr. 3 1.2392 
(3.52) 
0.6614 
Adjusted R2 0.5790 
LM 2.4251 
Chow 1 (10) 15.2488 
Chow 2 y2(24) 39.2781 
t-statistics in parentheses 
The coefficient on the residual series (RESIDS, r_i) in the dynamic mortgage equation 
is both highly significant and fairly large, indicating that around half of the adjustment 
sz The critical values for z2(10) and z2(24) at the 5 per cent level are 18.31 and 36.42 respectively. s3 The F-statistic for the inclusion of a time trend in the error correction model was calculated as 0.0671. With the critical value of the F-distribution at the 5 per cent significance level with (1,36) 
degrees of freedom being 4.11, we are unable reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient on the added 
time trend is zero. 
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of the quantity of mortgages traded to its long run value occurs during each quarter. 
This is in contrast to Drake and Holmes (1997) who find a considerably smaller 
adjustment parameter of less than 20 per cent for their individual demand and supply 
functions. The findings presented in this chapter therefore are particularly interesting 
since they lend support to the hypothesis that the market for mortgage finance has 
been characterised by a more rapidly clearing competitive equilibrium over the period 
of estimation. 
The dynamics of the variables A1nMIRAS and A1nR(ALDO) are also worth 
mentioning. The coefficients on the first and third lags of A1nMIRAS are of opposite 
sign, with the coefficient on the third lag being of greater magnitude (and 
significance) than that of the first. This would suggest that an increase in the 
generosity of MIRAS benefits will feed through (eventually) to a rise in the value of 
mortgages traded (as a result of demand side influences). Likewise, an increase in real 
financial wealth according to the model would initially lead to a fall in the equilibrium 
value of mortgages traded and an ensuing rise (of greater dimension) after 4 quarters. 
This would suggest that potential owner occupiers benefiting from a rise in wealth 
will in the first instance use the funds to increase their downpayment. The traditional 
wealth effect which will serve to raise the demand for owner occupied housing (and 
thus mortgage demand) then takes a further 3 quarters to filter through. Indeed, this is 
consistent with the literature on permanent income which suggests that only when a 
rise in wealth is believed to be permanent will it lead to increased consumption. 
7.3 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has examined the long run reduced form cointegrating relationships for 
the quantity of mortgages traded, the mortgage interest rate and the loan to value ratio, 
and the short run dynamic mortgage equation when the mortgage market is 
characterised by a situation of competitive equilibrium. The basic dynamics of the 
way in which the mortgage market operates in the presence of mortgage rationing 
were discussed and the difficulties involved in estimating structural equations for 
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mortgage supply and demand under conditions of disequilibrium have been 
investigated. 
The difficulties in identifying a structural model of mortgage supply and demand were 
circumvented by estimating the reduced form equation over the period 1984 to 1995 
in which the mortgage market was assumed to be in a state of competitive 
equilibrium. This allowed us to backcast the expected level of mortgages traded to a 
period in which the market was characterised by a regime of disequilibrium rationing 
and thus infer the extent of disequilibrium mortgage rationing during the 1970s and 
early 1980s. The model suggests that disequilibrium mortgage rationing was 
substantial throughout the 1970s and estimates of the amount of excess demand 
rationed from the market are presented and discussed. 
Finally, the short run dynamic estimation of the reduced form mortgage equation 
suggests that the adjustment to long run equilibrium is speedy but that any positive 
response of mortgages traded to changes in the real level of personal financial assets is 
slow. 
One obvious direction for further research would be the development of a 
simultaneous estimation technique for long run cointegrated variables. Although the 
Johansen technique allows us to restrict the cointegrating vectors to identify both 
supply and demand equations, it is well known that the Johansen estimates can often 
be lacking in any economic meaning. Being able to consistently estimate the 
parameters of simultaneous equations in a cointegrating framework would allow 
future researchers in the market for mortgage finance to present more credible 
structural parameters for mortgage demand and supply. 
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CHAPTER 8 
Overall Summary and Conclusions 
This thesis has investigated the issues of the repayment of long term mortgage debt, 
the determination of house prices and theoretical and empirical formulations of the 
supply of and demand for mortgage finance. Here we provide a summary of the main 
findings of the thesis. 
No piece of work on the mortgage market can possibly be complete without an 
analysis of the structure of the market, this being the subject of Chapter 2. In the first 
instance, a number of competing theories of how the mortgage market interacts with 
the economy as a whole were addressed in order that the mortgage market may be set 
in a wider perspective. The evidence would appear to suggest that the housing and 
mortgage markets move in a pro-cyclical fashion with the rest of the economy. One 
mechanism through which this operates is that when the housing market is booming, 
the demand for consumer durables will rise, which in turn will boost aggregate 
demand. Alternatively, rising house prices may lead to a rise in housing equity 
withdrawal and a subsequent rise in consumption. In addition, pro-cyclicality will be 
generated to a large extent by the operation of monetary policy, which should have 
similar effects on household durable consumption as it does on housing demand. 
Following an overview of the historical roots of the building society industry, the 
remainder of the chapter focused on the dramatic changes that have occurred in the 
mortgage market since the 1970s. The easing of legislation on both banks and 
building societies enhanced competition among the providers of mortgage finance and 
indeed encouraged new entrants into the market. The Building Societies Association 
rate-setting cartel could clearly no longer operate in such an environment and, since its 
abandonment in 1984, the process of interest rate setting has become considerably 
more competitive'. However, building societies were no longer able to maintain their 
1 As discussed in the literature review of Chapter 1, this is recognised by Paisley (1994) who models the 
process of building society interest rate setting as one of profit maximisation. 
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dominance in the provision of mortgage finance, losing business both to banks and 
other new entrants in the mortgage market. Following the wave of big-name de- 
mutualisations beginning in 1989 with the Abbey National, building societies 
currently hold less than one quarter of the total value of all mortgages outstanding 
(compared with almost 85 per cent during the late 1970s). The legislative changes 
have not only altered the balance of mortgage lending between building societies and 
banks, but in promoting competition have enabled the elimination of the regime of 
mortgage rationing that existed throughout the 1970s. 
Finally in Chapter 2, the motives for and trends in de-mutualisations, mergers and 
acquisitions in the building society sector are examined. The number of building 
societies in the UK has fallen considerably over the past two decades, from 273 in 
1980 to only 71 at the end of 1998 primarily as a result of friendly mergers and take- 
overs. Underperformance is identified by Thompson (1997) as the major factor 
inducing merger and take-over activity, which may possibly be a reason that studies 
by Gough (1979) and Barnes (1985) find that little discernible benefit accrues to the 
acquirer society. 
The investigation into the `tilt' or `front-loading' effect of inflation on the borrower's 
real mortgage repayment schedule was the subject of Chapter 3. A separate chapter 
was devoted to the topic due to its importance as one of the causes of mortgage 
default and as a determinant of mortgage demand (both of which were considered in 
depth in later chapters). The first half of the chapter showed that with certain types of 
mortgage contract, higher inflation can lead to higher real debt repayments during the 
initial years of the loan (even if the real mortgage rate remains constant). It was 
discussed that this could have two subsequent effects in the mortgage market. Firstly, 
those borrowers who continue to demand mortgage finance and those who already 
have a mortgage loan (not of the fixed rate type in the latter case) will face a greater 
probability of default the higher is the inflation rate (since the tilt effect will be more 
pronounced). Secondly, the demand for mortgages will be reduced among the group 
of potential owner occupiers when the rate of inflation rises. 
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The second half of the chapter considers the various mortgage designs which may 
ameliorate to some extent the front-loading problem. A number of different designs 
are discussed at length, and simulations of each over time are presented in the 
appendix to the chapter. Only the price level adjusted mortgage (PLAM) insulates the 
borrower completely from the tilt effect caused by both anticipated and unanticipated 
inflation. However, the insignificance of such mortgage designs in the UK and the 
prominence of variable and fixed rate mortgage contracts underlines the extent to 
which the tilt effect could be a serious problem to the borrower if the inflation rate 
were to rise. The value of including this chapter in the thesis is that not only does it 
give a background to the potential repayment problems investigated in the following 
chapters, but that it brings together a considerable volume of literature and may be 
considered a comprehensive reference on the problem of front-end loading. 
Clearly, a number of policy issues emerge from the discussion of Chapter 3. The 
government has two options in order that the tilt problem may be further moderated. 
Firstly, inflationary pressures in the economy may be addressed more actively. 
However, with the Bank of England being recently given operational independence 
with an explicit objective of price level stability, the amount of further progress that 
may be made on this front is probably limited. Secondly, the government may wish to 
promote alternative mortgage designs amongst potential owner occupiers. It is likely 
that the encouragement of borrowers to hold alternative mortgage designs (in 
particular the PLAM) can only be achieved through generous financial incentives and 
a nationally co-ordinated educational advertisement campaign. As such, further 
research to aid in the identification of the group of potential mortgagors who would 
benefit the most from alternative mortgage designs would be particularly desirable, 
allowing mortgage lenders to be better able to target the most appropriate subset of 
borrowers. 
Chapter 4 examined and re-estimated the models of real house prices, arrears and 
possessions proposed by Breedon and Joyce (1993) in a Bank of England working 
paper, the motivation for which has been the recent alarming trends in these variables. 
Following the economic boom and simultaneous surge in housing demand and 
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mortgage business during the late 1980s, the onset of recession in 1989 led to a 
dramatic and sustained fall in both real and nominal house prices. When combined 
with increasing unemployment (the rate of which rose from the third quarter of 1990), 
borrowers who had been made redundant and were suffering financial distress could 
no longer rely on the withdrawal of housing equity to support their mortgage 
repayments; the inevitable consequence was a sharp rise in both the number of 
households in arrears and the flow into possession. 
In the theoretical model, real house prices are derived from a standard household 
optimisation procedure in which potential owner occupiers maximise utility over 
housing and non-housing consumption subject to a budget constraint and two 
equations of motion defining the evolution of the stock of housing and financial 
assets. The stock of arrears is modelled as being dependent upon the household's 
level of disposable income relative to interest payments on the mortgage loan and the 
amount and availability of unwithdrawn equity in the housing asset. Finally, 
possessions are modelled from the point of view of the lender, who will decide to 
possess only when the current value of the property exceeds its future resale value 
plus the borrowers mortgage repayments. 
Turning to the empirical methodology, the technique used to estimate the long run 
relationships was that of Park's (1992) canonical cointegrating regression, its benefits 
lying in its efficiency and other desirable properties of the estimated coefficients. All 
equations were modified from those estimated by Breedon and Joyce, with respect to 
both the variables included and a number of other data specification issues2. House 
prices, in the long run, were found to be inelastic with respect to the measure of 
financial wealth, as expected. The coefficient on the rate of inflation was found to be 
positive, with the negative effect of the front-loading problem on housing demand 
being outweighed as the inflation variable captured some of the positive 'investment' 
effects which would otherwise have been absorbed by the real user cost (see equations 
(4.7) and (4.9) of Chapter 4). The separation of these two effects in models of 
housing demand and house prices has not thus far been satisfactorily achieved, and as 
2 The extension of the sample period is shown to have an important effect on some of the paramctcr 
values, for example. 
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such should be a priority for future research. Finally, the estimation confirms the 
hypothesised negative influence of possessions on house prices. Action to prevent 
arrears occurring should thus be of paramount importance to policy-makers given the 
significance of the housing market in the wider economy. 
In the estimation of the arrears equation, the largest and most significant effect comes 
from the unwithdrawn equity variable. This would suggest that the ability to 
withdraw equity from the property by either remortgaging or `trading down' is 
important for borrowers who face financial difficulties. This lends more support to 
the theory that a fall in house prices (particularly when accompanied by recession) 
will lead to a rise in arrears, which in turn will increase the number of possessions; 
through the house price equation, the rise in possessions will then lead to a further fall 
in house prices and the downward spiral continues. A relaxation of the non-interest 
terms of the mortgage contract is also shown to lead to a rise in mortgage default. 
Surely, then, the recent dramatic rise in the loan to value ratio for first time buyers 
must be of particular concern amongst mortgage lenders and policy makers alike; it 
seems clear that not all of the lessons from the experience of the early 1990s have 
been learned. The final estimated long run equation for possessions highlights the 
importance of arrears in the determination of the flow into possession, in addition to 
the level of unwithdrawn equity in the borrower's property (as in the arrears equation). 
However, house prices are significant only at the 10 per cent level and the mortgage 
rate is shown to have no significant impact on the number of households possessed 
each period. 
With regard future work in this area, attention should be directed towards the 
formulation of a more integrated theoretical model of house prices, arrears and 
possessions; ideally, such a model should also include the rental sector of the housing 
market. One would expect such a modelling strategy to yield more specific and 
rigorous testable assumptions. 
Chapter 5 developed a formal model of building society interest rate setting behaviour 
in which societies chose their mortgage and savings interest rates to maximise a 
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particular objective function. The appropriate specification of the objective function 
is especially important; given the mutual status of UK building societies, one cannot 
simply assume the objective is one of profit maximisation. On the other hand, with 
the increasing trend in de-mutualisations and with a considerable number of societies 
accumulating large pools of reserves, neither would it be appropriate to conclude that 
societies are interested solely in maximising member benefits. As such, we follow the 
US credit union literature in specifying the objective as a weighted function of 
member financial benefits and additions to reserves. In order for the mathematics of 
the optimisation problem to be tractable, it is assumed that borrowing and saving 
members are not treated any differently to one another by societies, i. e. that the 
benefits allocated to each have the same weight in the objective function. There are 
compelling theoretical reasons to believe this to be true, although one must not lose 
sight of the fact that even in aggregate, savers are allocated greater monetary benefits 
by UK building societies than their borrower counterparts (the figures are relatively 
small but statistically significant). However, the important innovation here over the 
previous credit union literature is the inclusion of a behavioural parameter which 
allows building societies to choose the extent to which they wish to trade off the 
ability to meet fully the desires of their members with the accumulation of society 
reserves. 
The significant finding reported in this chapter is that the optimal interest rate 
equations derived from the model under certain circumstances are independent of the 
behavioural parameter set by the society. In other words, the model suggests that up 
to a point a building society will not alter either its mortgage or savings rate if its 
preference in allocating financial benefits between its members and its reserve pool 
were to change. During the 1990s, we have seen that building societies have indeed 
been (implicitly) revising their behavioural parameters as more and more have geared 
up to following the route of de-mutualisation. The model would then predict that 
these societies in the process of planning for conversion should not alter their interest 
rates in response to their changing objectives, at least until profits command a larger 
weight in the objective function than do member benefits. Indeed, we have seen in the 
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UK mortgage market that de-mutualised societies speedily increased their mortgage 
rates and lowered their savings rates following the conversion. 
There are certain circumstances in which the model is constrained as a result of the 
objective function becoming convex. As such, one may only state unequivocally that 
the model is appropriate when strictly more weight is attached to the profit motive of 
societies than is to member benefits. However, this need not necessarily be the case, 
and (unquantifiable) restrictions are presented in the main text of Chapter 5 which 
must hold for the model to be interpretable when more weight is attributed to member 
benefits. The model is important, therefore, since it tells us that up to a point building 
societies will leave their interest rates unchanged in the process of becoming more 
profit oriented. 
Finally, we must also recognise that we have neglected a number of possible 
important factors in the model; the requirement that `windfall' payments be paid to 
members of the society on conversion, the different rules under which building 
societies and banks operate, and the threat to the management of hostile take-overs in 
the corporate sector (although only once five years have elapsed following the 
conversion) particularly if the newly converted society is seen as underperforming. 
Essentially the model can, at most, account for a behavioural shift within the existing 
regime under which building societies operate. 
The final two chapters of the thesis concentrated on the estimation of a long run 
cointegrating model of mortgage finance. In Chapter 6, following a discussion of the 
most appropriate theoretical models upon which to base the estimation, attention was 
focused upon some of the data issues involved in the empirical analysis3. In 
particular, the X11 procedure (described fully in Appendix 6.2) was used to seasonally 
adjust the raw data, and it was shown that use of an alternative and more simplistic 
dummy variable approach could in fact induce additional seasonality in the raw series. 
3 There exist well-established theoretical models of mortgage demand, one of which is described in the 
chapter. However, the supply model of Chapter 5 could not be used given that recent building society 
mortgage lending data has not been break-adjusted for the conversion of societies to banks. As such, 
the analysis aimed to model the total mortgage flow across all mortgage lending institutions rather than 
solely that of building societies. 
340 
The variables to be included in the estimations of the final chapter were discussed at 
length, all of which were subjected to rigorous tests for stationarity. 
One important issue was the generation of an expected house price series for inclusion 
in the user cost variable, which in the previous literature has been devoted little 
attention. Here, the full Box-Jenkins (1976) methodology was applied such that an 
appropriate ARMA model could be specified to make forecasts of future house price 
inflation; based on a number of diagnostic tests, the ARMA (2,2) model appeared to 
be the most suitable. One problem with ARMA modelling is that by its very nature, 
the predicted series will always be very dependent upon the actual series in the 
previous periods. Nevertheless, given that the expected house price inflation series 
was to be included as a component of the user cost variable which is designed to 
reflect the household's expectation of the cost of owner occupation, this naive 
measure of expected house price inflation may be considered appropriate. 
Based on the analysis in Chapter 6, Chapter 7 estimated long run reduced form 
cointegrating relationships for the quantity of mortgages traded, the mortgage interest 
rate and the loan to value ratio, and also the short run dynamic mortgage equation. 
The first part of the chapter outlined some of the empirical issues involved when faced 
with a market which, for some considerable length of time, has been characterised by 
disequilibrium quantity rationing. A number of studies have estimated the period in 
which rationing was replaced by a regime of competitive equilibrium in the mortgage 
market and, on the basis of this and other anecdotal evidence, the long run 
cointegrating model was estimated using Park's (1992) canonical cointegrating 
approach over the period in which competitive equilibrium could be assumed to 
prevail (1984 to 1995). On the supply side, risk considerations (as proxied by an 
inverse mortgage gearing ratio) appeared to be important in the decision to supply 
additional mortgage funds, although the presence of the aggregate level of savings in 
the model tended to reflect a demand side influence rather than the ability of societies 
to supply mortgages. Turning to the demand side, a1 per cent rise in real house prices 
was found to raise the real level of mortgages traded by 0.95 per cent as a result of 
raising the amount of mortgage required to purchase any given house and possibly an 
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investment demand effect. However, it was not possible to reject the null hypothesis 
that the coefficient was equal to unity (the relevant t-statistic was calculated as -0.35) 
and thus any positive effect that real house prices might have had on mortgage 
demand through the investment demand effect over and above that of the one-for-one 
price effect must have been offset by an equivalent reduction in demand as some 
households were priced out of the market. A negative coefficient on the inflation 
variable indicated that the tilting of real mortgage payments may have had an 
important effect on mortgage demand, while an increase in the real user cost measure 
was shown to decrease mortgage demand via its effect on housing demand. 
Discussion in the previous literature has been sparse regarding the way in which 
building societies have set their mortgage interest rates and non-interest mortgage 
terms to allocate mortgage funds. An important and innovative contribution of this 
work has been to use the estimated long run equations for the mortgage interest rate 
and the loan to value ratio to investigate whether the two mortgage terms are used in a 
complementary or substitutable fashion. In the estimations undertaken over the period 
of competitive equilibrium, it is confirmed that mortgage lenders have used interest 
and non-interest mortgage terms as alternatives for each other in allocating mortgage 
funds, in contrast to the earlier period characterised by quantity rationing. Along with 
the observed changes in the coefficients of the mortgage equation over time, this may 
be seen as confirmation of the regime shift in the mortgage market over the last three 
decades. 
The mortgage equation estimated over the period of competitive equilibrium was used 
to backcast the level of mortgages traded during the previous periods of 
disequilibrium mortgage rationing, thus allowing us to derive estimates of the 
magnitude of disequilibrium mortgage rationing during the 1970s and early 1980s. 
The model suggested that on average during the 1970s, a substantial 49 per cent of 
mortgage demand was rationed out of the market. In summary, the periods in which 
excess mortgage demand was found to be the strongest do coincide with those 
identified in the literature using various methodologies, although given the length of 
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the period over which the backcasting is undertaken, one would expect the `forecast' 
errors would not be insignificant 
Finally, turning to the short run dynamic estimation of the reduced form mortgage 
equation, the adjustment to long run equilibrium is found to be fairly rapid in relation 
to other studies' estimates, with almost half of the adjustment occurring in each 
quarter. On the other hand, the reaction of mortgages traded to real personal financial 
assets is found to be sluggish, with any positive adjustment occurring a whole year 
following any change. 
In summing up, the contribution of this thesis has been to investigate the causes of 
borrowers facing difficulties in the repayment of long term mortgage finance 
(particularly in the light of the trends in arrears, possessions and house prices during 
the last decade), to consider theoretically the demand for and supply of mortgage 
finance and to propose and estimate a reduced form model of the mortgage market. In 
formulating the models constructed and estimated in this research, it was imperative 
that the idiosyncratic nature of the market was taken into account; the mortgage 
market has undergone a considerable compositional change over the past three 
decades which has led to increased competition, the end of mortgage rationing and, to 
a great extent, the dramatic rise in arrears and possessions during the early 1990s. 
Further research should be directed at tying the determination of house prices, arrears, 
possessions and the demand for and supply of mortgage finance more closely together, 
both from a theoretical and empirical perspective. With the mortgage market being 
the facilitator to the operation of the housing market, which in turn plays a significant 
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 2 
APPENDIX 2.1 : TRANSFERS OF ENGAGEMENTS (1980-1999) 
Table A2.1.1 : Transfers of Engagements, 1980-1999 
TRANSFER OF ENGAGEMENTS 1999 DATE 
Birmingham Midshires BS TE to Halifax PLC 19.04.99 
TRANSFER OF ENGAGEMENTS 1997 
Northern Rock BS to Northern Rock PLC 01.10.97 
Greenwich BS TE to Portman BS 30.07.97 
Bristol & West BS TE to Bank of Ireland PLC 28.07.97 
Woolwich BS TE to Woolwich PLC 07.07.97 
Halifax BS TE to Halifax PLC 02.06.97 
Alliance & Leicester BS TE to Alliance & Leicester PLC 21.04.97 
TRANSFER OF ENGAGEMENTS 1996 
West Cumbria BS TE to Cumberland BS 29.09.96 
National & Provincial BS TE to Abbey National PLC 05.08.96 
City & Metropolitan BS TE to Stroud & Swindon BS 19.04.96 
TRANSFER OF ENGAGEMENTS 1995 
Cheltenham & Gloucester BS TE to Lloyds Bank PLC 01.08.95 
Leeds Permanent BS TE to Halifax BS 01.08.95 
TRANSFER OF ENGAGEMENTS 1994 
North of England BS TE to Northern Rock BS 01.10.94 
Tynemouth BS TE to Universal BS 31.10.94 
TRANSFERS OF ENGAGEMENTS 1993 
St Pancras BS TE to Portman BS 31.12.93 
Bexhill-on-Sea BS TE to Bradford & Bingley BS 29.11.93 
Heart of England BS TE to Cheltenham & Gloucester BS 02.10.93 
Surrey BS TE to Northern Rock BS 05.07.93 
TRANSFERS OF ENGAGEMENTS 1992 
The Haywards Heath BS TE to Yorkshire BS 31.12.92 
Mid-Sussex BS TE to Cheltenham & Gloucester BS 01.08.92 
Lancastrian BS TE to Northern Rock BS 13.07.92 
Town & Country BS TE to Woolwich BS 02.05.92 
Southdown BS TE to Leeds Permanent BS 01.04.92 
TRANSFERS OF ENGAGEMENTS 1991 
Cheshunt BS TE to Bristol & West BS 30.12.91 
Mornington BS TE to Britannia BS 01.10.91 
Bedford Crown BS TE to Cheltenham & Gloucester BS 20.07.91 
Leamington Spa BS TE to Bradford & Bingley BS 01.07.91 
Portsmouth BS TE to Cheltenham & Gloucester BS 30.06.91 
Hampshire BS TE to Bradford & Bingley BS 17.06.91 
Hendon BS TE to Bradford & Bingley BS 18.03.91 
CHANGES OF NAME 1991 
Nationwide Anglia BS to Nationwide BS 01.12.9 1 
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TRANSFERS OF ENGAGEMENTS 1990 DATE 
Louth Mablethorpe & Sutton BS* TE to Bradford & Bingley BS 26.11.90 
Walthamstow BS TE to Cheltenham & Gloucester BS 31.10.90 
Eastbourne Mutual BS TE to Sussex County BS which changed its name to 01.10.90 
Southdown BS 
Portman Wessex BS TE to Regency & West of England BS which changed its 01.10.90 
name to Portman BS 
Frome Selwood Permanent BS TE to Stroud & Swindon BS 01.07.90 
Peckham BS TE to Cheltenham & Gloucestser BS 30.06.90 
Sheffield BS TE to Bradford & Bingley BS 15.06.90 
Guardian BS TE to Cheltenham & Gloucester BS 16.04.90 
Bedford BS TE to Cheltenham & Gloucester BS 08.04.90 
CHANGES OF NAME 1990 
Leek United & Midlands BS to Leek BS 01.07.90 
Woolwich Equitable BS to Woolwich BS 06.05.90 
TRANSFERS OF ENGAGEMENTS 1989 
Portman BS merged with Wessex BS to form Portman Wessex BS 31.07.89 
Abbey National BS TE to Abbey National PLC 12.07.89 
Regency BS TE to West of England BS which changed its name to Regency & 01.05.89 
West of England BS 
Herts & Essex BS TE to Saffron Walden & Essex BS which changed its name to 01.04.89 
Saffron Walden Herts & Essex BS 
Bury St Edmunds BS TE to Cheltenham & Gloucester BS 01.01.89 
CHANGES OF NAME 1989 
Haywards Heath & District BS to Haywards Heath BS 01.03.89 
TRANSFERS OF ENGAGEMENTS 1988 
Bolton BS TE to Cheltenham & Gloucester BS 01.10.88 
Aid to Thrift BS TE to Cheshunt BS 01.07.88 
City of London BS TE to Chelsea BS 01.07.88 
Gateway BS TE to Woolwich Equitable BS 31.05.88 
North Wilts Ridgeway BS TE to West of England BS 01.03.88 
Rowley Regis BS TE to Heart of England BS 01.03.88 
Kidderminster Equitable BS* TE to Heart of England BS 01.03.88 
Essex Equitable BS TE to Cheltenham & Gloucester BS 29.02.88 
CHANGES OF NAME 1988 
Holmesdale Benefit BS to Holmesdale BS 01.09.88 
TRANSFERS OF ENGAGEMENTS 1987 
Paddington BS TE to West of England BS 02.11.87 
Cardiff BS TE to Cheltenham & Gloucester BS 01.10.87 
Chilterns BS TE to Bradford & Bingley BS 05.10.87 
City of Derry BS* TE to Nationwide Anglia BS 30.09.87 
Nationwide BS TE to Anglia BS to form Nationwide Anglia BS 01.09.87 
London Permanent BS TE to Cheltenham & Gloucester BS 01.08.87 
Colchester BS TE to Cheltenham & Gloucester BS 01.06.87 
Immigrants BS* removed from Register 15.05.87 
Harrow BS TE to Birmingham Midshires BS 30.04.87 
Hemel Hempstead BS TE to Birmingham Midshires BS 13.04.87 
Thrift BS* to Cheshunt BS 13.04.87 
Civil Service BS TE to Birmingham Midshires BS 06.04.87 
Wishaw Investment BS* TE to Northern Rock BS 02.02.87 
United Kingdom BS* TE to Northern Rock BS 05.01.87 
Swindon Permanent BS TE to Stroud BS to form Stroud & Swindon BS 02.01.87 
CHANGES OF NAME 1987 
Loughborough Permanent BS TE to Loughborough BS 01-05.87 
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TRANSFERS OF ENGAGEMENTS 1986 DATE 
Property Owners BS to Woolwich Equitable BS 01.12.86 
Bideford BS to West of England BS 31.10.86 
Norwich BS merges with Peterborough BS to form Norwich and Peterborough BS 31.09.86 
King Edward BS* TE to Birmingham Midshires BS 15.09.86 
Tyldesley BS to Middleton BS to form Lancastrian BS 01.07.86 
Birmingham & Bridgwater BS unites with Midshires BS to form Birmingham 30.06.86 
Midshires BS 
Metrogas BS to Midshires BS 24.06.86 
North East Globe BS to Universal BS 02.06.86 
North of England BS to Sunderland and Shields BS to form North of England BS 02.06.86 
Blackheath BS to Britannia BS 02.06.86 
Chatham Reliance BS to Herne Bay BS to form Kent Reliance BS 01.04.86 
Mitcham and Metropolitan BS to Sussex County BS 01.04.86 
Stanley BS to Bradford and Bingley BS 03.02.86 
CHANGES OF NAME 1986 
East Surrey BS to Surrey BS 01.07.86 
TRANSFERS OF ENGAGEMENTS 1985 
Alliance BS unites with Leicester BS to form Alliance & Leicester 
BS Argyle BS TE To Peterborough BS 
Bristol Economic BS TE to Stroud BS 
British BS* TE to Sun BS* 
Chatham BS TE to Principality BS 
Citizens Regency BS TE to Sussex Mutual BS 
Economic BS* TE to Sun BS* 
Enterprise BS* TE to Sun BS* 
Forresters BS* TE to Bradford and Bingley BS 
Hartlepool & District BS TE to Northern Rock BS 
Haslemere BS TE to National & Provincial BS 
Hibernian BS TE to Bradford & Bingley BS 
Huntly BS TE to Scottish BS 
Kirklees BS* removed from Register 
Manchester Unity of Odd Fellows* TE to Northern Rock BS 
Merseyside BS TE to Bradford & Bingley BS 
North Kent BS TE to Woolwich BS 
Old England BS* TE to Sun BS* 
South Durham BS TE to Sunderland & Shields BS 
South Shields Sun Permanent BS TE to Northern Rock BS 
Waltham Abbey BS TE to Cheltenham & Gloucester BS 
Western Counties BS TE to Ramsbury BS 
CHANGES OF NAME 1985 
Nottingham Oddfellows BS to Nottingham Imperial BS 
CANCELLATION OF REGISTRATION 1985 
Corinthian BS 
Kirklees BS 
Worksop BS was dissolved 
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TRANSFERS OF ENGAGEMENTS 1984 
Banffshire BS TE to Scottish BS 
Boston & Skirbeck BS TE to Leicester BS 
Clapham Permanent BS TE to Bradford & Bingley BS 
Cotswold BS TE to Cheltenham & Gloucester BS 
Country BS TE to Anglia BS 
Dover & Folkestone BS TE to Bradford & Bingley BS 
Ealing & Acton BS TE to Midshire BS 
Glamorgan BS TE to Bradford & Bingley BS 
Kent & Canterbury Permanent Benefit BS TE To Chatham 
Reliance BS 
London Grosvenor BS TE to Woolwich BS 
Marble Arch BS TE to Chelsea BS 
New Cross BS TE to Woolwich BS 
Permanent Scottish BS TE to Scottish BS 
CANCELLATION OF REGISTRATION 1984 
Axminster Seaton & District BS 
Dee BS 
Hamilton Savings Investment and BS was dissolved 
TRANSFERS OF ENGAGEMENTS 1983 
Anglia BS TE to London & South of England BS to form Anglia 
BS 
Colne BS TE to Britannia BS 
Coventry Provident BS TE to Coventry Economic BS to form 
Coventry BS 
Grangemouth BS TE to Woolwich Equitable BS 
Hadrian BS TE to Sunderland & Shields BS 
Horsham BS TE to Bradford & Bingley BS 
Housing and General BE TE to Bradford & Bingley BS 
London Commercial BS TE to Nottingham BS 
Musselburgh BS TE to Northern Rock BS 
North Wilts Equitable BS Unites with Ridgeway BS to form North 
Wilts & Ridgeway BS 
Padiham BS TE to Bradford & Bingley BS 
Rugby Provident BS TE to Hinckley BS to form Hinckley & Rugby 
BS 
Severn BS TE to Midshires BS 
Shields Commercial BS TE to Sunderland & Shields BS 
Stockport Mersey BS TE to Bradford & Bingley BS 
Tynemouth Victoria BS TE to Mercantile BS 
United Provinces BS TE to Bradford & Bingley BS 
Welsh Economic BS TE to Britannia BS 
ADDITIONS TO REGISTER 1983 
Immigrant BS 
CANCELLATION OF REGISTRATION 1983 
Connaught Permanent BS 
Simplified BS 
Torbay & Devon BS 
Victoria Permanent BS 
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TRANSFERS OF ENGAGEMENTS 1982 
Accrington Savings BS TE to Cheshire BS 
Advance BS TE to Darlington BS 
Banner BS TE to Midshires BS 
Birmingham BS Unites with Bridgwater BS to form Birmingham & 
Bridgwater BS 
Blyth & Morpeth BS TE to Northern Rock BS 
Burnley BS TE to Provincial BS 
City & District Permanent BS TE to Metrogas BS 
Denton BS TE to Britannia BS 
Dorking BS TE to Eastbourne Mutual BS 
Driffield BS TE to Britannia BS 
Hearts of Oak & Enfield TE to Bradford & Bingley BS 
Kilmarnock BS TE to Northern Rock BS 
Leigh Permanent BS TE to Cheshire BS 
Liverpool BS TE to Midshires BS 
Otley BS TE to Skipton BS 
Over Darwen BS TE to Britannia BS 
Queen Victoria Street BS TE to Metrogas BS 
Saddleworth BS TE to Bradford & Bingley BS 
Shields & Washington BS TE to Northern Rock BS 
Strathclyde BS TE to Scottish BS 
Swansea Park Permanent BS TE To Bradford & Bingley BS 
Sydenham BS TE to Mid-Sussex BS 
Target BS TE to Bradford & Bingley BS 
Wellington (Somerset) and District BS TE to Britannia BS 
Wigan BS TE to Cheshire 
London Goldhawk BS TE to South of England BS to form London 
& South of England BS 
Newcastle upon Tyne BS TE to Grainger BS to form Newcastle BS 
Oakleaf BS TE to Anglia BS 
Premier Permanent BS TE to City & Metropolitan BS 
St Martins le Grand Permanent Benefit BS TE to Ramsbury BS 
Spread Eagle BS TE to Bradford & Bingley BS 
Stamford BS TE to Peterborough BS 
Stoke-on-Trent BS TE to Britannia BS 
Summers BS TE to Cheshire BS 
Tyne BS TE to North of England BS 
Walker & Byker Industrial Permanent BS TE to Northern Rock BS 
CANCELLATION OF REGISTRATION 1980 
Blackpool BS 
First Salisbury BS 
Longbridge BS 
Wembley BS 
ADDITIONS TO REGISTER 1980 
Ecology BS 
Key :*: Not a member of the BSA 
TE : Transfer engagements 
BS: Building society 
Source : The Building Societies Association web site 
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 3 
APPENDIX 3.1 : FINANCIAL MATHEMATICS - ANNUITIES 
This appendix briefly describes how the nominal annuitised repayment schedule on a 
mortgage loan is determined. 
Consider a mortgage lender who offers the purchaser of a house a mortgage loan of 
amount Mat a nominal interest rate of rm over a period of n years. The intermediary's 
problem is then to determine the periodic payment that must be made by the borrower 
in order that the loan be amortised (i. e. that the principal be repaid in full, including 
all accrued interest) by the end of the nth year. The level of this required payment may 
be determined by the application of the mathematics of annuities to the problem. 
An annuity is an asset which makes a number of either constant or growing periodic 
payments over time. In the case of a mortgage loan, the present value of the annuity is 
simply the current level of mortgage debt outstanding held by the borrower, and the 
annuitised payment is the borrower's regular repayment of interest and principal to the 
lending institution. In general we will assume that the periodic payment grows at a 
constant rate of, say, g (the rate of graduation) over the life of the loan; this turns out 
to be especially useful when determining the pattern of payments resulting from a 
graduated payment mortgage (see Section 3.4.3 in the main text). 
Assuming that the regular mortgage repayments are made at the end of each period, 
the first repayment made to the mortgage lender must have grown by a rate of g over 
that which would have been paid if the payment was due at the beginning of the 
period. Denoting mo the periodic payment that would be made at the beginning of the 
current period and ml the first end-of-year payment, we may write m, = MO (1 + g, ) ; 
indeed, this relationship will hold for the whole duration of the contract period thus 
giving m1 = m, -, 
(1 + g, ). 
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With an intertemporally constant payment growth rate, the present value of the 
mortgage contract, M, may be written as the discounted sum of the stream of periodic 
payments over the n years of the contract, i. e. 
or 

















when the repayments are made at the end of each period. Defining 
a= (1 + g)/(1 + r, ) for ease of exposition, we may write equation (A 1.2) as 
M= moa + moat + moa3+" " "+moa" (A1.3) 
or 
M=moa(1+a+a2+"""+a"-') (A1.4) 
Multiplying equation (A1.4) by a and subtracting the result from (A1.4) yields 
or 
M(1-a)=amo(1-a") (A1.5) 
M_ moa(1- a") (A 1. G) 
1-a 
Substituting back in for a in equation (Al. 6) gives 










r,  -g 
(A1.8) 
Equation (A1.8) is the present value of n mortgage repayments that begin at the end of 
the first period at a level of ml and grow at a constant rate of g. To use this formula 
we must assume that the nominal rate of interest, rm, is greater than the rate of growth 
of the annuitised repayment, g, otherwise the long hand formulas of equations (Al. 1) 
and (Al. 2) must be used. Thus for a mortgage of value M, interest rate of r,  and 
mortgage maturity of n, the first repayment of a stream of payments growing at a rate 





This growing repayment contract is not a particularly common feature of UK 
mortgage loan contracts. Rather, the majority of mortgage loans have been of the 
fixed or variable rate type (or indeed a combination of both). Thus, with a zero 
predetermined growth rate of the annuitised repayments (i. e. g= 0), equation (Al. 7) 
becomes' 
m l+r,  
ll-(l+r, )-" 






M= (A1.11) rm 
1 We drop the subscript on the annuitised payment here since with a level payment mortgage all 
repayments will be identical. 
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Finally, the constant nominal payment which must be made by the borrower on a 
mortgage of size M over a term of n years at a rate of interest of r,  
is obtained by 




With a £50,000 level payment mortgage repayable over a 25 year amortisation period 
at a nominal interest rate of 7 per cent, the schedule of annual repayments made at the 
end of each year (calculated according to equation (Al. 12)) will look as follows. 









". """ of which interest 
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rM to h Of rM If! F- Of , Mtn "' r' ý' NNN 
Year 
APPENDIX 3.2 : SIMULATIONS OF ALTERNATIVE MORTGAGE DESIGNS 
Based on : £50,000 mortgage debt; 25 year amortisation period, annual repayment 
made at end of year, 3 per cent p. a. real interest rate, £15,000 initial borrower income 
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 4 
APPENDIX 4.1 : VARIABLES USED IN THE ANALYSIS 
Table A4.1.1: Variable Definitions 
Variable 
Name 
Variable Definition Source 
AIIJ Personal disposable income (£m) Economic Trends 
ALDO Personal gross financial assets (£m) Financial Statistics 
ARR Loans over 6 months in arrear at end period as a Housing Finance 
proportion of the number of outstanding mortgage 
loans 
A YR Loan to income ratio for first time buyers Housing Finance 
DSR Debt service ratio (debt repayments as a percentage Financial Statistics and 
of personal disposable income) Economic Trends 
DSTK Stock of owner-occupied dwellings (thousands) Housing and Construction 
Statistics Part 2 
POPN Percentage of population aged 25-29, mid-year Office for National Statistics, 
estimates Population Estimates 
PAHM Mix adjusted house price index (1990=100) Housing and Construction 
Statistics Part 2 
POSS Number of properties taken into possession in period Housing Finance 
as a proportion of the number of outstanding 
mortgage loans 
r,  MIRAS-adjusted basic rate on mortgages (per cent) Financial Statistics R(UG) Real user cost of owner occupied housing (per cent) Various sources (see Chapter 6) 
UNEW Unwithdrawn equity (ratio of the average house Housing and Construction 
price to the average mortgage loan size) (index) Statistics Part 2, Housing 
Finance and Financial Statistics 
UR Unemployment rate (per cent) Economic Trends 
ZLVF Loan to value ratio for first time buyers (per cent) Housing Finance 
Table A4.1.2 : Original Periodicity of Interpolated Variables 
Variable Definition Variable Name Availability 
Loans over 6 months in arrear ARR Annual and Bi-annual 
Stock of owner occupied dwellings DSTK Annual 
Proportion of population aged 25-29 POPN Annual 
Properties taken into possession POSS Annual and Bi-annual 
The EXPAND procedure in the econometrics package SAS was used to `expand' this 
non-quarterly data from its lower frequency interval (either annually or bi-annually) to 
the higher frequency interval (quarterly) by fitting a cubic spline curve to the data. 
The spline curve is simply a segmented function consisting of third degree (or cubic) 
polynomials joined together; the advantage of using such a function for interpolation 
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purposes is that the curve representing each distinct piece or segment is a continuous 
function and need not necessarily be a straight line (unlike simple `averaging' 
interpolation techniques, which are essentially variants of the methodology of 
piecewise linear regression)'. The procedure guarantees that the first and second 
derivatives will be continuous in contrast to the discontinuous derivatives which result 
from the fitting of straight line segments between the original data points. 
To see the effect of using this technique, consider the case where for a particular stock 
variable (y1) only bi-annual data is available Denoting quarterly time periods by t and 
assuming that the sample begins in period t and ends in period t+n, data points for this 
bi-annual variable will be observed at time periods t, t+2, t+4,..., t+n, interpolation 
then being required for periods t+1, t+3, t+5,..., t+n -1. This is illustrated below in 
Figure A4.1.1. Using standard linear interpolation, we would estimate the data point 
at time t+5, for example, to be simply (y,, 4 +Y, +6) 
/2 (labelled yL. s in the figure). 
Thus the interpolated data point at t+5 is clearly independent of the actual data point 
at, say, t+2. However, the estimation of a cubic spline function looks beyond the 
actual data points to each side of the required interpolated data point, and thus t+2 will 
be important (albeit to a lesser extent than t+4 or t+6) in determining the interpolated 
figure at time t+5 (a smooth spline curve is fitted to the data with y; 3 becoming the 
desired interpolated data point). 
Figure A4.1.1 :A Comparison between Spline and Linear Interpolation Techniques 
Y 





I t+1 1+2 t+3 1+4 1+5 1+6 Time 
' For a discussion of the theory and estimation of spline functions see Suits, Mason and Chan (1978). 
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Attention must be drawn to the technique used to interpolate those series in which 
data frequencies are combined. Consider, for example, a time series for which only 
annual data is available for the first half of the sample period with bi-annual data 
becoming available during the second period (such as the arrears and possessions 
series discussed in the main text). This situation is shown in Stage 1 of Figure A4.1.2 
below. 

















Stage I Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4 
Using straight-line estimation techniques, it would be valid simply to interpolate a 
quarterly series from the annual portion of the data sample and then separately 
interpolate a quarterly series from the biannual data, following which the two 
quarterly series may be combined. 
However, this method will be inefficient when using the cubic spline estimation 
technique since only a subsample of the whole data set would be used when 
estimating any interpolated figure. Instead, the procedure set out below is followed. 
Firstly, the bi-annual observations in the data series are aggregated such that an annual 
series is constructed for the whole of the sample period; no special interpolation 
procedures are required for this, just a perception of whether the biannual data 
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represents end of period stock values (in which case the annual figure is taken to be 
the value for the second half of the year), flow values over the period (in which case 
the annual figure will be represented by the summation of the two bi-annual figures), 
or period averages (where the annual figure will be represented by a simple average of 
the two bi-annual figures). This complete annual series is then interpolated to achieve 
a bi-annual series. Then, the interpolated potion of this complete bi-annual series is 
combined with the original raw bi-annual data to achieve a complete bi-annual series 
(Stage 3). Finally, this whole bi-annual time series is then interpolated to achieve the 
quarterly data series as required (Stage 4). This method of interpolation for series 
exhibiting multiple frequencies, despite being tedious, ensures that all available raw 
data is used at each stage of the procedure, thus ensuring no loss of information or 
efficiency in the interpolation of `missing' data points. 
APPENDIX 4.2 : UNIT ROOT TESTS 
Notation :A: Akaike Information Criterion (1974) 
S: Schwartz Criterion (1978) 
H: Hannan-Quinn Criterion (1979) 
L: LM Test Decision 
In : Denotes the natural logarithm of a variable 
R: Denotes a real variable 
All variable names and definitions are given in Table A4.1.1 of Appendix 4.1. The 
variables in levels in the tables below appear in the form they take in the cointegrating 
model as discussed in the main text of the chapter. The shaded cells in the tables 
below indicate the rejection of the null hypothesis of a unit root at the 5 per cent level, 
the ADF t-statistic being greater than the critical value. The tables would suggest that 
the ADF t-tests are strongly influenced by the choice of lag length. 
Table A4.2.1 : ADF Unit Root t-Tests (with constant, no time trend) : Levels 
Variable ADF (A) ADF (S) ADF (H) ADF (L) A S H L 
1nR(AIIJ) -0.5394 -0.7093 -0.7093 -0.6432 8 2 2 1 
InR(ALDO) 0.3445 0.3445 0.3445 0.3445 1 1 1 1 
InARR -0.7824 -1.0844 -1.0844 -1.0844 6 4 4 4 
inAYR -1.6010 -1.3083 -1.6010 -1.3083 6 1 6 1 
InDSR -1.6726 -1.5221 -1.6726 -1.5908 6 0 6 1 
1nDSTK -1.7871 -1.7272 -1.7272 -1.7871 7 3 3 7* 
1nINFL -0.3833 -0.7988 -0.3833 -0.3833 8 5 8 8 
1nR(PAHM) -2.3118 4 -2.3118 -2.7418 4 2 4 3 
1nPOPN -1.8938 -1.8938 -1.8938 -1.8938 8 8 8 8 
1nPOSS -0.9594 -1.0085 -1.0085 -0.9594 8 4 4 8* 
R(rm) -1.0672 -1.0975 -1.2781 -1.0975 8 4 7 4 
R(UC) 
UNEW I 
"3.71; : 2 6 
3; 7136 , 
9916 2 
-3: 713 '" 3.7 3 
-2 9916 -2 9 
1 1 1 1 
n - . : y . . 
2 2 2 2 
InUR -2.4837 =2.9714 .= , 
2; 9714 " -2.6581 7 2 2 1+ 
Critical value at the 5 per cent level of significance is -2.89 
2 This is the first lag for which the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation in the residual series cannot be 
rejected. Under the null hypothesis the LM statistic will follow a, 2 with 4 degrees of freedom; at the 5 
per cent level of significance the critical value is 9.49. If serial correlation remains in the model for all lags of up to order 8, then the chosen lag length is that with the lowest LM test statistic and is indicated bya*. 
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Table A4.2.2 : ADF Unit Root t-Tests (with constant and time trend) : Levels 
Variable ADF (A) ADF (S) ADF (H) ADF (L) A S H L 
InR(AIIJ) L-3.8ä8-2.6991 -2.6991 6 2 6 2 
InR(ALDO) -2.2558 -2.2558 -2.2558 -2.2558 1 1 1 1 
InARR -2.2817 -2.4845 -2.4845 -2.4845 6 4 4 4 
1nAYR -1.9052 -1.6570 -1.9052 -1.6570 6 1 6 1 
InDSR -2.6206 -1.5098 -2.6206 -1.5098 
6 0 6 0 
1nDSTK -2.5262 -2.5262 -2.5262 -2.5262 
3 3 3 3* 
InINFL -1.8908 -2.3546 -1.8908 -1.8908 
8 5 8 8* 
1nR(PAHM -2.7909 -4.1585 -4.1585 
4.1585 l 4 2 2 2 
1nPOPN -3 
8395 -3.8395 8395 -3. , 8395 - 
-3 8 8 8 8* 
InPOSS t- aßä22 0. 
ý.; 71 
_ -T-397p 
8 3 5 5 
R(rm) -2.2492 -2.0306 -2.6473 -s ' -2.6473 
7 4 6 6 
R(UC) 5.68p7 -5.6807 -5. 
G807 -5.6807 ;' - 
1 1 1 1 
InUNEW 44 _-4494-5-- ,- 
45 
-4 
4 AQ45, 2 2 2 2 
InUR -1.7725 -2.8615 -2.8615 -2.1613 7 2 2 4* 
Critical value at the 5 per cent level of significance is -3.46 
Table A4.2.3 : ADF Unit Root t-Tests (with constant, no time trend) : Differences 
Variable ADF (A) ADF (S) ADF (H) ADF (L) A S H L 
O1nR(AIIJ) x. 5893 -5: 7655 1 '-57655' -`-',, --12.0234, -. 7 1 1 0 A1nR(ALDO) -7.6317 -7.6317. -7.6317 
-7.6317 0 0 0 0 
A1n4RR -3.3034 -3.0943 3.09.43 -3 0943. 5 3 3 3 
A1nAYR -3.6956 -6.7294 3 2.85 66 -6? 
294-%` 8 0 5 0 




2 5K 5 0 5 0 
1I1nDSTK -1.8544 -1.6622 ý - 
-1.6622 
' -1.6622 
6 2 2 2 
O1nINFL F -3.1891 -4.5956 
-3.1891 57 8 4 8 7 
A1nR(PAHA? ) -3.8128 _,. -3.8128 - ., - . 
3.8128 -3 8128 t' 3 3 3 3 
AlnPOPN -2.0432 -2.0432 -2.0432 -2.0386 7 7 7 8+ 
OInPOSS -3.8299 -4.6671 -; 
4.6671 'r r_, -4.4258 ;;, 8 3 3 6* 
OR(rm) -4.4583 -6.7064 . 
4: 1543 3 6845 7 3 6 5 
AR(UGý -6.2225 -ä, 
97l8 -6.225. X5: 3955A 5 ý 2 1 2 0 
e1nUNEW -4.621 2,9223 -3 
8423 ° ý -3.9319 4 1 3 0 
elf UR -4 3221. . 
k. -; 4.3221. -4: 322 i ' ý. , ý. ý `, `-3.564 t; 6 6 6 2 
Critical value at the 5 per cent level of significance is -2.89 
Table A4.2.4: ADF Unit Root t-Tests (with constant and time trend) : Differences 
Variable ADF A ADF S ADF (H) ADF (L) A S H L 
M1nR(AIIJ) y3,5756 ,y ý-5.7422 -5.7422 -11.9694 7 1 1 0 
AInR(ALDO) - 780. ' °- 80 -. 
78 8 0 0 0 0 
A1nARR -3.2528 -3.0316 -3.0316 -3.0316 5 3 
3 3 
AInA YR -327`¢2: 7. -2.8716 -2.8716 
8 0 5 5 
AlnDSR -3.2121 -3.2121 =6.6 2 
5 0 5 1 
A1aDSTK -2.1152 -1.9757 -1.9757 -1.9757 
6 2 2 2 
OInINFL -3.3228 ,". 7 -3.3228 73b 8 3 
8 7 
A1nR(PAHAO $895 _1 "3. $89 __ _ý. -3 
9&.. 3 3 3 3 
AlnPOPN -2.0299 -2.0299 -2.0299 -2.0225 7 7 7 8* 
A1nPOSS 74.62 -4: 3769 8 3 3 6* 
1. R(r. ) 4.4167 '' `. -6.6677 -4.1129 -3.6442 7 3 6 5 
OR(UG') -6.1963 5.94 ,,.,, -6.1963 -5 
36$9 2 1 2 0 
AlnUNEW °-4.2814 -2.8521 -4.2814 -3.9317 1 4 1 4 0 
A1nUR 4.2782 t'` E-4.2782 -4.2782 -3.5255 6 6 6 2 
Critical value at the 5 per cent level of significance is -3.46 
The tables above suggest that the level variables 1nUNEW, R(UC), lnR(PAHM), 
1nPOPN and 1nPOSS could be stationary3 and that the first differences of 1nDSTK, 
InPOPN and 1nARR could be non-stationary at the 5 per cent level of significance. 
For each of these variables, the autocorrelation function and time series plots are 
examined upon which it is concluded that the level variables are integrated of order I 
and their differences of order zero, suggesting that all of the level series can be 
incorporated in the cointegrating relationships presented in the main text. 
The results are suggestive of trend stationarity, particularly in the cases of latter three variables. 
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APPENDIX 4.3 : RESULTS FROM COINTEGRATING REGRESSIONS 
The estimation results for the three cointegrating equations of real house prices, 
arrears and possessions are presented below as specified both with and without a 
constant term. All are estimated over both the full sample period and a sample period 
restricted to the same length as that of B&J4. The results are presented in the tables 
below for the following estimation techniques : Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Park's 
(1992) Canonical Cointegrating Regression (CCR) estimator, Phillips and Hansen's 
(1990) Fully Modified estimator and Phillips' (1993) Fully Modified estimator. 
As discussed in Section 4.3.2.1, the CCR estimator of Park (1992) produces superior 
results to the other estimators, and this is confirmed in the tables below by a 
comparison of the magnitude and signing of the CCR coefficients with the super- 
consistent OLS estimates. t-statistics are reported in parentheses, although for the 
OLS results the standard t-statistics will be invalid. 
4 The full sample period begins in 1971Q1 for real house prices and 1969Q4 for arrears and 
possessions, and for all series ends in 1995Q4. The restricted sample is defined as 1971QI-1990Q3 for 
the house price equation and 1970Q3-1991Q2 for the arrears and possessions equations (for data 
availability reasons the start dates of the restricted samples are not quite identical to those of B&J). 
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" Full Sample Period Estimations 
Table A4.3.1 : Estimates of the Long Run Cointegrating Real House Price Equation 
With Constant; Dependent Variable: 1nR(PAHM) 
OLS Park (1992) Phillips-Hansen 
(1990) 
Phillips (1993) 
Constant -14.4317 -15.7793 -22.2108 -58.8114 
(-9.95) (-9.79) (-12.71) 
lnR(AIIj) 0.2833 -0.3750 -1.2929 1.0900 
(0.77) (-0.90) (-3.15) 
InR(ALDO) 0.2653 0.3118 0.0562 -1.6183 
(3.15) (3.63) (0.57) 
1nDSTK 0.8196 1.6619 3.4023 7.2563 
(1.80) (2.93) (6.50) 
1nPOPN 1.6688 1.6365 3.4111 1.5793 
(6.67) (7.94) (11.56) 
R(UC) 0.0046 0.0104 0.0036 -0.0919 
(1.02) (1.67) (0.70) 
1nINFL 0.0942 0.1312 0.1451 -1.2018 (2.95) (5.25) (4.03) 
InPOSS -0.1878 -0.2256 -0.2934 -0.9675 (-6.69) (-6.36) (-9.071 
t-statistics in parentheses 
Table A4.3.2 : Estimates of the Long Run Cointegrating Real House Price Equation 
Without Constant; Dependent Variable : 1nR(PAHR? ) 
OLS Park (1992) Phillips-Hansen 
(1990) 
Phillips (1993) 
lnR(AIIJ) 1.3611 0.1858 0.2166 -1.7349 (2.71) (0.40) (0.31) 
InR(ALDO) 0.2554 0.5664 -0.0390 2.1525 (2.12) (4.56) (-0.22) 
1nDSTK -1.8147 -0.8708 -0.4352 0.2545 (-3.43) (-1.72) (-0.59) 
1nPOPN 1.3059 1.0941 3.2364 -4.5795 (3.68) (3.63) (6.37) 
R(UG) 0.0106 0.0215 0.0102 0.1055 
(1.66) (2.03) (1.14) 
1nINFL 0.0104 0.1507 0.0047 -0.0678 (0.24) (3.97) (0.07) 
1nPOSS 0.0152 -0.0041 0.0304 -0.5249 (0.55) (-0.14) (0.79) 
t-statistics in parentheses 
Table A4.3.3 : Estimates of the Long Run Cointegrating Arrears Equation With 
Constant; Dependent Variable : 1nARR 
OLS Park (1992) Phillips-Hansen 
(1990) 
Phillips (1993) 
Constant -3.9454 -0.8646 1.1340 -56.8273 
(-1.25) (-0.18) (0.22) 
InUR 0.0163 0.1300 0.1255 -1.9020 
(0.23) (1.17) (1.11) 
lnR(AW) 1.3256 0.8749 0.8275 2.6272 
(4.28) (1.78) (1.69) 
1nAYR 1.4023 2.3487 1.9599 3.1538 
(3.44) (2.93) (3.06) 
InUNEW -3.0303 -2.7139 -3.0019 4.5119 (-16.38) (-9.45) (-10.10) 
InDSR 0.4916 0.3982 0.4390 2.6223 
(4.24) (1.99) (2.39) 
t-statistics in parentheses 
Table A4.3.4 : Estimates of the Long Run Cointegrating Arrears Equation Without 
Constant; Dependent Variable : 1nARR 
OLS Park (1992) Phillips-Hansen 
(1990) 
Phillips (1993) 
InUR 0.0496 0.1043 0.1093 -1.1245 
(0.74) (1.33) (1.05) 
InR(AII. I) 0.9558 0.8777 0.9135 -1.9969 
(10.29) (8.58) (6.28) 
1nAYR 1.5324 1.8982 1.9321 5.0258 
(3.88) (3.34) (3.16) 
InUNEW -3.0828 -2.9257 -2.9643 2.4404 (-17.06) (. 14.73) (-10.50) 
InDSR 0.5933 0.5255 0.4542 3.2584 
(7.15) (5.94) (3.55) 
t-statistics in parentheses 
Table A4.3.5 : Estimates of the Long Run Cointegrating Possessions Equation With 
Constant; Dependent Variable : 1nPOSS 
OLS Park (1992) Phillips-Hansen 
(1990) 
Phillips (1993) 
Constant -7.2846 -14.3046 -16.6411 -24.4853 
(-3.61) (-2.01) (-2.24) 
InARR 1.1290 1.5199 1.1906 1.7992 
(7.41) (3.43) (2.17) 
R(rm) 0.0278 0.0114 0.0238 -0.0452 (2.37) (0.22) (0.58) 
InUNEW 1.0522 3.0814 2.7720 4.0559 
(1.48) (1.25) (1.08) 
InR(PAH1l? ) -0.0979 -0.5768 0.2878 0.8193 (-0.26) (-0.51) (0.21) 
t-statistics in parentheses 
Table A4.3.6 : Estimates of the Long Run Cointegrating Possessions Equation 
Without Constant; Dependent Variable : 1nPOSS 
OLS Park (1992) Phillips-Hansen 
(1990) 
Phillips (1993) 
1nARR 0.7144 0.7357 0.4311 -1.1735 (6.75) (7.42) (1.08) 
R(rm) 0.0234 -0.0189 -0.0174 -0.1175 (1.90) (-0.49) (-0.37) 
InUNEW -1.2702 -1.5976 -2.1685 -7.3232 (-3.98) (-2.93) (-1.79) 
InR(PAHM) 0.6428 1.0056 1.6078 7.0528 
(1.89) (1.68) (1.24) 
t-statistics in parentheses 
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" Restricted Sample Period Estimations 
Table A4.3.7 : Estimates of the Long Run Cointegrating Real House Price Equation 
With Constant; Dependent Variable: 1nR(PAHM) 
OLS Park (1992) Phillips-Hansen 
(1990) 
Phillips (1993) 
Constant -13.4403 -14.0372 -15.6726 -20.0924 
(-16.56) (-21.64) (-19.12) 
InR(AIIJ) 1.7694 0.9875 1.4334 1.2550 
(7.65) (5.12) (6.61) 
InR(ALDO) 0.1716 0.1156 0.0428 -0.2332 (3.39) (3.79) (0.86) 
InDSTK -0.8574 0.2361 -0.1230 0.7356 
(-2.99) (0.89) (-0.45) 
InPOPN 1.5794 1.4128 1.9340 2.8846 
(11.11) (20.79) (13.71) 
R(UC) 0.0102 -0.0022 0.0086 0.0079 (3.99) (-0.73) (3.55) 
InINFL -0.0066 0.0202 -0.0470 -0.1442 (-0.31) (1.45) (-2.31) 
InPOSS -0.1312 -0.1305 -0.1831 -0.2827 (-7.49) (-10.01) (-10.81) 
t-statistics in parentheses 
Table A4.3.8 : Estimates of the Long Run Cointegrating Real House Price Equation 
Without Constant; Dependent Variable : InR(PAHM) 
OLS Park (1992) Phillips-Hansen 
(1990) 
Phillips (1993) 
InR(AIIJ) 3.0327 2.6922 3.4427 3.3468 
(6.34) (6.62) (6.59) 
1nR(ALDO) 0.1583 0.0795 -0.2000 -0.1551 (1.43) (0.89) (-1.58) 
InDSTK -3.6116 -3.0298 -3.7948 -3.6696 (-7.08) (-6.78) (-6.81) 
1nPOPN 1.2633 0.9226 2.3760 1.4755 
(4.10) (4.27) (6.78) 
R(UG) 0.0174 0.0099 0.0181 0.0888 
(3.15) (1.37) (2.99) 
1nINFL -0.0852 -0.0570 -0.2018 -0.4294 (. 1.86) (-1.62) (-3.91) 
1nPOSS 0.0742 0.1050 0.0892 -0.3945 (2.74) (4.67) (3.02) 
t-statistics in parentheses 
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Table A4.3.9 : Estimates of the Long Run Cointegrating Arrears Equation With 
Constant; Dependent Variable : 1nARR 
OLS Park (1992) Phillips-Hansen 
(1990) 
Phillips (1993) 
Constant 15.2396 16.9203 17.9805 -25.6492 
(4.00) (2.95) (3.39) 
1nUR 0.1333 0.1458 0.1423 -0.3320 
(2.51) (2.20) (1.90) 
lnR(A11. I) -0.8977 -1.0924 -1.2245 1.3791 (-2.11) (-1.68) (-2.07) 
1nAYR 1.9407 2.4029 2.4087 3.3032 
(6.79) (5.87) (6.00) 
InUNEW -2.2337 -2.2232 -2.1655 1.3418 
(-11.91) (-10.43) (-8.02) 
InDSR 0.9954 1.0307 1.0870 0.5947 
(8.18) (4.63) (6.40) 
t-statistics in parentheses 
Table A4.3.10 : Estimates of the Long Run Cointegrating Arrears Equation Without 
Constant; Dependent Variable : 1nARR 
OLS Park (1992) Phillips-Hansen 
(1990) 
Phillips (1993) 
1nUR 0.0147 -0.0298 -0.0172 -0.3288 (0.31) (-0.33) (-0.20) 
lnR(AIIJ) 0.7719 0.8099 0.9483 -4.7189 (8.86) (7.33) (6.00) 
InAYR 1.4237 1.6028 1.6842 6.2437 
(5.12) (2.63) (3.47) 
InUNEW -2.5910 -2.7060 -2.9959 8.8911 (-14.40) (-12.71) (-9.21) 
1nDSR 0.5591 0.5831 0.4791 2.6871 
(9.44) (5.48) (4.67) 
t-statistics in parentheses 
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Table A43.11 : Estimates of the Long Run Cointegrating Possessions Equation With 
Constant; Dependent Variable : 1nPOSS 
OLS Park (1992) Phillips-Hansen 
(1990) 
Phillips (1993) 
Constant -9.5495 -18.4579 -25.5247 -36.5318 
(-3.52) (-2.99) (-3.68) 
InARR 1.6055 2.3061 2.5869 2.1100 
(6.84) (5.63) (4.41) 
R(r) 0.0134 0.0086 -0.0142 -0.0334 (0.99) (0.21) (-0.42) 
InUNEW 2.0450 4.4877 6.1239 7.5835 
(2.22) (2.15) (2.63) 
inR(PANLf) -0.5591 -0.9504 -1.0017 -0.1410 (4.26) (-1.04) (-0.90) 
t-statistics in parentheses 
Table A4.3.12 : Estimates of the Long Run Cointegrating Possessions Equation 
Without Constant; Dependent Variable : InPOSS 
OLS Park (1992) Phillips-Hansen 
(1990) 
Phillips (1993) 
InARR 0.9909 1.0675 0.4789 -4.5683 (5.90) (6.58) (0.88) 
R(r_) 0.0156 -0.0029 -0.0100 0.0422 
(1.08) (-0.07) (-0.22) 
InUNEW -0.9780 -1.4872 -2.7311 -10.8104 (-2.70) (-2.57) (-2.33) 
1nR(PAHM) 0.3763 0.9982 2.2811 10.2311 
(0.99) (1.53) (1.85) 
I-statistics in parentheses 
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 5 
APPENDIX 5.1 : DERIVATION OF THE LAGRANGE MULTIPLIER 
Given that the Lagrange multiplier (y) is zero when %=0, y is derived here for Cases 
2 and 3 alone. 
" Case 2: A=1, Complete Member Orientation 
For %=1, the optimal rates are given in equations (5.59) and (5.60) in the main text, 
i. e. 
and 
.Xp r` _ 2(1+r) 
+ 2a 
(A5.1) 
"Y+q (A5.2) rs = 2(1 +, v) 2ß 
where X= 2rß + y(r, + rDM + CL) and Y= 2rß + y(r + row - Cs) . Substituting 
these optimal rates into the budget constraint of equation (5.17), cancelling terms and 
rearranging gives 
zi P+R+ P(rLm - rDM - CL) + 9(r0 - rsm - 
CS) 
_ ar r 4a 4ß 22 u' o"' 
2 ßY2 





2(1+y) 2(1+y) 2(1+y) 2(1+y) 2(1+y) 2(1+y) 
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Multiplying both sides by [2(1+y)]2, expanding Y and X, collecting terms and 
rearranging gives 
p2(1+y)2 /a+q2(1+y)2 //3+2p(r, _r Dm -CL)(1+y)2 
+2q(rDm-r , -Cs)(1+y)2-[2(l+y)]ZE (A5.4) 
+2(1+y){ayrrM + 2ayrDMCL +aXL2 +2arL2m +ayr 
-2QYCsrDM +ß)CC 
+ßYrDM +2ßr +fYrL Z aZ2 +ßY2 
Expanding terms in Y2 and X2 and rearranging gives 
p2(1+y)2 /a+q2(1+y)2 //3+2p(r -rDM -CL)(l+y)2 
+2q(rDu -rSw -Cs)(1+Y)2 -[2(1+Y)12 Ez (A5.5) 
-(y2 +2y)(ark +07DM + aCi +2arDMCL -2a7LUCL -2ar1rDM 
+ßrL + ß'DM 
22 + PCs' - 2,6CSrDM -2 SMrDM + 
2ßrrMC ) 





4E- [p2 /a+q2 /ß+2p(rL -rDM -CL)+2q(rDu -rte -CS)] 
Finally, given that the budget constraint holds as an equality we may solve (A5.6) as a 
quadratic equation, giving an expression for yas 
i 
Z 1/2 -1 (A5.7) 
-Cs)2] SU 
as shown in equation (5.63) in the main text, where 
z 
Z=4E- p +q +2p(rLm -rom -CL)+2q(rDv -rte - C's (A5.8) a8 
396 
" Case 3: A= 0.5, Equal Weighting on Member Benefits and Profit 
For A, = 05, the optimal rates are 
+ CL +P (A5.9) rLm + rm, + CL rnu- r 2a rL- 2-Y 
and 
r. _r+ 
rrM - Cs + rr - rDM 
+ Cs 
-q (A5.10) s2 4r 2ß 
Substituting these optimal loan and savings rate equations into the budget constraint 
of equation (5.17), cancelling terms and rearranging givesl 
(1_J(c(rLu_rDM_CL)2+ß(rDM_rsf_Cs)2]ý 
(A5.11) 
4K-[p2 /a+q2 /ß+2p(r -rDM -CL) +2q(rrM -rsm -CS)] 
Finally, given that the budget constraint holds as an equality we solve equation 
(A5.11) as a quadratic, giving an expression for yas 
=1 r 4Z 1/2 
(A5.12) 
[4- 
a(r -rDM -CL)2 +ß(roM -rf -CS)Z 
as shown in equation (5.67) in the text, where Z is as defined previously. 
1 The algebra involved in this process is long and tedious, arising from the necessity to expand squared terms in the optimal rates of equations (A5.9) and (A5.10) and thus is not reported here. 
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APPENDIX 5.2 : THE SIGN OF THE HESSIAN MATRIX OF SECOND 
DERIVATIVES OF THE OBJECTIVE AND CONSTRAINT FUNCTIONS 
A5.2.1 The Complete Objective Function 
From equation (5.20) in the main text, the objective function (Q) is written 
Q= A(r,  -rL)f(ri)+2(rs - r)g(rs)+(1-A)rif(ri) 
- (1- A)rsg(rs) - (1- A, )rDM {. f (rL) - g(rs)} (A5.13) 
-(1-A)CL. f(ri)-(1-A, )CsS(rs)-(1-A)E 
with first and second derivatives with respect to rL 
Q. 
ý _-Ai(rc)+, 
(r r-rL)f' (rL)+(1-1%)f(rL) (A5.14) 
+(1-l%)rLf'(rL)-(1-A)rDMf'(rL)-(1-2)CLI'(rc) 
and 
-/If' (rL) - 
2f' (rL) + /Z(r,, - rL )f (rL ) 
+(1- , )f'(rL)+(1-A)f'(rL)+(1-A)rLf"(rL) (A5.15) 






+ f"(rL)[A(rzm -rL)+(1-A)rL -(1-A)rDm -(1-A)CL] 
which reduces to 
Qrcrt =' f(rL)[2(l - 2) - 22] (A5.17) 
on the assumption that f" (rL) =0. 
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The objective function has first and second derivatives with respect to rs as follows 
Q, 





Qvs = 2(rs -r,, )g" (rs )+ Ag, (rs )+ Ag, (rs ) 
-0- , )rsg"(rs)-0-A)g'(rs)-(1-A)g'(rs (A5.19) 
+(1- l%)r,. g', (rs) -0- A)Csg', (rs) 
or 
Qrsr3 = S(rs)[2/%-2(1-2)} 
+S' (rs)[i(rs -rte)-(1-A)rs +(1-2)rDM -(1- %)CC 
(A5.20) 
ý 
which reduces to 
Qrsrs 
-S'(rs)[2A, -2(1-i%)] (A5.21) 
on the assumption that g" (rs) = 0. The Hessian matrix for the objective function 
may then be written using equations (A5.17) and (A5.21) as equation (5.70) in the 
main text shows. 
A5.2.2 NGL and NGS Functions 
From equation (5.12) in the main text, we have 
NGL = (r, - rL )L = (r, - rL) f (rL) (A5.22) 
with first and second derivatives with respect to rL of 
NGL,, =(r, -rL)f'(rL)-f(rc) (A5.23) 
and 
NGLriri = (r,, -ri )f" (ri) - 2fß (rc) (A5.24) 
which reduces to 
NGLr, r` = -2f '(rL) >0 
(A5.25) 
on the assumption that f" (rL) = 0. 
Similarly, from equation (5.13) in the text, we have 
NGS = (r3 -r )S = (rs - rsw)g(rs) (A5.26) 
with first and second derivatives with respect to rs 
NGS, 
3 = 





which reduces to 
NGSýSrs = 2g' (rs) >0 (A5.29) 
on the assumption that g" (re) = 0. 
The Hessian matrix for the member benefits part of the objective function in equation 
(5.16) may then be written 
H- 
[_2J'(rL) 0 
0 2g' (rs ) 
(A5.30) 
The Hessian matrix is positive definite irrespective of the value of '% thus indicating 
convexity of underlying objective function. 
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A5.2.3 The Constraint Function 
From equation (5.21) in the main text, the constraint function is 
n' = ri, i(ri) - rsg(rs) - rDM {f (rL) - S(rs)) (A5.31) 
-CLI(TU)-Csg(rs)-E z0 
with first and second derivatives with respect to rL of 
; r",, _f(ri)+rif'(rL)-rDMf'(rL)-CLf'(rL) (A5.32) 
and 
rrLrt =f'(rL)+f'(rL)+rLf"(rL)-rDMf"(ri)-CLf"(rL) (A5.33) 
= 2f'(rL) + f"(rL)[rL -roe, -CL] 
which reduces to 
; rrLrL =2 f' (rL) (A5.34) 
on the assumption that f" (rL) = 0. 
The constraint function has first and second derivatives with respect to rs as follows 
7cs =-rSS1(rs)-S(rs)+roMe(rs)-CS91(rs) (A5.35) 
and 
, 5rs = -rsg"(rs) -ge(rs) - ga(rs) +rrMg"(rs) - 
Csg"(rs) 
=-2g'(rs)+go I (rs)[rDU -rs -CSI 
(A5.36) 
which reduces to 
; rrsrs = -2gß (re) (A5.37) 
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on the assumption that g" (rs) = 0. The Hessian matrix for the constraint function 
may then be written using equations (A5.34) and (A5.37) as equation (5.69) in the 
main text shows. The Hessian matrix is negative definite irrespective of A thus 
indicating the concavity of the underlying constraint function. 
A5.2.4 The Bordered Hessian Matrix for the Optimisation Problem 
The bordered Hessian matrix may be written as 
o &L &S 
H= ° °1t 
all 
(A5.38) &L aL aLrs 
O ate d2. e 
2 cg's aSrL Gis 
We require that the determinant of (A5.38) is greater than 0. Given the assumption of 
-Olt 
°l 











To evaluate IHI we find expressions for the second partial derivatives of the 
Lagrangian function with respect to rL and rs. 











QrLrL = 2f'(rL)[1-22-y]+ f''(ri)[2(rrm -rL)+(1-2)rL (A5.42) 
-(1-2)rDM -(1-A)CL -y(rL -rDM -CL)A 
which reduces to 
=2 f'(ri)[1-2#%- y] (A5.43) iriri 
on the assumption that f" (rL) = 0. 
Q, 
s = 
2(rs - rsM)S'(rs) + Ag(rs) - (1- ý, )rsgl (rs ) 
-(1-'%)S(rs)+(1-A)rDMS, (rs)-(1- t)Csg'(rs) (A5.44) 
+rSgo(rs)+n(rs)-YrDMgo(rs)+Yggl (rs) 
and 
, ý, ý _ 
A, (rs -r )g"(rs)+2g'(rs)+., g'(rs)-(1-. )rsg"(rs) 
-(1- 1)g'(r$)-(1-2)g'(r$)+(1-I%)r g"(rs)-(1-l%)Csg"(rs) (A5.45) 
+/'r5g"(rs) +/O'(rs) +Ig'(rs)-/r g"V5)+) sg11(rs) 
or 
Irss =2g'(rs)[2A-1+Y]+g"(rs)[A(rs-rs")-(1-A)rs 
+(1-A, )rDM -(1-2)Cs +Y(rs -rDM +Cs)] 
(A5.46) 
which reduces to 
4rsrs =-2ö'(r8)[i-2A, -y] (A5.47) 
on the assumption that g" (rs) =0. 
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2(1-2. %+Y)g'(rs) >0 (A5.48) 
LA'S L 
For this expression to be unequivocally positive, we require the first term in the square 
brackets to be negative and the second term positive. Since f' (rL) is assumed 
negative and g'(rs) positive from equations (5.43) and (5.44) in the main text, the 




Substituting in for y as given in equation (5.47) in the main text, the condition 
becomes 
Z 12 
> 2(2., -1) (A5.51) 
1 
Ia(riM - roM - CL )2 +ß(rDM - rs,, - Cs)2 J 
or 
<2 1 (A5.52) 4-z vz 
1- 
[a(r -rDM -CL )2 +ß(rDM -rsM -C3)2] 




[a(rus - rDM - CL )2 +Q(rDM - r&W - Cs )2 ] 
would ensure a maximum of the objective function Q subject to the profit constraint. 
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For A=0.5, to ensure the existence of a maximum of Q subject to the non-negative 





which must be the case if we take the positive root of the term in square brackets. 
Clearly, when A=0 we have y=0 and condition (A5.50) will always be satisfied. 
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 6 
APPENDIX 6.1 : FIGURES OF THE COINTEGRATED SERIES 
Figure A6.1.1 : Total Real Net Advances Secured on Dwellings, R(AAPR) (£m, 











Figure A6.1.2 : The Inflation Rate, INFL, and the Real After-Tax Mortgage Interest 
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Figure A6.1.4 : Value of Personal Sector Dwelling Stock per Pound of Outstanding 
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Figure A6.1.9 : Cost of Mortgage Interest Relief at Source per Pound of Outstanding 
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APPENDIX 6.2 : THE X11 PROCEDURE FOR SEASONAL ADJUSTMENT 
The following discussion of the X11 procedure is adapted from the manual of the 
statistical package SAS. 
The X11 procedure in SAS performs three iterations providing estimates of seasonal 
(S), trading day (TD), trend cycle (C) and irregular (1) components of equation (6.6) in 
the main text, with each iteration generating more refined estimates. 
Iteration 1: A centred 4 period moving average is applied to the original series (0) 
to provide an initial estimate of the trend cycle series. The original 
series is then divided by this trend cycle component to yield an estimate 
of the seasonal and irregular components (denoted the S-I ratio). 
A moving average is then applied to the S-I ratio to obtain the seasonal 
factors, which are divided into the S-I ratio series to obtain the irregular 
component. A moving standard deviation of the irregular component is 
used to assign weights to the quarterly irregular values to measure each 
observation's degree of extremity, the weights then being used to 
modify the extreme values of the S-I ratio series. New seasonal factors 
are estimated by taking the moving average of this adjusted S-I ratio 
component. A preliminary seasonally adjusted series is then 
constructed by dividing the original series by these seasonal factors. A 
preliminary estimate of the trend cycle is obtained by applying a 
weighted moving average to this seasonally adjusted series (i. e. 
removing the irregular component from the seasonally adjusted series). 
In a similar manner, the trading day components are identified and 
removed also. 
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Iteration 2: Using the same computations, a second iteration is performed on the 
original series that has been adjusted by both the trading day factors 
and irregular weights from iteration 1. Final estimates of the trading 
day factors and irregular weights are thereby produced. 
Iteration 3: The final iteration is performed using the original series that has been 
adjusted for trading day factors and irregular weights computed during 
the second iteration. Final estimates of seasonal factors, the seasonally 
adjusted series, trend cycle and irregular components are produced. 
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APPENDIX 6.3 : UNIT ROOT TESTS 
Notation :A: Akaike Information Criterion (1974) 
S: Schwartz Criterion (1978) 
H: Hannan-Quinn Criterion (1979) 
L: LM Test Decision' 
In : Denotes the natural logarithm of a variable 
R: Denotes a real variable 
All variable names are given in Section 6.4 of the main text. The variables in levels in 
the tables below appear in the form they will take in the cointegrating model of 
Chapter 7. The shaded cells in the tables below indicate the rejection of the null 
hypothesis of a unit root at the 5 per cent level, the ADF t-statistic being greater than 
the critical value. The tables would suggest that the ADF t-tests are strongly 
influenced by the choice of lag length, as we saw in Appendix 4.2. 
WHOLE SAMPLE PERIOD : 1969Q1-1995Q4 
Table A6.3.1a : ADF Unit Root t-Tests (with constant, no time trend) : Levels 
Variable 
0 1 2 3 
Laps 
4 5 6 7 8 A 
Lag Cntens 
SH L 
InR(. 4APR) -1.6282 -1.9484 -1.9491 -1.9035 -1.8683 -1.8723 -1.9083 -1.9627 -1.7959 1 1 1 0 
R(Rm) -1.2940 -1.6467 -1.5986 -1.7337 -1.0975 -1.2161 -1.5909 -12781 -1.0672 8 4 7 4 
lnR(RA. 4U) -2.8061 -1.7738 -1.6072 . 13568 . 1.4864 -1.6308 -1.7128 -1.7282 . 1.5252 1 1 1 1 
InZLVF -0.6324 -2.0808 -2.3367 -1.6709 -1.6468 -2.3404 -1.9375 -1.5095 -1.1477 8 1 5 5 
InCOLLAT 1.6190 . 1.9910 -1.7791 -0.9154 -0.4948 -0.5149 . 0.6021 -0.7769 . 0.4693 4 3 4 3 
lnR(PAHM . 1.9960 ß. 5043  -2.7418 . 2.3118 . 2.1965 -2.1831 -2.2313 -2.1008 4 2 4 3 
InR(ALDO) 0.7312 0.3445 0.3123 0.2077 0.5231 0.4077 0.4073 0.4516 0.4472 1 1 1 1 
1nJNFL . 0.6600 . 1.1161 . 1.2406 -1.3247 . 0.3088 -0.7988 "1.0782 -1.0864 -0.3833 8 S 8 8 
InMIR4S 5.2119 0.0429 0.6584 0.4844 0.5241 3.0151 1.3140 0.7814 0.9733 7 6 6 60 
R(UC) -1.8350 
. )1J = 55"1 "2.5425 -2.4567 -2.4924 -2.1810 1.8862_ -1 6457 1 1 1 1 
Critical value at the 5 per cent level of significance is -2.8906 
Table A6.3.1b : ADF Unit Root t-Tests (with constant and time trend) : Levels 
V arable 
0 12 3 
Aga 
4 5 6 7 8 A 
Lag Cnteria 
SH L 
InR(AAPR) -0.6713 -1.2451 -1.2131 -1.0796 -0.9301 -0.9670 -1.0945 -1.2768 -0.5929 1 1 1 0 
R(Rm) 2 0495 . 2.5623 . 2.5323 -2.7617 -2.0306 -2.1707 -2.6473 -22492 -1,9434 7 4 6 6 
InR(AAA(T) 
L, 6i3 -2.3973 -2.2172 -1.9181 -2.1079 -2.3576 -2.5342 -2.6138 "2.3754 1 1 1 1 
InZLVF -1.6498 -3.0892 =3 474 , 
2.7162 -2.7338 C3, J23S -3.3660 "2.8295 -2.3541 5 5 5 5 
InCOLLAT 4 O7 $ 3.4928 ., 63 
- 
3 





-2.6523 "2.6433 -2.5268 4 4 4 3 
InR(PAHM) . 0.9133 . 04 ß - , ,, 
9 "2. -2.5 . 2.5998 -2,8187 -2.4385 4 2 2 2 
InR(ALDO) -2.0653 . 2.2558 . 2.2632 "2.3184 . 2.1410 -2.1658 "2.1450 "2.1114 -2.0899 1 1 1 1 
WNFL . 2.1321 -2.5660 -2.6944 . 2.7908 "2.0635 -2.3546 "2,5611 . 2,5598 "1.8908 8 5 8 Bo InM1RAS 1.6526 -1.1783 -0.6120 ' 
-0.6805 -0.5750 1.3200 0.4899 0.2230 0.5103 6 6 6 6" 
R(UC) -29216 1 ""' $0 -i"ý0"`=fib 
.S b'"'""°-d: Sdý3 `ý'-' : 1375 " 3T1'ß""" a4$d"" ": 1: $404 ý{ 1 1 I 1 
Critical value at the 5 per cent level of significance is -3.4552 
' This is the first lag for which the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation in the residual series cannot be 
rejected. Under the null hypothesis the LM statistic will follow a X2 with 4 degrees of freedom; at the S 
per cent level of significance the critical value is 9.49. If serial correlation remains in the model for all lags of up to order 8, then the chosen lag length is that with the lowest LM test statistic and is indicated bya*. 
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Table A6.3.1c : ADF Unit Root t-Tests (with constant, no time trend) : Differences 
Variable 
0 1 2 3 
Lags 




























. 026 -9.0830 -7.7179 -5.6298 -4.2956 -3.6732 -3.3879 -3,6872 -3.6189, 0 0 0 0 
NnZLVF 629 . 4838 4,1854 3,1677 3.607$- 4 -3 7 0 7 5 A1nCOLL4T -1.5481 . 1.6977 -2.5532 -3.0955, -2,89104 -2.6100 -2.3195 -2.6770 -1.9567 8 3 3 2 
AInR(PAHM) = .4S' . 2.5260 
r-2,9473 
-3.8128 3.8961 -. 3.6450'- --3,1336 =3.6188 3 3 3 3 
AInR(ALDO) "76317 -4.6477 -5.1103 -4.1790 -3.8077 -3.6028 -3.3439 -2.9192 0 0 0 0 
AInINFL L,,, 
- -4.854 --L= -AIM. , -4.5956 
57 
 -3.1891 ---JXE 
8 4 8 7 






-3,1348 8 8 8 8" 
AR(UC) 's . 5.9718 ' -`- ý =S; S$3 -4.9249 -3.684 = -5. Ö 23 `r=5.3 5 -4.4276 2 1 2 0 
Critical value at the 5 per cent level of significance is -2.8909 
Table A6.3.1d : ADF Unit Root t-Tests (with constant and time trend) : Differences 
Variable 
0 1 2 3 
Lags 
4 5678 A 
Lag Criteria 
SH L 
GInR(AAPR) -7.6643 -6,2666 $, 6762: ' -5,4244 -4.7117 -3.9519 -3.3637 , 
4,. 2680 -1 -3.3516 0 0 0 0 
MR(Rm) -7,9420 =6,4065 , 
5.0344 -6.6677 -5.1038 3.6442 y fl' "" ': 4,4167 003 y 7 3 6 5 AInR(. 4AAU) -14.949 -9,0351 7,6766 -5,5994 -,: 
44 3, -3.6530 -3.3686 -3,6669 -3. $98 0 0 0 0 
AInZLVF IMAM tiu_ 
31.. 5 5095 4,8161 -3.2087 L: 3 , 6383 7 0 7 6 AInCOLL4T -1.4763 . 1.6739 -2.7379 -3.4563 -3.2738 2.9751 -2.6188 -3.2164 -2.3141 8 3 3 2 
NnR(PAHM) F -JOR "A -2.5824 -3.0123 . 
3.8895 -'f8 3.7441 -3.3350 "ý#: 72 1 -3.1869 3 3 3 3 
4S, IfR(ALDO) -7.7780 -IVfffr- =4 ß2Ö3 5.3604 -4.4298 -4.0809 3: (of2(I -3.6781 -3.2325 0 0 0 0 1,, ln! NFL -7.7857 -5,8787 4,9322 4.8676 4,6811 -3.8220 909 -4,7362 -3.3228 8 3 8 7 
AlnMJRAS -3.5129 4.1231 -3. Q48 -3,6557 -7.6531 -4,1355 -3.3898 -3.7552 7ß: b8 8 8 8 8" AR(UC) -5.3689 =5,9431 -6.1963 ' -5.5615 -4.9062 
91 
-5.0745 "= : ffs . 5.1435 -4.4397. 2 1 2 0 
Critical value at the 5 per cent level of significance is -3.4557 
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FIRST SUBSAMPLE PERIOD : 1969Q1-1983Q4 
Table A6.3.2a : ADF Unit Root t-Tests (with constant, no time trend) : Levels 
Variable 
0 1 2 3 
Lags 
4 5 6 7 8 A 
Lag Criteria 
SH L 
InR(AAPR) -1.7995 -2.5435 -2.7219 -2.1946 -2.1645 -2.2044 "2.2998 -2.3623 -2.1784 8 1 1 1 
R(Rm) -0.5850 -1.1779 . 1.2993 . 1.4473 -0.7614 -0.9758 -1.5625 -0.9513 -0.7340 7 1 1 1 
1nR(AAAL>) -2.0893 -2.0306 . 1.7778 -1.7023 1.7588 -1.8248 -1.8048 -1.7052 1 1 1 1 
InZLVF -0.9176 . 2.3687 -2.6118 . 2.0726 -2.151 6 -2.3100 -1.8272 5 1 5 5 InCOLL4T -1.9366 , 
S79r3. ÖÖ r, 7: ý -2.2785 . 2.1442 -2.1215 -2.1332 -2.0912 1.9789 4 3 3 3 
InR(PAXM) -2.2866 " i -4 
-: 504.; rs . 
$1Of " f2= A1 23 2 2 2 2 
InR(ALDO) -0.2276 -1.6014 -1.5306 -1.5647 -0.8908 -1.1223 . 1.2632 -1.2519 -0.9179 1 1 1 1 InINFL -0.4055 -1.3752 -1.5893 -1.5578 -1.2415 -1.5804 -1.5548 -1.4548 -1.0896 1 1 1 1 
InMIRAS -1.3343 -2.7088 -2.5182 -2.6312 -2.6627 -2.2200 -2.0759 -2.0275 -2.1171 7 5 7 7" 
R(UC) -1.3932 
=3"39661 
-2.7209 . 2.4694 -2.5644 . 2.5326 -2.1972 . 1.8062 -16201 1 1 1 1 
Critical value at the 5 per cent level of significance is -2.9190 
Table A6.3.2b : ADF Unit Root t-Tests (with constant and time trend) : Levels 
Variable 
0 12 3 
Lags 
4 56 7 8 A 
Lag Cntena 
SH L 
InR(AAPR) -2.0519 -3.0671 -3.4381 -2.8272 -2.8612 -3.0543 . 3.3836 ;, -2.7841 8 1 8 1 
R(Rm) -1.2697 -1.6887 -1.7540 -1.8527 -1.2299 -1.3094 -1.7628 -1.1442 -0.8821 7 1 1 1 InR(AAAU) . 7844 -2.2286 -2.2013 -1.7100 -1.5721 -1.8586 -2.1988 -2.3026 "2.2086 1 1 1 1 InZLVF -1.2430 -2.5257 . 2.7298 -2.1710 -2.1927 J$0.43 -3.0023 . 2.1909 -1.6577 5 1 5 5 InCOLLAT -1.7163 . 8431-3.2409 . 1.0835 -0.4716 -0.2793 -0.0073 ý -0.0625 -0.6208 4 3 3 3 InR(PAHM) -2.0733 =, Q4"]; ýý% -,: i, 1. 4ý . -3 
bäý"- i422w 
.. si, ß4lý 
; z$3 2 2 2 2 
InR(ALDO) -0.6432 -1.8492 -1.7285 -1.7189 -1.0136 -1.1719 -1.2625 -1.1922 -0.7774 1 1 1 1 InINFL -0.5088 . 1.3405 -1.4504 . 1.3420 -0.8744 -12114 -1.1102 -0.9196 -0.3624 1 1 I 1 1nMJRAS -0.2166 -2.7107 -2.4761 -2.7190 -2.8946 -0.6204 -0.7603 . 1.2404 -1.4625 7 5 7 7" 
R(UC) -2.2386 7&-" -3.3263 -2.9657 -2.6067 1 1 1 1 
Critical value at the 5 per cent level of significance is -3.4987 
Table A6.3.2c : ADF Unit Root t-Tests (with constant, no time trend) : Differences 
Variable Lags 
01234S67 8 A 
Laß Criteria 
SH L 
NnR(AAPR) : -4,8137 -4.0674 -,, -4.7932ý: F. 4.2938, -3.6439, . -33Q427J -2.7329 1-4.3533:. '. jA "" 
8 0 00 
AR(Rm) -2.3482 , 
¢ 2, q1 5.31 t 4.0787; '=ý3 3190 .4 2230 -3.3234 -2.4690 6 0 0 0 
AI nR(AAAU) 12,019', `"6.4887 5, -3.8367 '' -4.8079 '=t =3 4 40 ' -2.7006 -2.4905 -2.6369 -2.4065 0 0 0 0 
AI nZ1. ' -3.2338 > -2.2020 -2.6516 'F : 41-2.7490 7 0 0 0 
AInCOLL4T -0.9789 -1.3436 -2.2615 -3.0535 -2.7329 2.3170 "1.9489 -2.4772 -1.7849 3 2 2 2 
A1nR(PAHM) -2.1368 -1.8839 -2.4388 "-3.2297; -. 083o. 2,74]2,713 -2.5691 "2.6236 -2.3813 3 0 3 2 
AI nR(ALDO) 
1 1NF 
49 -3.5619 3,167 " -3.9342 "' -2.4998 -2.3525 -2.7061 X1 $488 50 3 2 7367 2 2 3941 -2.3079 
0 0 0 0 
n t L - . _, 
Q4 . . 8 - 4 . "2.3884 -2.9152 1 . 9661 0 0 0 0 A1nM/RAS -2.3090 -2.4072 -2.1903 -2.1088 =3 96 'ý-x'1883 -2.0033 "1.8143 3J 8 8 8 8 
MR(UC) -3.3731 `; ý-3.3940 
_ 
8264 1 0 1 0 
Critical value at the 5 per cent level of significance is -2.9202 
Table A6.3.2d : ADF Unit Root t-Tests (with constant and time trend) : Differences 
Variable Lags Lag Criteria 012345678ASHL 
AInR(AAPR) 1 -4.7480 '-4.0233 "r -}ßj5 -4.2555. . 3.59577 -2.9825 -2.6607 . 4. ao. §Q -2.9492 8070 AR(Rm) . 5.3155,. -4.1537 3.4024 -4.4¢]j-3.5379 -2.4691 -3.2151 -3.3457 -2.8143 6000 AInR(AA u) -12aOb " . 2.9226 -2.7266 . 2.8975 -2.6653 0000 AInZLVF . 3.1937 36287.1 3.3342 -2.2759 -2.7466 "3.4239 T: w-1 -2.9589 7000 AlnCOLLAT -1.8822 -2.2004 
ý- 
,. 
fl e, =- T-hjr , 
') Z -3.2976 196 7332 AlnR(PAHM) -2.1752 -1.9244 -2.4974 -3.3874 . 3.2801 -3.1955 -2.8001 . 2.8457 -2.6121 3332 t1nR(ALDO) i" ý52-3.3763 '7'i . 3.3331 -2.8385 -2.7163 -3.1665 . 2.7920 3000 Nn1NFL -2.9956 -2.8693 -2.9181 -3.3832 -2.4381 0000 Aln1NIRAS -2.6048 -2.7313 -2.5198 -2.4502 C2013: 1-: 00" 2.8197 -2.6584 ,; 
82 t8888 
AR(UC) -3.4274 r4, Ö24 'ß"" . o92s . 3: $Y8 "ä -3.4462 -3.7468 $269'""°3 ß2 "ä -3.2013 I110 Critical value at the 5 per cent level of significance is -3.5005 
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SECOND SUBSAMPLE PERIOD : 1984Q1-1995Q4 
Table A6.3.3a : ADF Unit Root t-Tests (with constant, no time trend) : Levels 
Variable 
0 1 2 3 
Lags 
4 5 6 7 8 A 
Lag Criteria 
SH L 
InR(AAPR) -0.1976 -0.5083 -0.4269 . 0.5315 -0.4324 -0.5359 -0.6367 -0.8281 -0.6069 0 0 0 0 
R(Rm) -2.7142 -2.0849 -2.1330 -2.4489 -2.4328 -2.0799 4 0 4 4 
InR(AAAU) -0.8415 -0.6412 -0.2203 -0.3753 -0.7492 -0.8590 -0.8699 -0.7597 -0.3606 4 0 0 0 
InZL'F -0.1503 -1.3866 -2.0783 -1.1707 -1.0803 . 1.6801 -1.6583 -1.7760 . 1.5712 5 1 5 3 
InCOLLAT 7, O -2.2339 -2.1374 -2.1435 -2.5193 -2.5727 -2.5916 -2.7386 MIL-40113 1 1 1 1 
Wt(PAHM) -1.8716 -1.8399 -2.2990 -2.3595 -2.1838 -2.0871 -2.1721 -2.2327 -1.8603 2 2 2 2 
InR(ALDO) -1.5189 -1.5606 -1.6524 -1.6386 . 1.9083 -1.7736 -1.7805 . 1.9215 -1.8649 0 0 0 0 
WNFL -1.1448 -1.2803 -1.2794 . 1.4204 -0.1541 -0.1556 -0.6144 -0.8844 -0.2002 8 0 8 6 
InMIRAS 4.2225 0.2486 0.9966 0.8445 0.9977 2.9792 1.3665 1.3501 1.6639 6 6 6 10 
R(UC) -16646 =`l". 8 -2.5381 -2.0527 -1.8632 -1.9604 -1.7848 -1.6436 -1.4340 1 1 1 1 
Critical value at the 5 per cent level of significance is -2.9228 
Table A6.3.3b : ADF Unit Root t-Tests (with constant and time trend) : Levels 
Variable 
0 1 2 3 
Lags 
4 5 6 7 8 A 
Lag Criteria 
SH L 
InR(AAPR) -1.7172 -1.7900 -1.6650 -1.6907 -1.5637 -1.5739 -1.5839 -1.6549 -1.4497 0 0 0 0 
R(Rm) -2.7865 . 3.3862 -3.0931 . 
21. -2.1815 -2.2146 -2.4910 . 2.4528 -2.0991 4 1 4 4 
InR(AAAU) -1.7523 . 1.5429 -1.1386 -1.2814 -1.6916 -1.8017 -1.8071 -1.6860 -1.3253 4 0 0 0 
InZLVF -0.2236 -1.0183 -1.8924 -0.3581 -0.0952 -1.2211 -1.2575 -1.4530 -1.3420 5 1 5 3 
InCOLLAT 0.7345 . 1.2989 -1.7001 -1.5915 -1.3615 -1.3452 -1.3457 . 1.4072 -1.5034 2 1 1 1 
InR(PAHM) -0.4393 -1.2694 -1.9670 -2.0490 . 1.7205 . 1.5007 -1.6394 -1.7746 -1.1666 2 2 2 2 
lnR(ALDO) -2.2489 -2.0414 . 1.7908 -1.7691 -1.5394 -1.5714 -1.5281 -1.4377 -1.4220 0 0 0 0 
In/NFL -1.7523 . 1.8808 -1.8563 -2.0183 -0.5024 -0.7554 -1.2323 -1.6539 -0.8469 8 0 8 8 
InMIRAS -0.6886 -2.0689 -1.4201 -1.5159 -1.3369 -0.1045 -0.9297 -0.8745 -0.5415 6 6 6 10 
R(UC) -19846 -3.5008 -3.0793 . 2.5782 -2.4028 -2.5537 . 2.3894 .2 2506 -2 0295 1 1 1 1 
Critical value at the 5 per cent level of significance is -3.5045 
Table A6.3.3c : ADF Unit Root t-Tests (with constant, no time trend) : Differences 
Variable Lags 




7008 44 5366 .3 
4560 ", '. 3.2233 " -2.6279 -2.2282 -1.7880 -1.9952 -1.5149 0 0 0 0 








3 3 3 3 
A1nR(AAAV) -65456 ; -4.0055 -2.5264 -2.1771 . 
7.5640 
L 
-2.0323 . 2.0602 , -2.4339 -2.3217 1 1 1 0 
A1nZLVF 93 -1.7899 "1.6948 "1.3166 -1.3821 -1.3154 4 0 2 2 
AInCOLLAT -1.2542 -0.8184 -0.8536 -1.1527 . 1.0713 . 0.9460 -0.8985 -1.2491 -0.6681 0 0 0 0 
A]nR(PAHM) -2.8326 . 1.6467 -1.5519 -1.7877 -1.8803 "ý -1.6671 -1.5209 . 
1.8875 . 1.5509 1 1 1 1 









M: 9(3 -2.3895 
.1 4371 2 6256 
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. . . . , " 7 . . . . . 
8 8 00 
AR(UCI W` , r7 7 i3 k :T *' "T - ý. g 
"-3.4942 =ý A n 
Critical value at the 5 per cent level of significance is -2.9228 




5 6 7 8 A 
Lag Criteria 
SH L 
A1nR(AAPR) . 6.0966 -5.0353 ` -, 3 ,, . 9793,, v, 4.8113-, 4 -3.2333 -2.8499 -2.3881 -2.7899 -2.1657 0 0 0 0 AR(Rm) . 6.0955 5; 3484 -3.9939 -3.2345 -3.0192 -3.4940 -3.3162 3 3 3 3 AInR(AAAU) -7.5960 -6,6450 -4,11462.6381 -2.2992 -2.1682 "2.2272 -2.6917 -2.6234 1 1 1 0 NnZLVF 116 
. -2.0807 -1.9572 -1.5213 -1.6577 "1.2989 4 2 2 2 AlnCOLLAT -2.1424 -1.6845 -1.7527 . 2.3008 -2.3301 . 2.2978 -2.4069 -3.2700 . 2.3806 0 0 0 0 NnR(PAHM) -3.2549 -1.9823 -1.8943 -2.2042 -2.3638 -2.1550 . 2.0087 -2.3774 -2.0749 1 1 1 0 A1nR(ALDO) igf 16 . bO11 -3.4955 -3.1512 -3.1734 -2.8010 .2 1891 0 0 0 0 AIn1NFL j 55 ß, A, $0 -3.0645 -2.6030 -3 3993 
. 
-2 5617 8 3 8 AInMIRAS -2.4423 -3.2673 . 2.823.2.9844-- :, --40-4j ' """= ""°° "2.8457 -2.7331 
. 
-2.9544 
. gýj 8 8 8 
6 
8 8R(UC) ice. 3813 a39b0' 4. l f r--r"-4 . 3.4607 . 3.3921 -3.3000 -3.3367 -29639 2 0 0 0 Critical value at the 5 per cent level of significance is -3.5045 
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Where the findings presented in the tables above suggest either that a variable in 
levels is stationary or its first difference is non-stationary, this will obviously cause 
problems for the inclusion of the relevant variable in levels in a cointegrating 
relationship. In such cases, additional ADF F-tests are undertaken (see Section 
4.3.3.1 of Chapter 4 for a discussion of the F-test) for the joint significance of both the 
lagged dependent variable and the deterministic time trend in the ADF regressions. 
However, with very few exceptions, the results appear to confirm the results of the t- 
tests presented above. 
As a final check, Phillips-Perron (PP) tests are computed only for those variables for 
which the optimal lag choice suggests that either its level is stationary or its difference 
non-stationary. For the whole sample period, PP tests2 (conducted using lags of up to 
order 8) indicate that the variables InZLVF, 1nR(PAHM) and R(UC) are non-stationary 
(as required). However, according to the PP tests the first difference in the variable 
1nCOLLAT is non-stationary suggesting that 1nCOLLAT could be integrated of order 2 
or higher. 
For the first subsample period, PP tests suggest that the variables InZLVF, 1nR(PAHM) 
and R(UC) are non-stationary as expected, but that the first differences of 1nCOLLAT 
and 1nR(PAHM) are non-stationary (possibly suggesting integration of order 2 in the 
level series). Finally, for the second subsample period, PP tests suggest that R(UC) is 
non-stationary as required. The first difference in the variable InCOLLAT appears 
non-stationary, the first difference in 1nINFL is stationary, O1nMIRAS is stationary at 
the 10 per cent level (when the Akaike, Schwartz or Hannan-Quinn criteria are used to 
determine the optimal lag length) and the first difference in 1nR(PAHM) is non- 
stationary for lags 1-4 and stationary for lags 5-8. Given that the highest significant 
lag order from either the autocorrelation or partial autocorrelation function is fairly 
low, one could argue that the first difference in 1nR(PAHM) is non-stationary (again 
suggesting integration of order 2 in the level series). 
2 Phillips-Perron F-tests are conducted for the joint significance of the lagged dependent variable and a time trend, and t-tests are conducted for regressions which include a constant, and a constant and time trend. The output results are lengthy and thus are omitted from the appendix. 
416 
From the above discussion of the ADF and PP unit root F and t-tests, it is reasonable 
to conclude that all of the level variables are 1(1) with the exceptions of 1nCOLLAT 
and 1nR(PAHM) which, the results suggest, are integrated of at least order 2 since their 
differences are found to be non-stationary. Graphical evidence on both of these 
variables is presented below. If the autocorrelation function of a variable declines 
quickly as the lag length (k) rises then the variable will most likely be stationary (in 
fact an autocorrelation function declining geometrically to zero will be strong 
evidence for stationarity). The evidence presented below would tend to suggest that 
first differences of these series are 1(0) (rather than non-stationary as the formal tests 
suggest), allowing us to conclude that the level series are indeed integrated of order 1. 
Figure A6.3.1 : Autocorrelation Functions of Variables with Unclear ADF Tests 
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 7 
APPENDIX 7.1 : LM TESTS FOR RESIDUAL SERIAL CORRELATION OF 
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